THE REPLACEMENTS a
SEPTEMBER 2020
WHY AND HOW “ACTING” OFFICIALS ARE MAKING SENATE CONFIRMATION OBSOLETE
THE REPLACEMENTS
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Case Studies in
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THE REPLACEMENTS 1
The report includes specific recommendations to
address the prevalence of temporary ocials, fix broken
processes and improve accountability:
The Senate must reassert its constitutional authority
to provide advice and consent on executive branch
nominations.
Congress should require more transparency around
vacant positions subject to advice and consent.
The Senate should reduce the number of presiden-
tial appointments subject to Senate confirmation
and should revisit the “privileged nominations”
process.
The executive and legislative branches should invest
the time, resources and processes necessary to
support the nomination and confirmation of well-
qualified nominees.
The extensive use of acting ocials and the ease with
which a president can sidestep the confirmation process
should serve as a wake-up call to senators of both parties.
For the government to be fully accountable to the people
it serves, the laws and processes that guide the use and
disclosure of temporary and acting ocials need to be
reconsidered.
The Constitution vests responsibility for filling federal
leadership positions in both the president and the Senate
— the president nominates ocials for key posts, and the
Senate provides “advice and consent.” But in recent years,
presidents have found it increasingly easy to sidestep this
process altogether and to install temporary, “acting” of-
ficials in place of Senate-confirmed leaders.
All presidents have used acting ocials on a tem-
porary basis to fill some of the more than 1200 posi-
tions subject to Senate confirmation, but the executive’s
use of acting ocials has increased in recent years. The
Trump administration has utilized more acting ocials
than other recent presidents and found numerous ways
around the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and other laws
intended to constrain the use of temporary appointees.
Ambiguities in the laws governing the use of acting o-
cials, processes based on norms rather than rules, lack of
transparency into personnel decisions and political pit-
falls risk making the Senate irrelevant in filling positions
across government.
This report examines the prevalence of vacancies
and temporary ocials in Senate-confirmed positions,
the use of acting ocials and the reasons the nomination
and confirmation process has broken down. Through five
case studies of positions that have recently been without
Senate-confirmed ocials, the report oers key insights:
There is little downside or consequence for an
administration to sidestep the Senate with a tempo-
rary appointment.
The laws governing the use of temporary ocials are
ambiguous and hard to enforce.
Some vacancies are intended to reflect an adminis-
tration’s policies.
The Senate often contributes to, or even causes,
vacancies in key positions in order to achieve politi-
cal objectives.
Some agencies operate eectively with career leaders
in lieu of political appointees.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
INTRODUCTION
the law and competing statutes enable presidents to find
alternative and sometimes creative methods.
Even identifying who is acting in the role of a Sen-
ate-confirmed appointee can be dicult. While some
people are given the ocial title of “acting,” others are
declared to be “performing the duties of” or given some
other moniker. The reasons for the various titles are not
always clear, but a change in terminology often signals an
individual is continuing to perform an acting role after
the time limits of the vacancies act have expired, thereby
circumventing specific provisions in the law that define
who may serve as an acting leader and for how long. (For
the purposes of this report, all temporary ocials are re-
ferred to as acting ocials even when some of them have
varying titles.)
A recent finding by the Government Accountability
Oce has challenged the Trump administration’s applica-
tion of current law in designating acting leaders and con-
cluded that the appointments of Chad Wolf, acting sec-
retary of the Department of Homeland Security, and Ken
Cuccinelli, his acting deputy, did not follow the process as
defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which es-
tablishes the DHS line of succession.
5
Although the impact
of GAO’s finding on the current and future administrations
is unclear, it may have caught the attention of the presi-
dent. On Aug. 25, 2020, Trump announced via Twitter that
he would nominate Wolf to be the secretary of DHS.
While many acting and unconfirmed leaders are ex-
perienced and capable, their temporary nature can limit
long-term planning and erode employee morale. For
some agencies, the lack of a Senate-confirmed person in
a leadership role may have little negative impact on the
day-to-day operations. Yet extended management by
those who are not Senate-confirmed can decrease trans-
parency in how decisions are made.
Some critics charge that presidents also use tempo-
rary ocials to circumvent the Senate’s advice-and-con-
sent role and appoint individuals who might not other-
wise be confirmed.
5 Randolph Walerius and Tanvi Misra, “GAO says Wolf, Cuccinelli
appointments at HS invalid,” Roll Call, Aug. 14, 2020. Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/3kSI1u5
One of the most important tasks for any president is to fill
more than 1,200 politically appointed government posi-
tions needing Senate confirmation. Presidents use tem-
porary ocials — often referred to as “acting” ocials
— on an interim basis pending the selection, nomination
and confirmation of a Senate-confirmed appointee. This
reliance on acting ocials has become more prevalent in
recent years, and in some positions, an acting ocial is
now the norm rather than the exception.
President Donald Trump has expressed a pref-
erence for temporary appointees because of the per-
ceived flexibility to move or reassign them, a perspec-
tive not expressed by his predecessors.
1
Even Trump’s
third White House chief of sta, Mick Mulvaney —
though not in a Senate-confirmed position — carried
the “acting” qualifier for his entire 15-month tenure.
Presidential preference, however, is far from the only
reason many key federal positions remain vacant or are
filled by a temporary ocial. The Senate’s confirmation
process is challenging and takes twice as long today as
it did during President Ronald Reagan’s administration.
2
Increased partisanship and a dicult vetting process are
also contributing factors. Some positions are left vacant
for policy reasons while others have been a challenge to
fill for multiple presidents.
So how do presidents fill positions in the absence of
Senate-confirmed appointees?
Since the first term of President George Washington,
Congress has given the president limited authority to
appoint acting ocials to perform the duties temporar-
ily — without Senate approval — of a vacant oce that is
required to be filled with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
3
The most recent iteration of the law, the Federal
Vacancies Reform Act of 1998,
4
spells out the procedures
used to appoint acting ocials, although ambiguities in
1 Amanda Becker, “Trump says acting Cabinet members give him ‘more
flexibility,’” Reuters, Jan. 6, 2019. Retrieved from https://reut.rs/2VyaoAY
2 Partnership for Public Service, “Senate Confirmation Process Slows
to a Crawl,” January 2020. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3b2vEFS
3 For a history of laws governing vacancies, see the Supreme Courts
decision in NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 2017.
4 Pub. L. No. 105 -277, Div. C, tit. 1, §151, 112 Stat. 2681-611-16, codified
at 5 U.S.C.§3345-3349d.
THE REPLACEMENTS 3
WHY VACANCIES
MATTER
Acting ocials — even if they are seasoned and
highly regarded individuals — often lack the
perceived authority that accompanies Senate
confirmation.
Many acting ocials do not feel like it is their place
to make long-term policy or operational and manage-
ment decisions that will bind their successors.
Thad Allen, former commandant of the Coast Guard,
said, “People who are in an acting capacity feel they do
not have the power to make long-term changes and do
what they need to do.
7
In some ways, acting ocials are like substitute
teachers — they may be skilled professionals who have
much to oer the students, but they are not perceived
by those around them as having the full authority of the
teacher, and they do not view themselves as having the
right to make decisions with long-term impact.
“To eectively lead an agency, you need as much
authority and gravitas as you can muster,” Robert Bon-
ner told The Wall Street Journal.
8
Bonner, who was con-
firmed by the Senate to lead both the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion agency, added, “If you’re not a confirmed head of an
agency … you’re not going to be able to command as much
respect and attention from your own people and from
other agencies whose cooperation is important.
Observers have posited the Trump administration,
frustrated by historic and unremitting delays in the Sen-
ate’s consideration of its nominees, has pursued a strat-
egy of relying on acting ocials. Ken Cuccinelli, who has
served in multiple senior positions under Trump, told Fox
News, “The Trump administration has been somewhat
frustrated with how long it takes to get people through
the Senate … So they’ve had to use … these alternatives
that are legal, they’re just less preferential to getting a full
Senate appointment.
9
7 Partnership for Public Service, “Government Disservice: Over-
coming Washington Dysfunction to Improve Congressional Stew-
ardship of the Executive Branch,” September 2015. Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/2ypo1vS
8 Byron Tau, “Half of 10 Biggest Federal Law Agencies Lack Perma-
nent Chiefs,” The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2019. Retrieved from
https://on.wsj.com/2Wwzkua
9 “Ken Cuccinelli reacts to judge ruling he was unlawfully appointed
In June 2020, for example, Trump nominated re-
tired general ocer Anthony Tata to serve as the under-
secretary of defense for policy. Tata was a controversial
nominee due in part to findings of misconduct while in
uniform and for controversial public comments he made
after his service. When it was clear by August that Tata’s
nomination would not be approved by the Senate Armed
Services Committee due to concerns on both sides of the
aisle, the White House withdrew his nomination and
designated him as “the ocial performing the duties of
the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.” That
role eectively made him the first assistant to Acting Un-
dersecretary of Defense for Policy James Anderson and
thus eligible to replace Anderson if the administration so
chooses. The move drew furious criticism from Senate
Democrats, including the senior Democrat on the Armed
Services Committee, Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., who called
it, “a flagrant end run around the confirmation process.
6
This report oers insights into the use of temporary
ocials, the consequences and the need for reform. In
addition to quantifying the extent of their use, the report
includes five case studies that illustrate unique and com-
plex circumstances that surround specific positions. The
report concludes by oering recommendations to clarify
the rules governing acting ocials, reduce the frequency
of temporary leaders and promote a government that is
well-served by committed appointees working on behalf
of the American people.
6 Aaron Mehta, “Controversial nominee Tata appointed to a top de-
fense job, bypassing Congress,” Defense News, Aug. 2, 2020. Retrieved
from https://bit.ly/32wG6mq
4 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
Members of Congress from both parties have de-
cried the lack of Senate-confirmed appointees and re-
sulting reliance on temporary ocials. “It’s a lot. It’s way
too many,” said Sen. James Lankford, R-Okla., about the
number of acting ocials in Cabinet agencies in 2019.
10
“You want to have confirmed individuals there because
they have a lot more authority to be able to make deci-
sions and implement policy when you have a confirmed
person in that spot.” Sen. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn.,
speaking on the Senate floor, said, “The American people
deserve qualified nominees, and it is our job to ensure we
take the time and care necessary to confirm people who
will serve their country with distinction.
11
“Make no mistake — the ongoing vacancies and lack
of steady leadership have consequences, especially at a
time like this,” stated Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss.,
this past March.
12
“For example, since 9/11, the federal
government has invested heavily in developing doctrine
to define roles and responsibilities for incident response.
But no one in the administration seems to be familiar
with them. As Americans face a potential coronavirus
pandemic, the administration appears to be caught flat-
footed, scrambling to figure out who is in charge.
But the political parties diverge on the reason for the
slow pace of confirmations. Lankford successfully cham-
pioned a change to reduce the hours of debate required
for most nominations, limiting the ability of senators
to slow the confirmation of nominees.
13
Klobuchar and
other Senate Democrats opposed the change; Klobuchar
said it would “remove important checks and balances” at
a time when “we also know that we are getting a slew of
unqualified nominees.
14
Nominations continue to be a
partisan flashpoint, leaving acting ocials in charge for
extended periods despite the changes intended to ad-
vance nominees through the process more quickly.
to lead U.S. immigration agency,” Fox News, March 2, 2020. Retrieved
from https://bit.ly/3d5Q6Xa
10 Juliet Eilperin, Josh Dawsey and Seung Min Kim, “‘It’s way too
many’: As vacancies pile up in Trump administration, senators grow
concerned,” The Washington Post, Feb. 4, 2019. Retrieved from https://
wapo.st/2Ztytgu
11 Sen. Amy Klobuchar, “On the Senate Floor, Klobuchar Fights to En-
sure Nominees to Federal Bench and Executive Branch Are Fully Vet-
ted,” April 2, 2019. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3g8s2p4
12 “Statement of Rep. Bennie Thompson.” Hearing on “A Review of
the Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for the Department of Homeland
Security,” House Committee on Homeland Security, March 3, 2020. Re-
trieved from https://bit.ly/3gzyqFV
13 Sen. James Lankford, “Senator Lankford Discusses His Nomina-
tions Rules Change Proposal on Senate Floor,” April 2, 2019. Retrieved
from https://bit.ly/3g4lzvj
14 Sen. Amy Klobuchar, “On the Senate Floor, Klobuchar Fights to En-
sure Nominees to Federal Bench and Executive Branch Are Fully Vet-
ted,” April 2, 2019. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3g8s2p4
Many acting ocials are asked to perform multiple
jobs at the same time, dividing their attention and
increasing their responsibilities.
Leadership positions are demanding jobs that require a
great amount of time and attention. Yet when a person
is given the responsibilities of multiple positions, it be-
comes more dicult to eectively perform the full duties
of each role. This “dual-hatting” has occurred numerous
times in recent years. For example, in June 2019, Gail En-
nis was appointed to serve temporarily as the inspector
general for the Department of the Interior while serving
simultaneously as the inspector general for the Social
Security Administration.
15
This meant that for about two
months, Ennis was the inspector general for two agen-
cies at the same time. Margaret Weichert, already the
deputy director for management at the Oce of Manage-
ment and Budget, was simultaneously dual-hatted as the
acting director of the Oce of Personnel Management, a
role she filled from October 2018 until September 2019.
16
In a few instances, ocials have performed three
jobs simultaneously. William Todd was named acting un-
dersecretary for management at the Department of State
in February 2018. For about a year, Todd also served as
acting director general of the foreign service/director of
human resources in addition to maintaining his ocial
position of deputy undersecretary for management.
17
The use of temporary ocials can complicate and
even invite legal challenges to government action.
When a person or group sues the federal government, the
fact that an acting ocial was involved in the decision
can be used as a legal objection. For example, in Novem-
ber 2018, the state of Maryland questioned the method
by which Matthew Whitaker was appointed acting attor-
ney general.
18
A month later, the issue was raised again
as Whitaker contemplated a rule change to ban the use
of bump stocks in semiautomatic rifles. Senior Justice
Department lawyers advised Whitaker against signing
such a change because a legal challenge to how he was
appointed might be used in court.
19
In fact, at least five
federal lawsuits were filed and a central argument to
15 Miranda Green, “Trump appoints Social Security Administration
watchdog to also oversee Interior,” The Hill, June 10, 2019. Retrieved
from https://bit.ly/32kSrf7
16 Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, “Dale Cabaniss confirmed as OPM direc-
tor,” fedscoop, Sept. 11, 2019. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/30OUzJD
17 U.S. Department of State, “William E. Todd.” Retrieved June 25,
2020, from https://bit.ly/3dpI4sF
18 Ann E. Marimow, “Maryland challenges legality of Whitaker’s ap-
pointment as acting U.S. attorney general,” The Washington Post, Nov.
13, 2018. Retrieved from https://wapo.st/3acUofr
19 Devlin Barrett, “Senior Justice Dept. ocials told Whitaker sign-
ing gun regulation might prompt successful challenge to his ap-
pointment,” The Washington Post, Dec. 21, 2018. Retrieved from
https://wapo.st/2E4XhDn
THE REPLACEMENTS 5
several cases involved objections to Whitaker’s status.
20
Although the legal challenges were eventually dismissed,
the fact that such a rule change was made by an ocial
who was not confirmed by the Senate provided addi-
tional obstacles for the government to defend its actions.
In another instance of legal uncertainty, the Oce of
Personnel Management’s inspector general found in 2016
Beth Cobert could no longer serve as OPM acting direc-
tor after she was formally nominated for the same posi-
tion, and thus her decisions since the date of her nomi-
nation were void. The inspector general disagreed with
the Justice Department’s view that her acting status was
permissible under the vacancies act.
21
Similarly, the Government Accountability Oce de-
cision in August 2020 that the Trump administration im-
properly appointed two top ocials at the Department
of Homeland Security might contribute to future legal
challenges. Immigrant advocacy groups have challenged
the White House’s policies by arguing the ocials who
20 Nick Penzenstadler, “Judge says ban on rapid-fire ‘bump stocks’ can
go forward, rejects challenge to new rules,” USA Today, Feb. 26, 2019.
Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2ZKsGmL
21 Eric Yoder and Joe Davidson, “OPM director nominee can’t serve as
acting agency head, inspector general says,” The Washington Post, Feb.
17, 2016. Retrieved from https://wapo.st/2DD8Pxd
implemented such initiatives lacked proper legal author-
ity to do so.
22
The GAO ruling will likely lead to more liti-
gation on the subject.
The use of temporary ocials in ways that are not
clearly explained in the vacancies law can create a set
of legal complications and complicate the government’s
defense against lawsuits. “The Senate confirmation pro-
cess puts that issue to rest,” said Bob Rizzi, a lawyer who
has guided political appointees through the confirmation
process. Having a permanent ocial “blesses the legiti-
macy of the person in that oce.
22 Erica Werner and Nick Miro, “Top DHS ocials Wolf and Cucci-
nelli are not legally eligible to serve in their current roles, GAO finds,” The
Washington Post, Aug. 14, 2020. Retrieved from https://wapo.st/314etBZ
LAWS GOVERNING THE USE OF ACTING OFFICIALS: THE FEDERAL VACANCIES REFORM ACT
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 updated the law specifying how a government employee may temporarily perform the du-
ties of a vacant position in an executive agency that is subject to Senate confirmation.
23
While the legislative history acknowledges that
some positions are subject to separate statutes regarding succession, the act is intended to provide the general framework for the vast
majority of Senate-confirmed positions and creates a time limit for service of acting ocials.
24
The cap is generally 210 days, although
it increases to 300 days for vacancies at the beginning of a president’s first term. The time limits are paused while a nomination for the
position is pending in the Senate. The legislation was intended to encourage administrations to nominate qualified people in a timely
manner without undermining the Senate’s advice-and-consent role.
The law provides for three classes of people who may carry out the duties of the oce without Senate confirmation: the first assistant
to the vacant position, an ocial in any other Senate-confirmed position or a senior ocer within that agency.
Once the time limit for a temporary ocial is reached, the law states the position is vacated and the duties vested in that position are
delegated to the head of the agency. However, the law is not specific on who performs the duties of the agency head when that position
is vacant and the act’s time limit on an acting ocial is reached.
The law is intended to give presidents considerable flexibility in filling vacant positions. Yet, the gray areas of the law and diculties
enforcing time limits have given presidents considerable latitude in filling positions.
23 Partnership for Public Service, “The Vacancies Act: Frequently Asked Questions,” Nov. 1, 2017. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3bJyocY
24 “Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998,” 5 U.S.C. § 3345 et seq.
6 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
THE PREVALENCE OF VACANCIES IN
SENATE-CONFIRMED POSITIONS AND
THE APPROACHES TO FILLING THEM
of Senate-confirmed appointees. Filling open positions,
particularly those requiring congressional approval, is a
multistep process that has been governed by norms, re-
quirements and laws.
The prevalence of temporary ocials in the Trump
administration goes beyond the Cabinet and exists
throughout the executive branch. As of Aug. 17, 2020,
only 70% of 757 key Senate-confirmed positions tracked
by the Partnership for Public Service and The Washing-
ton Post were filled with confirmed ocials. The remain-
ing 30% were either vacant or filled by an acting ocial.
27
Vacancies have been evident throughout many key
departments. As of Aug. 17, eight of the 15 Cabinet-level
agencies were without Senate-confirmed appointees for
27 Current data is available at the database maintained by the Part-
nership for Public Service and The Washington Post located at
https://wapo.st/3fygtr6
From the earliest days of the republic, presidents have
used acting ocials to fill important federal positions and
vacancies. In the two terms of the most recent presidents,
Barack Obama had 14 acting ocials serve as Cabinet sec-
retaries while George W. Bush had 13 and Bill Clinton 11.
25
Trump has used many more acting ocials. In his
Cabinet, Trump had more acting ocials in his first three
years (27) than each of the previous five presidents had
during their entire presidencies.
26
The preceding five ad-
ministrations used an average of about seven acting Cabi-
net ocials per four-year term.
Like previous administrations, Trump has used many
dierent methods to fill vacancies and even challenged
well-established assumptions around the importance
25 This number excludes acting ocials who served fewer than 10
days; Anne Joseph O’Connell, “Actings,” Columbia Law Review 120(3),
April 2020, 613–728. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2YEMw2L
26 Ibid.
Number of Senate-confirmed positions without a confirmed appointee in
Cabinet-level departments as of Aug. 17, 2020
Number of
Senate-confirmed
positions
Currently vacant
positions
Continuously vacant
positions under
Trump
No. % No. %
Agriculture 13 4 31% 1 8%
Commerce 21 9 43 1 5
Defense 59 21 36 0 N/A
Education 16 7 44 2 13
Energy 23 3 13 0 N/A
Health and Human Services 18 3 17 3 17
Homeland Security 17 11 65 2 12
Housing and Urban Development 13 2 15 1 8
Interior 18 5 28 2 11
Justice* 29 16 55 9 31
Labor 14 4 29 2 14
State** 59 24 41 7 12
Transportation 22 10 45 3 14
Treasury 26 9 35 5 19
Veterans Aairs 12 3 25 1 8
*Does not include United States attorneys and United States marshals **Does not include ambassadors
Note: Data includes full-time, civilian positions that are Senate-confirmed.
Source: The Partnership for Public Service and The Washington Post
THE REPLACEMENTS 7
Positions without a Senate-confirmed appointee since the beginning of the Trump administration
in the Departments of Justice, Interior and State
Jan. 20, 2017–Aug. 17, 2020
Vacant Position
Name of Ocial Performing
Duties
Title Given
Department of Justice
Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Programs
Division
Katharine Sullivan
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General of the Oce of Justice Programs
Assistant Attorney General for the Tax Division Richard E. Zuckerman Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration* Timothy Shea Acting Administrator
Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration
Preston L. Grubbs Principal Deputy Administrator
Chairman, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Vacant
Chairman, U.S. Parole Commission Patricia K. Cushwa Vice Chairman and Acting Chairman
Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair
Employment Practices*
Vacant
Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives
Regina Lombardo Acting Deputy Director
Director, Community Relations Service Gerri Ratli Deputy Director
Director, Oce on Violence Against Women Laura L. Rogers
Acting Director of the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Oce on Violence Against Women
Department of the Interior
Director, Bureau of Land Management William Perry Pendley
Deputy Director, Policy and Programs,
Bureau of Land Management, Exercising
Authority of the Director
Director, National Park Service David Vela**
Deputy Director, Exercising the Authority
of Director for the National Park Service
Special Trustee for American Indians Jerold Gidner
Acting Special Trustee and Principal
Deputy Special Trustee
Department of State
Chief Financial Ocer Vacant
Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy
and Human Rights
Nathan A. Sales
Acting Undersecretary for Civilian
Security, Democracy and Human Rights
Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International,
Environmental and Scientific Aairs
Jonathan Moore Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and
Migration
Carol Thompson O’Connell Acting Assistant Secretary
Assistant Secretary for South Asian Aairs Dean Thompson Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs Ryan Taugher Acting Oce Director
Representative of the United States to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Melissa A. Brown Chargé d’Aaires ad interim
Representative of the United States to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
Andrew Haviland
Chargé d’Aaires ad interim and Acting
Permanent Representative
Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights Issues Vacant
Alternate Representative of the United States of
America for Special Political Aairs in the United
Nations, with the Rank of Ambassador
Vacant
* Position is exempted from the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998. ** Vela announced he will retire in September 2020. He will be replaced by
Margaret Everson, principal deputy director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
28
Note: Several of the vacant positions have nominations pending in the Senate as of August 2020.
28 Benjamin J. Hulac, “Park Service head retires; successor quickly named,” Roll Call, Aug. 7, 2020. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2DNUjmn
Source: Partnership for Public Service
Source: Partnership for Public Service
8 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
more than a third of their top positions. Almost two-
thirds (65%) of the key positions in the Department of
Homeland Security were either vacant or filled with an
acting ocial, as were slightly more than half of the top
29 positions at the Department of Justice, 44% at the
Department of Education and 45% at the Department of
Transportation.
When a Senate-confirmed position is vacant, who
fills in? The answer is that there is no single method for
how these leadership positions are filled. Instead, the ad-
ministration has used a complex array of temporary titles
and assumed authority with limited opportunity for pub-
lic scrutiny.
To demonstrate the various methods used to fill posi-
tions, the table above shows examples of the wide array
of titles from three of the largest agencies — departments
of Interior, State and Justice. The table includes positions
that have not had a confirmed ocial for more than three
and a half years — from Trump’s inauguration, Jan. 20,
2017, through Aug. 17, 2020.
For some of these positions, simply identifying the
individuals performing the duties is a challenge. Agency
websites show a collection of acting ocials, principal
deputies, acting assistant secretaries and those “exercis-
ing authority of the director.” In short, there is no uniform
set of titles either within or across the three departments.
In some instances, the Trump administration has
temporarily filled a position by clearly labeling an individ-
ual as the acting ocial. For example, at the Department
of Justice, Regina Lombardo, a longtime law enforcement
ocial at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, has been serving as acting director since Oc-
tober 2019, while the administration has nominated an-
other person to become the permanent director.
29
By contrast, no one has been appointed to be the act-
ing director of the Community Relations Service within
DOJ. The top ocial there is Gerri Ratli, the deputy di-
rector since January 2017.
30
The agency website refers to
Ratli as the deputy director and does not have an easily
identifiable page associated with the director position.
The oce has become a subject of controversy during the
current focus on civil rights and community policing. The
Trump administration proposed eliminating the agency
and shifting its responsibilities to the Civil Rights Divi-
sion in each of its budget requests to Congress.
31
Support-
ers claim the CRS is meant to address the very conflicts
29 Alex Leary, “Trump to Name President of National Police Ocers
Group to Lead ATF,” The Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2019. Retrieved
from https://on.wsj.com/2Oo3njU
30 The United States Department of Justice, “Meet the Deputy Direc-
tor.” Retrieved Aug. 28, 2020, from https://bit.ly/2Wx5tBR
31 Gabriel T. Rubin, “Democrats Push to Block Trump-Requested
Cuts to Community Policing Programs,” The Wall Street Journal, June
5, 2020. Retrieved from https://on.wsj.com/3eu5zBQ
and issues of racism aecting communities around the
country.
32
At the Department of the Interior, the responsibili-
ties of the director of the Bureau of Land Management
have been fulfilled since July 2019 by William Perry
Pendley, the deputy director of policy and programs. But
Pendley does not have the ocial title of acting director.
Instead, the bureau’s website lists Pendley as the deputy
director “exercising the authority of the director.
33
Press
reports sometimes incorrectly refer to Pendley as the act-
ing director even though that is not his ocial title.
34
At the Department of State, some top ocials are
listed with yet other titles. For instance, there is no con-
firmed appointee for the assistant secretary for South
Asian aairs. The Department of State’s website does not
include a clear reference to that position, but instead lists
Dean Thompson as the top ocial with the title of princi-
pal deputy assistant secretary.
35
As for ambassadorial va-
cancies abroad, the vacancies law does not apply, accord-
ing to former Undersecretary of State for Management
Patrick Kennedy. Someone does not become the “acting
ambassador”; one becomes the “chargé d’aaires” in ac-
cordance with international diplomatic practice.
The multitude of approaches makes it dicult for
Congress, citizens and other interested parties to hold
temporary leaders accountable, let alone contact them for
critical information or assistance. In order to dig deeper
into how the Trump administration has filled high-level
vacancies in the absence of Senate-confirmed leaders,
the following section provides five examples, highlights
the particular circumstances that have contributed to
each situation and shows how the vacancy law has been
applied or in some cases circumvented.
32 A.C. Thompson and Robert Faturechi, “How a Key Federal Civil
Rights Agency Was Sidelined as Historic Protests Erupted,” ProPublica,
July 9, 2020. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2Wmdo5r
33 Bureau of Land Management, “Leadership.” Retrieved May 27,
2020, from https://on.doi.gov/2AhmvMU
34 Associated Press, “Bureau of Land Management director to contin-
ue through April,” April 6, 2020. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3cb8wFo
35 U.S. Department of State, “Bureau of South and Central Asian Af-
fairs.” Retrieved Aug. 26, 2020, from https://bit.ly/3ek6zb7
THE REPLACEMENTS 9
INSIGHTS AND CASE STUDIES
Background
The job of director had been held by Jonathan Jarvis for
seven years until the end of Obama’s term. Michael T.
Reynolds, a 34-year veteran of the park service,
37
exer-
cised the authority of the position for the first year of the
Trump administration, followed by Daniel Smith, who
was named acting director in January 2018. Smith came
out of retirement to accept the role after serving as super-
intendent of Colonial National Historical Park in Virginia
for a decade.
38
While Smith was serving as acting director, the
Trump administration formally nominated veteran park
service employee Vela to become the full-time director.
39
Vela spent 30 years with the agency and four years as
the superintendent of Grand Teton National Park.
40
The
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
held a hearing for Vela two months after his September
2018 nomination and reported him favorably to the full
37 National Park Service, “Mike Reynolds Named NPS Regional Direc-
tor of Department of the Interior Lower Colorado Basin, Upper Colora-
do Basin, and Arkansas-Rio Grande-Texas-Gulf Regions,” Oct. 23, 2019.
Retrieved from https://bit.ly/39WohAz
38 Miranda Green, “Acting National Park Service director gets new
role overseeing 2026 Independence Day celebration,” The Hill, Sept.
30, 2019. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3k9qYUg
39 Congress.gov, “PN2477 — Raymond David Vela — Department of
the Interior.” Retrieved Aug. 28, 2020, from https://bit.ly/3fptsvg
40 Jenni Gritters, “Vela to Serve as Acting Director of the NPS, Ef-
fective Immediately,” REI Co-op Journal, Oct. 1, 2019. Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/3dnZJRC
Most recent ocials
National Park Service
Director
Pres. Name Start End
Obama Jonathan Jarvis Oct. 2009 Jan. 2017
Trump Michael T.
Reynolds (acting)
Jan. 2017 Jan. 2018
Daniel Smith
(acting)
Jan. 2018 Sept. 2019
Raymond David
Vela (acting)
Oct. 2019 Sept. 2020
Margaret Everson
(acting)
Sept. 2020
Insight 1: There is little downside for an
administration to designate a temporary
leader in order to sidestep the complicated
Senate confirmation process.
Case study: Director, National Park Service
Why does this position lack a Senate-confirmed
appointee?
The National Park Service has been without a Senate-
confirmed director since the beginning of the Trump
presidency. Instead, the administration has given the du-
ties of the job to multiple people on a temporary basis.
One recent appointee, Raymond David Vela, had been ex-
ercising the authority of the director from October 2019
to September 2020 — much longer than the time allotted
for acting ocials to serve according to the vacancies law.
Vela was nominated in 2018 to become the permanent di-
rector and would have been the first Hispanic American
to hold the position. But Vela never received a vote from
the full Senate. His pending nomination was returned to
the president at the end of the 115th Congress, per Senate
rules. Instead of renominating him, the administration
gave Vela the temporary title and the responsibilities of
the job.
The reasons this position has been filled with tem-
porary ocials appear to be a combination of timing and
priority — not necessarily because of significant opposi-
tion or controversy regarding Vela or other nominees. It
appears to have been easier for the Trump administration
to designate Vela to serve in an acting capacity than to go
through the eort to renominate him — and there is rela-
tively little pressure to alter that situation.
Who was filling this position in the absence of a
Senate-confirmed leader and what was their title?
Following Vela’s retirement in September, Margaret
Everson, the principal deputy director of the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, was given the authority of the di-
rector position.
36
36 Benjamin J. Hulac, “Park Service head retires; successor quickly
named,” Roll Call, Aug. 7, 2020. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2DNUjmn
10 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
Senate with little opposition.
41
However, Vela’s nomina-
tion never received a Senate vote and was returned to the
president on Jan. 3, 2019 at the end of the 115th Congress.
No public reason was given for why Vela did not receive
a vote, although Senate sta suggested Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., could not get bipartisan
agreement to include Vela in a package of nominees at the
end of the year.
Vela’s nomination was not resubmitted to the Senate
at the beginning of the new Congress. Although the com-
mittee would likely have moved his nomination forward
again, Secretary of the Interior David Bernhardt issued
an order to have Vela exercise the authority of director
to replace Smith on Oct. 1, 2019.
42
Vela was not given
the ocial title of “acting” director even though he was
given the authority of that position. Bernhardt’s order
stated Vela would serve until at least Jan. 3, 2020. Subse-
quent orders extended Vela’s role through at least June
5, 2020.
43
Since then, Vela and other temporary leaders
in the Interior Department had their authority extended
through a series of (legally questionable) reappointments
and succession orders that have been the subject of a law-
suit filed by two environmental groups.
44
Why the lack of a Senate-confirmed ocial matters
Vela stated he believed his title had little impact on his
eectiveness. “For the most part, and as it pertained to
the daily operations of the NPS, I felt I did have the au-
thority to do the job,” he said. However, Vela added that
the agency and its workforce would have benefitted from
a Senate-confirmed ocial at the top. “For the first time
in its history, the Park Service didn’t have a permanent
director … The NPS workforce as well as our partners
and park visitors need to know and have confidence in
the direction the agency will follow in a second century
of service.
Some advocacy organizations expressed additional
dissatisfaction with the lack of a confirmed director.
Most of those concerns reflected unhappiness with the
process and the disregard for the formal confirmation
41 Rob Hotakainen, “Smith out, Vela in as NPS acting director,” E&E
News, Sept. 27, 2019. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3ceHmhV
42 National Park Service, “Secretary Bernhardt Announces New National
Park Leadership,” Sept. 30, 2019. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2YV72vV
43 The Secretary of the Interior, “Order No. 3345 Amendment No. 30,
Jan. 2, 2020. Retrieved from https://on.doi.gov/3cbnHiI; The Secretary
of the Interior, “Order No. 3345 Amendment No. 32,” May 5, 2020. Re-
trieved from https://on.doi.gov/3fAgYRA
44 Kelsey Tamborrino and Anthony Adragna, “Trump’s ‘unforced er-
ror’ puts Western Senate Republicans in an election jam,” Politico, July
17, 2020. Retrieved from https://politi.co/2PueKav; Public Employees
for Environmental Responsibility, “Press Release: Lawsuit Seeks Oust-
er of Park Service and BLM Leaders,” May 11, 2020. Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/3kgEEg5
role of the Senate, and not opposition to the individual
serving in the position.
For example, Theresa Pierno, president and CEO
for National Parks Conservation Association, noted her
organization supported Vela’s nomination, but objected
to how he was placed into that role without being renom-
inated. Pierno wrote, “Despite the Trump administration
having every opportunity to formally advance a National
Park Service director nomination, thousands of National
Park Service employees have gone more than two and a
half years without an empowered leader. Park superin-
tendents aren’t getting support to fulfill their steward-
ship responsibilities and the public is shut out of one de-
cision after another.
45
45 National Parks Conservation Association, “Press Release: Trump
Administration Continues to Ignore Park Service Director Nomina-
tion,” Oct. 1, 2019. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2yBiX7y
THE REPLACEMENTS 11
Insight 2: Statutes governing vacancies are
dicult to enforce.
Case Study: Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration
Why does this position lack a Senate-confirmed
appointee?
While the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration requires Senate confirmation, the position has
been filled by an acting ocial for eight of the last 12 years.
In the legislative history of the Federal Vacancies Re-
form Act, the Senate noted that ocials in this position
were subject to other authority.
46
Both the Obama and
Trump administrations agreed, finding that an executive
order by President Richard Nixon creating the agency
superseded the vacancies law.
47
Under Nixon’s order, a
top vacancy can be filled by a Justice Department ocial
chosen by the attorney general for longer than the time
period allowed by the vacancies law. The alternative ap-
pointment scheme, like the vacancies law, gives the Sen-
ate little recourse in forcing a nomination.
Who is filling this position in the absence of a Senate-
confirmed leader, and what is the title?
Timothy Shea was named acting administrator in May
2020.
48
He is the fourth-consecutive acting ocial in that
role and replaced Uttam Dhillon, who was the acting ad-
ministrator for more than two years.
Background
The DEA is part of the Department of Justice and has a $2
billion budget and 5,000 special agents in 68 countries.
49
The agencys primary role is to enforce laws regarding con-
trolled substances and combat the country’s opioid crisis.
Over the past five years, neither Presidents Obama
nor Trump formally nominated anyone to this posi-
tion. In 2015, Obama replaced confirmed appointee Mi-
chele Marie Leonhart with former U.S. Attorney Charles
46 “Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998,” S. Rep. 105-250, accompa-
nying S. 2176, 105th Congress, 2d Session, 1998.
47 Michael C. Bender, “Trump’s DEA Chief Vetted Candidates and
Then Took the Job Himself, Riling Police Groups,” The Wall Street
Journal, Oct. 25, 2018. Retrieved from https://on.wsj.com/2zgOFXF
48 The Drug Enforcement Administration, “Attorney General Barr an-
nounces Timothy J. Shea as new Acting Administrator of Drug Enforce-
ment Administration,” May 19, 2020. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/37B3lhA
49 The Drug Enforcement Administration, “Stang and Budget.” Re-
trieved May 7, 2020, from https://bit.ly/3du4NnD; The Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, “Foreign Oce Locations.” Retrieved May 7,
2020, from https://bit.ly/2SMI8uR
Rosenberg in an acting capacity. Rosenberg held that po-
sition until resigning in October 2017.
50
Robert Patterson was the departments principal
deputy administrator and replaced Rosenberg as the act-
ing administrator for nine months beginning in 2017.
51
Patterson served until June 2018 when the Trump admin-
istration named Dhillon as acting administrator. Dhillon
had played a role in vetting other candidates for the job
before accepting the position himself.
52
Shea was named
the acting administrator in May 2020 to replace Dhillon.
Why the lack of a Senate-confirmed ocial matters
The lack of a Senate-confirmed administrator since 2015
has hindered crisis management and long-term plan-
ning for the agency. In a January 2018 letter, 10 Demo-
cratic senators wrote to the president to urge him to fill
positions at DEA, the Oce of National Drug Control
Policy and other agencies essential to combating opioid
abuse.
53
The senators declared, “We appreciate the work
of the civil servants who are serving as the acting heads
of ONDCP and DEA, but acting leaders cannot enact the
50 Devlin Barrett and Matt Zapotosky, “DEA administrator plans
to step down,” The Washington Post, Sept. 26, 2017. Retrieved from
https://wapo.st/2A2JhYt
51 Devlin Barrett, “DEA chief steps down, citing increasing challenges
of temporary role,” The Washington Post, June 18, 2018. Retrieved from
https://wapo.st/2WEtHKx
52 Michael C. Bender, “Trump’s DEA Chief Vetted Candidates and
Then Took the Job Himself, Riling Police Groups,” The Wall Street
Journal, Oct. 25, 2018. Retrieved from https://on.wsj.com/2zgOFXF
53 Sen. Margaret Wood Hassan et al., United States Senate, Jan. 17,
2018. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3g62Ijc
Most recent ocials
Drug Enforcement Administration
Administrator
Pres. Name Start End
Bush/
Obama
Michele Marie
Leonhart (acting)
Nov. 2007 Dec. 2010
Michele Marie
Leonhart
Dec. 2010 May 2015
Obama/
Trump
Chuck Rosenberg
(acting)
May 2015 Oct. 2017
Trump Robert W. Patterson
(acting)
Oct. 2017 June 2018
Uttam Dhillon
(acting)
July 2018 May 2020
Timothy Shea
(acting)
May 2020 Current
12 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
kind of robust response to the ongoing fentanyl, heroin
and opioid epidemic that the crisis demands.
Assistant Attorney General for Administration Lee
Lofthus said individuals serving in an acting capacity
“need to keep the trains running, but sometimes are lim-
ited in the ability to make major changes on their own
— not because of any rule precluding them from doing
so, but because they may not have sucient support. A
confirmed appointee usually gives more certainty to the
workforce, and to external contacts such as Congress.
In a farewell email to sta, Patterson wrote, “The ad-
ministrator of the DEA needs to decide and address pri-
orities for years into the future — something which has
become increasingly challenging in an acting capacity.
54
54 Devlin Barrett, “DEA chief steps down, citing increasing challenges
of temporary role,” The Washington Post, June 18, 2018. Retrieved from
https://wapo.st/3ceEyBp
THE REPLACEMENTS 13
Insight 3: Administrations choose to leave
some positions unfilled as a reflection of
their policies.
Case study: Special Envoy for North Korean Human
Rights, Department of State
Why does this position lack a Senate-confirmed
appointee?
The special envoy for North Korean human rights posi-
tion has been without a nominee since the beginning of
the Trump administration as a matter of policy.
Who is filling this position in the absence of a Senate-
confirmed leader and what is their title?
This position has not been filled since President Trump
took oce in January 2017, although the responsibilities
were assumed by the undersecretary for civilian security,
democracy and human rights — a position currently filled
in an acting capacity by Nathan A. Sales. Sales also serves
in the Senate-confirmed role of coordinator for counter-
terrorism.
55
Background
In 2004, Congress approved the North Korean Human
Rights Act and established a special envoy position that
would “coordinate and promote eorts to improve re-
spect for the fundamental human rights of the people of
North Korea.
56
The job was filled almost continuously
until early 2017.
Since then, the post has remained vacant as the cur-
rent administration, the Senate and the State Department
have debated priorities and approach regarding North
Korea.
When the 2004 law expired in mid-2017, Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson proposed a restructuring plan that in-
cluded the removal or reorganization of dozens of special
envoys.
57
Tillerson added the duties of the North Korean
human rights envoy to those of the undersecretary of
state for civilian security, democracy and human rights.
55 U.S. Department of State, “Nathan A. Sales.” Retrieved July 16, 2020,
from https://bit.ly/32uvLri; U.S. Department of State, “Under Secretary
for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.” Retrieved July 16,
2020, from https://bit.ly/30k7kLV
56 Congress.gov, “H.R.4011 — North Korean Human Rights Act of
2004.” Retrieved Aug. 28, 2020, from https://bit.ly/2SJNZku
57 Josh Rogin, “Tillerson scraps full-time North Korean human
rights envoy,” The Washington Post, Aug. 31, 2017. Retrieved from
https://wapo.st/2SKOPNV
In August 2018, the Trump administration created a
separate new position that does not need Senate confir-
mation called the special representative to North Korea
and appointed Stephen Biegun to the role. In December
2019, Biegun was confirmed to be deputy secretary of
state and continued to be involved with North Korean
issues along with the other duties associated with that
position.
Senators on both sides of the aisle have objected to
the reorganization that left the North Korea envoy po-
sition vacant. Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., told The Wash-
ington Post, “We need a dedicated special envoy focused
specifically on the North Korean government’s system-
atic and horrific human rights abuses against its own
people.
58
Sen. Ben Cardin, D-Md., said, “We need to em-
power the State Department to expose and seek account-
ability for North Korea’s abusive human rights practices,
and I am concerned this proposal [for reorganization of
the envoy’s responsibilities] would fall far short of that
goal.
59
Shortly thereafter, Congress and the president re-
authorized the North Korean Human Rights Act, which
required that a special envoy would be confirmed in time
to submit a report to Congress in January 2019.
60
Never-
theless, as of August 2020, the administration had yet to
nominate a special envoy for North Korean human rights
or appoint an acting special envoy.
Why the lack of a Senate-confirmed ocial matters
The impact of not having a Senate-confirmed special en-
voy for North Korean human rights is in the eye of the be-
holder. The Trump administration appears to have made
a policy decision not to fill the position out of concern
such a move might derail diplomatic eorts. However,
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Congress.gov, “H.R.2061 — North Korean Human Rights Reauthori-
zation Act of 2017.” Retrieved Aug. 28, 2020, from https://bit.ly/3fDmy
Most recent ocials
Department of State
Special envoy for North Korean human rights
Pres. Name Start End
Obama Robert R. King Nov. 2009 Jan. 2017
Trump Vacant* Jan. 2017 Current
* The responsibilities of the position have been assumed by the
undersecretary of state for civilian security, democracy, and human
rights — a position filled by Nathan A. Sales since Sept. 2017.
14 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
some experts have called on Trump to appoint an envoy
and place more focus on North Korean human rights vio-
lations.
“[The special envoy on North Korean human rights]
is the central figure for policy and would have direct ac-
cess to the president in carrying out his or her job to ad-
dress the atrocious human rights abuses in North Korea,
wrote Victor Cha of the George W. Bush Institute.
61
“The
Trump administration should nominate a candidate.
61 Victor Cha, “Policy Recommendations: North Korean Human
Rights Critical to Denuclearization,” George W. Bush Presidential Cen-
ter, Nov. 26, 2018. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3fx3gip
THE REPLACEMENTS 15
Insight 4: The Senate will tolerate, and
even cause, extended vacancies in
leadership roles to accomplish political
objectives.
Case Study: Undersecretary of State for Management
The undersecretary of state for management plays a key
role in the operations of the State Department. The job
has been filled with a Senate-confirmed ocial since May
2019, but was without one for the previous 28 months.
One of the primary reasons for the lengthy vacancy was
because the nomination of the current undersecretary,
Brian Bulatao, became a bargaining chip in negotiations
between Senate Democrats and the secretary of state re-
garding a separate issue.
Other reasons contributed to the vacancy. The exit
of senior administrative ocials at the State Department
soon after President Trump’s inauguration created a gap
that rarely occurred in previous transitions.
62
In addition,
a failed nominee preceded Bulatao at a time when the job
was vacant, and this added to the length of time without
a Senate-confirmed appointee.
Who was filling this position in the absence of a
Senate-confirmed leader?
Prior to Bulatao’s confirmation in May 2019, the position
did not have a Senate-confirmed ocial for the first two
years of the Trump administration. From January to June
2017, the position was vacant with no one designated to
fill the role. From June 2017 through May 2019, William
E. Todd served as the acting undersecretary.
Background
In 2017, the National Academy of Public Administration
cited the State Department position as one of the tough-
est management jobs to fill.
63
“Department expertise in
security, management, administrative and consular posi-
tions in particular are very dicult to replicate and par-
ticularly dicult to find in the private sector,” noted Da-
vid Wade, the chief of sta to former Secretary of State
John Kerry.
64
62 Barbara Plett Usher, “Top U.S. diplomats leave State Department,
BBC News, Jan. 27, 2017. Retrieved from https://bbc.in/39W8kdU
63 National Academy of Public Administration, “Prune Book 2017: The
40 Toughest Management Positions in Government.” Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/35I2rP3
64 Josh Rogin, “The State Department’s entire senior administrative
team just resigned,” The Washington Post, Jan. 26, 2017. Retrieved from
https://wapo.st/3ccqVm1
For the first five months of the Trump administra-
tion, no one was assigned the duties of the oce. At that
point, Todd was named the acting undersecretary and
served for almost two years, far surpassing the vacancy
law’s 210-day limitation.
65
Not only was Todd serving
as undersecretary, but for about half of that time he was
filling two additional positions concurrently: acting di-
rector general of the foreign service/director of human
resources, and his ocial position of deputy undersecre-
tary for management.
The process for getting a confirmed ocial took sev-
eral tries. About six months into his presidency, Trump
nominated Eric Ueland for the job. Though he was voted
on favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Ueland never received a full Senate vote and Trump of-
ficially withdrew his nomination in June 2018.
66
Following Ueland’s withdrawal, the administration
nominated Bulatao, the former chief operating ocer
and third ranking ocial at the CIA. Though Bulatao
was well-received by the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, he faced a nearly yearlong wait due to a power
struggle between senators and the administration. Sen.
Robert Menendez, D-N.J., the ranking member on the
committee, held up dozens of State Department nomi-
nations due to a host of issues, including the administra-
tion’s perceived lack of responsiveness to questions about
interactions with foreign leaders and potential political
retribution against career State employees.
67
After sev-
eral months, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo agreed to
produce documents and Menendez lifted his hold on the
65 U.S. Department of State, “William E. Todd.” Retrieved June 11,
2020, from https://bit.ly/3dpI4sF
66 Congress.gov, “PN1387 — Eric M. Ueland — Department of State.
Retrieved May 7, 2020, from https://bit.ly/2YJaJ8c
67 Rachel Oswald, “Menendez, Pompeo Feud Over Diplomatic Nomi-
nees,” Roll Call, Oct. 16, 2018. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/39uVrXY
Most recent ocials
Department of State
Undersecretary of state for management
Pres. Name Start End
Bush/
Obama
Patrick Kennedy Nov. 2007 Jan. 2017
Trump Vacant Jan. 2017 June 2017
William E. Todd
(acting)
June 2017 May 2019
Brian Bulatao May 2019 Current
16 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
nomination in May 2019.
68
Bulatao was confirmed shortly
thereafter with a 92-5 senate vote.
69
Why the lack of a Senate-confirmed ocial matters
Former Undersecretary of State Patrick Kennedy, who
held the position under Presidents George W. Bush and
Obama, said the long-term vacancy had a “significant
negative impact across the entire management spec-
trum.” He suspects that a permanent undersecretary
would have kept leadership from maintaining a long
hiring freeze, which he said damaged the department.
A confirmed ocial also would have been able to point
out the eects — like lowered morale and increased wait
times for getting passports — to the secretary, Kennedy
said.
Kennedy added that the undersecretarys role is es-
pecially crucial now because of constant security threats
to embassies around the world. The undersecretary plays
a central role in consular services for Americans abroad,
such as when American medical volunteers had to be
evacuated during the Ebola crisis in Western Africa and
more recently during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Retired ambassador Ronald Neumann, who currently
heads the American Academy of Diplomacy, considered
the undersecretary of state for management vacancy the
most important of the many State Department vacancies
during the Trump administration.
70
Since taking oce as a Senate-confirmed undersec-
retary, Bulatao initiated a reform strategy focused on tal-
ent management, security infrastructure, technology and
other key work streams. He is also overseeing eorts to
improve employee diversity and equity and inclusion, a
long-standing challenge for the workforce.
68 Nick Wadhams and Daniel Flatley, “Menendez Drops Hold on
Pompeo Friend for State Department Post,” Bloomberg, May 2, 2019.
Retrieved from https://bloom.bg/3cguTKG
69 Congress.gov, “PN111 — Brian J. Bulatao — Department of State.
Retrieved May 7, 2020, from https://bit.ly/3du6D81
70 Charles S. Clark, “State Department Under Pompeo Still Coping
with Vacancies,” Government Executive, Dec. 17, 2018. Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/35ExkUJ
THE REPLACEMENTS 17
Insight 5: Some agencies and bureaus may
operate eectively with a seasoned career
ocial in charge.
Case Study: Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division,
U.S. Department of Justice
Why does this position lack a Senate-confirmed
appointee?
It is unclear why the Justice Departments assistant at-
torney general in charge of the Tax Division has not had a
Senate-confirmed appointee for nine of the last 11 years.
Former DOJ ocials and outside observers cited a variety
of reasons apart from the rigor of the confirmation pro-
cess, including the diculty of finding qualified lawyers
with tax law expertise, post-employment restrictions and
the eect on one’s career path. Others suggested the Tax
Division does not have a high profile and many of the
most important tax-related investigations are carried out
by other parts of the federal government or local prose-
cutors. Consequently, placing a Senate-confirmed leader
atop the Tax Division may not be a top priority.
Who is filling this position in the absence of a Senate-
confirmed leader, and what is their title?
No one is in the role of assistant attorney general. The Tax
Division website lists Richard Zuckerman, the principal
deputy assistant attorney general, as the top ocial.
71
Background
The Tax Division and its roughly 370 attorneys are
charged with enforcing the nation’s tax laws by support-
ing IRS investigations and representing the U.S. in tax
litigation. In a single year, they process almost 6,700 civil
cases and approximately 625 appeals, and authorize be-
tween 1,300 and 1,800 criminal tax investigations.
72
The top position at the Tax Division is the assistant
attorney general. A temporary ocial in this role is not
a new phenomenon. The position has been filled by an
acting or temporary ocial for nine of the last 11 years
spanning two administrations, including six of Obama’s
eight years.
President Trump did not nominate anyone for the
job during his first three years. On Feb. 12, 2020, Trump
formally nominated Zuckerman, who was the principal
deputy assistant attorney general for the division. Ac-
cording to the Justice Department website, Zuckerman
71 United States Department of Justice, “Tax Division.” Retrieved Aug.
4, 2020, from https://bit.ly/2XtNrlf
72 Tax Division, United States Department of Justice, “FY 2019 Con-
gressional Budget.” Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2SHT64w
is serving as the “head of the Tax Division.
73
Essentially,
Zuckerman has been formally nominated to do the job he
is currently doing in a temporary capacity. His nomina-
tion was pending as of August 2020
.74
Why the lack of a Senate-confirmed ocial matters
The impact of this vacancy may be limited. Former ocials
suggested that an acting leader of the Tax Division — along
with the career ocials — can accomplish the agency’s
goals even without a Senate confirmation. In fact, surveys
of government employees show that job satisfaction and
engagement for the division have been consistently higher
in recent years than scores for the Justice Department as
a whole and the entire government.
75
Since the division
tends to prosecute mostly low-profile cases, there is little
pressure to nominate a permanent ocial.
Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of Pol-
icy and Planning of the Tax Division Caroline Ciraolo,
73 The United States Department of Justice, “Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney General.” Retrieved May 7, 2020, from https://bit.ly/35JhJmL
74 Congress.gov, “PN1512 — Richard E. Zuckerman — Department of
Justice.” Retrieved Aug. 5, 2020, from https://bit.ly/3icspiY
75 Partnership for Public Service and Boston Consulting Group, “Best
Places to Work in the Federal Government: Tax Division,” 2019. Re-
trieved from https://bit.ly/3gd9aEF
Most recent ocials
U.S. Department of Justice
Assistant attorney general, Tax Division
Pres. Name Start End
Obama Kathryn Keneally April 2012 June 2014
Tamara W. Ashford
(acting)
June 2014 Dec. 2014
Caroline D.
Ciraolo* (acting)
Jan. 2015 Jan. 2017
Trump David Hubbert
(acting)
Jan. 2017 Nov. 2017
Richard Zuckerman
(acting)**
Dec. 2017 Current
*Principal deputy Caroline Ciraolo filled the role in an acting capacity
from Feb. 2015 through July 2016 when her role expired under the
Federal Vacancies Reform Act. From that point, she headed the Tax
Division as principal deputy assistant attorney general.
**Zuckerman has been the head of the Tax Division even though he is
listed on the website as the principal deputy assistant attorney general.
Zuckerman was formally nominated for the assistant attorney general
position in Feb. 2020.
Note: Periods of two months or less when there was no clear
temporary ocial are not listed.
18 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
who served in an acting capacity under Obama, said that
when she was the acting assistant attorney general, she
was not limited. “Serving in an acting capacity doesn’t
mean you can’t get a tremendous amount of work done,
Ciraolo told Bloomberg Law.
76
“To the extent there was
any hesitation in the acting role, it was out of respect for
the pending nominee … This did not impede our ability to
operate the division. It was simply in recognition of my
role as acting assistant AG.
Not everyone agrees. Matt Axelrod, an ocial in the
Obama Justice Department, discussed the broad issue of
acting DOJ ocials with The Washington Post. While
those in acting roles often perform admirably, he said,
“Everyone knows they’re temporary, and that means that
they don’t have the same heft internally or externally as
the Senate-confirmed heads will.
77
76 Jacob Rund, “Justice’s No. 3 Slot Is Soon to Be Vacant — Once Again,
Bloomberg Law, May 2, 2019. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3ccxSDT
77 Matt Zapotosky, “The Justice Department lacks key leaders, and a
Republican senator is threatening to keep it that way,” The Washington
Post, Jan. 6, 2018. Retrieved from https://wapo.st/2LxoLBO
THE REPLACEMENTS 19
FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN THE
PREVALENCE OF ACTING OFFICIALS
AND VACANCIES
the nomination of Raymond David Vela to be the director
of the National Park Service, nominations are returned
to the president with no clear reason other than they
did not make the list of top Senate priorities as a session
comes to an end.
In recent months, Senate activity has been further
challenged by the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of the Sen-
ate’s business has been conducted remotely and only a
few hearing rooms — large enough to accommodate so-
cial distancing — are available for committee business
meetings. The Senate is known for being a deliberative
body, but the new issues raised by current health con-
cerns will add to the diculties in managing the Senate
calendar for the foreseeable future.
Even nominees who are uncontroversial, well-qual-
ified and widely supported may endure a long road to
confirmation. Because rules and procedures govern how
and when the Senate considers nominations, the major-
ity leader spends the chamber’s limited time on the po-
sitions that matter most, while nominees for other po-
sitions wait. Coupled with the rigorous, expensive and
time-consuming process of resolving financial conflicts
of interest, submitting to a background investigation and
answering hundreds of policy questions, some talented
people decide that the price of public service is too high.
2. Senate polarization
Political polarization, characterized by ongoing stale-
mates on a wide range of issues, is by many measures the
highest it has been in decades. The average Senate confir-
mation process for presidential appointments took more
than twice as long during Trump’s first three years (115
days) as it did during President Reagan’s time in oce
(56.4 days).
79
One of the major reasons the average confirmation
time has grown is the increased use of Senate filibus-
ters to delay nominations. Cloture votes, the Senate’s
procedural motion used to limit debate and overcome
filibusters, have increased dramatically as a result of the
increased use or threatened use of the filibuster. During
79 Partnership for Public Service, “Senate Confirmation Process Slows
to a Crawl,” January 2020. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3b2vEFS
It is often dicult to pinpoint specific causes for indi-
vidual positions, but there are several contributing fac-
tors. President Trump’s choices and processes are major
causes, for example, but they are far from the only rea-
sons that so many vacancies and temporary ocials in
politically appointed jobs persist across the government.
The following major factors have contributed to va-
cancies during the Trump administration and, in some
instances, prior administrations.
1. Senate rules
The Senate bears partial responsibility for the large num-
ber of unfilled positions. While the Senate can move
quickly with unanimous consent, the complexity of Sen-
ate rules and procedures can allow even one senator to
slow the pace of nominations even if a nominee faces
minimal opposition. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Senate faces further obstacles that have slowed down the
process.
The delay for many nominees is complicated by the
Senate requirement that nominations not confirmed or
rejected at the end of a session, or when the Senate ad-
journs or recesses for more than 30 days, are automati-
cally returned to the president.
78
The president must
resubmit those individuals for nominees to get another
chance for Senate confirmation.
Because of the limited Senate schedule and other
priorities, many nominations are returned to the presi-
dent accordingly, especially at the end of the calendar
year and always at the end of a Congress. At the end of the
115th Congress in January 2019, about 300 civilian nomi-
nations were returned to Trump while about 85 were
returned in January 2020. In some instances, the same
people are renominated the following year. But others are
not resubmitted and lose their chance at confirmation.
In practice, Senate leaders usually agree on certain
priority confirmations as the end of the year approaches.
Yet the Senate does not necessarily have the time or in-
terest to vote on all nominees. In some instances, such as
78 Congressional Research Service, “Senate Consideration of Presi-
dential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure,” RL31980, April
11, 2017. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2Q8bxye
20 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
the first terms of Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush and
Obama combined, there were only about 30 cloture votes
on judicial and executive nominees. However, there were
approximately 150 cloture votes on judicial and executive
nominees in the first two years of Obama’s second term.
And in Trump’s first two years in oce, the Senate also
held about 150 cloture votes on such nominees.
80
In April 2019, the Senate changed the rules related to
cloture and cut debate for lower-level nominees from 30
hours to two hours in an attempt to speed up the confir-
mation process.
81
The change, referred to as the “nuclear
option” since it changed longstanding Senate procedures,
was adopted mostly along party lines with all but two Re-
publicans in favor and all Democrats opposed.
3. Too many Senate-confirmed positions
Congress reduced the overall number of Senate-con-
firmed positions by about 160 with the passage of the
Presidential Appointment Eciency and Streamlining
Act of 2011.
82
However, there are still more than 4,000
presidential appointments to make, with over 1,200 re-
quiring Senate confirmation. The small size of the Oce
of Presidential Personnel,
83
the limited number of legisla-
tive days available in the Senate, partisan delays and the
process itself make it impossible for a new president to
nominate, and the Senate to confirm, a full complement
of appointees early in an administration when the confir-
mation success rate is historically highest.
84
4. Dicult positions to fill
Some jobs have been vacant for years because they are
tough to fill. Many positions require a unique skill set and
the most qualified candidates may be in high demand in
other sectors. Other positions must be filled according to
a unique and lengthy process established in statute.
The director of the Indian Health Service is one
such position. Prior to the confirmation of Rear Adm.
Michael D. Weahkee in April 2020, the job had not been
filled with a Senate-approved ocial since 2015. The ob-
stacles were numerous: management challenges, low pay
80 Partnership for Public Service analysis of data from Congress.gov
and Senate.gov; David B. Rivkin Jr. and John Shu, “The Senate’s Unprec-
edented Obstruction,” The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 2, 2018. Retrieved
from https://on.wsj.com/3cbuAjX; Drew DeSilver, “Trump’s nominees
have already faced a large number of cloture votes,” Pew Research Cen-
ter, June 1, 2017. Retrieved from https://pewrsr.ch/3cbU5BW
81 Kelsey Snell, “Senate Rewrites Rules to Speed Confirmations for
Some Trump Nominees,” National Public Radio, April 3, 2019. Retrieved
from https://n.pr/2WtXG7I
82 “Presidential Appointment Eciency and Streamlining Act of
2011,” P.L. 112-166; James Pfiner, “Smoothing the Peaceful Transfer
of Democratic Power,” The White House Transition Project, 2017. Re-
trieved from https://bit.ly/3loPfGg
83 Congressional Directory, “Cong. Dir. 115th — Executive Branch.
Retrieved May 6, 2020, from https://bit.ly/2YF58Q5
84 Anne Joseph O’Connell, “Stang federal agencies: Lessons
from 1981-2016,” Brookings Institution, April 17, 2017. Retrieved from
https://brook.gs/2zlyk3R
compared with private sector jobs, a dicult selection
process and a lack of resources. Furthermore, the Indian
Health Service faced funding shortages and accusations
of hiding misconduct by physicians.
85
In August 2019, the
Department of Health and Human Services Oce of In-
spector General published a report stating, “IHS is at a
crossroads. The agency has had longstanding problems
providing consistent high-quality hospital care … How-
ever, to make meaningful and lasting improvements, IHS
needs to overcome underlying organizational problems
that have hampered its success.
86
Finding a qualified individual to take on the chal-
lenge of improving the agency was a dicult process.
One former Trump administration ocial said HHS con-
tacted nearly a dozen executives who had overhauled
large private hospital systems, but none was willing to be
considered.
87
The process was further complicated when
the previous nominee, Robert Weaver, withdrew his
nomination after reports surfaced alleging that he had
exaggerated his work experience.
88
5. Recruitment
The opportunity to serve as a presidential appointee is,
for many, a career highlight — but it requires personal
commitment and sacrifice.
89
When the honor of an ap-
pointment collides with the reality of the process, some
prospective nominees think twice before moving for-
ward. In many instances, people can earn higher pay in
the private sector for a similar job they would have in the
federal government. The time and costs associated with
going through the vetting and confirmation process can
be extensive — nominees may wait months with no guar-
antee of confirmation, and those with complicated finan-
cial holdings often spend tens of thousands of dollars on
accounting and legal help completing their paperwork.
And for some high-profile roles, the Senate confirmation
process has become a risk to their reputation as senators
use them as weapons in political warfare.
“The confirmation process must be thorough enough
for the Senate to fulfill its constitutional duty, but it should
not be so onerous as to deter qualified people from public
85 Anna Wilde Mathews and Christopher Weaver, “Six CEOs and No
Operating Room: The Impossible Job of Fixing the Indian Health Ser-
vice,” Frontline, Dec. 10, 2019. Retrieved from https://to.pbs.org/3hBBsui
86 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Oce of Inspec-
tor General, “Organizational Challenges to Improving Quality of Care
in Indian Health Service Hospitals,” August 2019. Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/3hJ1f3V
87 Anna Wilde Mathews and Christopher Weaver, “Six CEOs and No
Operating Room: The Impossible Job of Fixing the Indian Health Ser-
vice,” Frontline, Dec. 10, 2019. Retrieved from https://to.pbs.org/3hBBsui
88 Dan Frosch and Christopher Weaver, “Trump’s Nominee for In-
dian Health Post Withdraws,” The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 22, 2018.
Retrieved from https://on.wsj.com/2YInjmq
89 Partnership for Public Service, “Ready to Serve.” Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/3aWkmV
THE REPLACEMENTS 21
service,” said Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, during a 2011
Senate hearing on streamlining the nominations process.
90
“We drag some unsuspecting citizen through this
gauntlet of investigations and questioning,” added Sen.
Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., later that year. “They are very
fortunate if they get all the way through without being
made to appear a criminal.
91
6. Presidential preference
President Trump has declared his preference for using
acting” ocials. In 2019, he told reporters, “I like acting.
It gives me more flexibility.
92
This approach circumvents
the Senate’s advice-and-consent role, enabling the presi-
dent to appoint, reassign or remove people from specific
roles without congressional approval. At times, presidents
place individuals in an acting role to serve as an audition to
see whether they are worthy of an ocial nomination. All
presidents have found it necessary to use acting ocials in
certain situations, but the Trump administration has made
a conscious choice to use acting ocials far more often.
Leaving a position vacant is one strategy for mitigat-
ing the highly politicized confirmation process. With so
many executive branch nominations to fill and the slow
pace of the nomination process, an administration may
forgo nominating people for some positions in order to
focus valuable yet limited Senate floor time on other
priorities. In the case of the Trump administration, this
has included judicial nominations, which have generally
been prioritized over executive branch nominees.
93
7. Reflection of policy priorities
In some cases, such as the special envoy for North Korean
human rights, the preference for the White House is to
leave a position unfilled altogether. Congress may create
a new position in statute, but it has limited recourse if a
president does not nominate anyone to fill it.
Each presidential administration proposes to elimi-
nate, create or consolidate federal agencies or oces. This
may reflect an eort to reduce duplication, improve e-
ciency or emphasize a policy priority. Positions or agen-
cies that are low priority for presidents or proposed for
elimination are unlikely to see a nominee. For example,
the Trump administration has not filled the Justice De-
partments director of the Community Relations Service
in large part due to the administration’s desired policy to
90 “Opening Statement of Senator Collins.” Hearing on “Eliminating
the Bottlenecks: Streamlining the Nominations Process,” Senate Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aairs, March 2, 2011.
Retrieved from https://bit.ly/33luyoj
91 Carl Hulse, “Lawmakers Seek to Unclog Road to Confirmation,” The
New York Times, April 24, 2011. Retrieved from https://nyti.ms/2Wzzz7v
92 Amanda Becker, “Trump says acting Cabinet members give him ‘more
flexibility,’” Reuters, Jan. 6, 2019. Retrieved from https://reut.rs/2VyaoAY
93 Cori Petersen and CJ Szafir, “Trump Is Remaking the Federal Judi-
ciary at a Historic Rate,” RealClearPolitics, Jan. 4, 2020. Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/31vFSNe
consolidate it with other oces within the Department of
Justice. This reflects an administration’s goals and govern-
ing philosophy. By choosing not to fill a position, an admin-
istration can essentially limit the capacity of the entity to
function or send a message about its priorities.
8. Sequencing
Some vacancies may endure because higher profile,
more important vacancies — including at the head of the
agency or department — have yet to be filled. For exam-
ple, the Department of Homeland Security is unlikely to
put forth a nominee for deputy secretary when there is
also a vacancy in the secretary position. Typically, admin-
istrations aord agency leaders an opportunity to partici-
pate in selecting their deputies.
9. Lack of proper vetting and preparation for
candidates
Nominations can fail for many dierent reasons, and the
problem is exacerbated when appointees do not under-
stand the process and potential pitfalls. Nominees must
fill out extensive paperwork, disclose their finances and
deal with press attention while navigating interactions
with Senate committees and outside interests. Many ap-
pointees — especially those who are not familiar with
the inner workings of the federal government — do not
have the knowledge or resources to do so successfully.
Mistakes, omissions or delays in paperwork — even when
unintentional — can delay and even derail a nomination.
Most administrations do preliminary vetting on
prospective nominees before they are formally nomi-
nated, and also work with the nominees to ensure that
they are prepared for a public service position that may
require them to divest from financial holdings to avoid
the appearance of a conflict. The Trump administration
learned this lesson the hard way, as some of the presi-
dents earliest nominations were announced via Twitter
without much of the advance work that would lead to a
smoother process. Vincent Viola, for example, was nomi-
nated for secretary of the Army on Inauguration Day, but
reluctantly withdrew from consideration in early Febru-
ary when it became clear that he could not disentangle
himself from his business interests.
94
When nominees withdraw from consideration, it
delays filling important jobs. This issue has been more
pronounced under Trump than the previous presidents.
By April 2019, slightly more than two years into his term,
Trump had withdrawn 40 announced or forwarded nom-
inations for Senate-confirmed positions, 74% more than
either Presidents Obama or George W. Bush.
95
94 Susanne Craig, “Vincent Viola, Nominee for Army Secretary, Drops Out,
The New York Times, Feb. 3, 2017. Retrieved from https://nyti.ms/3f4nbUr
95 Heather Ba and Terry Sullivan, “Why does it take so long to con-
firm Trump’s appointments?” The Washington Post, April 24, 2019. Re-
trieved from https://wapo.st/39YKbmG
22 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
RECOMMENDATIONS
role — setting aside partisan solidarity with the sitting
president to preserve the institutional role of the Senate.
That eort resulted in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act,
the law that governs how a president may temporarily fill
a position subject to Senate confirmation.
Congress should again update the law to address am-
biguities that have arisen since the last update. For ex-
ample, Congress could:
Clarify that the vacancies law applies when an o-
cial is fired.
Prevent agency schemes to reshue succession
orders to circumvent laws rules.
Require that an acting inspector general be selected
from within the IG community to preserve IG inde-
pendence.
Prohibit ocials from being “dual-hatted” in Senate-
confirmed positions — in other words, from per-
forming the duties of two or more Senate-confirmed
positions at once.
Mandate timely reporting on vacancies and acting
ocials.
Pass legislation to allow an individual to serve as an
acting ocial while being the nominee for the same
position. This would overturn the Supreme Court’s
2017 decision on the vacancies law, which generally
prohibits an individual from simultaneously being an
acting ocial and the nominee for the position.
98
The
2017 decision reversed bipartisan interpretation of
the law since its passage, limits the pool of potential
acting ocials and can cause unnecessary turnover in
a position. For example, when nominated as secre-
tary of defense in 2019, Mark Esper, who was serving
as acting secretary at the time, had to be replaced as
acting secretary while his nomination was pending
as a result of the Supreme Court decision — causing
unnecessary turnover in the department’s leadership.
Conduct a bipartisan, bicameral eort to review and
update the vacancies law and relevant statutes to
ensure that the constitutional role of the Senate is
preserved. One eort of note is legislation introduced
in May 2020 by Rep. Katie Porter, D-Calif., which
would address many of the reforms discussed here.
99
98 NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 2017.
99Accountability for Acting Ocials Act,” H.R. 6689, 116th Congress,
2020.
Appointees to Senate-confirmed positions fill big, com-
plicated and consequential jobs. Our nation’s founders
envisioned a system by which the president and the Sen-
ate would work cooperatively to ensure that the Ameri-
can people are served by capable and qualified appoin-
tees, but that system is badly broken. How can Congress
and the executive branch decrease the reliance on tem-
porary ocials in important leadership positions?
1. The Senate must reassert its constitutional
authority to advise and consent on executive branch
nominations.
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution
states that the president “shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Am-
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Ocers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law.” In other
words, filling senior appointments in the executive branch
is a responsibility shared by the president and Senate. The
Senate’s advice-and-consent role is a fundamental compo-
nent of the founders’ vision of a system of checks and bal-
ances, a system so successful that the Constitution is the
world’s longest surviving written charter of government.
96
The Senate should guard this responsibility closely.
Senators of both parties should defend the Senate’s
prerogatives and object vociferously when a president
skirts its advice-and-consent authorities.
97
And, as it
has in the past, Congress should update the laws under
which executive branch ocials temporarily may fulfill
the duties of the oces subject to Senate confirmation.
In 1998, Senate Democrats joined Republicans to
take issue with what they saw as President Clinton’s at-
tempts to circumvent the Senate’s advice-and-consent
96 United States Senate, “Constitution of the United States.” Retrieved
from https://bit.ly/2YEvDo5
97 The House of Representatives can be an important ally as well. For
example, in 2018, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on So-
cial Security held a hearing to examine the impact of over five years
of acting leadership at the Social Security Administration. (Hearing on
“Lacking a Leader: Challenges Facing the SSA After Over Five Years of
Acting Commissioners,” House Committee on Ways and Means, March
7, 2018.) In November 2019, two House committee chairs requested that
the Government Accountability Oce examine the legality of acting
ocials at the Department of Homeland Security. (U.S. Government
Accountability Oce, “Department of Homeland Security—Legality of
Service of Acting Secretary of Homeland Security and Service of Senior
Ocial Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity,” Aug. 14, 2020.)
THE REPLACEMENTS 23
2. Congress should require more transparency into
vacant positions subject to advice and consent.
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act requires agencies to
report to Congress and the Government Accountability
Oce on vacancies in Senate-confirmed positions and
the names of acting ocials.
100
Compliance with this
reporting requirement is sluggish and spotty. As noted
above, Congress could update the vacancies law to re-
quire real-time reporting of vacancies and acting ocials.
Another way Congress should improve transparency
into appointments would be to pass legislation to create a
real-time, online “Plum Book,” which is the government’s
publication of federal political appointees and top career
positions in the civil service. Under current practice, the
Plum Book is updated only every four years through a
data call to agencies by the Oce of Personnel Manage-
ment. The publication, therefore, provides only a snap-
shot in time that is out of date by the time it is made pub-
lic (through publication traditionally done by Congress).
An online resource, updated regularly and easily
searchable, would bring increased transparency and ac-
countability to the federal government and let the Ameri-
can people know who is making decisions that aect
them as a political appointee or a senior career ocial.
It also would provide valuable information to individuals
interested in serving in a political appointment. Congress
should also insist on more timely reporting of the identity
of acting ocials. Bills that would achieve these goals are
pending in both the Senate and the House.
101
3. The Senate should reduce the number of
presidential appointments subject to Senate
confirmation and should revisit the “privileged
nominations” process.
More than 1,200 executive branch positions require con-
firmation — more than the Senate can consider during
the roughly 190 days it is in session each year. Executive
branch nominees compete with judicial nominees, leg-
100 “Reporting of Vacancies,” 5 U.S.C. 3349.
101 On July 22, 2020, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Aairs favorably reported S. 3896, Periodically List-
ing Updates to Management Act of 2020 or the PLUM Act of 2020. As
originally introduced, the bill (sponsored by Sen. Tom Carper, D-Del.)
would have required agencies to update information on positions at
least monthly. During the committee business meeting, though, the
committee adopted an amendment reducing the frequency of the re-
porting requirement by requiring an update at least every two years, not
monthly. In the House of Representatives, Rep. Carolyn Maloney, D-
N.Y., has introduced a bill, H.R. 7107, whose text is identical to S. 3896 as
originally introduced and contains the monthly reporting requirement.
islative priorities and other business for scarce Senate
committee and floor time. In 2011, Congress reduced the
number of positions that require Senate confirmation,
but has since created new ones.
102
Congress and the presi-
dent should revisit which positions should be subject to
Senate confirmation, with the same bipartisan coopera-
tion that resulted in the 2011 reduction.
On a separate track in 2011, the Senate also created
the executive calendar, which includes “privileged nomi-
nations” for some positions that typically are not con-
troversial, allowing a nominee to bypass committee con-
sideration unless any senator objects. While helpful in
speeding confirmation for some nominees, the privileged
nominations process still leaves many nominees waiting
behind higher-priority nominees — such as nominated
judges — before consideration by the full Senate.
4. The executive and legislative branches should
invest the time, resources and processes necessary
to support the nomination and confirmation of well-
qualified nominees.
A president should maintain a well-functioning Oce of
Presidential Personnel to build a talent pipeline and pre-
pare nominees for public service. Nominees should submit
timely, accurate and complete paperwork to the Senate to
minimize the delay caused by revisions. Personnel should
also be a top priority for presidential transition teams,
which should identify and select well-qualified candidates
for the most important Senate-confirmed positions before
the presidential election. Selecting nominees early, ensuring
they are fully vetted and educating them on the confirma-
tion process will increase the likelihood that a president’s
nominees are confirmed with bipartisan Senate support.
Congress and the incumbent administration should
ensure that agencies responsible for selecting, vetting
and processing nominees are prepared for a surge in
nominations in the first and fifth years of a presidency.
The House Committee on Appropriations passed legisla-
tion in July 2020 in support of additional resources for
the Oce of Government Ethics and the Oce of Presi-
dential Personnel to process a high number of nominees
during the transition to a first or second term. The Senate
should follow suit.
103
102 Congressional Research Service, “Presidential Appointee Positions
Requiring Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling Nomina-
tions,” RL30959, May 2017. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/32rk5pf
103 “Financial Services and General Government Appropria-
tions Bill, 2021,” H.R. 7768, 116th Congress, 2020. Retrieved from
https://bit.ly/3165HCj
24 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
CONCLUSION
The use of acting ocials to fill vacant Senate-confirmed
positions is not a new phenomenon. The Trump admin-
istration, though, has taken an unconventional approach
to stang and used more acting ocials than previous
administrations. While Trump’s preference for acting of-
ficials and the rate of turnover in his administration are
important factors behind many vacancies and temporary
ocials, these factors alone do not tell the whole story.
Many other issues contribute, including the confirmation
process, the Senate’s use of nominations as a negotiation
tool and policy preferences. Some jobs have not been
filled for multiple presidencies, while other vacancies
may have little impact on the functioning of the govern-
ment.
Our government works best when it has a full team of
capable and committed individuals serving in career po-
sitions and political appointments. A long-term reliance
on temporary ocials without Senate confirmation may
hinder long-term planning, erode employee morale and
reduce accountability. A presidential administration and
Congress share responsibility for filling critical roles, but
the current process is fraught with challenges. More can
and should be done to ensure that the American people
are well-served by a fully staed and fully accountable
government — and to reassert the Senate’s constitutional
authority to provide advice and consent on senior gov-
ernment appointments.
THE REPLACEMENTS 25
METHODOLOGY
The Partnership for Public Service conducted interviews
with many public ocials, Senate sta and domain ex-
perts throughout 2019 and 2020 to complete this report.
Information about stang, appointments and vacancies
is current as of Aug. 17, 2020, unless otherwise noted.
To find up-to-date information, refer to the data-
base maintained by the Partnership and The Washington
Post. The database tracks more than 700 key positions
and shows the number of appointees confirmed by the
Senate, the progress of candidates as they go through the
nomination and confirmation process, and the jobs for
which there is a vacancy and no nominee. The appointee
database is located at wapo.st/2JUQPi2
PROJECT TEAM
PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
Bob Cohen
Senior Writer and Editor
Christina Condreay
Research Associate
Troy Cribb
Director of Policy
Samantha Donaldson
Vice President, Communications
Paul Hitlin
Senior Research Manager
Tim Markatos
Associate Design Manager
Audrey Pfund
Senior Design and Web Manager
Monica Scigliano
Government Aairs Associate
Kristine Simmons
Vice President, Government Aairs
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, PhD
Senior Fellow, Miller Center, UVA
Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Additional thanks to the following Partnership sta for
their contributions: Jaqlyn Aldrete, Dan Blair, Katie Bryan,
Shannon Carroll, Drew Flanagan, Diane Hill, John Kelley,
David Marchick, Loren DeJonge Schulman, Kayla Shana-
han, Tina Sung and Alexander Tippett.
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