JUVENILE MIRANDA RIGHTS

Joey L. Caccarozzo

Legal Division Intern

This article will discuss a

juvenile’s Miranda rights, what constitutes

a valid waiver of those rights, and what

officers must do to make sure a juvenile’s

confession will not be suppressed in court.

BACKGROUND

Before the twentieth century,

juveniles were treated and sentenced as

adults. It was not until the

Industrialization Era that society

developed the parens patriae concept, that

the state could intervene to protect a

child’s welfare.

The juvenile court that

developed in the 1900’s was very different

from the adult court by having informal

proceedings, proceedings based on civil

law, closed proceedings, emphasis on

helping the child, and lack of jury trials.

The juvenile court system

remained virtually unchanged until the

Supreme Court decision, In Re Gault in

1967

which held that the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

applied to juvenile court proceedings. The

opinion states that juveniles have 1) a right

to notice, 2) a right to counsel, 3) a right to

confront witnesses, and 4) a privilege

against self-incrimination in hearings that

could result in them being confined to an

institution.

The juvenile’s right to notice

includes being advised in a timely manner

David W. Neubauer, America’s Courts and the

Criminal Justice System (6

ed., West/Wadsworth

1998).

Id.

In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

of the charges against them and notice to

parents when their child has been taken

into custody. Juveniles have the right to

have an attorney present during all phases

of the proceedings. If they cannot afford

an attorney, one will be appointed for

them.

Juveniles have the right to cross-

examine witnesses. Finally, the Court

extended the Miranda decision to apply to

juveniles as well as adults.

REQUIREMENTS

FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

ACT 18 USC § 5033

Custody prior to appearance before

magistrate.

Whenever a juvenile is taken

into custody for an alleged

act of juvenile delinquency,

the arresting officer shall

immediately advise such

juvenile of his legal rights, in

language comprehensive to a

juvenile, and shall

immediately notify the

Attorney General and the

juvenile’s parents, guardian,

or custodian of such custody.

The arresting officer shall

also notify the parents,

guardian, or custodian of the

rights of the juvenile and of

the nature of the alleged

offense.

The juvenile shall be taken

before a magistrate

forthwith. In no event shall

the juvenile be detained for

longer than a reasonable

period of time before being

brought before a magistrate.

Id. at 41.

In Fare v. Michael C., The Supreme Court

ruled that a totality of the circumstances

test is adequate to determine a valid

waiver of rights during an interrogation of

a juvenile.

The court must look to all

circumstances surrounding the

interrogation. Some factors to consider

are the juvenile’s age, education,

experience, intelligence, background, and

whether the juvenile understands the

warnings given and the consequences of

waiving those rights.

In this case, the

juvenile was 16 ½, was currently on

probation, had a record of prior offenses,

had spent time in a youth corrections

camp, was of average intelligence, and

there was no coercion used. Therefore,

under the totality of the circumstances, the

juvenile voluntarily waived his rights and

the confession was admitted.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

uses a three-part test for reviewing

Juvenile Delinquency Act violations.

First, the Court asks whether the

government violated § 5033.

If the

answer is yes, the next question is whether

the government’s conduct was so

outrageous that it deprived the juvenile of

their due process rights.

If the answer to

the second question is yes, then the case is

reversed.

Even if the answer is no, the

court also has discretion to reverse the

case if the defendant was “prejudiced.”

The Ninth Circuit uses a two-step test to

determine prejudice – 1) was the § 5033

violation a cause of the confession

(isolation from family, lack of advice from

counsel, etc.) and 2) what was the

Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).

Id. at 725.

U.S. v. Juvenile (RRA-A), 229 F.3d 737 (9

Cir.

2000).

Id. at 744.

prejudice caused by the confession.

For

example, was the prosecution and

conviction based primarily on the

confession?

SCOPE

The State must make a good faith effort

to locate a juvenile’s parents or

guardian before beginning questioning.

In the case U.S. v. Burrous, the

defendant was arrested for armed

robbery.

One of the arresting agents

asked the defendant three different times

how his parents or guardian could be

contacted and the defendant replied that he

did not know how either his mother,

father, or brother could be contacted. The

defendant did not give the agents enough

information to locate his relatives and he

did not attempt to contact anyone himself.

The defendant voluntarily waived his

Miranda rights and confessed. The court

ruled that law enforcement officers made

good faith efforts to locate juvenile’s

parents and that his confession was

admissible.

A juvenile’s parents or guardian must

be advised of the juvenile’s rights

immediately, according to §5033.

In U.S. v. John Doe, the court said

that even though the agents attempted to

notify the juvenile’s parents before they

began to question him, it was three and a

half hours after he was taken into custody

and, therefore, not “immediate” under §

5033.

Id. at 747.

147 F.3d 111 (2

Cir. 1998).

Id. at 113.

219 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9

Cir. 2000).

The arresting officer has the

responsibility to notify parents or

guardians that the juvenile is in

custody.

In U.S. v. Juvenile (RRA-A), the

arresting officer twice delegated his job of

notifying a juvenile’s parents or consulate

- first to an AUSA and second to a

secretary in the United States Attorney’s

office.

(The juvenile was a foreign

national whose parents were not in the

United States. Therefore, the appropriate

consulate should have been contacted.)

The arresting officer must comply with §

5033 unless there are extenuating

circumstances.

This type of violation

alone will not result in reversal, because it

is not considered a due process violation.

In this case, because the officer delegated

his duties and the consulate was not

contacted before the interrogation and the

court ruled that these § 5033 violations

were prejudicial. The juvenile’s confession

was suppressed.

A juvenile must be brought before a

magistrate “forthwith,” according to §

5033.

The Ninth Circuit held that a 34-

hour delay was reasonable where no

magistrate judge was available, the agents

were busy with other urgent cases, and the

government agreed not to use the pre-

arraignment statement of the juvenile.

A 31-hour delay caused by a U.S.

Marshal policy that only accepted juvenile

prisoners at the courthouse between 7:00

and 8:00 a.m. was ruled “prejudicial.”

229 F.3d 737 (9

Cir. 2000).

Id. at 745.

Id. at 747.

U.S. v. Doe, 701 F.2d 819, 824 (9

Cir. 1983).

U.S. v. John Doe, 219 F.3d 1009 (9

Cir. 2000).

Because the policy assured that the

arraignment of a juvenile would be

delayed longer than a “similarly situated

adult,”

it violated § 5033 and would not

be considered an extenuating

circumstance.

A juvenile’s confession was considered

voluntary when his will was overborne

by his mother, not by police officers,

after he invoked his right to silence.

Officers ceased questioning a

juvenile after the juvenile invoked his

right to silence. The juvenile’s mother

convinced him to talk freely with the

officer, which lead to his confession. The

juvenile’s parents were present during the

interrogation and the law enforcement

officer did not use any coercion to get the

juvenile to confess. The juvenile’s

confession was deemed voluntary by the

Tenth Circuit.

A juvenile’s request for counsel and

right to remain silent should be asserted

in a clear manner.

In Fare v. Michael C., after the

juvenile was read his Miranda rights, he

asked to speak to his probation officer.

The officers refused and the juvenile was

again read his rights. This time he agreed

to speak without an attorney present. A

probation officer is duty bound to report

the juvenile if the juvenile gets into

trouble. Because of this a conflict of

interest, the probation officer does not

represent the juvenile in the same sense as

an attorney.

There is no right to a

Id. at 1013.

Id. at 1014.

U.S. v. Erving L., 147 F. 3d 1240 (10

Cir.

1998).

442 U.S. 707 (1979).

Id. at 720.

probation officer during questioning; nor

does such a request constitute an

invocation of the right to remain silent.

The juvenile never requested an attorney.

Based on the taped interrogation, using the

totality of the circumstances test, the Court

decided that the juvenile clearly waived

his Miranda rights.

CONCLUSION

Once a juvenile is in custody, the

arresting officer must make a good faith

effort to notify the juvenile’s parents or

guardian to tell them that the child has

been taken into custody, what offense the

child was accused of committing and the

juvenile’s Miranda rights. A juvenile’s

Miranda rights must be given in a

language that the juvenile can understand.

The confession must also be otherwise

voluntary. If the juvenile requests an

attorney or invokes his/her right to remain

silent, the interrogation must stop

immediately. The juvenile must appear

before a magistrate “forthwith.” If the

juvenile is not afforded these due process

rights, the confession may be suppressed.