2017] REINTERPRETING JAPAN'S WAR POWERS 429
III. THE REINTERPRETATION, INFORMAL AMENDMENT,
AND LEGITIMACY............................................................... 489
A. The Reinterpretation as Normal Interpretive Move ............ 490
B. The Reinterpretation as Informal Amendment ................... 502
C. Clarifying the Contours of Legitimacy ............................... 506
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 520
INTRODUCTION
There is a vibrant debate in American constitutional law
scholarship regarding the existence, nature, and legitimacy of so-
called informal amendments.
1
The definition of the concept of
“informal amendment” is itself an important subject in the debate, but
we may start with the idea that the term refers to a form of significant
change to the understanding and operation of a constitutional
provision that is neither a formal amendment nor a normal
1. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998);
Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) >
26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change [hereinafter Levinson,
How Many Times Has the United States Constitutions Been Amended?], in R
ESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 13 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter R
ESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION]; Akhil Reed Amar, Popular
Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in R
ESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 89; Stephen
Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to Politics, in R
ESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION 37; Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
R
ESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 237 [hereinafter Lutz, Toward a Theory - Responding to
Imperfection]; David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in R
ESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION 117; Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional
Revision in Eastern Europe, in R
ESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 275; Jack M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 V
A. L. REV. 1045 (2001);
Z
ACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS (2009); Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165
(2014); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Y
ALE L. J. 408
(2007); Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 T
ENN.
L. REV. 155 (1997); Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional
Amendments: A Response to Strauss, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 247 (2002); Rosalind Dixon, Updating
Constitutional Rules, 8 S
UP. CT. REV. 319 (2009); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of
Constitutional Amendments, 114 H
ARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. &
JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010);
Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 Y
ALE L. J. 2576 (2014); Richard
Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 1029,
1062 (2014); Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical
Response to Our Democratic Constitution, 55 D
RAKE L. REV. 925 (2007).