Regional mobile
infrastructure
inquiry
July 2023
Final report
ii
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
Ngunnawal
23 Marcus Clarke Street, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, 2601
© Commonwealth of Australia 2023
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Important notice
The information in this publication is for general guidance only. It does not constitute legal or other professional advice, and should not be relied
on as a statement of the law in any jurisdiction. Because it is intended only as a general guide, it may contain generalisations. You should obtain
professional advice if you have any specic concern.
The ACCC has made every reasonable effort to provide current and accurate information, but it does not make any guarantees regarding the
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ACCC 07/23_23-27
www.accc.gov.au
Acknowledgment of country
The ACCC acknowledges the traditional owners and custodians of Country throughout
Australia and recognises their continuing connection to the land, sea and community. We pay
our respects tothem and their cultures; and to their Elders past, present and future.
iii
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Contents
Executive summary 1
1. About the Inquiry and report 3
1.1 The Inquiry has conducted consultation and information gathering 3
1.2 Release of report on preliminary ndings 4
2. Regional mobile consumer experiences and perspectives 5
2.1 Regional, rural and remote consumers report lower quality of mobile services than
urban consumers 5
2.2 Consumers need access to reliable and resilient communications services during
natural disasters 9
2.3 Customers want wider mobile data services coverage with more capacity 12
2.4 Remote First Nations communities face poorer mobile service 14
3. Industry context and regulatory framework 18
3.1 Industry context 19
3.2 Changed industry landscape due to tower divestments 20
3.3 Regulatory arrangements 23
4. Costs of providing towers and associated infrastructure 28
4.1 Towers are a fundamental part of mobile networks 28
4.2 A mobile network operator has options when adding sites to its network 30
4.3 Ongoing costs 45
5. Land access 48
5.1 Land access arrangements 48
5.2 Land access costs vary signicantly 51
5.3 Costs of accessing Crown land 52
5.4 Planning rules vary across states, territories and different levels of
government 54
5.5 Stakeholders advocated for planning reforms 56
5.6 The impact of land aggregators 57
6. Effectiveness of tower access arrangements 59
6.1 Commercial arrangements for access to towers may be limiting coverage
expansion 59
6.2 Tower divestment has altered terms of access 62
6.3 Regulatory arrangements for access to towers could be more effective 66
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
7. Providing towers and access to towers 69
7.1 Mobile network operator demand drives mobile network infrastructure
providers’ investment 69
8. The impact of mobile market competitive dynamics 75
8.1 Gaining and retaining market share is the largest driver of providing greater
mobile coverage 75
8.2 Spectrum access is not currently a barrier to expansion for incumbent
operators, but the cost of deploying spectrum may affect its use 80
9. Temporary mobile roaming 82
9.1 Temporary mobile roaming is technically feasible 82
9.2 Any solution needs to consider technical, policy and commercial factors 86
9.3 Support systems and business processes required 91
9.4 Multiple communications options are needed during a natural disaster
or emergency 95
Consolidated list of ndings 97
Regional, rural and remote consumers report lower quality of mobile services
than urban consumers 97
Costs of providing towers and associated infrastructure, including infrastructure sharing
arrangements 98
Costs of accessing land to provide towers and associated infrastructure 99
Effectiveness of commercial and regulatory tower access arrangements 99
Demand for towers is derived from the demand from mobile network operators for
those towers 100
The impact of mobile market competitive dynamics 100
Temporary mobile roaming 101
Appendix A: Denitions and terms used in this report 102
Denitions of regional, rural, remote and peri-urban 104
Appendix B: Ministers Direction 106
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Executive summary
In March 2022, the ACCC was directed to conduct an inquiry into access to towers and other
infrastructure used in the supply of mobile telecommunications and other radiocommunications
services in regional areas, and into the feasibility of providing mobile roaming during natural disasters
or other emergencies (the Inquiry).
Consumers of these services have told us that they expect mobile coverage in their homes, where
they work and where they travel. These expectations are largely met in cities and more populous
areas of Australia. However, many consumers in regional, rural and remote areas of Australia
continue to report experiences of poor coverage, congestion and, in many locations, a limited choice
of retail service providers.
Further, there are still many First Nations people living in communities in remote parts of Australia
with extremely limited access to mobile network coverage and substantially poorer mobile
connectivity compared with urban Australia.
The Inquiry has looked at many factors which could ultimately affect the incentives of mobile network
operators to invest in providing greater and improved mobile coverage. A key question is how these
incentives could be increased by reducing the cost of providing greater coverage and removing
obstacles for them to do so.
Providing greater mobile coverage relies primarily on increasing the number of sites used by a mobile
network operator. The 2 most common ways are for mobile network operators to build a new tower
or co-locate on a tower owned by someone else.
The cost of building a new tower is typically more expensive than co-locating. It appears that the
mobile network operators no longer build their own towers, except when subsidised by government
co-contribution programs, with the majority of towers now owned by mobile network infrastructure
providers. Nevertheless, the costs incurred by the mobile network infrastructure providers in building
towers will ultimately be passed on to the mobile network operators in access fees.
There may be ways to reduce the cost of building new towers or making it a faster and easier
process. Many stakeholders expressed support for the concept of reforms to streamline existing
state, territory and local government rules and better facilitate infrastructure deployment.
In terms of co-locating, a regulatory regime that removes obstacles for access to towers and relevant
facilities and that reduces the costs for mobile network operators to do so is required. This will enable
mobile network operators and other providers of radiocommunications services to co-locate on
others’ towers more easily.
To this end, there is a need to review the current Facilities Access Regimes under
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) (Telecommunications Act). In the short-term, the ACCC can
review the existing Facilities Access Code and consider whether to make a code under Part 34B
of the Telecommunications Act. However, a broader concern is that the Facilities Access Regimes
do not cover the eld. Whether a tower owner is required to give access depends on whether the
owner has a carrier licence or is part of a corporate group in which at least one company has a
carrier licence. The divestment or transfer of mobile towers by mobile network operators to large
mobile network infrastructure providers means that there is uneven application of the Facilities
Access Regimes: Amplitel and Indara are subject to the Part 34B Telecommunications Act facilities
access regime but not the current Facilities Access Code (which is under Part 5 of Schedule 1 of the
Telecommunications Act). Waveconn is not subject to any facilities access regime.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Government should consider whether it is necessary that a mobile network infrastructure provider
be subject to a facilities access regime and a Facilities Access Code. Submissions to this Inquiry
have argued that mobile network infrastructure providers have incentives to maximise tenancy,
which is different from the incentives of the mobile network operators to provide co-location prior
to divestment. However, we have not seen evidence indicating that the market for the provision
of tower access has become more competitive or that the prices for access to towers are lower
since divestment.
A competitive market for access to towers could potentially result in more active sharing or neutral
host arrangements in areas otherwise considered uneconomical to one mobile network operator.
1
Arguably, this would likely further reduce the cost of providing mobile coverage compared to seeking
co-location, as they involve the sharing of not just passive but also active infrastructure. If active
sharing or neutral host models were limited to deployment in areas where there is otherwise no
commercial incentive to provide services, we consider this would be a positive development. It could
lead to more infrastructure sharing and competition in regional, rural and remote areas, depending
on the type of arrangement. Given demand for mobile coverage in regional areas, if this model does
not emerge in the near future, it is likely being constrained by the commercial incentives of mobile
network operators, mobile network infrastructure providers, or both.
Ultimately, a mobile network operator will consider whether the cost of providing greater or improved
mobile coverage is outweighed by the benet in doing so. The state of competition in the retail
mobiles market heavily inuences whether benets outweigh costs. The desire to differentiate
on network coverage has historically driven investment in regional areas, particularly by Telstra
and Optus. However, Telstra’s enduring competitive advantage in regional areas has the potential
to undermine other mobile network operator’s incentives to continually invest in improving their
regional coverage.
Importantly, we were required to report on the feasibility of temporary mobile roaming during natural
disasters and other such emergencies.
Consumers have highlighted to us the importance of mobile connectivity during natural disasters
to remain up to date with emergency news and to stay in touch with family and friends. Many have
described the stress and isolation that a lack of mobile services causes during natural disasters.
Stakeholders also emphasised the importance of mobile network resiliency during times of
natural disasters.
We have found that temporary mobile roaming during natural disasters is technically feasible, while
acknowledging that there are issues that mobile network operators and government will need to
consider to implement this capability. Implementation of temporary mobile roaming requires changes
to the mobile network operators’ business processes and network and operational systems and
there are costs to them in establishing and maintaining a temporary mobile roaming capability.
Government agencies and industry would also need to develop frameworks and protocols with the
mobile network operators for initiating and deactivating temporary mobile roaming.
1 Active sharing arrangements involve the sharing of active infrastructure in the radio access network such as antennas,
transmission and spectrum.
Neutral host refers to network infrastructure owned and maintained by a third party that rents or leases its infrastructure to
any network operators looking to scale up their network capacities.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 About the Inquiry and report
On 31 March 2022, the Australian Government directed the ACCC (the Direction) to conduct an
inquiry in relation to:
a. access to towers and associated passive and active infrastructure provided by
telecommunications and other infrastructure providers in regional, rural, remote and peri-urban
areas within Australia, that can be used in the supply of mobile telecommunications and other
radiocommunications services; and
b. the feasibility of temporary mobile roaming services to be provided during natural disasters and
other such emergencies.
2
Access to towers has been a renewed area of focus for government in light of the increasing
importance of mobile telecommunications, the rising cost of living and the recent divestments of
tower assets and the, as yet indetermined, potential impact of tower access on regional, rural and
remote consumers.
The 2021 Regional Telecommunications Review recommended undertaking a feasibility study into
temporary mobile roaming services. Other recommendations concerned mobile coverage, capacity
and competition issues.
3
The ACCC has had regard to the matters specied in the Direction. The Inquiry has considered the
costs of building telecommunications towers and associated infrastructure, including land access,
and their relationship to access seeker fees. The Inquiry also examines the determinants of industry
investment into towers and expanded mobile coverage. The Inquiry also examines the feasibility of
temporary mobile roaming during natural disasters and emergencies.
The Inquiry is intended to provide an evidence base to the Australian Government to support future
policy decisions on these matters and we have considered the issues through this lens.
A glossary of terms and denitions used in this report can be found at Appendix A. The Direction
from the Australian Government can be found at Appendix B.
 

On 1 July 2022 the ACCC published a consultation paper and sought submissions.
4
We received 59
submissions from stakeholders.
On 20 September 2022 the ACCC published an online consumer survey via its Consultation Hub,
which sought responses to the following questions:
How are businesses and consumers impacted by a lack of mobile coverage?
Do you support the provision of mobile roaming during emergencies?
Where can mobile coverage be improved?
2 The Hon Paul Fletcher MP, then Minister for Communications, urban Infrastructure, Cities and the Arts, Telecommunications
(ACCC Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and Associated Infrastructure) Direction 2022, 25March2022, accessed
23 June 2023.
3 Regional Telecommunications Independent Review Committee (RTIRC), 2021 Regional Telecommunications Review – A step
change in demand, 14 February 2022, accessed 23 June 2023.
4 ACCC, Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry consultation paper, 1 July 2022, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
The consumer survey closed on 31 March 2023. The Inquiry received 1,483 responses to the survey
and these responses are reected in this report. We received responses from consumers, businesses
and also some government entities such as local councils.
In 2023, the ACCC hosted 3 stakeholder forums for:
consumers and consumer organisations (22 February, via Microsoft Teams)
emergency services organisations and related bodies (2 March, via Microsoft Teams)
industry stakeholders (16 March, in Sydney).
The Inquiry also engaged:
remote First Nations communities and local businesses in the Northern Territory Nauiyu/Daly
River region, alongside the ACCCs First Nations Outreach team
rural and regional consumers at the Wimmera Machinery Field Day in Longerenong, Victoria
a number of other State, Local and Federal government, industry and consumer group
stakeholders throughout the Inquiry.
The Inquiry team also visited mobile tower sites, at the invitation of Amplitel and Indara.
We have received condential material as part of the Inquiry. We have included some of this material
in this report with the consent of the information providers.
All analysis and ndings in this report have had regard to and are based on information and evidence
obtained throughout the Inquiry, and other publicly available information.
We thank all stakeholders for their engagement with the Inquiry.
 
We released a report on our preliminary ndings on 18April 2023 and sought stakeholder feedback
on those ndings. We received 9 submissions to the report, which are available on our website. We
have considered the issues stakeholders raised in drafting this nal report and its ndings.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 Regional mobile consumer
experiences and perspectives
The ACCC consulted with members of the community who may be interested in improvements in
mobile coverage and/or temporary mobile roaming services to be provided during natural disasters
and other such emergencies.
While the ndings from this Inquiry are consistent with ndings from previous research
and other inquiries, we raise the concerns we have heard from regional, rural, remote and
peri-urban Australians.
 


We consulted widely with consumers living in, working in, and visiting regional, rural, remote, and
peri-urban areas. We heard a range of views from consumers about their needs and expectations,
because consumers access and use mobile services in a variety of ways.
Overall, we heard a consistent message that mobile network operators are continuing to fail to meet
consumer demand for mobile services in regional, rural, remote, and peri-urban areas, particularly in
relation to coverage and capacity.
Many consumers told the Inquiry that they desire the same level of services as those living in urban
areas.
5
The 2021 Australian Digital Inclusion Index survey found that approximately 2.8million
Australians experienced digital exclusion, and that exclusion is more pronounced in regional
areas compared to urban areas.
6
Additionally, our consumer survey showed that around 78% of
respondents considered that mobile coverage in their area was poor, very poor, or none (see below).
Consumers living and working in regional, rural and remote areas told us that they are concerned that
their service levels will fall further behind as demand for mobile services, especially for data services,
continues to grow. The ACCC also heard similar concerns from consumers living and working in
peri-urban areas about their mobile phone services.
7
Consumers and consumer representative groups continued to report issues around the accuracy
and comparability of mobile coverage maps, which is consistent with concerns we heard in the
5 For example, ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023; Macdonald Valley Association, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 1 August 2022,
p 1, accessed 27 June 2023; BHore, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 July 2022 p 2,
accessed 27 June 2023; National Farmers’ Federation, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
16 August 2022, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
6 The 2021 Australian Digital Inclusion Index results show that 11% of Australians experience a high level of digital exclusion,
which is around 2.8 million people in 2021. See, J Thomas et al, Measuring Australia’s Digital Divide: Australian Digital
Inclusion Index: 2021, RMIT, Swinburne University of Technology, and Telstra, 2021, p 5, accessed 23 June 2023.
7 A peri-urban area is characterised as the transition from an urban to a rural area. Peri-urban areas can also have geographic
terrain which makes is more dicult to supply mobile networks such as dense foliage or mountains. See appendix A for
further information on the denitions used in the Inquiry.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
ACCC’s Regional Mobiles Issues Forum 2018.
8
For example, the Murraylands and Riverlands Local
Government Association noted in its submission that coverage maps do not reect the experience
on the ground and that there were no clear standards for good or acceptable mobile service.
9
Stakeholders told us that mobile network operators should also include performance standard
metrics such as congestion.
10
In areas where coverage is sparse, some consumers devise ‘work-arounds’ by purchasing repeaters
11
,
services with multiple providers to maximise the coverage area by using dual Subscriber Identity
Module (SIM) phones or carrying multiple devices.
12
Consumers noted that while there are technical options to improve coverage, these options have
some limitations and can be prohibitive in cost.
13
For example, the increased coverage that cellular
repeaters can provide is dependent on the strength of the existing mobile network. Some consumers
also commented that repeaters sold by the mobile network operators only worked on the operators
network, which is more likely to lock a consumer into that network.
14
Comments from our consumer survey
We have to have a mobile booster to get service but it is slow. We get no service where we
work and even satellite is unreliable.
‘[The respondent’s mobile] only works at station homestead with help of booster towers and
can be hard for people to hear us.
‘Coverage and reliability has deteriorated in recent years… We need to use [name] booster and
[name] antenna in all the houses in order to have coverage inside.
Network congestion issues are also a key concern for regional consumers.
15
The joint effect of the
inux of people moving to regional areas and increasing demand for data appear to be contributing to
congestion.
16
This is consistent with the feedback to our consumer survey (see below). Respondents
told us they are increasingly reliant on their mobile phones to access a range of services including
8 For example, Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure
Inquiry; 4 August 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023; B Hore, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
29July 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023; Regional Development Australia Grampians, Public submission to the Regional
Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5August 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023; ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the
Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
9 Murraylands and Riverlands Local Government Association, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
3 April 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
10 ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023.
11 Cellular mobile repeaters extend the coverage of mobile phone service by boosting the strength of the received radio signals
and re-radiating the signal in the area where the coverage is poor. The use of repeaters in Australia is regulated by the
Australian Communications and Media Authority in order to prevent increases in signal interference and noise.
12 ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023. The ACCC also received multiple stakeholder comments to this effect in our Inquiry survey.
13 For example, W Kurz and B Kurz, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 1 August 2022, pp 1–2,
accessed 27 June 2023; BLingard, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 28 January 2023, p 1,
accessed 27 June 2023; Roper Gulf Regional Council, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
5 September 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
14 For example, ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023; ACCC interviews at the 2023 Wimmera Field Days, 7 – 9 March 2023.
15 For example, P Penfold, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 1 August 2022, p 1, accessed
27 June 2023; Regional Development Australia – Yorke and Mid North, Public submission to the Regional Mobile
Infrastructure Inquiry, 31 March 2023, pp 8–12, accessed 27 June 2023.
16 For example, ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023. The Light Regional Council describe the expected growth of 10,000 persons over the next 1015 years in
their Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 9 March 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023. Destination
Gippsland Ltd explain how mobile services are used by businesses and consumers for data services in its Public submission
to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 9 March 2023, pp 1–2, accessed 27 June 2023.
7
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
banking, social services and to perform business related activities. Over half of our survey
respondents had a least 3 mobile devices in their household.
Seasonal inuxes of tourists and the staging of events, where the networks are unable to deal with a
sudden surge in demand, can also cause regional congestion.
17
For example, the Alpine Shire Council
submission described how the overnight and day visitor markets during peak holiday periods and an
increasing reliance on telecommunications technology ‘has led to a service that is grossly inadequate
to support our escalating needs.’ Its submission also highlighted the pressures of regional population
growth after COVID-19.
18
Congestion on a mobile network under normal usage indicates underinvestment by the mobile
network operator in the capacity of their network. Given the high cost of investing in mobile
infrastructure in regional and remote areas, there are areas where the population density is too low
for a business case for the mobile network operators to invest in their networks to address these
coverage and congestion issues on a commercial basis.
Comments from our consumer survey
‘Congestion on the network is [an] issue on a normal day let alone during [an]
emergency event.
‘Not only does the coverage need to improve, so does the bandwidth. [There is] severe
congestion, and poor-quality connectivity.
We have a tower within 10 kms but the tower is congested… and no upgrade planned in the
foreseeable future.
…My family has taken risk minimisation approach and we have split our mobile phones
between different carriers to maximise our chances of one service... ‘
This is not safe and for business is unproductive and causes me to either stop or make calls
later which just leads me to work longer hours or miss business opportunities.
u Finding1
Mobile services are vitally important to consumers in regional, rural and remote Australia but
these consumers are concerned about coverage and congestion issues.
17 For example Dr Helen Haines MP, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 1 March 2023, p 1,
accessed 27 June 2023; Destination Gippsland Ltd, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
9 March 2023, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
18 Alpine Shire Council, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 3 August 2022, p 1, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Highlights from our survey –
how respondents use their mobile phones
Most of the respondents to our survey use their mobile primarily for personal use (96%).
A high proportion also use their phone for business use (72%) and for banking (72%).
Over half of respondents had three
or more mobile network devices in
their household. Some respondents
noted that while they may have
mobile-capable devices, there may
not be mobile coverage at home.
Some respondents noted a lack of
mobile connectivity as a reason for
not having any mobile devices.
Note: responses to each question of the survey were optional. Percentages of responses in the charts above are shown as
a proportion of total responses rather than responses to that question, meaning that totals may not add to 100%.
Most respondents (78%) rated
the mobile coverage in their
area as poor, very poor or none.
What respondents use their mobile phone service for
How many devices respondents have in their
household connecting to mobile networks
How respondents rate the availability of
their mobile coverage in their area
total number
of responses
to our survey
And of the total
respondents,
NoneVery poorPoorGoodVery good
4%
17%
34%
39%
5%
Respondents mostly use their
mobile phones while at home or
while travelling. A large majority
also use their mobile phone at
work. Some responses to the
survey were from businesses.
Where respondents use their mobile phone
95%
While travellingAt workAt home
Other location
(e.g. visiting relatives
or friends)
73%
93%
74%
OtherBankingTelehealthEducationBusinessPersonal use Social services
(e.g. myGov or
Centrelink)
Professional
consultations
(e.g. legal or financial)
96%
72%
30%
39%
53%
72%
35%
9%
live in a regional,
rural, remote or
First Nations
community
69%
1,483
2%
0
8%
23%
19%
18%
10%
18%
1 2 3
Number of devices
4 5 6+
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 


Many stakeholders have emphasised the importance of remaining connected during emergencies
and natural disasters.
19
Mobile services are particularly important because they provide consumers
and emergency services organisations with real-time information, access to emergency services,
ability to contact loved ones, and resources for post-disaster recovery.
20
The Local Government
Association of Queensland adds that ‘community members who are not at direct risk could help to
coordinate rescue, access support, and be in contact with family members.
21
Further, as the National
Farmers’ Federation stated in its submission, in emergency situations, ’this impact is felt not just
during the events, but in many cases for an extended period following.
22
Consumers also told us about signicant safety concerns with gaps in mobile coverage, particularly
along main transport corridors between regional and remote towns.
23
For example, consumers
told us that having to drive to an area of coverage to call for help after trac accidents or other
emergencies is common.
24
This was consistent with the results from our consumer survey (see
below). Three quarters of respondents who had experienced a natural disaster told us their mobile
coverage was below their usual level of service, with almost half nding it very dicult or were unable
to connect at all.
19 For example, Primary Producers SA, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 23 August 2022,
23 August 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023; Isolated Children’s Parents’ Association of Australia, Public submission to
the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 26 August 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023; Light Regional Council, Public
submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 9 March 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023; NSW Small Business
Commissioner, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 27 July 2022, p1, accessed 27 June 2023;
The Hon D Littleproud MP, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 31 March 2023, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023.
20 For example, Australian Local Government Association, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
5 September 2022, pp 1–4, accessed 27 June 2023; National Farmers’ Federation, Public submission to the Regional Mobile
Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023; Moree Plains Shire Council, Public submission to the
Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 February 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
21 Local Government Association of Queensland, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
11 October 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
22 National Farmers’ Federation, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, pp 6–7,
accessed 27 June 2023.
23 ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023; see also for example, M Devine, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
2 August 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023; K Hawkins, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
10 March 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
24 For example, Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure
Inquiry; 4 August 2022, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023; ACCC interviews at the 2023 Wimmera Field Days, 7–9 March
2023, accessed 27 June 2023; Primary Producers SA, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
23 August 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
10
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
We have heard broad support for temporary roaming capability for natural disasters, due to these
concerns.
25
However, stakeholders stressed the importance of network resilience in establishing
any temporary roaming capability, and noted potential challenges, including power outages and
congestion.
26
This topic is discussed further in chapter 9 of this report.
u Finding2
Consumers need reliable and resilient mobile services. They have a heightened need for access
to these services during emergency situations such as natural disasters.
25 For example, Isolated Children’s Parents’ Association of Australia, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure
Inquiry, 26 August 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023; Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, Public
submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 4 August 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
26 For example, Isolated Children’s Parents’ Association of Australia, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure
Inquiry, 26 August 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023; Kalang Progress Association, Public submission to the Regional Mobile
Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 January 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
11
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
7%
15%
29%
26%
22%
Mostly normal,
with some
service drop outs
Intermittent
access with
regular drop outs
Very difficult or
rare to receive
mobile reception
Not able to
connect
As normal
Highlights from our survey –
respondent experiences during natural disasters
Consumer Comments
Many of the respondents who had experienced a natural disaster event had issues with
mobile phone connectivity during the event. Around 76% of respondents rated their mobile
phone connectivity as being below mostly normal during natural disasters.
‘Voice and data are crucial during a natural disaster... it
should be in place until normal services are operational.
’Service is often worse during and after major rain events…
It is usually at the start of a crisis where
telecommunications are needed most.
‘Telstra is the only operator in the greater region. Optus have
service in Nhulunbuy but it is co-located on the same tower
as the Telstra services. If the tower gets damaged in a
natural disaster - both services will be ineffective.
Any communication in a disaster or emergency is a must.
Note: responses to each question of the survey were optional. Percentages of responses in the charts above are shown
as a proportion of total responses rather than responses to that question, meaning that totals may not add to 100%.
Of the respondents who had a experienced a natural disaster or other such emergency,
how was access to mobile networks during that time?
Of respondents were involved with the emergency
services response to the natural disaster in their area
33%
Of respondents have experienced
a natural disaster or other such
emergency where they currently live
Of respondents thought that temporary
mobile roaming would benefit them or
their community during a natural
disaster or other such emergency
62%
80%
&
12
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 

The way consumers use their mobile phones is changing, with data becoming increasingly
important. Patchy coverage affects the ability of consumers to undertake online tasks related to
their businesses, health, or education, as well as consumers’ ability to adopt new technologies. The
National Farmers’ Federation has stated this issue is prevalent across and between farms.
27
To illustrate how mobile data is used in rural areas, Australian farmers have adopted internet-enabled
digital technologies such as farm machinery and ground sensors that require a reliable mobile service
to communicate back to a central database or device.
28
Such technologies increase productivity,
improve sustainability, create eciencies, and provide some resilience to labour shortages.
29
In
its submission to the ACCC, Australian Grape and Wine described the costs to business revenue,
decreased well-being and worker safety, and lost opportunities to improve sustainable resource
use and reduce carbon emissions‘ as a result of poor coverage.
30
In its submission to the Inquirys
preliminary ndings, Connected Farms noted the importance of on-farm connectivity and reliable
internet access to help deliver increased farm gate values for the sector by 2030.
31
u Finding3
Reliable access to the internet is an increasing issue in the agriculture industry. Mobile
connectivity can impact the eciency and competitiveness of farms.
Consumers are concerned about the closure of the 3G network
in 2024
Stakeholders raised concerns in public submissions and at our Consumer forum about the upcoming
closure of 3G in 2024 and full transition to 4G and 5G.
32
Stakeholders fear that some users will lose
mobile coverage for their mobile voice, Internet of Things, and broadband data, or that there will be
insucient capacity in the network.
Over the past few years, several technical enhancements have been made to 4G and 5G which
enable them to support better voice, Internet of Things and data coverage and capacity than 3G.
However, we note that these improvements depend on the mobile network operators replacing all or
the majority of the closed 3G sites with 4G or 5G using a similar frequency band as that used for 3G.
Detailed roadmaps, including timelines, may provide regional and rural consumers with assurance
27 National Farmers’ Federation, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, p 4, accessed
27 June 2023.
28 For example, ACCC interviews at the 2023 Wimmera Field Days, 7 – 9 March 2023; Primary Producers SA, Public submission
to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 23 August 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023; Australian Grape and Wine,
Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 March 2023, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023; I Lewis, Public
submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 4 August 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
29 For example, Primary Producers SA, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 23 August 2022, p 1,
accessed 27 June 2023; Rock Ridge Farming, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 2 August 2022,
p 2, accessed 27 June 2023; Moree Plains Shire Council, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
8 February 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
30 Australian Grape & Wine, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 March 2023, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023.
31 Connected Farms, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings,
16 May 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023. This target was also noted in Primary Producers SA, Public submission to the
Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 23 August, 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
32 ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023.
13
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
that they will have at least a minimum level of coverage equivalence when the 3G network is shut
down.
33
Our analysis on provided maps indicates there are a number of areas in regional, rural and
remote areas currently with 3G coverage where there is no 4G coverage.
We do note that a small number of consumers with 3G-only mobile phones will need to replace their
phones with handsets that are 4G capable. The replacement of 3G Internet of Things devices such
as farm-based Internet of Things devices and EFTPOS terminals is a larger issue.
34
These devices
generally have a longer lifespan than a mobile phone, with the expense amortised over a number of
years.
35
Comments from submissions
The removal of 3G will affect the use of 3G equipment and sensors used by the agricultural
and horticultural sectors. Stakeholders want a guaranteed replacement service before the
3G network is switched off. (Murraylands and Riverlands Local Government Association).
36
u Finding4
There are areas where there is 3G network coverage but currently no 4G or 5G coverage.
Consumers are concerned that 4G and 5G coverage will not be equivalent to 3G coverage
before the 3G shutdown in 2024.
33 For example, Small Business and Family Ombudsmen, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
5August 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
34 For example, B Hore, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 July, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
35 Ingenu, Without Device Longevity, the Internet of Things Will Never Be, 20 January 2016, accessed 23 June 2023.
36 Murraylands and Riverlands Local Government Association, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
3 April 2023, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
14
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 

Access to mobile network infrastructure has improved for most consumers in regional, rural and
remote Australia.
37
However, First Nations peoples living in small, dispersed, and very remote
communities, homelands, or outstations still face signicant limitations in accessing reliable mobile
telecommunications services.
38
Two key factors contribute to this challenge:
Gaps in mobile network coverage in areas of sparse population.
39
Many First Nations people living in remote communities prefer using mobile devices to access
the internet, rather than xed broadband services that generally have more capacity for
household internet consumption.
40
Mobile phones provide portability and the ability to top up with
pre-paid access.
Central Australian Youth Link Up Service’s submission noted that ‘remote Aboriginal communities
have been the last to benet from improvements in communications technologiesand that ‘the
market model for communications infrastructure and communications is not t for purpose in remote
regions.
41
These issues were also noted during the 2021 Regional Telecommunications Review.
42
There are gaps in mobile network coverage in remote First Nations
communities
Remote First Nations communities are less likely to have access to mobile infrastructure, resulting
in network coverage gaps. The network coverage gaps in these communities arise from limited
market-based eciencies in building mobile infrastructure in very remote areas.
43
This is due to the
high costs associated with building mobile infrastructure, and the low revenue opportunities that
sparsely populated areas offer to commercial operators.
44
Co-investment programs have had limited success in expanding mobile coverage to very remote
communities, because the government share in these programs is not sucient to incentivise
mobile network operators to invest in costly mobile infrastructure in areas with little commercial
value.
45
Remote First Nations communities with larger populations, those with tourist economies or
37 Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
4August 2022, pp.1–2, accessed 27 June 2023.
38 Dr D Featherstone, Remote Indigenous Communications Review: Telecommunications Programs and Current Needs for
Remote Indigenous Communities, October 2020, accessed 23 June 2023.
39 For example, Central Land Council, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 15 March 2023, p 2,
accessed 27 June 2023.
40 For example, First Nations Media Australia, Indigenous Community Perspectives and Experiences of Digital Inclusion,
February 2021, accessed 23 June 2023; ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
22 February 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
41 Central Australian Youth Link Up Service, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 23 January 2023,
pp 1, 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
42 For example, Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, Submission to the Regional Telecommunications
Review 2021, 30 September 2021, accessed 23 June 2023.
43 For example, Central Australian Youth Link-Up Service, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
23January 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
44 For example, Local Government Association of Queensland, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
11 October 2022, pp 6–7, accessed 27 June 2023; Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, Submission to the
National Indigenous Australians Agency Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan, 5 November 2021, accessed 23 June 2023.
45 Co-investment programs are government funded programs, where the government will contribute to the capital costs to
build infrastructure in areas where it would normally not be commercially viable for a mobile network operator or mobile
network infrastructure provider to build a tower. Examples of co-investment programs include the Mobile Black Spots
Program and Regional Connectivity Program.
15
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
communities located near major regional cities or major roads appear more likely to have access to
mobile services than remoter communities, where there is often no coverage.
Misalignment between use and purpose of infrastructure used for
internet consumption
Stakeholders at our consumer stakeholder forum commented that remote-based First Nations
peoples may prefer to use relatively inexpensive mobile services to access voice, SMS, and internet
services. We heard this is because mobile services are perceived to be more exible and affordable
than other communications services because consumers can purchase pre-paid plans which can
then be topped up.
46
Smartphone devices offer highly portable access to voice and data services, which is especially
important for remote-based First Nations peoples, who can be highly mobile and often travel for
cultural reasons between communities and homelands. We also heard at our stakeholder forum that
mobile phones are preferred and that they can be shared within the household.
47
However, the existing mobile infrastructure does not have sucient backhaul capability to carry the
increasing levels of household internet consumption, resulting in severe congestion or unavailability
of the mobile network for consumers.
48
Stakeholders told us of the importance of reliable mobile
phone coverage to purchase goods and access government services.
49
We also heard at our consumer forum that pre-paid plans are considered more affordable in the
short-term if a consumer has a low or unreliable income. Consumers perceive it is a more effective
budgetary control to ‘top up’ a pre-paid plan than purchase an ongoing post-paid service which falls
due at specic times, is often paid via direct debit and non-payment can lead to disconnection and
a poor credit rating. Stakeholders at our consumer forum also commented that pre-paid plans are
currently not available for NBN xed wireless services as an alternative service in the home. Mobile
devices provide more exibility as they provide access in the home and while travelling for cultural or
business reasons.
We also heard from stakeholders about the unreliability of landline phones and the lack of
maintenance of telecommunications infrastructure in remote communities.
50
The Central Australian
Youth Link-Up Service noted that pre-paid plans are the most manageable way for First Nations
peoples to access communications but also the most expensive.
51
u Finding5
First Nations peoples living in remote communities often have unreliable communications
services.
46 Central Australian Youth Link-Up Service, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 23 January 2023,
pp 3–4, accessed 27 June 2023; ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
22 February 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
47 ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023.
48 First Nations Media Australia, Indigenous Community Perspectives and Experiences of Digital Inclusion, February 2021,
accessed 23 June 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
49 ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023.
50 ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023.
51 Central Australian Youth Link-Up Service, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 23 January 2023,
p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
16
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Mobile services in Nauiyu
In November 2022, ACCC ocers visited the remote Malak Malak community of Nauiyu to hear
from consumers living in remote areas about their mobile phone services. Nauiyu is located in the
Katherine Region of the Northern Territory, approximately 224km southwest of Darwin, and has a
population of approximately 350people.
52
The community features a strong tourist economy based
on its proximity to the Daly River, in addition to ne art and farming businesses.
53
During the visit to Nauiyu, local residents told us that the mobile network services in the area were
limited despite demand for both voice and data services from both the local population and frequent
visitors supporting the tourist economy. We heard that the 4G network coverage was reasonable near
the mobile tower, which was located behind the local council oce. However, the mobile network
coverage deteriorated and eventually dropped out as residents travelled further away from the tower
to attend school and conduct business. Community stakeholders also reported poor penetration of
mobile network coverage into dwellings near the tower.
Figure 1: Map of Nauiyu
Northern
Territory
Nauiyu
Darwin
Image 1: Mobile tower in Nauiyu
Above: Mobile tower in Nauiyu.
54
Source: Photo taken by ACCC staff.
52 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Nauiyu: 2021 Census All persons QuickStats, accessed 23 June 2023.
53 Tourism NT, Burramundi Fishing Charters, accessed 23 June 2023.
54 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Radio Frequency National Site Archive ID 0822007, accessed
23June2023. This tower is a 31m steel guyed mast.
17
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Figure 2: Mobile coverage in Nauiyu
Source: Data collected by the ACCC’s Infrastructure Record Keeping Rules and published on data.gov.au. Imagery provided by
Bing and Precisely. Mobile coverage is as at 31 January 2022. See ACCC, Mobile infrastructure Report – data release,
12 September 2022.
Note: Nauiyu’s mobile tower transmits 3G (lighter blue shading) with some 4G mobile services available closer to the tower.
Consistent with the feedback from organisations at our consumer stakeholder forum, most dwellings
in Nauiyu do not have a landline or xed wireless internet. Residents reported that they need to go
outdoors to access mobile services due to poor in-building signal penetration, even in dwellings near
the mobile tower.
Nauiyu residents shared the impact of unreliable telecommunications services in their community,
including:
Diminished educational outcomes: we heard from teachers about the challenges in accessing
online learning content and educational resources. They told ACCC staff that poor digital
connectivity can be isolating and leads to understang and younger members leaving
the community.
Diminished healthcare outcomes: clinic staff ying into nearby Woodycupildiya reported no
mobile coverage, making it dicult for residents to access emergency services.
Public safety: community members stressed the importance of mobile network connectivity
for community safety in remote areas, especially on isolated roads with minimal trac and in
the eld where there is a risk of venomous snake bites. Nauiyu also experiences regular ooding
which can impact telecommunications infrastructure in the area, including the EFTPOS terminal
connection failures.
Technician unavailability: due to the lack of community-based technicians, infrastructure is not
serviced within a timely manner, which becomes more pronounced during ooding events.
Purchasing repeaters to extend coverage: mobile phone repeaters are considered unaffordable
by households.
Unreliable satellite services: some community members reported using satellite internet
services but those who did described the service as slow and unavailable during the wet season.
18
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 Industry context and
regulatory framework
Telecommunications is an industry characterised by signicant economies of scale and high barriers
to entry and expansion.
Mobile networks require signicant up-front capital investments in physical infrastructure, active
equipment and spectrum licences to establish a network, and ongoing investment to continue
to expand and densify that network. Mobile network operators are also required to upgrade their
networks periodically to include newer generations of mobile technology, such as 5G.
Providing mobile services has high xed costs, but relatively low variable costs. This cost structure
results in declining unit costs as more services are provided – up to a point.
In the short run, mobile networks have some level of available capacity to carry trac. Large
upgrades to the network, such as additional sites, more spectrum or newer technology, can increase
the capacity of the network in the area in which they are deployed by a step-change amount, allowing
the operator to carry more trac and serve more customers.
Mobile network operators also invest to grow the coverage footprint of their network, in order to serve
customers who live or work or travel to these areas. Australia’s overall population density is low but
distributed in such a way that makes it one of the most urbanised nations in the world. Outside cities
and regional centres, it becomes less economic to provide incremental areas of coverage.
Ultimately, the degree of investment incurred by a mobile network operator will be determined by
whether the business case for investing in additional coverage or increased capacity outweighs
the costs.
Passive infrastructure, such as towers, represents a signicant cost in investing in additional
coverage or increased capacity. Until relatively recently, towers were largely owned and operated by
mobile network operators in Australia.
Internationally, mobile operators have been selling off their tower assets to specialist companies or to
large infrastructure investors for a number of years.
Recent divestment or transfer of their tower assets by Australian mobile network operators has
changed the structure of the industry here. This chapter provides information on the tower industry,
including ownership and corporate structure. It also provides background on the legislative and
regulatory regime that applies to the provision of telecommunications infrastructure.
19
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 
The Australian telecommunications industry has undergone restructuring of its tower assets and
subsidiaries. Historically, mobile network operators built and operated telecommunications tower
infrastructure. Over the last 20 years, mobile network operators have established various joint
ventures and asset sharing arrangements in relation to mobile tower infrastructure to expand
their networks and increase coverage. The Australian telecommunications industry has also been
characterised by several large tower asset sell-offs and restructures, which have generated additional
liquidity for the sector and resulted in new corporate entities, such as Indara, being formed.
During 2021 and 2022, the mobile network operators sold most of their tower infrastructure to
new tower entities, referred to as ‘mobile network infrastructure providers’. A summary of these
transactions is provided below:
In 2021, Telstra transferred over 8,000 of its physical towers, mast, large pole and antenna
mount structures to Amplitel. Telstra retains 51% ownership of Amplitel.
55
Telstra sold a
49% non-controlling interest in Amplitel to a consortium of investors comprising of the Future
Fund, Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation and Sunsuper, and managed by Morrison &
Co.
56
Singapore Telecommunications Limited (Singtel), parent company of Optus, formed the business
Australia Tower Network (ATN) to hold its telecommunications infrastructure.
57
Singtel then sold
70% of ATN to AustralianSuper in late 2021, with Singtel retaining access to the sites through
long-term leasing arrangements.
58
In May 2022, AustralianSuper and Singtel purchased Axicom,
which increased the AustralianSuper investment in ATN to 82% and reduced Singtel’s investment
to 18%.
59
The combined portfolio is more than 4,300 tower and rooftop sites and is now known as
Indara Digital Infrastructure (Indara).
60
Axicom, formerly Crown Castle Australia, originally became a tower asset owner in 2000 when it
acquired 712 mobile tower sites from Optus Group.
61
The following year, Crown Castle acquired
669 of Vodafone Hutchison Australia’s towers. In 2007 and 2008, Crown Castle acquired a further
190 mobile tower sites from Vodafone Hutchison Australia.
62
In May 2022, TPG Telecom sold its mobile towers to Canadian public pension fund OMERS
related entity, Waveconn.
63
Figure 3 below is a visual summary of tower divestments and transfers in Australia since 2001.
55 Riley, B 2021, Introducing Amplitel, the largest mobile infrastructure provider in Australia, Media Release, 1 September 2021,
accessed 23 June 2023.
56 Telstra, Telstra nalises $2.8 billion InfraCo Towers sale, Media Release, 1 September 2021, accessed 23 June 2023.
57 Singtel Telecommunications Limited, Announcement pursuant to rule 706A of the SGX Listing Manual, Media Release,
31August 2020, accessed 23 June 2023.
58 Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Singapore Telecom to Sell 70% Stake in Australian Tower Network to AustralianSuper,
10January 2021, accessed 23 June 2023.
59 ATN, AustralianSuper, Singtel and Australia Tower Network to acquire Axicom, Media Release, 1 April 2022, accessed
23June 2023.
60 Indara, Australia Tower Network and Axicom Rebrands as Indara, Media Release, 11 October 2022, accessed 23 June 2023.
61 Indara, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
62 Indara, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
63 OMERS Infrastructure, OMERS Infrastructure Announces Agreement to Acquire its First Asia-Pacic Digital Infrastructure
Asset, OMERS website, 9 May 2022, accessed 6 October 2022, accessed 27 June 2023.
20
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Figure 3: Summary of key tower transfers and divestments in Australia since 2001
Optus
towers
Vodafone
towers
TPG Telecom
towers
Telstra
towers
Australia
Tower
Network
Australia
Tower
Network
Group
2022 the combined entity of
Australia Tower Network and
Axicom became Indara Digital
Infrastructure (Indara)
Indara
Crown
Castle
Stilmark
Axicom
Amplitel
(82% AustralianSuper,
18% Singtel Optus)
2001 Vodafone
sells 699 2G towers
to Crown Castle
2001 Optus sells
712 2G towers to
Crown Castle
2015 Crown Castle International divested the
Australian business to a consortium of
investors. The company was renamed Axicom.
May 2022 AustralianSuper
and Singtel purchased
Axicom
Waveconn
(100%
OMERS)
2022 TPG Telecom sold all its
towers and rooftops to OMERS
Infrastructure Management
comprising of 1,237 sites
August 2022 the acquisition of TPG Telecom’s and
Stilmark’s towers and rooftops gave Waveconn a
combined footprint of around 1,400 towers and rooftops
(51% Telstra,
49% consortium of
investors)
September 2021 Telstra transferred over 8,000
towers, masts and similar structures to Amplitel
Following the initial
acquisitions in 2001, Crown
Castle purchased various
smaller tower portfolios
In 2021, Australia Tower Network
was transfered 1,512 towers and
800 rooftops from Singtel
 

The divestments that have occurred in Australia are part of an international trend of mobile network
operators selling their passive mobile telecommunications infrastructure to specialist mobile network
infrastructure providers.
Amplitel holds the largest number of towers in Australia
Amplitel and Indara are the 2 largest mobile network infrastructure providers in Australia, but Amplitel
operates the most sites by a signicant margin. Amplitel operates over 8,000 sites,
64
Indara owns
over 4,300 sites
65
and Waveconn operates around 1,400 sites.
66
Cumulatively they own or operate
around 13,700 sites, which is a substantial majority of the approximately 16,600 active mobile
infrastructure sites being used by Optus, Telstra and TPG Telecom as of 31 January 2022.
67
64 Amplitel, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
65 Indara, Empowering our Digital Future, accessed 11 April 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
66 Waveconn, Public submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
67 ACCC, Mobile Infrastructure Report 2022, September 2022, Table 4.6 on p 16, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
In contrast, BAI Communications owns around 400 towers, not all of which are used for mobile
equipment.
68
NBN Co submitted that it has access to approximately 2,400 sites across Australia
for its xed wireless access network, around 30% of which are owned by other mobile network
infrastructure providers and subject to co-location arrangements.
69
These sites are primarily built for
xed wireless purposes, with co-location for mobile equipment being a secondary purpose.
70
Being
placed to maximise their xed wireless coverage, NBN Co sites may not be in locations of interest to
mobile network operators.
71
The distribution of tower and rooftop structures owned and operated by entities is shown Table 1
below. Table 1 demonstrates Amplitel’s clear dominance in outer regional, remote and very remote
Australia. In total, Amplitel operates 43% of all tower and rooftop structures, Indara owns or operates
23% and Waveconn owns or operates 7%.
72
These proportions suggest a relatively concentrated
market overall. As remoteness increases, Amplitel’s market share increases to 45% (outer regional),
67% (remote) and 72% (very remote), which shows Amplitel’s increasing dominance in these
geographic areas.
73
The presence of other operators such as Waveconn, BAI Communications and
NBN Co are a source of competition, however their impact decreases with remoteness.
Notably in Table 1, Telstra retains some tower and rooftop structures rather than passing these onto
Amplitel. Telstra explained that it has retained ownership of several mainly smaller and typically
non-shareable structures, which it continues to use to supply mobile services and/or universal
service obligation services over its customer access radio network.
74
Table 1: Number of towers and rooftop structures owned or operated by each entity as at December 2022
75
Geographic
Area
Amplitel BAI
Communcations
Indara NBN
Co
Optus Telstra TPG Waveconn Total
Very
Remote
Australia
1,688 115 31 5 3 474 - 0 2,316
Remote
Australia
1,033 79 159 51 11 191 - 11 1,535
Outer
Regional
Australia
1,915 211 839 579 76 598 - 78 4,296
Inner
Regional
Australia
1,668 120 1,141 880 58 529 - 136 4,532
Major Cities
of Australia
1,788 79 2,064 117 36 670 - 1,108 5,862
Total 8,092 604 4,234 1,632 184 2,462 0 1,333 18,541
Notes: At the time these counts were provided, there were a number of Telstra’s towers which had been purchased by Amplitel
but had not yet transferred. There is likely some double counting between Amplitel and Telstra’s site counts. Telstra’s site
count also includes rooftop sites on the top of Telstra exchange building and structures used to install small cells. Small
cells are generally not capable of being upgraded to support multiple carriers.
Not all towers or rooftops will have mobile network operator active equipment mounted on them.
68 BAI Communications, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, p 5, accessed
27 June 2023.
69 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
70 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
71 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
72 ACCC calculations based on information provided by stakeholders.
73 ACCC calculations based on information provided by stakeholders.
74 Information provided by stakeholder.
75 Information provided by stakeholders.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
In outer regional, remote and very remote Australia, Amplitel, Indara, Waveconn, BAI Communications
and NBN Co own or operate a substantial number of towers and rooftops, a cumulative total of
6,794 towers and rooftops.
76
Amplitel operates over 65% of these structures.
77
In very remote
Australia, Amplitel operates over 90% of the cumulative total of towers and rooftops owned or
operated by Amplitel, Indara, Waveconn, BAI Communications and NBN Co.
78
Thus, most towers and
rooftops in regional and remote areas are still operated by one company.
Table 2 below provides a count of the number of structures used by mobile network operators to
provide mobile services, as a comparison to the number of structures owned by mobile network
infrastructure provider.
Table 2: Number of tower and rooftop structures used by the mobile network operators to provide mobile
telecommunications services as at December 2022
79
Region of Australia Telstra Optus TPG Telecom
Very Remote Australia 927 162 8
Remote Australia 710 246 62
Outer Regional Australia 1,945 1,175 469
Inner Regional Australia 2,261 1,769 859
Major Cities of Australia 5,497 4,794 4,412
Total 11,340 8,146 5,810
Notes: Telstra operates 2,491 more sites in inner regional, outer regional, remote and very remote Australia than its nearest
competitor. Figures for Telstra represent the number of unique Telstra mobile sites and include repeater sites. Many of
the structures on which Telstra’s mobile site equipment is located are now operated by Amplitel, or are owned or operated
by third parties.
80
TPG Telecom lodges information to the ACCC concerning mobile sites in accordance with the Audit of
Telecommunications Infrastructure Assets – Record Keeping Rules (RKR). There may be variations between TPG
Telecom’s RKR lodgement with the information provided as part of this Inquiry by TPG Telecom. This difference is due to:
(a) ‘repeater sites’ being included in the information provided as part of the Inquiry, but not for the purposes of the RKR,
(b) changes in the count of active and temporary sites between providing information as part of this Inquiry and its
RKR submission.
Unsurprisingly, the structure of the mobile network infrastructure provider market follows a similar
trend to that of the mobile network operator market, in that Telstra/Amplitel have a signicantly larger
number of structures than the next nearest competitor Optus/Indara.
Table 3 below highlights how the rate of co-location on active sites used by mobile network operators
in 2022 decreases signicantly by remoteness.
76 ACCC calculations based on information provided by stakeholders.
77 ACCC calculations based on information provided by stakeholders.
78 ACCC calculations based on information provided by stakeholders.
79 Information provided by stakeholders.
80 Information provided by stakeholder.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Table 3: Total number of active sites used by mobile network operators by co-location and by remoteness
area, as at January 2022
Region Type of site 2020 2021 2022 Rate of colocation
in 2022
Major Cities of
Australia
Co-located sites 4,270 4,335 4,379
51%
Single mobile network operator sites 3,806 4,106 4,169
Inner Regional
Australia
Co-located sites 1,062 1,086 1,110
33%
Single mobile network operator sites 2,070 2,160 2,240
Outer Regional
Australia
Co-located sites 635 645 654
24%
Single mobile network operator sites 1,983 2,047 2,100
Remote
Australia
Co-located sites 98 101 105
12%
Single mobile network operator sites 745 766 788
Very Remote
Australia
Co-located sites 40 40 45
4%
Single mobile network operator sites 876 933 972
Source: Mobile Infrastructure Report 2022, output tables, 9 September 2022.
 
The ACCC is required to have regard to the effectiveness of current regulatory arrangements in
enabling third party telecommunications providers and other likely users to access towers and
associated infrastructure.
The Telecommunications Act, the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards)
Act 1999 (Cth), and Part XIB and Part XIC of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) are
central aspects of the regulatory framework for the telecommunications industry.
The main object of the Telecommunications Act, when read together with Parts XIB and XIC of the
CCA, is to provide a regulatory framework that promotes:
the long-term interests of end-users of carriage services or of services provided by means of
carriage service
the eciency and international competitiveness of the Australian telecommunications industry
the availability of accessible and affordable carriage services that enhance the welfare of
Australians.
81
The Telecommunications Act identies ‘carriers’ and ‘carriage service providers’ as the main
participants regulated in the telecommunications industry.
We outline the key aspects of the regulation that applies in the context of access to towers and
associated infrastructure below.
81 Telecommunications Act s 3.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Regulation applies to carriers and companies that are part of a group
that has a carrier company
The legislative denitions behind the concept of a carrier’ in the Telecommunications Act are
complex, but essentially a ‘carrier’ means the holder of a ‘carrier licence’.
82
A carrier licence is required
before physical telecommunications infrastructure owned by a person can be used to supply a
‘carriage service’ to the public.
83
A mobile network operator owns the type of infrastructure that is
used to supply a retail mobile service to the public, including base stations, and therefore requires a
carrier licence to operate.
A person who supplies to the public a service for carrying communications by means of guided
and unguided electromagnetic energy using infrastructure owned by a carrier is a ‘carriage
service provider’.
84
A carrier can be both a carrier and carriage service provider. A carriage service
provider includes mobile network virtual operators, which do not themselves own mobile network
infrastructure but instead use wholesale services provided by mobile network operators to provide a
retail mobile service to the public.
Currently, the Telecommunications Act and the CCA do not include any specic regulation of mobile
network infrastructure providers that do not hold a carrier licence, or are not part of a company
group that includes at least one company with a carrier licence. The operations of mobile network
infrastructure providers are subject to general law, such as competition law under the CCA.
Regulation that is relevant to building telecommunications infrastructure and accessing such
infrastructure is outlined below.
Carriers’ powers and immunities
The Telecommunications Act provides certain powers and immunities for licensed carriers to
access and use land which is owned by third parties.
85
Under the Telecommunications Act, activities
carried out by carriers are not generally exempt from State and Territory laws.
86
However, authorised
activities may be engaged in despite the law of a State or Territory.
87
There are 3 general types of
authorised activities:
1. entering on and inspecting land for the purpose of determining whether the land is suitable for
certain purposes
88
2. for purposes connected with the supply of a carriage service, installing a:
a. low impact facility
89
b. facility for which a carrier has an installation permit
90
c. temporary facility for use by, or on behalf of, a defence organisation for defence purposes
91
3. maintaining a facility which has already been installed.
92
82 Telecommunications Act s 7. A carrier licence is granted under s 56 of the Telecommunications Act.
83 Telecommunications Act ss 7, 42.
84 Telecommunications Act ss 7, 16, 87.
85 Telecommunications Act s 484, Sch 3.
86 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 36.
87 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 37.
88 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 5.
89 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 6(1)(b).
90 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 6(1)(a).
91 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 6(1)(c).
92 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 7.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
The Minister may, by written instrument, determine that a specied facility is a low-impact facility.
93
However, the Minister must not determine the following facilities to be low-impact facilities:
designated overhead lines
94
submarine cables
95
freestanding towers
96
towers attached to buildings which, excluding any antenna, are more than 5metres high
97
extensions to towers, unless the extension does not exceed 5metres and there have been no
previous extensions to the tower.
98
Carriers can install ‘low-impact facilities’ on land despite certain state or territory laws, such as those
in relation to town planning, the use of land or the assessment of environment effects.
99
In doing so,
carriers must comply with the Telecommunications Code of Practice 2021.
100
Facilities that are low-impact are generally phone and internet network structures that are less
conspicuous.
101
Low-impact facilities can include small antennas or dishes, equipment in buildings,
and equipment on structures that already exist such as buildings, poles or towers (with some height
restrictions).
102
This will predominantly apply to rooftops and since rooftops are more prevalent in
major cities, the carrier’s powers and immunities are less relevant in regional, rural and remote areas.
Generally, any tower structure does not fall within the concept of a low-impact facility.
These provisions in relation to carrier powers and immunities apply only to carriers and not
to companies that are part of a group that include a carrier company. Some mobile network
infrastructure providers own or operate rooftops and install such rooftops. However, if the mobile
network infrastructure provider entity does not itself have a carrier licence, it is not able to directly rely
on these powers and immunities.
A carriers powers under the Telecommunications Act may be exercised by an employee of the
carrier, a person acting for the carrier under a contract, or an employee of a person acting for the
carrier under a contract.
103
93 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 6(3).
94 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 6(4).
95 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 4A.
96 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 6(5).
97 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 6(5), 6(6).
98 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 6(7).
99 Telecommunications Act s 484, Sch 3 cl 37.
100 Telecommunications Code of Practice 2021, made pursuant to subclause 15(1) of Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications
Act, accessed 27 June 2023.
101 Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), Local councils and network facilities, accessed 23 June 2023.
102 Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), Local councils and network facilities, accessed 23 June 2023.
103 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 43.
26
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
The Facilities Access Regimes
Carrier-to-carrier regime
Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications Act requires carriers to provide other carriers
with access to facilities it owns or operates. A ‘facility’ means any part of the infrastructure
of a telecommunications network; or any line, equipment, apparatus, tower, mast, antenna,
tunnel, duct, hole, pit, pole or other structure or thing used, or for use, in or in connection with a
telecommunications network.
104
Part 5 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications Act requires carriers to provide other carriers with
access to telecommunications transmission towers, the sites of telecommunications transmission
towers and eligible underground facilities. A telecommunications transmission tower and eligible
underground facility each fall within the denition of ‘facility’ in s 7 of the Telecommunications Act.
The ACCC developed A Code of Access to Telecommunications Transmission Towers, Sites of Towers
and Underground Facilities (the Facilities Access Code) under Part 5 in 1999.
105
Compliance with the
Facilities Access Code is a standard carrier licence condition.
106
The Facilities Access Code only
applies to carriers, meaning that it does not apply to Amplitel, Indara and Waveconn.
The Facilities Access Code includes provisions about condentiality, queuing policies, dispute
resolution and non-discriminatory access. Under the Facilities Access Code, carriers are required
to develop a ‘queuing policy’.
107
This policy must include the infrastructure owners applications and
orders, meaning for example where a mobile network operator is the owner of infrastructure, it can
reserve itself space on a tower. Other access seekers can also reserve their own space on towers.
The existence of the Facilities Access Code is designed to alleviate barriers to co-location, such as
the introduction of a ‘use it or lose it’ system for capacity reservations on towers.
108
Clause 18 of Part 3 and Clause 36 of Part 5 of Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act require that
the terms and conditions of access to facilities are to be agreed by carriers or, failing agreement, are
to be determined by an agreed arbitrator or the ACCC if the parties fail to agree on the appointment
of an arbitrator. We note that there can be diculties resolving disputes through this mechanism,
particularly where a party is against the proposed resolution.
104 Telecommunications Act s 7 (denition of ‘telecommunications network’).
105 A Code of Access to Telecommunications Transmission Towers, Sites of Towers and Underground Facilities, 1 January 2023,
accessed 27 June 2023.
106 Section 61 of the Telecommunications Act provides that a carrier licence is subject to the conditions specied in Schedule 1,
and subclause 37(2) of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications Act provides a carrier must comply with the Code.
107 Facilities Access Code, subclause 2.3 (1).
108 See Facilities Access Code, subclause 2.3 (3).
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Eligible company-to-carrier regime
Part 34B is a new addition to the Telecommunications Act that commenced on 14December 2021.
109
The new Part 34B largely mirrors the carrier-to-carrier Facilities Access Regime contained in Parts 3
and 5 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications Act.
110
Part 34B applies to telecommunications
transmission towers and supplementary facilities owned by a body corporate that does not have a
carrier licence but is part of a ‘carrier company group’. Part34B requires an ‘eligible company’ to give
a carrier access to facilities owned or operated by the eligible company.
An eligible company means a body corporate that is in a ‘carrier company group’ and is not a
carrier.
111
A ‘carrier company group’ means 2 or more related companies, of which at least one is
a carrier. The question of whether companies are related is to be determined in accordance with
section 50 of the Corporations Act 2001, which provides that a holding company of another body
corporate, a subsidiary of another body corporate, or 2 subsidiaries of the same holding company will
be related bodies corporate.
112
However for the purposes of Part 34B of the Telecommunications Act
a company will be a subsidiary of a second company if the second company can cast, or control the
casting of, more than 15% of the votes that might be cast at a general meeting, or where the second
company holds more than 15% of the issued share capital (referred to as the ‘control threshold’).
113
This modies s 46 of the Corporations Act 2001, which provides for a 50% control threshold.
A similar negotiate-arbitrate provision is also provided for in Part 34B, where the ACCC is the
arbitrator of last resort.
114
Part 34B also provides that the ACCC can make a code relating to Part 34B
which would apply to ‘eligible companies.
115
109 Part 34B commenced on 14 December 2021, see Telstra Corporation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021 s 2,
accessed 27 June 2023. However, the ACCC’s review of the corporate control percentage (under s 581ZH(1) of the
Telecommunications Act) meant that this Part 34B was not operational until 6 months later.
110 Explanatory Memorandum to the Telstra Corporation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2021, p 58, accessed
27 June 2023.
111 Telecommunications Act s 581X.
112 Telecommunications Act, subsection 581W(2).
113 Telecommunications Act subsection 581W(4).
114 Telecommunications Act s 581Z.
115 Telecommunications Act s 581ZF.
28
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 Costs of providing towers and
associated infrastructure
The Direction requires the ACCC to have regard to the costs of providing towers and associated
passive and active infrastructure that can be used by third party telecommunications providers and
others to supply mobile telecommunications and other radiocommunications services.
This chapter does so by examining the options available for providing mobile coverage, the costs
involved and the factors that mobile network operators consider when deciding which option to use.
To provide greater mobile coverage in regional, rural and remote Australia, mobile network operators
will primarily rely on increasing the number of sites that form part of their mobile networks. There are
currently 2 options usually utilised by mobile network operators to add sites to their network:
1. The mobile network operator can locate on a newly built tower (a greenelds site). This
could be built by the mobile network operator itself or may be built by a mobile network
infrastructure provider.
2. The mobile network operator can co-locate on an existing tower (a brownelds site). This
could be a tower owned by another mobile network operator, a mobile network infrastructure
provider or another third party (such as electricity infrastructure).
116
This is known as passive
infrastructure sharing.
There is also a third option of active infrastructure sharing, such as neutral host models, however this
is not currently commonplace in Australia.
Aside from adding new sites to its mobile network, a mobile network operator can also upgrade the
active equipment on its existing sites or deploy more spectrum to expand the coverage or capacity
provided by the site.
 

Towers provide the building blocks of mobile coverage. They provide the height required for mobile
antennas to optimise signal strength and propagation.
117
Towers also provide the structural support
required to support multiple mobile antennas and equipment to meet consumer demand. Thus,
towers play a critical role in being able to provide sucient coverage and network capacity in a
mobile network.
Mobile network antennas are mounted onto towers and communicate with consumer devices, via
radio frequency signal in allotted radio spectrum, to connect them to a mobile network operator’s
core network through transmission links (also known as backhaul). Towers are positioned to
maximise coverage and to minimise blocking or weakening the signal to and from consumer devices
by obstacles such as buildings, terrain or vegetation.
118
116 See for example, Energy Queensland, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022,
accessed 27 June 2023.
117 See Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, pp 1112, accessed
27 June 2023; Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 25, accessed
27 June 2023.
118 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, pp 1112, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
The mobile infrastructure mounted on and around a tower is known as the base station. A base
station provides mobile coverage to an immediate geographic area called a cell. Importantly, in
a mobile network, mobile devices will maintain connectivity with the network as the end-user (or
device) moves between cells (inter-cell handover).
The base station forms part of the radio access network.
119
The radio access network is connected to
the rest of the mobile network through backhaul. These links are commonly bre in the major cities,
with signicant use of microwave and satellite transmission particularly in regional, rural and remote
areas.
120
The core network connects the different parts of the access network, connects to other
networks (including the internet) and undertakes billing and user management.
There are 3 main types of infrastructure that can be used for mobile base stations:
Macro tower sites. These can be lattice towers, monopoles, masts or similar structures which
are generally above 20m in height. Macro tower sites are larger sites with taller masts and more
powerful transmitter and aim to cover large areas.
Rooftops and high vantage points (for example, on top of multi-story buildings, water towers or
any high vantage point).
Small structures such as power and light poles.
In addition, mobile network operators also deploy in-building-solutions such as the distributed
antenna systems to extend indoor coverage within large buildings, such as shopping centres.
In this chapter, references to towers refer to macro tower sites.
Different components that make up a tower site are commonly described as ‘active’ and ‘passive’
infrastructure. Active infrastructure is generally the equipment that requires power to operate and is
involved in data transmission and reception, such as the antennas, radio units (processor, receiver,
transmitter) and the transmission equipment (backhaul). Passive infrastructure is primarily the tower
structure, provisioning of power, fencing and access tracks. This is shown in Figure 4 below.
119 See for example Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 10, accessed
27 June 2023.
120 See for example Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 155, accessed
27 June 2023; Telstra, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary
ndings, 16 May 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
30
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Figure 4: Active and passive components on a mobile tower site
Fibre Blackhaul
Power Supply
Air Conditioning
Processor
Shelter
Receiver
Transmitter
Tower Top
Amplifier
Microwave
Blackhaul
Feeder
Tower
Antenna
Active – Red
Passive – Navy
TTA
Site
The active infrastructure components are usually the responsibility of the mobile network
operator to deploy and manage. Passive components are usually managed by the mobile network
infrastructure provider.
 

Deploying terrestrial mobile networks is highly capital intensive. It involves the construction of
tower structures, base stations and installation of associated infrastructure. Various models of
infrastructure sharing have developed to share these costs between mobile network operators and
mobile network infrastructure providers.
The commonality between co-location and new tower construction is that mobile network operators
will need to invest in the active equipment. The costs of equipment can vary based on the technology
being deployed (e.g. 4G or 5G), the required capacity and coverage, and associated radio access
network technology vendor fees.
For active sharing, both the passive and active infrastructure is shared between mobile network
operators. This option allows mobile network operators to utilise the same infrastructure.
The decision on what option a mobile network operator will take will depend on various factors such
as cost, time for deployment, planning permits and regulatory requirements, suitability of existing
infrastructure and commercial arrangements. These are outlined in detail below.
31
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
New towers
Building a new tower incurs various costs associated with land acquisition or leasing, planning
permits and application fees, tower design and construction, site preparation and installation.
121
The
overall costs of a new tower build can vary depending on the height, type of tower, materials used
for the tower, as well as the labour costs for construction. As deployment of new towers is capital
and time intensive, generally new towers are only built in response to demand from mobile network
operators for a new tower in a particular location.
122
Building a new tower will generally incur overall higher upfront costs, have longer deployment
timelines and additional regulatory requirements in terms of planning approvals compared with
co-location on existing infrastructure. While co-locating on existing infrastructure may be more cost
effective and quicker, there are several reasons why a mobile network operator may prefer to deploy a
new tower:
There is no existing infrastructure in the area where the mobile network operator is seeking to
expand its network.
123
Existing infrastructure is not in a suitable location where the mobile network operator is seeking
to expand its network.
124
Existing infrastructure may have been designed or positioned for
different purposes (for example, electricity infrastructure) or for different network needs.
125
The existing infrastructure may not be suitable for the use intended by the mobile network
operator and the cost of upgrading it may not be considered cost-effective.
126
Network differentiation from competitors. In some strategic locations, a mobile network operator
may prefer to have greater control with the build of a new tower, to optimise its network and tailor
the tower to its needs.
Flexibility for future expansion. Certain areas may be seen as future high growth areas, and thus
having control over tower locations and access to backhaul can benet mobile network operators’
future network plans. It may be valuable to a mobile network operator to scale their infrastructure
for forecast rollouts rather than relying on existing infrastructure co-location opportunities.
There is a cost differential between self-provisioning new towers or
outsourcing to mobile network infrastructure providers
Once a mobile network operator has decided on a new tower, it can either build its own tower
(self-provision) or outsource the build to a mobile network infrastructure provider. Which option a
mobile network operator will choose will depend primarily on whether the terms of agreement it can
reach with a mobile network infrastructure provider are favourable to self-provisioning.
Self-provisioning a new tower involves signicant capital expenditure which the mobile network
operator will bear. There are also ongoing costs associated with maintaining the tower, including rent
paid to landowners, management of co-location requests as required by the Telecommunications Act
and maintenance of the tower as well as the active infrastructure on it.
121 See for example, Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
6 September 2022, p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
122 Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 12, accessed
27 June 2023; Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, pp 1112,
accessed 27 June 2023.
123 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 25, accessed 27 June 2023.
124 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
125 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 25, accessed 27 June 2023.
126 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 25, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Having a mobile network infrastructure provider build the tower can transfer some of the upfront
expenditure from the mobile network operator to the mobile network infrastructure provider. The
mobile network infrastructure provider will usually bear the costs of ongoing operating expenditure
associated with land lease arrangements, inspections, repairs and maintenance of the tower
structure itself.
127
However, the mobile network operator can still be responsible for some of the
costs, including backhaul connectivity and costs of active equipment.
128
The mobile network operator
will also incur operating expenditure for the access fees paid to the mobile network infrastructure
provider for access to the tower.
Mobile network operators typically have arrangements with mobile network infrastructure providers,
known as ‘build-to-suit’ agreements where the infrastructure provider will build a new tower for the
network operator based on its requirements.
129
Accompanying built-to-suit arrangements can be
take-or-pay’ obligations where a mobile network operator may receive a volume discount for leasing
a minimum number of new sites from a mobile network infrastructure provider.
130
Our understanding
is that such arrangements guarantee revenue for infrastructure providers and forward cost certainty
for network operators, and because of this, may be more cost effective than self-provisioning a
new tower.
The divestment of towers indicates a preference for the cost of ownership of that infrastructure to
reside with mobile network infrastructure providers, meaning that it is more likely a new tower build
will be outsourced to a mobile network infrastructure provider.
Costs for a new tower build
Throughout the Inquiry, mobile network infrastructure providers highlighted that there is no ‘typical’
cost for a tower.
131
This is because there is signicant variation in build costs depending on the site
choice and tower design (height, capacity and type of tower).
132
There are also trade-offs in tower
design, for example a cheaper tower could be built but this may require more maintenance or earlier
replacement, compared to a more expensive tower that requires less maintenance and lasts longer.
133
Table 4 below outlines the typical categories of costs incurred by both mobile network infrastructure
providers and mobile network operators in the build of new towers.
127 See for example, Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
6 September 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
128 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 10, accessed 27 June 2023.
129 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 18, accessed 27 June 2023;
Indara, Build to Suit, 2023, accessed 23 June 2023.
130 Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 5, accessed
27 June 2023.
131 See for example Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022,
p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
132 Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 8, accessed
27 June 2023; Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, pp 1112,
accessed 27 June 2023.
133 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 17, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Table 4: Typical costs incurred in the build of new towers
Cost category About this cost category
Tower site selection
and planning approvals,
including environment
and design
Tower site selection and planning approval costs are highly site specic. The type
of landowner involved, the complexity of town planning approvals or other approval
processes will impact tower design and planning.
134
Community opposition can
also signicantly increase these costs by requiring more consultation. Higher costs
also occur where additional speciality consultants (e.g. environmental, ecological,
hydrological, heritage) or appeals against adverse planning decisions are required.
135
Tower site construction,
including civil
construction, tower
fabrication/delivery,
site preparation and
foundations
This cost category includes the tower structure itself and material supply costs for
it, and fabrication and delivery of the tower.
136
It also includes the excavation and
foundations required for the site, as well as the costs of mobilising personnel to
build and install the tower.
137
The type of tower built and foundation requirements
will depend on current and future customer requirements, local environment (wind,
corrosion, whether it is susceptible to ooding or other natural disasters), as well as
geotechnical conditions (rock and unstable soils).
138
Access tracks to a tower
site
Construction access limitations, which can require access track modications or
upgrades, can signicantly impact build costs.
139
There can be a high variability in
these costs depending on the location.
140
Generally, remoter sites will tend to be
further away from public roads and require a longer access track to be built, or a more
signicant upgrade, than sites in major cities.
Connection to power New tower builds may require a power extension to connect to the local power grid.
141
This may also require an upgrade or replacement to the existing power infrastructure
to cope with the additional power consumption load.
Connection to backhaul This is the cost of connecting a tower site to an existing transmission link, known as
backhaul.
142
It can be owned by the mobile network operator or can be transmission
capacity acquired by the access seeker from another party and is often referred to
as the ‘last mile. OneWi submitted that depending on the remoteness of the site
and proximity to power and backhaul infrastructure, the power and backhaul could
account for up to 50% of the total build cost.
143
Associated
infrastructure, including
active equipment
Associated infrastructure includes antennas and feeders, batteries, active equipment
and the shelters to house on-ground equipment. It is usual practice for each mobile
network operator to have its own shelter that will house the on-ground equipment and
feeder cables connecting the active equipment on the tower to the shelter.
The active equipment on a tower can make up between 10% to 30% of the total tower
build cost.
144
134 Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 8, accessed
27 June 2023.
135 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 18, accessed 27 June 2023.
136 Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 8, accessed
27 June 2023.
137 Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 8, accessed
27 June 2023.
138 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 22, accessed 27 June 2023.
139 Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, pp 3–4, accessed
27 June 2023.
140 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 27, accessed 27 June 2023.
141 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 26, accessed 27 June 2023.
142 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
143 OneWi and Infrastructure, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 4 August 2022, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023.
144 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023;
OneWi and Infrastructure, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 4 August 2022, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Connection to backhaul
From the mobile network operator perspective, the largest cost can be the connection to
backhaul, depending on the location of the tower.
145
Backhaul refers to the network infrastructure
(bre, microwave or satellite) that connects the radio access network to the core network. The
transmission technologies used for mobile backhaul are no different from that used for any other
transmission service.
Backhaul connects new tower builds to the mobile network operator’s wider network. There are the
following backhaul options:
point-to-point microwave connection using apparatus licences (for spectrum)
satellite connections
bre optic connection to sites
bre optic line rental from a third party.
Which options are available will depend on the location of the tower and its proximity to existing
backhaul infrastructure. In major cities, the costs to connect to backhaul are generally limited where
distances are short and there is existing bre backhaul available. In regional, rural and remote areas
the cost for connecting to existing backhaul will be higher where there is a greater distance to existing
backhaul.
146
The GSM Association recently published a study comparing the costs of deploying a mobile base
station in an urban environment compared with a remote region in the United Kingdom.
147
Table 5 below summarises the results and shows that backhaul is the cost most impacted
by remoteness.
Table 5: Cost differential for total cost of ownership of a rural base station compared to one in an urban
area
Share of cost envelope (urban
environment)
Cost premium in a remote region
compared to urban
Tower and civil works 48% +27%
Active network costs 12% 0%
Power 30% +37%
Backhaul 10% +110%
Total 100% +35%
Source: GSMA Intelligence and GSMA Connected Society (2019 gures)
While Table 5 shows the costs in the United Kingdom, it does highlight how backhaul costs can
signicantly impact the nancial viability of network expansion by way of new tower builds. Building
a new tower will require provisioning and establishing a dedicated backhaul link, which will involve
upfront costs for build the backhaul connection.
148
145 See for example Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 11, accessed
27 June 2023.
146 See for example, Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 45, accessed
27 June 2023.
147 GSM Association, Connectivity from the sky: Reinventing the nal frontier, 2021, p 17, accessed 27 June 2023.
148 See also the discussion at the industry stakeholder forum, Industry stakeholder forum, 16 March 2023, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Remoter sites will tend towards having microwave or satellite backhaul due to larger distances
between sites making bre transmission very expensive.
149
The use of point-to-point microwave is
generally less expensive than installing a new optical bre.
150
This has performance implications and
may also require additional microwave-only site(s) to span long transmission distances.
151
Microwave
backhaul can be over multiple ‘radio hops’ before reaching a tower that has a wired backhaul
connection. A radio hop is a link between a microwave transmitter on a tower and a receiver, that
connects into wired backhaul. A single radio hop usually covers a distance between 5 to 30km,
depending on radio frequency used (unlike bre where a link can be couple of 100 km or more). To
cover larger distances, multiple transmitters and receivers are used in daisy chain with each link of
the chain known as hop. The availability of spectrum does impact the capacity of these systems.
As the cost of backhaul can signicantly impact the nancial viability of a new tower built, it may be a
reason why a mobile network operator will prefer to co-locate on existing infrastructure rather than on
a new tower build.
Connection to power
Mobile network infrastructure providers highlighted that often the largest delay in tower builds is
connection to power.
152
Waveconn and another mobile network infrastructure provider submitted that
connecting a tower site to power is a signicant challenge for regional deployment, with timelines for
the local utility providing a response to a power application frequently being more than 6months and
many exceeding 12 months.
153
Waveconn submitted that securing easements for power supply can
also result in delays, with some easements taking approximately 3 years to secure.
154
It outlined that
connection to power creates the most uncertainty for deployment timelines and overall costs, and
can frequently make otherwise viable sites commercially infeasible.
155
Waveconn submitted that implementing minimum service-level agreements for power utilities would
assist when mobile network infrastructure providers deal with power utilities.
156
Location impacts a new tower build
Overall, rural, regional and remote tower sites are typically more expensive to establish.
157
The costs
to enable access to the site, tower build, connection to power and to backhaul typically increase with
remoteness.
158
The costs for associated infrastructure such as radio equipment, antennas/feeders,
and costs for site selection and planning approvals do not typically change due to remoteness.
As outlined, connection to backhaul is a cost that can be signicant and will increase due to a lack
of existing infrastructure and the need to connect backhaul over longer distances.
159
In remoter
areas, typically taller structures are built to cover wider areas, resulting in increased build costs
(more expensive towers, bigger foundations that require more complex excavation, more land area
149 See for example Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 11, accessed
27 June 2023.
150 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
151 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
152 Information provided by stakeholder.
153 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
154 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
155 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
156 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
157 See for example, Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 45, accessed
27 June 2023.
158 Australia Tower Network, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 14, accessed
27 June 2023; TPGTelecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 10, accessed
27 June 2023.
159 See also the discussion at the industry stakeholder forum, Industry stakeholder forum, 16 March 2023, p 7, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
for guy wires if used).
160
Access tracks may be further from public roads, requiring a new access
track or upgrades to support the delivery of infrastructure. Similarly, connection to power can be a
distance away requiring additional electricity infrastructure to be build, or upgrades to the electricity
infrastructure to support the additional load of the tower. There are also higher mobilisation costs for
personnel and transport for all phases of a tower build and construction of the tower site.
161
u Finding6
The cost of building a new tower site typically increases with remoteness. In particular, the cost
of backhaul can be especially high in regional and remote areas compared to urban areas.
As mobile network operators generally bear the cost of connecting sites to backhaul, high
costs to do so can be a key reason for preferring to co-locate on existing infrastructure, where it
exists in the desired areas.
Sample of tower build costs
To provide context to how variable build costs for new towers can be, Table 6 and Table 7 provide
a sample of cost information the ACCC received in relation to tower builds. The cost information
is for one site and is provided from either a mobile network infrastructure provider or a mobile
network operator perspective. This information is a sample of costs only and should not be taken as
representative of build costs or of land lease costs.
Table 6: Sample build costs for monopoles (25 – 45m) by region
162
Major cities Inner
regional
Outer
regional
Remote Very remote
State/Territory South
Australia
Queensland New South
Wales
South
Australia
Queensland
Structure type Steel
monopole
Steel
monopole
Concrete
monopole
Concrete
monopole
Monopole
Tower site selection and
planning approvals
$69,885 $369,563 $102,627 $65,197 $132,058
Tower site construction $159,271 $278,038 $411,534 $472,874 $480,984
Access to tower site (if an
upgrade is required)
$0 $0 $0 $10,325 $0
Connection to power $0 $30,199 $57,822 $111,680 $0
Connection to backhaul $5 7,0 08 $43,551 Not known Not known $9,646
Associated infrastructure $266,277 $144,895 Not known Not known $207,117
Indicative total build cost $552,441 $866,246 $571,983 $660,076 $829,805
Payment to landowner in
2021–22
$9,050 $9,425 $16,637 $6,310 $34,965
160 See for example, Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 22, accessed
27 June 2023.
161 See the discussion at the industry stakeholder forum, Industry stakeholder forum, 16 March 2023, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023.
162 Information provided by stakeholders.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Table 7: Sample build costs for lattice towers (30–60m) by region
163
Major cities Inner regional Outer regional Remote
State/Territory New South
Wales
New South
Wales
South Australia Northern
Territory
Structure type Lattice Lattice Lattice Lattice
Tower site selection and
planning approvals
$111,260 $104,967 $151,052 $35,958
Tower site construction $287,866 $318,456 $305,942 $841,515
Access to tower site (if an
upgrade is required)
$120,387 $23,638 $1,422 $30,183
Connection to power $235,486 $113,795 $227,614 $0
Connection to backhaul Not known Not known Not known $25,483
Associated infrastructure $85,270
164
$65,113
165
$67,670
166
$248,431
Indicative total build cost $840,269 $625,968 $753,700 $1,181,570
Payment to landowner in
2021–22
$14,901 - - -
As illustrated in tables 6 and 7, there is high variability in tower build costs. While overall build costs
tend to increase with remoteness, the tables illustrate that it is dicult to provide general estimates
for new tower builds because costs depend on site specic features, such as height, structure type
and distance from the power grid, access track and backhaul connection.
Co-location on existing infrastructure
Mobile network operators may prefer to co-locate on existing infrastructure in some circumstances.
Co-location is a form of passive infrastructure sharing where a mobile network operator deploys
its active equipment on the same passive infrastructure as another mobile network operator.
Image 2 shows an example of a tower with 3 mobile network operators co-located on the tower by
stacking their active equipment. Passive sharing is very common and regularly used by the 3 mobile
network operators.
A decision or preference to co-locate is driven by several factors, including potential cost savings,
time eciency, regulatory and planning approval considerations. These factors are outlined below.
Co-location can be a more cost-effective option than deploying a new tower. Building new
towers involves signicant capital investment, including land acquisition, tower fabrication and
construction, associated equipment installation. In comparison, co-locating on existing infrastructure
allows mobile network operators to share the costs associated with the passive tower build and
maintenance.
167
This reduces capital expenditure and operational costs, making co-location more
nancially attractive.
163 Information provided by stakeholders.
164 This gure does not include active equipment.
165 This gure does not include active equipment.
166 This gure does not include active equipment.
167 See for example, TPG Telecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings,
May 2023, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Image 2: Example of a monopole tower with the 3 mobile network operators co-located on the tower.
Source: Photo taken by ACCC staff.
Co-locating on existing infrastructure can provide immediate access to established backhaul
connections. If the infrastructure already has sucient backhaul capacity to support the co-locating
mobile network operator’s network trac, this can reduce the need for backhaul upgrades.
There are also time savings with co-location. Constructing a new tower has a signicant lead time
and requires obtaining leases or land rights, permits, conducting site surveys and construction.
Co-locating on existing infrastructure reduces the time for these processes signicantly, although
there is often a need to go through planning approvals and consultation processes to co-locate onto
a tower.
However, co-location is not always feasible or practical. Whether a mobile network operator seeks to
co-locate on existing infrastructure will depend on factors such as:
The availability of suitable infrastructure in the desired location.
Space limitations or structural limitations on existing infrastructure.
168
Co-location may require
some site modications or upgrades to accommodate the additional equipment. These costs will
depend on the specic site conditions and the capacity of the existing tower infrastructure. The
cost of co-location, such as upgrades to power, backhaul or structural upgrades can make the
business case for co-locating unviable.
169
Whether the network outcome (for example, coverage in a desired area or direction) is acceptable
to the mobile network operator.
170
As co-locating tenants have not chosen the location of the site,
it can mean that the tower location or the position available on the tower may provide sub-optimal
network outcomes.
171
Whether the mobile network operator considers there are favourable terms of access and ease
of co-locating onto the tower.
172
Mobile network infrastructure providers submitted that their
168 See for example, Amplitel, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 2 September 2022, p 11, accessed
27 June 2023.
169 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
170 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023;
Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 25, accessed 27 June 2023.
171 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
172 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
39
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
access processes are more streamlined and enable fast, easy co-location to maximise new
co-locations.
173
However, TPG Telecom submitted that the fees required by mobile network
infrastructure providers are one of the ongoing barriers to increased co-location.
174
The revenue potential from the site. Regional locations generally have lower customer revenue,
which results in lower co-location demand.
175
Mobile network infrastructure providers may offer incentives to co-location, such as co-location
discounts. These agreements allow mobile network operators to access existing infrastructure on
terms that may result in reduced costs overall.
Costs for co-locating
With most tower assets now held by mobile network infrastructure providers (Amplitel, Indara and
Waveconn), the costs of co-locating will largely depend on the agreements mobile network operators
reach with these entities. As shown in Table 1, the carriers no longer own or operate many tower
and rooftop assets themselves. TPG Telecom does not own or operate any towers or rooftops
itself and Optus retains a very small number at 184.
176
At a site visit with Amplitel, it noted that
generally the towers capable of co-location had passed to Amplitel and Telstra retained ‘one-tenant
structures’.
177
This means that the carrier-to-carrier co-location arrangements are no longer relevant
post-divestment and co-location arrangements will be between a carrier and a third party such as a
mobile network infrastructure provider.
The costs of co-location are also signicantly impacted by the need for any upgrades, as the mobile
network operator will generally bear the cost of the upgrade. The typical costs incurred by both
mobile network infrastructure providers and mobile network operators when co-locating are shown in
Table 8 below.
173 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
174 TPG Telecom, Public submission in response to report on preliminary ndings, May 2023 p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
175 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
176 Information provided by stakeholders.
177 Information obtained in ACCC site visit to Amplitel.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Table 8: Typical costs incurred when co-locating
Cost category About this cost category
Tower site selection
and planning approvals,
including community
consultation
There is often a need to go through relevant town planning and approval processes.
This also requires engineering design work and Electromagnetic Emission (EME)
analysis to support approval applications.
Upgrade to tower
(structural only)
An assessment of the tower may be required to ascertain co-location feasibility.
Land lease obligations (if
required)
There may be an increase in ground rent payable to the landlord that owns the land
where the tower is located, or amendments to lease.
178
Upgrade to power Any cost incurred for power upgrades will be site specic and will depend on the
equipment the mobile network operator proposes to use. The power requirements of
4G and 5G technologies are higher than 3G.
Connection to backhaul When co-locating, there will already be a backhaul connection in place. The
co-locating mobile network operator may choose to access existing backhaul and pay
an access fee to the third party which owns it.
Costs paid to mobile
network infrastructure
provider
For the mobile network operator, a large cost consideration is the access fees paid to
the mobile network infrastructure provider.
Associated equipment This includes the installation of the mobile network operator’s active equipment on
the tower and any associated fees to equipment vendors. There can also be a need to
build an additional equipment shelter, as mobile network operators may prefer to have
separate shelters on a tower site.
Table 8 shows that the typical costs incurred to establish a co-location are similar categories to initial
build costs, as there can be a need for planning approvals and construction to upgrade the tower. To
our understanding, the largest incremental cost mobile network infrastructure providers would face
with an additional co-location may be an increase in ground rent payable to the landlord that owns
the land where the tower is located.
179
Other operating costs, such as utilities and maintenance costs,
are likely to increase by a small degree with additional tenants.
From a mobile network operators perspective, the 2 main costs inuencing the business case for a
co-location are the costs of any upgrades, and the fees payable to a mobile network infrastructure
provider for access to the tower.
The 3 major mobile network infrastructure providers (Amplitel, Indara and Waveconn) highlighted that
they will generally seek to build a new site that can support at least 2 but, if possible, 3 tenants.
180
Where this is the case, there will be limited need for upgrades when a second or third carrier seeks to
co-locate. However, mobile network infrastructure providers need a strong enough business case to
build a multi-tenant capable tower (e.g. there is demand from multiple mobile network operators for
a tower in that location), otherwise they are incentivised to only build a single tenant tower at a lower
cost.
181
178 See for example, Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed
27 June 2023.
179 See for example, Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed
27 June 2023.
180 Amplitel, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 2 September 2022, p 20, accessed 27 June 2023;
Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 17,
accessed 27 June 2023; Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5,
accessed 27 June 2023.
181 See for example, Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 4, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Waveconn submitted that frequently existing towers require an upgrade to accommodate additional
tenants.
182
The cost of a structural upgrade to a tower could be relatively low, but this depends on the
tower. However, for some towers, a structural upgrade could mean that the total cost of co-location is
similar to the cost of building a new tower.
Amplitel submitted that many of its existing sites are of an insucient size to accommodate
additional tenants.
183
Additional compound space may be required to accommodate a tenant, which
will require negotiations with the landlord.
184
Amplitel holds the largest portfolio of towers and has the
largest percentage of towers in outer regional, remote and very remote Australia. Consequently, our
understanding is that mobile network operators seeking to co-locate in these areas will likely need to
negotiate with Amplitel for co-location, and will likely face costs associated with upgrading the site to
accommodate additional equipment.
A key consideration for mobile network operators in deciding whether to co-locate is the ongoing
access costs paid to the mobile network infrastructure provider.
185
A driver of the divestments was
the ability for the mobile network operator to move expenditure away from inexible large capital
investments to more manageable and exible operating cost expenses.
186
One mobile network
operator noted that there is a trade-off for fees between higher scale of the assets and longer tenure
(which typically enables lower fees) and ensuring exibility and future options (which typically results
in higher fees).
187
We expect that in areas with infrastructure competition, mobile network infrastructure providers will
respond to demand and tower access fees would be set accordingly. Co-location rates decrease
with remoteness, driven by lower demand from mobile network operators to establish sites where
there is a more marginal case for investment due to lower population. In a competitive market, we
would expect that lower demand would result in lower access fees if mobile network infrastructure
providers were wanting to attract tenants to these areas. This is consistent with the mobile network
infrastructure providers submitting that they have an incentive to increase co-locations. Where a
mobile network infrastructure provider is subject to limited competition, we would expect higher
fees to be charged due to the incentive for rent-seeking behaviour, although this may be balanced by
other factors.
The fees that mobile network infrastructure providers charge for co-location are highly dependent
on the commercial arrangements in place and can vary substantially. Some stakeholders have
submitted that access fees are now higher post-divestment.
188
How the ongoing access fees payable to mobile network infrastructure providers are impacted
by region varies considerably by the commercial agreement. It is unclear what exactly drives the
differences in these access fees, i.e. whether they are impacted by demand, cost or the ability of
a mobile network infrastructure provider to extract price premium in certain areas or particular
circumstances. We have found from our review of some commercial arrangements that ongoing
access pricing can vary based on location and market conditions and can also depend on tower
height and the amount of the mobile network operator’s equipment to be located on the tower.
189
While some mobile network infrastructure providers pricing decreases with remoteness as we would
expect, we have observed that some access fees are lowest in regional Australia but will increase
182 Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
183 Information provided by stakeholder.
184 Information provided by stakeholder.
185 TPG Telecom, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings,
May 2023, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
186 Information provided by stakeholder.
187 Information provided by stakeholder.
188 ACCC, Industry stakeholder forum, 16 March 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
189 Information provided by stakeholder.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
in remote Australia. Some agreements had lower pricing in rural areas, or in some cases at pricing
across all Australia.
190
For one mobile network infrastructure provider, its co-location ratios decline with geographic
remoteness and it has lower site pricing declining with remoteness.
191
The mobile network
infrastructure provider notes that this is a function of lower demand due to the inferior customer
economics of serving marginal population areas, i.e. lower demand has translated into lower prices.
192
However, a mobile network infrastructure provider may have different pricing trends based on region.
This could be that regional areas have the lowest fees, with fees increasing in remote areas and then
generally being highest in major cities.
193
This suggests that despite the divestments, commercial
arrangements between mobile network operators and the mobile network infrastructure provider
have not improved competition in the provision of tower access in remote areas. This is likely
because there is limited infrastructure competition in remote areas of Australia.
194
It is dicult to provide a like-for-like cost comparison between building a new tower and co-location
due to the high variability of factors involved, particularly due to commercial arrangements. Generally
co-locating on existing infrastructure is more cost-effective than building new towers, particularly
where no signicant upgrade to the tower is required. However, where signicant upgrade to the
tower is required, co-location could, in some cases, be prohibitively expensive.
195
To determine a cost-comparison for deployment in a particular area, a mobile network operator
would assess the characteristics of the area sought to be deployed into. This includes location,
capacity of existing infrastructure, whether requirements in terms of network coverage and capacity
could be met by existing infrastructure, and the commercial arrangements in place with the relevant
mobile network infrastructure provider.
196
u Finding7
Co-location on existing infrastructure is generally more cost effective than building new towers.
However, where co-location requires signicant upgrade to the tower infrastructure, co-location
can in some cases be prohibitively expensive.
Mobile network infrastructure providers can inuence the business case for co-location by
mobile network operators in 2 main ways:
1. By the decision to build a single or multi-tenant capable tower, noting that the business
case for the initial build may not support a multi-tenant tower if the tower provider does not
anticipate demand from multiple tenants.
2. By the access fees they set, noting that high access fees will discourage co-location.
190 Information provided by stakeholder.
191 Information provided by stakeholder.
192 Information provided by stakeholder.
193 Information provided by stakeholder.
194 See also the discussion at the industry stakeholder forum, Industry stakeholder forum, 16 March 2023, p 1, accessed
27 June 2023.
195 See also the discussion at the industry stakeholder forum, Industry stakeholder forum, 16 March 2023, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023.
196 See for example, Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 5, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Active sharing arrangements and the neutral host model
Infrastructure sharing arrangements can be both passive (sharing passive infrastructure such as
towers only) or active (sharing both passive infrastructure and active infrastructure such as the radio
access network). Sharing arrangements allow mobile network operators to avoid the duplication of
physical infrastructure, by sharing capital costs and operational expenditure.
The decision to pursue sharing arrangements will depend on regulatory and commercial
arrangements, potential cost savings and the willingness of mobile network operators to share
infrastructure in this way.
Figure 5 below shows 2 ways in which active sharing arrangements may occur.
Figure 5: Comparison of Mobile Operator Core Network and Mobile Operator Radio Access Network active
sharing arrangements
MORAN
(Multi Operation Radio Access Network)
SP #2 (MNO)
Freq. #2
SP #1 (MNO)
Freq. #1
RAN
TTA
Tower Top
Amplifier
SP #1: Separate Core
Mobility
Management
Subscriber
Registry
Packet
Gateway
SP #2: Separate Core
Mobility
Management
Subscriber
Registry
Packet
Gateway
SP #1 (MNO) and SP #2 (MNO)
Same Freq.
RAN
TTA
Tower Top
Amplifier
SP #1: Separate Core
Mobility
Management
Subscriber
Registry
Packet
Gateway
SP #2: Separate Core
Mobility
Management
Subscriber
Registry
Packet
Gateway
MOCN
(Multi Operator Core Network )
Note: SP (sevice provider).
In a Mobile Operator Core Network arrangement, the whole of radio access network (the antenna,
transmitters, receivers, baseband signal processors etc) are shared, as well as the spectrum which
is deployed. The carriers connect their own separate core network to this common radio access
network. In a Mobile Operator Core Network arrangement, the carriers in the arrangement will have
same coverage and capacity (to share).
In a Mobile Operator Radio Access Network arrangement, the whole of the radio access network is
shared as in a Mobile Operator Core Network arrangement, except the spectrum deployed is different
for different carriers. In Mobile Operator Radio Access Network, the carriers in the arrangement can
44
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
have different coverage and capacity. Optus and Vodafone entered this type of sharing arrangement
in 2004, to share more than 2,000 base stations nationally.
197
There is also the neutral host model, where active and passive infrastructure is provided by a third
party who is not usually providing retail telecommunications services themselves. The passive
and active infrastructure capacity is leased out to mobile network operators. Neutral host models
can use a Mobile Operator Core Network, Mobile Operator Radio Access Network or a roaming
arrangement.
198
For active sharing models such as the neutral host model, Field Solutions Group submitted there are
additional costs beyond those associated with greeneld or browneld sites.
199
Field Solutions Group
submits that the mobile network infrastructure provider takes responsibility for:
the purchase and deployment of the active equipment on the tower structure
spectrum value.
200
These additional costs would then impact the commercial fee arrangements between mobile
network operators and mobile network infrastructure providers.
201
Active sharing arrangements have the potential for considerable cost reductions compared with
new tower builds, given both passive and active infrastructure can be shared between mobile
network operators. These types of sharing arrangements may also result in greater cost savings
than co-location.
202
However, active sharing (particularly in neutral host models) may require new
vendor integration, integration of operational systems or loss of independence in making capacity
and coverage upgrade decisions, and may result in additional costs. These types of active sharing
arrangements are not as common in Australia as co-location arrangements.
At the industry stakeholder forum, some stakeholders noted that there is now greater competition
with tower infrastructure.
203
If the divestment of tower assets has led to a more competitive market
for tower provision, we would expect to see that the mobile network infrastructure providers
competing ercely for the business of mobile network operators in order to maintain or gain market
share. We would also likely see the development of a market for the provision of neutral host services
where demand for it exists. On the other hand, active sharing (in the form of Mobile Operator Core
Network or Mobile Operator Radio Access Network to the exclusion of any neutral host provider)
between mobile network operators would in fact reduce demand for tower access. While this is an
effective way to reduce the cost of network deployment for mobile network operators, it is contrary
to the interest of mobile network infrastructure providers in maximising tenancy in cases where they
otherwise have capacity to host more tenants.
Active sharing arrangements could potentially give rise to competition concerns due to the risk of
collusion, reduced competition on network quality and distorted incentives for network investment in
shared infrastructure. However, as recognised by the Australian Competition Tribunal, the commercial
and economic benets of network infrastructure sharing are readily apparent and particularly
197 Optus, Optus and Vodafone Australia nalise agreement to roll out shared 3G network, 19 November 2004, accessed
27 June 2023.
198 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 22, accessed 27 June 2023.
199 Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, p 10, accessed
27 June 2023.
200 Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, p 10, accessed
27 June 2023.
201 Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, p 10, accessed
27 June 2023.
202 Pivotel, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings,
16May 2023 p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
203 ACCC, Industry stakeholder forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
45
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
pronounced in regional areas.
204
The ACCC considers if active infrastructure sharing is focussed
on deployments in areas where there is otherwise no commercial incentive to provide services or
limited prospect of meaningful infrastructure competition, there is likely public benet associated
with such sharing arrangements. The ACCC authorisation framework considers any proposed
active sharing arrangements on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they would likely lead a
substantial lessening of competition, and if so, whether the likely public benet outweighs the likely
public detriment.
u Finding8
Active sharing arrangements, including neutral host models, can further reduce the cost
of providing mobile coverage compared to co-location, particularly in areas where there is
otherwise no commercial incentive to invest in new infrastructure.
Market dynamics and commercial arrangements after the divestment or transfer of towers
from mobile network operators to mobile network infrastructure providers can inuence
whether a broader market for neutral host provision may develop over time.
 
Once a mobile network is deployed, there are ongoing operational and maintenance expenses for
both mobile network operators and mobile network infrastructure providers. These costs can include
regular inspections, upgrades or maintenance.
205
OneWi estimates that the direct cost to maintain a
tower is between 5% to 7% of the capital cost per annum.
206
Maintenance costs are linked to the type of tower structure, as lattice towers and masts tend to have
higher maintenance costs than most rooftop structures or monopoles.
207
Costs include maintenance
of site ground, fence, access road, tower structure, headframe, fall arrest systems, tower corrosion,
bird protection, and lightening protectors. There are also costs to mobilise personnel to regional, rural
and remote areas. Consequently, maintenance costs tend to increase with remoteness.
Table 9 below outlines the typical costs incurred for the ongoing provision of access to towers.
204 Australian Competition Tribunal, Applications by Telstra Corporation Limited and TPG Telecom Limited for review of Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission Merger Authorisation Determination MA1000021, Summary of Reasons for
Determination, [20], accessed 27 June 2023.
205 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 12, accessed 27 June 2023;
Amplitel, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 2 September 2022, p 17, accessed 27 June 2023;
Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022,
pp 8–9, accessed 27 June 2023; Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022,
p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
206 OneWi, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 4 August 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
207 Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Table 9: Typical ongoing costs incurred by a mobile network infrastructure provider
Cost category About this cost category
Maintenance, including
track, tower, general
cleaning and site security
The costs of maintenance are site specic, and are also dependent on the type of
climate that a tower is located in. For example, a tower located on a coastline will
require different maintenance to manage higher corrosion compared with an inland
tower.
The cost of maintenance will generally have a xed component (for example for
planning and submitting a report) and a variable component (travel to the tower,
inspection depending on type of structure/location, type of repair or replacement).
208
It is more expensive to deploy personnel to undertake maintenance in rural areas due
to higher transport costs and the need for accommodation.
Inspections Inspections can be conducted via drones of visual inspection from riggers who climb
the tower, or inspect the tower via cranes.
209
The frequency of inspections and repairs
is not consistent and depends on the type of tower, age, and the weather conditions
where it is located.
Upgrades and
refurbishments
The costs of upgrades and refurbishments are site specic and dependent on the
requirements for a particular tower site. Towers in more hostile environments (such
as coastal or in cyclone areas) are more likely to require upgrades or refurbishments.
Whether the mobile network infrastructure provider or the mobile network operator
bears the cost of upgrades will depend on the type of upgrade required and the terms
of their commercial agreement.
Property costs such as
land leases
There is high variability in land access costs and this is not necessarily driven by
remoteness. Land rent costs can vary signicantly depending on the site and landlord
characteristics. Land lease costs will vary depending on the business model of mobile
network infrastructure provider. For example, some mobile network infrastructure
providers will tend to own some land rather than lease it.
210
The cost of property
leases is generally the largest cost on a per-tower basis.
Utilities such as
electricity
This cost is usually negligible as mobile network operators tend to not pay ongoing
electricity costs.
Business overheads for
company operations
These costs are not incurred specically to certain towers or regions, and often
relate to a dedicate team and systems to manage the portfolio of infrastructure. Field
Solutions Group submitted that over a ten-year period, the cost of software packages
that assist with the establishment and operation of tower access can easily exceed
$700,000.
211
Generally, ongoing costs are not strongly impacted by remoteness but can vary depending on the
particular site. The cost to mobilise labour to a site will increase with remoteness.
Options for capacity upgrades are more limited in remoter areas
In addition to adding new sites to mobile networks, the active equipment on existing sites can be
upgraded to expand the coverage or capacity provided by the site. However, there are more limited
options to upgrades in towers in remoter areas. This is largely because the number of users captured
by a tower is lower in regional, rural and remote areas than in major cities. The lower population
density and wider geographic spread of mobile network users mean that the types of upgrades that
may be suited to major cities are not well suited to regional, rural and remote areas.
208 Information provided by stakeholder.
209 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 28, accessed 27 June 2023.
210 Information provided by stakeholder.
211 Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, p 5, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Typically, mobile network operators will use low-band spectrum in remoter areas as it is able to
reach longer distances, and thereby provide a wider coverage area around a base station. However,
the available bandwidth for low-band spectrum is small, usually around 10–20MHz, which limits
the capacity of the base station and the users data rate. Techniques to improve capacity such
as multiple input multiple output (MIMO) are dicult to implement using low-band spectrum, as
the antennas required to use low-band spectrum are large and may require upgrades to towers to
support additional equipment.
Other ways to upgrade capacity on sites utilising low-band spectrum include:
Sectorisation: This is where the area around a site is split into 2 or more sectors, using separate
antenna and radio equipment for each. However, existing towers may require upgrades to support
the additional equipment required for sectorisation. This form of capacity upgrade is more
effective if users are spread around the site in different directions and not concentrated within a
narrow angle around the site.
Densication: This is where coverage is split into smaller areas and separate base stations are
deployed for each. Finding suitable sites for densication can be challenging, particularly if terrain
is dicult.
Use of small cells with satellite backhaul can target small areas of users. Traditional satellite
connectivity will have higher latency than terrestrial technologies, however the emergence of
low-Earth orbit satellites provide a lower latency solution than satellites in geosynchronous orbit.
Use of satellites for backhaul, or direct-to-handset satellite connectivity.
Another limitation relevant to capacity upgrades is the type of backhaul used. Remoter areas may not
use bre, and may instead use multi-hop microwave backhaul or satellite backhaul. These have lower
bandwidth capacity than bre, and thereby limit the maximum capacity that could be achieved at a
base station.
With the demand for data use on mobile networks continually growing, there is an increasing
amount of small-cell infrastructure being built in more densely populated areas. In remoter areas,
the tendency is to consider upgrades to antennas on existing structures, which can lead to structural
upgrade costs.
u Finding9
Options for capacity upgrades to meet consumer demand for mobile services are more limited
in regional, rural and remote areas compared with urban areas. This is due to higher costs
to increase capacity (particularly backhaul transmission upgrade costs) to meet increasing
demand for data.
48
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 Land access
The Direction requires the ACCC to have regard to the costs of accessing land to provide towers and
associated infrastructure.
The location of land is critical for mobile coverage, including to provide new coverage and ll
coverage gaps often referred to as ‘black spots. We received a signicant number of submissions
on these issues, reecting their importance to mobile network infrastructure providers and mobile
networks operators.
Stakeholders indicated that access to land can be complicated by the need to operate across
different government planning jurisdictions. This adds complexity to processes, which can be time
consuming and costly to resolve. Stakeholders advocated for several reforms to planning rules to
better facilitate infrastructure deployment.
 
Infrastructure providers and mobile network operators engage with private, commercial and
government landlords to access the following kinds of land:
Freehold land – land that is privately-owned, including by First Nations landowners. Access to
private land may be preferred due to council regulations being among the only restrictions to
land access.
Leasehold – land that is privately leased by an individual or commercial entity to infrastructure
providers and mobile network operators.
Non-freehold land – public land, held by federal, state, territory or local government. This includes
reserves, National and State parks and forests, as well as native title interests.
212
The Inquiry has found that government and private landlords set rents in fundamentally different
ways. Private landlords tend to negotiate fees themselves, or through an intermediary, whereas
government entities set prices for land access through rental determinations. In Queensland, for
example, this is set by the Queensland Valuer General.
213
Observations of land access agreements
During the inquiry the ACCC collected data from a range of stakeholders, including a large sample of
industry land access agreements. General observations from these agreements include:
We observed land access agreements which varied in length ranging from 6months to 30years,
with the most common tenures observed between 10 and 20years.
214
Longer agreements may
be preferred to ensure security of access to infrastructure.
Land access agreements may include provisions for annual rental reviews and periodic market
rental reviews. We observed that land access rents are typically indexed at a xed percentage
annually or by the consumer price index (CPI). We observed reviews of leasing costs generally
occurred at least every 5 years, although we note that not all rents are raised annually.
215
212 Infrastructure providers can include the major mobile network infrastructure providers (such as Amplitel, Indara and
Waveconn) and other infrastructure providers such as BAI Communications and NBN Co.
213 Queensland Government, About land valuations in Queensland, accessed 27 March 2023.
214 Information provided by stakeholders but is not representative of all responses.
215 Information provided by stakeholders
but is not representative of all responses.
49
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
We note that ination, which is commonly used across industries for indexation, has signicantly
increased recently in Australia, with CPI rising 7% for the 12 months to the March 2023 quarter.
216
An industry stakeholder commented that many tenants prefer to avoid market rent reviews,
as cost uncertainties and resource constraints can make them dicult to manage and cause
commercial risks. They noted that tenants typically offer xed escalation, compounding, which
reects current market conditions. This stakeholder also highlighted that some government
landlords have adopted CPI-based rent escalations. However, this has risks given ination and
dynamic markets can impact budget forecasting.
217
State and Territory regulations
Mobile network operators and mobile network infrastructure providers operate across different
jurisdictions, with varying land access laws and planning requirements.
The proportion of different types of land and related regulations differ markedly between states and
territories. For example, approximately 55% of Victoria is freehold agricultural land and around 38%
is public land.
218
Victorian reserves are managed by a diverse range of land managers, including
local government, statutory bodies or government agencies. Conversely, most of the land in South
Australia is privately owned or held under a Crown lease or other arrangement.
219
Crown land in South
Australia is subject to different types of tenure, including licenced, dedicated land, term lease, or
perpetual lease.
In addition to other laws, native title is another relevant and important consideration across Australia.
For example, approximately 48% of the Northern Territory’s land mass and 80% of its coastline is
held under native title.
220
The Native Title Act 1993 allows governments, companies and native title
holders to negotiate agreements, including Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs), about future
developments on the land, waters, and sea.
221
There is a further discussion regarding planning rules in section 5.4.
Accessing land in more remote areas
The Inquiry heard that mobile network infrastructure providers are not currently incentivised to
acquire land in areas where there is low potential for multi-carrier tenancy, or where there is no
commitment from a mobile network operator to locate in that area.
This is particularly the case in rural and remote areas, where commercial incentives are poor due to
the low customer base. Further, as discussed below, accessing land in rural and remote areas can
lead to a range of challenges and higher costs for deployment.
216 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, Australia, accessed 23 June 2023.
217 Information provided by stakeholder.
218 Agriculture Victoria, Land Use, accessed 27 March 2023.
219 Government of South Australia Department of Environment and Natural Resources, What is Crown Land, accessed
23 June 2023.
220 Northern Territory Government, Northern Territory Aboriginal Land and Sea Action Plan 20222024, p 6, accessed
27 June 2023.
221 Northern Land Council, Our governing laws, accessed 23 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Special arrangements for some types of telecommunications
infrastructure, including non-discrimination of carriers
Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications Act provides ‘carriers’ with certain powers and immunities.
222
In certain circumstances, certain activities undertaken by carriers may be exempt from some state,
territory, or local government planning approval, or landowner consent in relation to inspecting,
installing and maintaining ‘low-impact facilities’. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.
Schedule 3 also sets out provisions regarding non-discrimination. Those provisions include cl 44(1)
of Schedule 3, which provides that state and territory laws have no effect to the extent that the law
discriminates, or would have the effect (directly or indirectly) of discriminating, against a particular
carrier, particular class of carriers, or carriers in general.
Clause 44(1) of Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications Act is directed at state and territory laws that
discriminate against carriers. The effect is that unless specied in a written instrument made by the
Minister, a State or Territory law is of no effect to the extent that it discriminates against carriers.
223
Optus and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association refer to Clause 44 of Schedule 3
to the Telecommunications Act in the context of setting prices for leasing government land.
224
Both
submitted that State and Territory governments should audit/review the basis for setting government
land lease rates.
225
Optus submits that the Telstra v Queensland [2016] FCA 1213 case means that
‘[t]he use of benchmarking of private market rates for communication leases to set rents for Crown
land is not permissible.
226
However, relevantly the issue in this case was whether the Land Regulation 2009 (Qld) impermissibly
discriminated, or had the effect of discriminating, against carriers by imposing higher rents for State
leases held by carriers than for leases held by other businesses in the disputed areas. We understand
this means that benchmarking private market rates may not of itself be discriminatory, but could be if
it, for example, resulted in a carrier, a particular class of carriers, or carriers generally being adversely
treated in a way that is differential by reference to an appropriate standard of comparison.
227
We
understand from that case that it is the existence and extent of any differential treatment of carriers
compared with other users of land which is relevant.
228
Optus submits that State/Territory bodies should justify how their processes and charges are
consistent with the Telecommunications Act.
229
Such a review has occurred in some jurisdictions.
230
We consider that greater transparency on how Crown land lease rate are set would be benecial.
It can be dicult to ascertain how leases for Crown land is set based solely on publicly
available information.
222 Section 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 denes a carrier as the holder of a carrier licence.
223 Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 44.
224 Optus, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, May 2023, p 5, accessed
27 June 2023; Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry
report on preliminary ndings, 16 May 2023, p5, accessed 27 June 2023.
225 Optus, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, May 2023, p 6, accessed
27 June 2023; Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry
report on preliminary ndings, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
226 Optus, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, May 2023, p 6, accessed
27 June 2023
227 Bayside City Council v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2004] HCA 19, 44, accessed 27 June 2023.
228 For completeness, we note there was also a secondary issue in the case as to whether the Land Regulation 2009 (Qld)
discriminated against carriers by denying them a right to appeal against rents for their leases.
229 Optus, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, May 2023, p 6, accessed
27 June 2023.
230 For example, IPART, Review of rental arrangements for communication towers on Crown land, November 2019, p 5, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 
Land access costs vary by site size, landlord, tenure type, market conditions, state or territory, and
geographic region.
231
The costs are highly site specic and can include initial costs such as site
selection, commercial negotiation, state and territory planning, authorisation costs, and ongoing
rental costs. Further, tenure costs and risk vary by landlord – the short-term nature of commercial
leaseholds can increase long-term risks for access costs.
In response to our consultation paper, stakeholders emphasised the importance of both the location
of suitable land and the potential for the commercial development of that land.
232
This is because
costs can depend on how the surrounding land is ‘zoned’ (residential, commercial or rural) and even
the local community’s views. For example, Amplitel submitted that its towers are often located
at high points in sometimes ‘sensitive’ areas, as they occasionally coincide with local landmarks,
national parks, or areas of signicance for First Nations landowners.
233
We observed a large sample of land access agreements provided condentially to the ACCC. We
observed agreements for both private and government landlords with nominal rental amounts, across
a range of ABS areas of remoteness.
234
We also observed that land rental costs can vary immensely. One stakeholder considered that current
land access prices may be in the order of 40% to 80% above true market rates.
They argued that
rental prices have been signicantly impacted by high xed annual rent increases, overly anxious
lessees, unwilling landlords, rachet clauses which prevent true market reviews and the previous
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal Schedules of 2005 and 2013.
235
One stakeholder noted that the market continues to suffer from the hasty rollout and expansion of
tower leases, which began 30 years ago when mobile phones became widely available in Australia.
They assert that these ‘legacy’ agreements are based on uncommercial and outdated terms, which
have no association with current market rates. The stakeholder notes that all major carriers are now
are attempting to renegotiate these agreements to bring them closer to current market rents.
236
Additional costs
There are a number of additional costs specied in some of the condential land access agreements.
Many agreements stipulated that the lessee is responsible for utilities (such as electricity),
land taxes and, in a more limited number of cases, council rates.
237
Other costs found in some
agreements include:
legal costs and stamp duty
vermin mitigation
bushre abatement and/or mitigation.
238
231 Amplitel, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 32, accessed 27 June 2023;
and BAI Communications, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, p 6, accessed
27 June 2023.
232 Amplitel, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, pp 18–19, accessed
27 June 2023; and Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 14, accessed
27 June 2023.
233 Amplitel, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 19, accessed 27 June 2023.
234 Information provided by stakeholders but is not representative of all responses.
235 Information provided by stakeholder.
236 Information provided by stakeholder.
237 Information provided by stakeholders but is not representative of all responses.
238 Information provided by stakeholders but is not representative of all responses.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Co-user fees
As noted below, some landlords are imposing additional co-user fees. One stakeholder observed that
private landlords are seeking more control over tenants and are increasingly negotiating clauses to
capture additional value from increased tower utilisation. Further, they note that some government or
commercial landlords may charge additional fees depending on how many tenants are on the site.
239
The same stakeholder also observed that private landlords are seeking to increase controls such as
requiring consent for additional tenants or undertaking routine maintenance. They argued that this
consequently increases the administrative burden and increases the timeframes for co-location.
240
 
Commercial data
The data we gathered through land access agreements shows that leasing costs for government
land varies signicantly, and in some cases is less expensive than private landlords.
241
It is important
to note that this data was drawn from a sample of land access agreements spanning several years
and may not reect current market values or current pricing by government landlords.
242
One stakeholder reported that ongoing lease costs for Crown Land in regional and remote areas is
between 100% to 300% higher than for private land.
243
Another stakeholder reported local government
landlords are now seeking to negotiate signicantly higher rents based on third party valuations.
244
Industry submissions
The Inquiry heard that access to government land is signicantly more expensive than access to
private land.
245
NBN Co submitted that access costs are typically higher for public land based on
the need to engage with multiple agency approval processes and the lengthy periods for obtaining
approvals.
246
The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association also noted that rents for private
land are not comparable to Crown rents.
247
NBN Co and other stakeholders also raised the additional
imposition of co-user fees by government landlords, even where the primary tenant is paying the rent
and the co-user makes no further encumbrance on the land.
248
The Department of Regional NSWs submission outlined the annual fees the NSW National Parks
and Wildlife Service charges for all telecommunications facilities located on reserved land. Currently,
for primary users, the fees are approximately $18,000 for sites in remote areas and $32,000 for sites
239 Information provided by stakeholders but is not representative of all responses.
240 Information provided by stakeholder.
241 Information provided by stakeholders but is not representative of all responses.
242 Information provided by stakeholders but is not representative of all responses.
243 Information provided by stakeholder.
244 Information provided by stakeholder.
245 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure
Inquiry, 1 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023; NBN Co, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure
Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023; Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
30 August 2022, p 14, accessed 27 June 2023; Waveconn, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
29 September 2022, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
246 NBN Co, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
247 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry
– Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
248 Amplitel, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, pp 35, 45, accessed
27 June 2023; NBN Co, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 11, accessed
27 June 2023.
53
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
in regional areas. The fees for co-users are between approximately $9,000 for remote areas and
$16,000 for regional areas. Fees are reviewed every 5 years and adjusted based on the rental market
for communications facilities. They can vary depending on location and can be increased annually
based on the Australia CPI.
249
Many industry stakeholders supported the recommendations made by the 2019 NSW Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) Review of Rental Arrangements for Communications Towers
on Crown Land, which recommended signicantly reduced rents. The Independent Pricing and
Regulatory Tribunal’s review recommended annual rents for locations in NSW ranging from $508 for
very remote areas to $16,900 for metropolitan areas. TPG Telecom submitted that the Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal’s recommendations should be applied more broadly across the
country. However, as Australian Mobile Telecommunication Association noted, the Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal recommendations have not been adopted anywhere, and some state
and territory governments have not reviewed pricing structures for several years.
250
Amplitel submitted that government landowners are in a unique position to reduce the cost of
infrastructure deployment in regional Australia by reducing rents on government lands. Amplitel
advocated for the adoption of a consistent whole-of-government approach.
251
Telstra also argued
that land access reform could lead to signicant cost savings and would enhance the economics of
extending mobile coverage to regional and peri-urban locations.
252
Similarly, Waveconn considered
that more favourable public land access arrangements would support increased investment.
253
The
Australian Mobile Telecommunication Association also submitted that land access costs should be
considered and addressed by the Australian government to improve regional mobile coverage.
254
The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association argued that the ACCCs Preliminary Report
ndings 10 and 11 around the varying costs of land access indicated a need for state and territory
governments to review the rent setting for access to Crown land. It considers that the rentals charged
for other users of Crown land and the value of that land is the appropriate basis for setting Crown
rents for mobile network operators. It argued that to charge otherwise would be discriminatory and
inconsistent with Schedule 3 of the Telecommunications Act.
255
Optus submitted that a key cost impediment to infrastructure deployment and greater mobile
coverage is the discriminatory treatment of land access fees and approvals for telecommunications
assets. Optus asserts that it is often treated inconsistently compared with other utilities such
as gas, water and electricity. Optus further argued that the ACCC should make ndings that
governments should audit the extent to which land access fees and approvals are consistent with the
non-discrimination laws under the Telecommunications Act.
256
249 Department of Regional NSW, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, August 2022, pp 3–4,
accessed 27 June 2023.
250 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry
– Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
251 Amplitel, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, pp 47–48, accessed
27 June 2023.
252 Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 14, 17, accessed 27 June 2023;
TPG Telecom, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
253 Waveconn, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
254 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
1 September 2022, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
255 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry
– Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
256 Optus, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry – Report on Preliminary Findings, May 2023, pp2, 4–6,
accessed 27 June 2023.
54
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
u Finding10
Land access costs are highly site specic, with considerable variance in costs across states
and territories, areas of remoteness and private and government landlords. Stakeholders
submitted that access to government land is signicantly more expensive than private land in
terms of ongoing lease payments. However, we have found signicant variance in land leases
including between private and public land and that public land is not always more expensive.
 

Stakeholders consistently reported that the deployment of telecommunications infrastructure is
affected by a range of factors including:
negotiations with landlords about developments
development applications
inconsistent state and territory government planning approval requirements
delays resulting from adverse planning outcomes (and, in some, cases lengthy court disputes)
local community opposition
scarcity of local government sites zoned for commercial or industrial use
council elections, resulting in new local governments during the planning process
the rights to traverse neighbouring land
national park access rules
heritage laws
native title laws
access to power networks
construction/maintenance of access roads.
The Inquiry heard from the Department of Regional NSW regarding a range of planning costs for
NSW Crown lands. The Department noted that assessing new planning applications can involve
substantial time and resources including environmental impact assessments, heritage and First
Nations cultural impact assessments, and assessing bushre mitigation measures.
257
During a 2023 Standing Committee on Communications and the Arts session, Telstra stated that one
of the biggest challenges is local government inconsistency for planning and approval processes. It
noted that planning issues were handled by the state governments in Victoria and Tasmania, while in
Queensland they tended to be managed by the local government.
258
Similarly, during the Inquiry’s industry stakeholder forum, some stakeholders expressed frustration
that a national issue such as telecommunications infrastructure is impacted by varying levels
257 Department of Regional NSW, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, August 2022, p 4, accessed
27 June 2023.
258 Telstra, Committee Hansard House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications and the Arts Co-investment
in multi-carrier regional mobile infrastructure, 22 March 2023, accessed 23 June 2023.
55
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
of government. Stakeholders also agreed that land access varies signicantly between levels
governments and noted that some States and Territories were easier to work with than others.
259
Further, also at the industry stakeholder forum, some industry stakeholders reported inconsistent
application of planning rules by local government bodies. Several stakeholders gave examples of
issues they’d experienced with access to land:
In an example from Western Australia, the land access arrangements had been taken to court
several times.
There were examples of councils taking many years to review land access agreements.
Some councils require ex gratia payments and stakeholders consider that this may be done to
delay or stop the approval process.
In an example from Queensland, a council required $35,000 just to apply for a
development application.
Sometimes one councillor can hold up a whole process.
There were also reports of inconsistent application of planning rules by some local government
bodies.
260
Planning costs and timeframes
During the Inquiry the ACCC observed the following site selection, acquisition, engineering design and
planning approval costs, which are referred to generally here as planning costs.
Planning and approval costs: the ACCC observed variations in planning and approval costs, with
the average cost approximately $74,000 per site, however one stakeholder noted that some sites
may cost up to $300,000 per site.
261
Another stakeholder reported that the cost of council permits
between regional and metropolitan regions can vary signicantly, and be up to approximately
$23,000 more expensive in regional areas.
262
Appeal costs: one stakeholder reported that the costs of appealing an adverse planning decision
and resolving issues in conferences can range between $60,000 and $120,000 and the costs of
an appeal can be a further $150,000 and $300,000 for a planning/environmental court hearing
(including legal fees, expert opinions and junior barrister).
263
Community consultation costs: one stakeholder reported signicant variation in consultation
costs, especially for heritage sites or requirements to access First Nations land. They noted that
costs can range from $20,000 to $40,000 per site, with some sites exceeding $100,000.
264
Timeframes: Based on one stakeholder’s submission, it could take up to 3 years to secure a site,
depending on whether there are objections or the need for negotiation or appeals.
265
259 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
260 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
261 Information provided by stakeholder.
262 Information provided by stakeholder.
263 Information provided by stakeholder.
264 Information provided by stakeholder.
265 Information provided by stakeholder.
56
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 
In submissions to the consultation paper and the report on preliminary ndings, industry
stakeholders expressed support for reforms to streamline existing rules and better facilitate
infrastructure deployment.
The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association noted that there is a patchwork of rules
and processes across 8 state and territory governments, as well as 537 councils in Australia. These
rules and processes may be costly and resource intensive to navigate.
266
Optus considered that the
government should assist in streamlining land access across Australia, as operating across multiple
planning jurisdictions is one of the major impediments to deployment of regional infrastructure.
267
Amplitel and Telstra submitted that planning reform is required to increase eciency and reduce the
cost of securing land.
268
At the Inquirys industry stakeholder forum, stakeholders suggested the NSW State Environmental
Planning Policy was an effective planning approvals and exemptions model and recommended that
it be adopted more broadly.
269
They noted that the NSW Policy streamlines planning approvals and
contains exemptions for certain telecommunications infrastructure deployment and upgrades.
During a 2023 Standing Committee on Communications and the Arts session, Telstra noted that no
jurisdiction could be considered ‘gold standard’ for planning processes. It suggested that some of
the local government area processes could be transferred to State governments to better promote
commonality and reform. At that same session, Telstra also noted it inates its stated costs in
Federal telecommunications funding programs to account for costs associated with planning
processes. It suggested that a harmonised approach would reduce costs and provide better value for
public money.
270
The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association noted recommendations in its 5G State and
Territory Readiness Assessment relating to Development Approval are grounded in the principles and
guidance found in the ‘Leading Practice Model for Development Assessment in Australia’ produced
by the Development Assessment Forum. It highlights the benets of the Development Assessment
Forum model and the inclusion of planning controls like those successfully used in the NSW State
Environmental Planning Policy.
271
Telstra also supported the reforms outlined in the Australian Mobile
Telecommunications Association’s State and Territory 5G Infrastructure Readiness Assessment
Report regarding access to crown land.
272
266 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
1 September 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
267 Optus, Public submission to the ACCC’s Report on Preliminary Findings, May 2023, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
268 Amplitel, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023;
Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, pp 14,18, accessed 27 June 2023.
269 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
270 Telstra, Committee Hansard House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications and the Arts Co-investment
in multi-carrier regional mobile infrastructure, 22 March 2023, pp 5–6, accessed 23 June 2023.
271 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
1 September 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
272 Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 18, accessed 27 June 2023;
Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), 5G Infrastructure Readiness Assessment, March 2021,
accessed 27 June 2023.
57
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
In addition to these proposed consistency measures, stakeholders advocated for a range of other
reforms, namely:
Amplitel submitted that non-carrier mobile network infrastructure providers should be exempt
from planning and development approvals for towers, particularly those built via co-funding
programs and below specied heights.
273
Amplitel also noted that minimum required lot sizes for telecommunications towers creates
unnecessary costs by mandating the purchase of more land than required and supported a
reconsideration.
274
The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Telstra called for an update to
the Communications Alliance Mobile Base Station Deployment Code. They considered that it
currently creates unnecessary costs when notifying Interested and Affected Parties.
275
u Finding11
Accessing land across different government planning jurisdictions can be complex, lengthy,
and costly. Many industry stakeholders advocate for a range of reforms to improve consistency
of regulations and to better facilitate infrastructure deployment.
 
Land aggregators are emerging entities in the Australian telecommunications sector. Indara
noted that it could be considered a land aggregator, given that it aggregates land to service the
telecommunications industry through the consolidated management of telecommunications
infrastructure.
276
Land aggregators may engage in tower lease buyout schemes by acquiring long-term rental
contracts from property owners in exchange for the right to receive ongoing rent from
telecommunications providers.
277
The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Telstra
submitted that aggregators such as AP Wireless and Landmark Dividend procure land in this way.
278
Both the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Telstra also submitted that many
land aggregators are ‘well supported’ and that some are backed by major pension funds.
279
Stakeholders highlighted the potential impact that land aggregators may have on regional
infrastructure deployment. The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Telstra
asserted that the impact of land aggregators may be more pronounced in regional areas, where
273 Amplitel, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, pp 4, 18, accessed
27 June 2023.
274 Amplitel, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, pp 18, 20, accessed
27 June 2023.
275 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
1 September 2022, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023; Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
30 August 2022, pp 14–15, accessed 27 June 2023.
276 Indara, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 11, accessed 27 June 2023.
277 Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 16, accessed 27 June 2023.
278 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
1 September 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023; and Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
30 August 2022, p 16, accessed 27 June 2023.
279 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
1 September 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023; Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
30 August 2022, p 16, accessed 27 June 2023.
58
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
landholdings are larger and the choice of alternative sites is much smaller.
280
Several stakeholders
submitted that land aggregators that procure rental contracts and speculate on land (ahead of towers
being built) may potentially increase rental costs.
281
Field Solutions Group asserts that this behaviour
ties up land and has the potential to lessen service levels, with providers having to select less-than-
optimal tower locations where multiple parcels of land are targeted.
282
Another stakeholder observed that land aggregators increase the overall cost of providing
telecommunications infrastructure by arbitraging the high cost to relocate through rent increases.
They highlighted that once installed, there are signicant barriers to moving equipment for costs
reasons as well as maintaining optimised network performance. Tower companies have limited
ability to push back on price increases because of the sunk costs (locations having been originally
determined by the required cellular network radio frequency footprint).
283
At the Inquirys industry stakeholder forum, we heard that the full effect of land aggregators in
the market is yet to be seen.
284
A stakeholder noted that land aggregators currently hold a small
percentage of the private land lease market and further increases in ownership may lead to rent
seeking.
285
280 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
1 September 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023; Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
30 August 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
281 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure
Inquiry, 1 September 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023; Field Solutions Group, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile
Infrastructure Inquiry, August 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023; Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile
Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 16, accessed 27 June 2023; TPGTelecom, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile
Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
282 Field Solutions Group, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, August 2022, p 7, accessed
27 June 2023.
283 Information provided by stakeholder.
284 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
285 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
59
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 
arrangements
The Direction requires the ACCC to have regard to the existing commercial arrangements and
other fee arrangements under which third party telecommunications provider and other likely
users can access towers and associated infrastructure, as well as their effectiveness. We are also
required to have regard to the effectiveness of current commercial and regulatory arrangements
in enabling third party telecommunications providers and other likely users to access towers and
associated infrastructure.
 

As outlined in chapter 2, Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications Act requires carriers
who own or operate existing facilities to provide other carriers with access. Part 34B of the
Telecommunications Act has a similar requirement in relation to companies in a carrier
company group.
As such, mobile network operators and mobile network infrastructure providers have developed
processes and agreed on commercial arrangements to facilitate access to telecommunications
infrastructure, such as towers.
Arrangements between mobile network operators and mobile network infrastructure providers are
governed by commercially negotiated access arrangements within the framework established by the
Telecommunications Act. Access to towers can be through a master services agreement, which is
generally used for larger site volumes, or an individual site agreement or other ad hoc arrangement,
which are generally used for smaller site volumes.
286
Commercial arrangements involve various fees and long-term
contracts
Commercial arrangements for access to towers involve multiple types of fees, including application
fees, assessment fees, recurring annual fees and additional fees for the ground lease.
287
There may
also be volume or co-location discounts on these fees.
288
Other costs associated with tower access
are generally managed on a site-by-site basis, such as costs for upgrades or strengthening a tower.
289
Costs for providing towers may increase by remoteness but the appetite or ability for multiple
tenancies decreases by remoteness. This means there are complex incentives for mobile network
infrastructure providers in establishing their fee arrangements with mobile network operators. As
noted in Chapter 4, how remoteness impacts the access fees set by the mobile network infrastructure
286 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
287 Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, p 6, accessed
27 June 2023.
288 Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, p 6, accessed
27 June 2023.
289 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
60
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
providers vary across commercial agreements and it is unclear exactly what drives these differences.
Historically, fees were usually based on a cost-per-equipment basis.
290
More recently some mobile network infrastructure providers have moved to an ‘effective sail area’
pricing model.
291
This pricing model can be used to determine the structural impact of an equipment
conguration on a structure.
292
The effective sail area model allows for greater exibility as the
access seeker can deploy equipment up to the top of the agreed effective sail area (in metres
squared (m2)) without incurring additional costs.
293
We have heard that several factors inuence the overall fees that a tenant, such as a mobile network
operator, pays to a mobile network infrastructure provider. Indara submitted that there are no ‘typical’
commercial arrangements.
294
Different mobile network infrastructure providers consider different
factors when setting fees, but can include factors such as initial asset sale prices, pricing approach
(e.g. portfolio-wide or geographically based), contributions requests to tower upgrades, take-or-pay
obligations, and volume and co-location discounts.
295
Amplitel and Indara both submitted that tower provision costs determine fees for access, however
there were differing views about how tower purchase costs affect fee calculations.
296
Amplitel
submitted that securing a return on investment for the cost of purchasing tower assets is not a factor
that it considers in establishing access costs, while Indara submitted that tower infrastructure is
managed based on recovering costs over the long term in return for an upfront capital outlay.
297
During the industry forum, some attendees noted that the divestment gives better visibility and
understanding of how costs are allocated and how capital is allocated.
298
Attendees also noted
that investment decisions are being made more holistically, rather than based on a mobile network
operator’s access to capital.
299
We understand that each of the mobile network operators have a long-term agreement in place with
a mobile network infrastructure provider, which they have negotiated from a signicant bargaining
position (the sale of their assets to the mobile network infrastructure provider). The mobile network
operators can also enter into contracts with other mobile network infrastructure providers and build
their own sites if needed (although there can be restrictions or nancial implications of doing so in
existing commercial arrangements).
290 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
291 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
292 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
293 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
294 Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022,
p 10, accessed 27 June 2023.
295 Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022,
p 5, accessed 27 June 2023; Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
10 August 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
296 Amplitel, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, 16May 2023, p 4, accessed
27 June 2023; Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
6 September 2022, p 12, accessed 27 June 2023.
297 Amplitel, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, 16May 2023, p 4, accessed
27 June 2023; Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
6 September 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
298 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
299 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
61
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Some stakeholders think commercial arrangements are effective in
facilitating access to towers
Telstra and Amplitel both submitted that the current commercial arrangements are t for purpose
and effective in facilitating tower access.
300
Indara considers its agreements with its customers are
effective, in that they enable ‘suciently comfortable’ transactions with mobile network operators to
achieve increased co-location.
301
Further, most stakeholders noted during the industry stakeholder
forum that they had not experienced issues accessing towers in the new industry structure.
302
Amplitel submitted that there are new commercial arrangements in the process of being negotiated,
and this will take time to be implemented and will involve negotiation tension, which it considers
would be expected for substantial commercial arrangements.
303
Other stakeholders raised concerns about high access fees
However, the divestment transactions appear to impact some mobile network infrastructure
providers access costs, in that access fees can take into consideration the value of the divestment
transactions.
304
Tower access fees can reect both the operation of, and investment in, the mobile
network infrastructure provider’s tower network, and recovering the capital outlay in purchasing the
towers. There are concerns among stakeholders that access fees may be too high to promote access
via co-location.
NBN Co submitted that mobile network infrastructure providers have tower revenue as their core
business and this contributed to ‘generally high-cost commercial arrangements’ arrangements with
mobile network operators.
305
TPG Telecom submitted that access fees required by mobile network
infrastructure providers are an ongoing barrier to increased co-location and that reducing the cost
of accessing existing infrastructure would result in improved competitiveness in downstream
markets.
306
TPG Telecom noted that there are immediate opportunities to co-locate in inner and outer
regional areas, specically in the 2,853 Telstra-only and 1,249 Optus-only sites.
307
TPG Telecom also
stated that the basis for annual access fees for co-location were unclear and raised the question of
what ‘legitimate’ costs mobile network infrastructure providers were recouping from second or third
mobile network operators co-locating on towers.
308
During the industry stakeholder forum, one stakeholder noted that when attempting to access towers
in remote areas, they considered the price for access was excessively high.
309
However, another
stakeholder noted that they considered the pricing impact of the tower divestments had been
relatively neutral.
310
The varying views among industry stakeholders suggests the current commercial arrangements are
working more effectively for some players in the industry than others.
300 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 24, accessed 27 June 2023;
Amplitel, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, 16 May 2023, p 5, accessed
27 June 2023.
301 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
1 September 2022, p 12, accessed 27 June 2023.
302 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
303 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 40, accessed 27 June 2023.
304 Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022,
p 12, accessed 27 June 2023.
305 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
306 TPG Telecom, Public Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, pp 2–3, accessed 27 June 2023.
307 TPG Telecom, Public Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
308 TPG Telecom, Public Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, pp 3-4, accessed 27 June 2023.
309 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
310 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
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 
The Direction requires the ACCC to have regard to the implications (if any) for the provision
of access to towers and associated infrastructure of mobile carriers divesting their tower and
associated infrastructure.
The divestments that have occurred in Australia are part of a trend internationally of mobile network
operators selling their passive mobile telecommunications infrastructure to specialist mobile network
infrastructure providers.
There are varying views on pre-divestment terms of access and
several historical concerns raised by stakeholders
Waveconn submitted that prior to divestment, the vertical integration of the mobile network operators
(in terms of owning mobile tower infrastructure and providing retail mobile services) meant that they
had incentive to frustrate access and to ensure that they had the best access to the infrastructure
they owned.
311
TPG Telecom submitted a similar point, stating that Telstra engaged in practices that
increased barriers to co-locate, including reserving tower space on a site.
312
TPG Telecom submitted that Telstra’s conduct resulted in higher costs for the second operator to
co-locate, given they had to strengthen the site to account for Telstra’s future capacity requirements
as well as the second mobile network operators’ equipment. TPG Telecom submitted that the
additional costs to strengthen a site can be prohibitive.
313
Waveconn also submitted that a mobile
network operator’s revenue cross-subsidised infrastructure costs, further reducing its incentive to
maximise access by increasing tenants.
314
TPG Telecom also submitted that historically, the second mobile network operator locating on a
tower was given an articially lower position on the tower, which led to inferior signal propagation
compared to that which is available to the mobile network operator that owned the tower.
315
In response, Telstra submitted that the protections in the Facilities Access Code, introduced in
2020, prevent the ability to engage in the frustration of access raised by Waveconn and TPG.
316
It
also argued that the separation between operator equipment on towers is industry best practice for
technical and health and safety reasons, including to manage interference.
317
311 Waveconn, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
312 TPG Telecom, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
313 TPG Telecom, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
314 Waveconn, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
315 TPG Telecom, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
316 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, 16 May 2023, p 15,
accessed 27 June 2023.
317 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, 16 May 2023, p 16,
accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Stakeholder concerns about incentives remain post-divestment,
albeit they have changed focus
Varying views persist among stakeholders about post-divestment terms of access and incentives.
We have heard that the investors behind recent tower divestments are focused on reliable, long-term
income streams from stable asset classes.
318
The mobile network infrastructure providers have the
nancial incentive to maximise utilisation on their infrastructure through co-locations.
319
Amplitel noted that one of its strategic objectives is to ‘increase utilisation of its infrastructure by
providing better access’ as well as widening its existing customer base.
320
Waveconn noted that
mobile network infrastructure providers have a greater commercial incentive to provide more ecient
access to infrastructure than when the infrastructure was vertically integrated with mobile network
operators – tenants are now customers, rather than direct competitors.
321
This assertion appears
to be supported by the rate of co-location on some towers.
322
We have also observed within master
services agreements that there can be a co-location discount provided, which varies with the number
of tenants on the tower. These discounts can be signicant.
323
Field Solutions Group considered that one of the impacts of divestment, given that new tower owners
are looking to maximise their returns, is a ‘freeing up’ of space on towers of what would otherwise be
reserved space.
324
TPG Telecom submitted that the structural change in the mobile network infrastructure market may
solve some of the legacy access issues within the industry, however it may also amplify other issues
such as increasing the incentives for rent-seeking behaviour by tower companies.
325
Industry dynamics post-divestment
Ideally, the divestment of tower and associate infrastructure by the mobile network operators and
the formation of vertically separated mobile network infrastructure providers should mean that the
market for the provision of tower access is more competitive. This is because the mobile network
infrastructure providers should have the incentive to maximise tenancy on and revenue derived
from their infrastructure. In such a market, the mobile network infrastructure providers are fully
independent and compete with each other for the business of all mobile network operators. One key
question to consider is whether the divestment of tower assets by mobile network operators means
it has become easier, and potentially less costly, for them to seek co-location in providing greater
mobile coverage.
However, while it is still early days, we have heard concerns from mobile network operators that they
have not seen increased competition for the provision of tower access post-divestment. During the
industry stakeholder forum, we heard some views that there was not consistent competition across
318 Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022,
p 15, accessed 27 June 2023.
319 Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022,
p 15, accessed 27 June 2023.
320 Amplitel, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
321 Waveconn, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
322 For example, Indara outlines that it is aiming for tenancy ratios that exceed 2.5x across its portfolio, with existing tenancy
ratios being around 1.5x or above by region. Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public submission to the Regional Mobile
Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
323 Information provided by stakeholders.
324 Field Solutions Group, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, p 8, accessed
27 June 2023.
325 TPG Telecom, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
tower sites.
326
Some industry stakeholders noted that competition for the provision of access to
existing sites only increases in relation to sites where there is a substitutable site nearby, however this
is not often the case.
327
In reality, the ACCC considers that the divestment of tower assets to mobile network infrastructure
providers has created anchor tenants for infrastructure providers, which are their associated mobile
network operator (i.e. the operator that owned the towers prior to divestment).
Anchor tenants can be benecial for infrastructure provision generally, as they provide certainty to the
infrastructure provider of investment returns that enables it to build and maintain the infrastructure.
On the other hand, where a mobile network infrastructure provider has a long-term access agreement
with a mobile network operator of this kind, it may not be incentivised to attract additional tenants
to its towers. This is particularly true if the mobile network infrastructure provider is already prot
maximising off a single tenant.
The anchor tenant relationship may also create restrictions for the mobile network operators. For
the anchor tenant mobile network operator, there are costs involved in switching to another mobile
network infrastructure provider and there may not be suitable existing infrastructure nearby. There
may also be legacy issues for a co-locating mobile network operator, where the original mobile
network operator has not optimally positioned its equipment within a particular space or ‘aperture’
now used by the mobile network infrastructure provider to separate co-located equipment.
This means that while the divestments made commercial sense for the mobile network operators,
the extent to which the new industry structure could lead to better access to towers, compared to
pre-divestment structure, is unclear.
In addition, the mutually dependent nature of the anchor tenant relationship means that the mobile
network operator and their mobile network infrastructure provider could seek to protect each other’s
commercial and strategic interests in their commercial arrangements. This could have implications
for other related markets.
As noted in Chapter 4, we would expect that a competitive market for the provision of tower access
could lead to the development of a broader market for the provision of neutral host services. On this
point, Vocus submitted that the mobile network infrastructure providers have an economic incentive
to provide neutral host networks, as they benet from multiple mobile network operators utilising
their infrastructure.
328
Vocus also submitted that mobile network infrastructure providers would not
lose any market advantage as the same coverage would be equally available to all mobile network
operators.
329
The ACCC has reason to believe that the current market dynamics and commercial arrangements
may not be conducive to the development of a broader market for the provision of neutral host
models. We have observed that there can be restrictive provisions within a master services
agreement between a mobile network infrastructure provider and a mobile network operator. The
ACCC considers that restrictive provisions may, in some instances, limit or impact the activities that
parties to the agreement can undertake.
326 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
327 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
328 Vocus, Submission to the ACCC Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 27 March 2023, p.2, accessed 27 June 2023.
329 Vocus, Submission to the ACCC Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 27 March 2023, p.2, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Divestment has not solved the incentive problems some
stakeholders were concerned about
Some stakeholders have raised concerns that due to the remaining vertical integration between
Telstra and Amplitel, there is an ongoing incentive and opportunity for Amplitel to favour Telstra.
330
Due to the risk of vertical effects, we have heard ongoing concerns around whether the divestments
overall have improved accessibility to towers, particularly in regional and remote areas where most
towers are operated by Amplitel.
Telstra retains a 51% majority ownership of Amplitel.
331
Amplitel was established as a standalone
business with the sale of a non-controlling 49% interest to a consortium of superannuation funds.
332
Both Amplitel and Telstra stressed that Amplitel operates as a separate and independent business
to Telstra, with Telstra having no rights to reject an Amplitel customers order.
333
Amplitel objected to
the ACCC’s concerns regarding its commercial impartiality, stating that it ‘is an independent company
focused on delivering returns to shareholders from its infrastructure assets.
334
Although stakeholders only raised concerns about Amplitel and Telstra’s relationship, we note that
there is a similar relationship between Indara and Optus, given the Singtel’s (Optus’s parent company)
remaining ownership stake in Indara (albeit to a lesser extent). Waveconn and TPG Telecom are
completely separate entities, however TPG Telecom appears linked to Waveconn in a similar manner
to Telstra and Optus with Amplitel and Indara, respectively.
Divestment appears to have created opposing incentives for mobile network infrastructure providers,
depending on whether they have one of these anchor tenants that are subject to restrictive
agreements. Where an infrastructure provider does not have such an agreement with an anchor
tenant, there is an incentive to attract as many tenants as possible to maximise earnings. However, an
infrastructure provider that is already maximising its earnings from an anchor tenant with a restrictive
agreement has minimal incentive to attract additional tenants, as it is likely to already be earning
returns to cover investment.
u Finding12
There are conicting views among stakeholders about whether commercial arrangements for
access to towers, particularly tower access fees, are working effectively. Some stakeholders
consider that access fees may be too high to promote co-location on existing towers.
It is unclear whether divestment of towers will lead to better access compared with the
situation pre-divestment, based on 2 factors. First, each of the mobile network operators have
become the anchor tenant of the mobile network infrastructure provider who purchased its
towers. This affects the incentives of the mobile network infrastructure provider to compete for
new tenants. Second, there remains vertical integration between some industry players.
330 National Farmer’s Federation, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, p 6, accessed
27 June 2023; TPG Telecom, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 8, accessed
27 June 2023.
331 Telstra, Introducing Amplitel, the largest mobile infrastructure provider in Australia, 1 September 2021, accessed on
23 June 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
332 ITNews, Telstra sells 49 percent of towers business for$2.8bn, 30 June 2021, accessed 23 June 2023, accessed
27 June 2023.
333 Amplitel, Public Submission to ACCC Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, pp 6–7, accessed 27 June 2023, Telstra,
Public Submission to ACCC Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 14, accessed 27 June 2023.
334 Amplitel, Public Submission to ACCC Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, pp 6–7, accessed 27 June 2023.
66
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 

As detailed in Chapter 1, the current coverage of the regulatory framework and application of certain
powers and immunities depend on whether a company has a carrier licence or is part of a carrier
company group, where at least one company is a carrier.
Divestment of towers means regulatory arrangements do not apply
evenly to entities with similar operations
We note, however, that for an access seeker that is co-located on infrastructure that has now been
divested, it likely means that the access seeker will need to enter into a new agreement with the new
mobile network infrastructure provider. While some of the mobile network infrastructure providers are
subject to the Part 34B access regime in the Telecommunications Act, others are not.
Table 10: Application of various regulatory arrangements
Entity Carrier status Subject to Part 34B of the
Telecommunications Act
Subject to Parts 3 and
5 of Schedule 1 of the
Telecommunications Act
Amplitel Part of carrier group Yes No
Telstra Carrier No Yes
Indara Part of carrier group Yes No
Optus Carrier No Yes
Waveconn Not part of carrier group No No
TPG Telecom Carrier No Yes
BAI Communications Part of carrier group Yes No
Where the mobile network infrastructure provider is not subject to the Part 34B regime, there is no
access to the negotiate-arbitrate regime, despite previous arrangements having this as a fall back.
This means that there is no ‘threat’ of arbitrated pricing or safety net where a commercial agreement
cannot be reached. While the recent divestments have highlighted this uneven application of the
regulatory regime to mobile network infrastructure providers, there have been providers operating in
the market prior to divestment, such as BAI Communications. Consequently, this uneven application
of regulation is not an entirely new issue caused by divestments.
Stakeholders had varying views on the effectiveness of current
regulatory regimes
There are several stakeholders that consider the regulation is effective or could be reduced.
Amplitel submitted that there is no enhancement required to the regulatory access regime,
however the current access arrangements could be reduced.
335
This is because in the absence
of vertical integration, Amplitel considers that the need for access regulation has diminished.
336
Amplitel submits that it has ‘clear commercial incentives to provide access to its infrastructure to
335 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, 16 May 2023, p 6,
accessed 27 June 2023.
336 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 49, accessed 27 June 2023.
67
ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
customers.
337
Amplitel also submits that the commercial incentives on both sides should drive
appropriate access outcomes through competition.
338
Field Solutions Group submitted that Part 5 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications Act has
provided an access regime that has ‘worked for the most part’ given the many co-located towers in
operation.
339
Waveconn submitted that it did not see any issues that may arise that are not already
covered by the current regulatory arrangements.
340
There are other stakeholders who consider that changes to the regulation is needed. TPG Telecom
submits that the Facilities Access Regimes in the Telecommunications Act are ‘ineffective in
practice in assisting access seekers to gain access to existing passive infrastructure on reasonable
commercial terms.
341
TPG cited the decreased number of co-locations with remoteness, as shown in
the ACCC’s Mobile Infrastructure Report 2022, to support this point.
342
TPG Telecom submits that there is an opportunity to explore whether the Facilities Access Regimes
should be updated to a model similar to PartXIC of the CCA, where the ACCC could set reference
prices to access to passive infrastructure.
343
TPG Telecom submits that the declaration-nal access
determination model under Part XIC is more effective to the negotiate-arbitrate model.
344
The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association submitted that additional support and
regulatory relief for the structural upgrade of existing towers would be useful.
345
The Australian Mobile
Telecommunications Association propose that the regulations allow for additions of headframes
and antennas as low-impact sites.
346
This would, however, require changes to the list of facilities that
must not be determined to be low-impact facilities.
347
During the industry stakeholder forum, we heard views that while access to towers is regulated, this
does not translate into practice because mobile network infrastructure providers could set access
fees at uneconomic rates for second or third mobile network operators, eliminating competition.
348
We also heard concerns about tower sites where ownership had changed due to divestment. With
towers that were previously owned by a carrier, the tower access was subject to the Facilities Access
Regimes in the Telecommunications Act. However, with a change in ownership and no carrier licence
in some mobile network infrastructure provider entity groups, there is no safety net as intended by the
Facilities Access Regime for future negotiations regarding these existing tower locations.
337 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 49, accessed 27 June 2023.
338 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 49, accessed 27 June 2023.
339 Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, p 8, accessed
27 June 2023.
340 Waveconn, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
341 TPG Telecom, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, May 2023, p 4,
accessed 27 June 2023.
342 TPG Telecom, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, May 2023, p 3,
accessed 27 June 2023.
343 TPG Telecom, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, May 2023, p 4,
accessed 27 June 2023.
344 TPG Telecom, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings, May 2023, p 4,
accessed 27 June 2023.
345 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on
preliminary ndings, 16 May 2023, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
346 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on
preliminary ndings, 16 May 2023, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
347 For example, see Telecommunications Act, Sch 3 cl 6(7).
348 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
The Facilities Access Regime is no longer t for purpose
The carrier negotiate-arbitrate Facilities Access Regime has been a feature of the
Telecommunications Act since it was enacted. It has not substantively been reviewed since this
time, despite suggestions it could be improved.
349
As discussed above, the ACCC has observed that
incentives for mobile network infrastructure providers may vary depending on relationships with
mobile network operators. We also consider an uneven application of the regulatory framework
warrants review.
It is dicult to know for certain how this dynamic and differing incentives may play out in the coming
years. However, given the above concerns raised by stakeholders, we consider the Facilities Access
Regime is no longer t for purpose and should be reviewed to ensure there are not adverse incentives
or limitations to tower access that may limit improved mobile coverage in regional areas.
u Finding13
The Facilities Access Regimes within the Telecommunications Act are no longer t for purpose.
The Government should consider whether it is necessary for the Facilities Access Regime to
cover all mobile network infrastructure providers, regardless of whether they have a carrier
licence or are part of a group that has a carrier company.
The Government should also review the Facilities Access Regime itself to ensure that it
remains t for purpose and is effective in promoting access to towers and associated
infrastructure.
349 For example, Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (2009), National Regulatory Reform for
21st Century Broadband, Discussion Paper, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 Providing towers and access to
towers
Under the Direction, the ACCC is required to have regard to the kinds of matters (including the impact
of costs) providers of towers and associated infrastructure consider in deciding to:
i. provide towers and associated infrastructure
ii. provide access to towers and associated infrastructure.
In this chapter, we consider the kinds of matters that the 3 major mobile network infrastructure
providers (Amplitel, Indara and Waveconn) submitted that they consider in providing towers and
access to towers. We also consider submissions from other mobile infrastructure providers such as
NBN Co, BAI Communications and Field Solutions Group.
For towers primarily used to provide retail mobile services, the demand for towers is derived from
the demand from mobile network operators for those towers. To provide a full picture of the chain
of demand, this chapter will consider the matters that inuence the incentives of mobile network
operators to demand tower access in extending their mobile coverage. This includes incentives to
co-locate on an existing tower and incentives to locate on a new tower build (whether through a build
arrangement with a mobile network infrastructure provider or otherwise).
 

The major mobile network infrastructure providers do not use the tower assets they own for their
own purposes. These towers are predominately used by mobile network operators to provide retail
and wholesale mobile services. A wide range of other access seekers also use these towers to a
lesser extent, including smaller wireless internet service providers, governments, emergency service
operators, mining and agriculture operators.
350
Other mobile network infrastructure providers such as NBN Co and BAI Communications do use their
towers to provide their own services, predominately xed wireless access services and terrestrial
television and radio respectively.
351
Consequently, co-location of mobile network operator equipment
on these towers is secondary to the primary purpose of NBNCo’s and BAI Communication’s towers.
Demand from mobile network operators for access to infrastructure drives the incentives for mobile
network infrastructure providers to build new towers and support existing towers (for example by
maintaining towers and associated infrastructure to remain safe for use). Mobile infrastructure
provider incentives are also inuenced by whether the mobile network operators’ willingness to pay
for access to the infrastructure outweighs the cost.
We have heard from major mobile network infrastructure providers that without a commitment from
a mobile network operator to be the tenant on a particular site, there is no incentive for them to build
new infrastructure or maintain unattractive sites. This is because the sole purpose of the tower is
350 Amplitel, Our Customers, accessed 4 April 2023; Australia Tower Networks (now Indara), Public submission to Regional
Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023; Waveconn, Public submission to Regional
Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
351 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023;
BAI Communications, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, p 1, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
to generate revenue, and for the major mobile network infrastructure providers revenue is primarily
generated from mobile network operators.
352
Amplitel submitted that rational owners of infrastructure will build infrastructure for expected users
of that infrastructure within a certain period.
353
In addition, the mobile network operators radio
frequency requirements determine the quantity of equipment and the height at which that equipment
is installed.
354
Indara submitted that the business case for a new location is typically based on commitments
from the anchor tenant.
355
Field Solutions Group also submitted that mobile network infrastructure
providers will only invest in providing new infrastructure where there is a commercial agreement with
an access seeker.
356
This is because the costs for acquiring land, obtaining relevant approvals and
constructing the tower need to be recovered by way of licence fees across the term of the agreement
with access seekers.
357
Downstream retail demand for mobile network services ultimately determines demand for mobile
network infrastructure. Value is not generated from obtaining access to the tower infrastructure in
and of itself, but from the downstream retail service to consumers and businesses that access to the
tower infrastructure facilitates.
Mobile network operators consider cost and the overall degree of
mobile market competition in deciding to access existing towers or
seek new tower builds
Waveconn submitted that mobile network operators are capital constrained for deployment of new
towers, including in urban areas where commercial returns are more attractive.
358
Given the major
mobile network infrastructure providers rely on commitments from mobile network operators, the
commercial returns of a mobile network operator are a key investment driver for mobile network
infrastructure providers.
Telstra submitted that the cost of deploying new mobile infrastructure in regional areas is generally
higher than urban areas and that the commercial returns are lower due to the smaller number
of customers covered by the site.
359
During the industry stakeholder forum, we heard that the
more regional and rural areas experience exponentially diminishing returns in terms of generating
revenue.
360
However, the overall state of competition in retail mobile market has signicant inuence over the
business case for a mobile network operator to seek a new site. Mobile network operators consider
the revenues they would generate from customers that live outside the new coverage areas, but
nonetheless value a mobile service that provides coverage to it. Optus submitted that competition
between the mobile network operators has led to signicant investment in and expansion of mobile
352 NBN Co, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
353 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 11, accessed 27 June 2023.
354 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 12, accessed 27 June 2023.
355 Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 7,
accessed 27 June 2023.
356 Field Solutions Group (FSG), Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, p 9, accessed
27 June 2023.
357 Field Solutions Group (FSG), Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 10 August 2022, pp 9–10,
accessed 27 June 2023.
358 Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
359 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 11, accessed 27 June 2023.
360 ACCC, Industry consultation exchange – synopsis of discussions, 22 June 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
networks.
361
Telstra submitted that its network differentiation compared with other mobile network
operators is key to driving investment in expanding or improving coverage in regional and rural
areas.
362
Telstra submitted that its customers place a high value on its network coverage and maintaining this
competitive advantage can offset the higher costs of building and upgrading mobile infrastructure
in regional and rural areas.
363
Telstra is driven by capturing revenue in the national retail mobile
market.
364
Stakeholders also expressed views on whether the state of competition in the mobiles market also
inuences a mobile network operators incentives to share its own infrastructure with competitors.
Vocus submitted that the coverage dominance of Telstra means that Telstra has limited, if any,
incentive to share infrastructure with other mobile network operators.
365
Telstra regarded Vocus’s
argument as “demonstrably incorrect” in its submission to the report on preliminary ndings, citing
that co-location with other mobile network operators is over a third (35%) of its sites.
366
Telstra also submitted that its active network sharing proposal with TPG would have extended
coverage in regional and urban fringe areas. However, Optus submitted that Telstra restricts the
degree to which it shares its network; Telstra does not offer full network access to its wholesale
partners and the recently proposed network sharing agreement with TPG Telecom only did not
include access to the entire network coverage that is available in its own retail services.
367
TPG Telecom submitted that some parties may have engaged in practices that are designed to
increase the barriers for a competing mobile network operator to co-locate on a mobile site where
another mobile network operator is already located. For example, some parties may have sought
to hinder other mobile network operator’s ability to co-locate on some mobile sites by strategically
reserving tower space on the relevant site.
368
Waveconn also submitted that mobile network
operators do not have the incentive to encourage co-locations on tower infrastructure, since
increased co-locations will drive increased competition for mobile network operators.
369
Conversely,
Telstra submitted that the new mandatory “use it or lose it” timeframe of 24 months for infrastructure
providers to reserve capacity on towers now prevents potential anti-competitive practices.
370
Telstra submitted that once it identies a need to extend or improve its mobile coverage or capacity
by establishing a new base station, small cell or in-building solutions, Telstra undertakes a search
to assess the range of possible candidate sites and ranks them based on criteria such as: planning
considerations, transmission accessibility, power accessibility, coverage delivered and the nature
and location of existing network infrastructure.
371
Amplitel submitted that carriers are ‘very particular
about site choice and this limits where new sites can be built.
372
The considerations on the mobile
network infrastructure provider side include the type of land available, the local communitys
acceptance of mobile infrastructure and costs for access to land.
373
361 Optus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, September 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
362 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 34, accessed 27 June 2023.
363 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 34, accessed 27 June 2023.
364 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, pp 33–34, accessed 27 June 2023.
365 Vocus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, March 2023, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
366 Telstra, Public Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
367 Optus, Public Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 4, accessed 27 June 2023.
368 TPG Telecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
369 Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
370 Telstra, Public Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings , 16 May 2023, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
371 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 33, accessed 27 June 2023.
372 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 18, accessed 27 June 2023.
373 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 19, accessed 27 June 2023;
Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022,
pp 9–10, 12, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
During the industry stakeholder forum, we heard that there are differing business cases for an anchor
tenant compared to a second or third mobile network operator seeking to co-locate.
374
u Finding14
The provision of new towers and maintenance of existing towers are commercial decisions
of mobile network infrastructure providers driven by demand from mobile network operators,
other service providers and government. Mobile network operators providing greater or
improved mobile coverage drives demand for towers and associated infrastructure.
Governments have provided funding assistance to mobile network
operators to reduce the cost of investing to improve regional
coverage
Government may also inuence demand for new infrastructure and services. Waveconn submitted
that government funding is required to incentivise infrastructure deployment in regional areas.
375
Waveconn also submitted that even with government funding, the commercial business case can
remain marginal and a low priority for mobile network operators.
376
State and federal governments have put in place numerous initiatives to reduce the cost and improve
the viability of mobile network operators investing in improved coverage in regional, rural and
remote areas.
For example, the Mobile Black Spot Program, an initiative that is supported by the Federal
Government as well as co-contributions from state and local governments, mobile network operators,
businesses and local communities, has generated investment of more than $875million to deliver
more than 1,270 mobile base stations across Australia.
377
To date, the vast majority of Mobile Black
Spot Program sites have been built by Telstra.
378
However, the extent to which the mobile network
operators actually co-locate on Mobile Black Spot Program funded sites has been limited. The
ACCC’s analysis from the Mobile Infrastructure Reports shows that, as at January 2022, only 9% of
active mobile sites funded under the Mobile Black Spot Program have more than one mobile network
operators operating on them.
379
Under Mobile Black Spot Program guidelines, funding recipients are required to offer co-location
opportunities, where technically possible, to other mobile network operators on more favourable
terms.
380
Mobile network operators that build a site for their own purposes must allow carriers to
access that site on a commercial basis, as governed by the Telecommunications Act and discussed
further above.
374 ACCC, Industry consultation exchange – synopsis of discussions, 22 June 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
375 Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
376 Waveconn, Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 29 September 2022, p 1, accessed 27 June 2023.
377 Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communication and the Arts (DITRDCA), Mobile Black Spot
Program, accessed 24 March 2023.
378 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 11; ACCC, Mobile Infrastructure
Report 2022, 9 September 2022, p 13, accessed 27 June 2023.
379 Data from the mobile network operators’ reports in accordance with the ACCCs Infrastructure Record Keeping Rules and
published in the ACCC’s Mobile Infrastructure Report 2022, 9 September 2022, accessed 27 June 2023.
380 Favourable terms include incremental capital cost and backhaul being provided at a discounted rate.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Other government programs put in place for similar objectives including:
The Western Australian Government’s Regional Mobile Communications Program and the
Regional Telecommunications Project, both of which combined have resulted in $125million
investment to expand mobile broadband and a 60% increase in WA’s mobile coverage.
381
The NSW Government has established co-contribution programs to extend mobile coverage to
facilitate services and infrastructure co-location, such as the neutral host model and the active
sharing model. The NSW Government is supporting this through its $300 million Mobile Coverage
Project of which $30 million has been allocated to the Mobile Coverage Program’s Active
Sharing Partnership.
The Victorian Government’s $300 million Connecting Victoria mobile program where the Victorian
Government would partner with mobile network infrastructure providers and mobile network
operators to build 309 new mobile towers, upgrade 492 towers to 5G, adapt 170 towers for
multi-carrier use, etc.
382
We have received submissions that the low rate of co-location on Mobile Black Spot Program towers
is a result of the underlying incentives created by the program.
383
Even though the Mobile Blackspot
Program includes provisions for additional mobile network operators to co-locate on funded
infrastructure, co-location generally occurs after funding has been awarded and this may not suit
an additional mobile network operator. During the industry stakeholder forum, stakeholders raised
that for sites that were historically co-funded, there is no mechanism in place for a second or third
co-locator to benet from that subsidy.
384
In previous rounds of the Mobile Black Spot Program, sites were awarded funding for generating new
coverage. This meant that there was the incentive for mobile network operators with more expansive
existing coverage to extend that coverage, disincentivising those with smaller coverage footprints
from participating.
385
Conversely, Telstra submitted that 20% of sites in the Mobile Blackspot
Program between 2020 and 2022 were awarded to Optus and TPG Telecom and asserted that other
mobile network operators were not disincentivised from participating.
386
TPG Telecom submitted that open access requirements that are now part of the Mobile Black Spot
Program have not delivered greater benets to regional consumers, in terms of multiple mobile
network operators co-locating on government funded infrastructure.
387
Consequently, TPG Telecom’s
view is that open access requirements have not provided a better return on public money spent.
388
Some stakeholders submitted that neutral host models would lead to more infrastructure sharing
and competition in regional areas, since it would allow all mobile network operators to provide
services on the same site.
389
However at the industry stakeholder forum, we heard concerns that the
signicant differences in coverage between the mobile network operators means there are limited
locations where all 3 of the mobile network operators could benet from the neutral host model.
381 Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development, Digital Connectivity – Regional Telecommunications Project,
accessed 24 March 2023.
382 Department of Jobs, Skills, Industry, and Regions, Boosting mobile connectivity across Victoria, accessed 24 March 2023.
383 BAI Communications, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023; Vocus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, March 2023, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023; TPG Telecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 2, accessed
27 June 2023.
384 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
385 TPG Telecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
386 Telstra, Public Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings , 16 May 2023, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
387 TPG Telecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 11, accessed 27 June 2023.
388 TPG Telecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
389 BAI Communications, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, p 3, accessed
27 June 2023; Vocus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, March 2023, pp 2–3, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Vocus submitted that Telstra’s signicant coverage advantage means that Telstra has little incentive
to pursue infrastructure sharing opportunities such as neutral host models.
390
Telstra does not support neutral host models, outlining in its submission that there is a risk of
losing service features due to technical challenges such as network synchronisation and managing
interference.
391
Telstra prefers mobile network operator-led active sharing models, such as the
multi-operator core network model, because it believes it would provide superior outcomes from
a technical, commercial and customer experience perspective. Telstra submitted that government
funding and investment programs should be exible and not prescribe outcomes, specic models or
how bids should be formed.
392
Vocus submitted that the success of neutral host trials to date have been hampered by one or more
mobile network operators refusing to participate.
393
We consider that submissions raised a number of practical challenges in the use of neutral host
models to deliver coverage improvement and multi-carrier outcomes. These may need to be
considered in the design of future government funding programs that focus on the use of neutral
host models.
Some stakeholders expressed views that while past government programs have provided additional
mobile coverage, they have also entrenched Telstra’s coverage advantage in regional areas.
394
This means that many rural communities are serviced by a single provider which, in the absence
of competition or further taxpayer funding, faces little incentive to improve or upgrade services.
395
Optus submitted that some of the challenges for communities are increasingly around capacity and
quality of service, as well as gaps in coverage.
396
However, Optus submitted that government funding
programs should not place an absolute primacy on achieving new coverage, but should also focus on
delivering improvements and strongly incentivise multicarrier solutions.
397
u Finding15
Governments at both federal and state levels have made signicant investments to reduce the
cost to mobile network operators of investing in additional mobile network infrastructure in
regional areas. In many cases, without government support, mobile network operators would
not have had the incentive to invest in certain regional areas. However, government funding
has had limited success in encouraging sharing of publicly subsidised infrastructure between
multiple mobile network operators. Telstra has been the main beneciary of funding from these
programs.
390 Vocus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, March 2023, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
391 Telstra, Public Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 10, accessed 27 June 2023.
392 Telstra, Proof Committee Hansard – House of Representatives stating committee on communications and the arts, Co-
investment in multi-carrier regional mobile infrastructure, 22 March 2023, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
393 Vocus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, March 2023, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
394 Optus, Proof Committee Hansard – House of Representatives stating committee on communications and the arts, Co-
investment in multi-carrier regional mobile infrastructure, 14 April 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023; Pivotel, Submission to
ACCC report on preliminary ndings, pp 2–3, accessed 27 June 2023.
395 Optus, Proof Committee Hansard – House of Representatives stating committee on communications and the arts, Co-
investment in multi-carrier regional mobile infrastructure, 14 April 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
396 Optus, Proof Committee Hansard – House of Representatives stating committee on communications and the arts, Co-
investment in multi-carrier regional mobile infrastructure, 14 April 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
397 Optus, Proof Committee Hansard – House of Representatives stating committee on communications and the arts, Co-
investment in multi-carrier regional mobile infrastructure, 14 April 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 The impact of mobile market
competitive dynamics
Under the Direction, the ACCC is required to have regard to how the kinds of matters discussed in
chapter 7 may affect the provision of greater mobile coverage.
This chapter examines how demand from mobile network operators for towers may affect the
provision of greater mobile coverage. The provision of greater mobile coverage includes both the
provision of new towers and new mobile coverage, as well as greater capacity or deeper coverage
where there is existing coverage.
398
This chapter examines how the competitive dynamics in
the retail mobile market affects investment in regional mobile infrastructure to provide greater
mobile coverage.
 


Numerous stakeholders submitted that providing greater mobile coverage in regional, rural and
remote areas of Australia is ‘uneconomical’ or commercially unattractive.
399
There are several factors
that mobile network operators balance in assessing the business case for providing greater mobile
coverage, such as:
costs of accessing land
the costs of building the infrastructure, associated quality and capacity relating to those costs,
including for example connection to power and backhaul
costs for mobile network equipment, such as antennas
ongoing operational costs to maintain the site, including any commercial agreements such as
fees to a mobile network infrastructure provider
ease of access and maintenance
direct revenues from the site
whether investment will impact the mobile network operators national retail mobile market share.
This primarily factors in to whether the location of the infrastructure is in a location the mobile
network operator considers is important.
400
398 New mobile coverage may include coverage in areas outside of where people live (such as roads and transport corridors).
Deeper coverage where there is existing coverage may include improved indoor coverage.
399 For example, Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 4, accessed
27 June 2023; TPG Telecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 16, accessed
27 June 2023; Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 45, accessed
27 June 2023.
400 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, pp 33–34, 45, accessed
27 June 2023; Optus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, September 2022, p 3, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
There are multiple scenarios where these factors are considered, including providing:
new coverage
competing mobile coverage (where there is another mobile network operator already providing
mobile coverage in the area)
improved quality of service or deeper coverage in areas where the mobile network operator is
already providing retail mobile services.
We consider that mobile network operators’ drive to maintain or obtain greater market share is
the most signicant consideration in deciding to invest to provide greater mobile coverage. Mobile
network operators have little commercial incentive to invest in regional, rural and remote areas if
providing new or better coverage in these areas does not increase their market share in the national
mobiles market or otherwise generate sucient additional revenue.
We recognise that for mobile network operators, investing in regional areas is commercially
challenging and this challenge becomes greater as remoteness increases. Australia has a signicant
land mass, and much of inland Australia is sparsely populated. In some regional areas, signicant
investments by a mobile network operator are justied on the basis that there is sucient additional
demand within the coverage area and there is prospect of capturing market share in the national
mobile market for customers that value coverage within that area.
401
However, the commercial
returns for investment diminish the more remote the area is and the lower the population and in many
of these areas only Telstra has network presence.
402
Telstra stated that its decisions to invest in regional, rural, and remote areas are also inuenced by
other factors not related to maintaining network superiority over its rival mobile network operators.
Telstra stated that its investment incentives are inuenced by other factors such as its “T25 Strategy,
a desire to differentiate Telstra from other competitors in national mobile markets (including in
metropolitan areas), expected increases in data consumption, making necessary mobile technology
upgrades, and its “Responsible Business Strategy.
403
From a mobile network infrastructure provider perspective, Amplitel submitted that it considers
whether its customer(s) (such as a mobile network operator) are willing to pay a fee that will recover
Amplitel’s costs plus a return.
404
Indara submitted that securing new locations and building towers
is capital intensive, time consuming and can be sensitive for communities.
405
This means that new
towers are generally pursued in response to customer demand for a particular location.
406
Indara
submitted that it requires a stable income stream for a long period to recover the cost of outlay for a
new tower build.
407
Mobile network infrastructure providers’ ability to make regional, rural or remote infrastructure
commercially feasible is highly dependent on mobile network operators’ demand for the
infrastructure. Mobile network operator’s demand for mobile tower infrastructure is largely dependent
on its ability to prot from access to regional, rural or remote infrastructure.
401 For example, Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, pp 11, 33–34,
accessed 27 June 2023.
402 For example, Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 4, accessed
27 June 2023.
403 Telstra, Public submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, page 11, accessed 27 June 2023.
404 Amplitel, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 September 2022, p 39, accessed 27 June 2023.
405 Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 12,
accessed 27 June 2023.
406 Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 12,
accessed 27 June 2023.
407 Australia Tower Network (now Indara), Public Submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 6 September 2022, p 14,
accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
u Finding16
Mobile network operators have little commercial incentive to invest in regional, rural and remote
areas if providing new or better coverage in these areas does not impact their market share in
the national mobiles market or otherwise generate sucient additional revenue.
Telstra and Optus have made signicant investments in regional,
rural and remote areas, despite the challenges, to differentiate
themselves on geographic coverage
We understand that Telstra’s commercial strategy is premised on being the leading mobile network
provider in Australia, particularly in terms of geographic coverage.
408
Telstra’s historical investments
have had the objective of ensuring that Telstra maintains this network superiority over its rival
network operators.
409
Telstra has stated in market briengs that maintaining and extending network leadership is critical
to its growth strategy and will underpin its ability to charge premium prices in the market.
410
Telstra
submitted that despite the higher costs for building and upgrading mobile infrastructure in regional,
rural and remote areas, it has invested in those areas due to customers placing a high value on
geographic coverage.
411
In urban areas, Telstra, TPG Telecom and Optus each have strong network infrastructure and they
exert competitive pressure on each other to densify their networks, deploy 5G technology upgrades
and invest in spectrum and bre.
412
However, in regional areas, Optus submitted that it has been
Optus’s competitive impact that leads to infrastructure-based competition between Optus and
Telstra.
413
Optus claimed it has made signicant investments in its network infrastructure since it entered the
market and typically invests over $1.5 billion in capital expenditure annually in its mobile network
services.
414
Optus’s investments in regional areas have driven Telstra to invest in response to ensure it
maintains network leadership over its rivals.
415
Telstra has noted that it is competition in urban areas
(where most customers live and work) and in particular competition for urban customers that value
regional, rural and remote coverage, that is the primary driver to Telstra investing to maintain superior
coverage.
416
Telstra claimed that irrespective of Optus’s regional 5G investment, it will roll out 5G in
regional areas according to its T25 strategy.
408 Telstra, Telstra Submission to ACCC’s Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 34, accessed 27 June 2023.
409 Telstra, Telstra Submission to ACCCs Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 34, accessed 27 June 2023.
410 Telstra, Telstra Investor Day Brieng Transcript 2021, 17 September 2021, p 24, accessed 27 June 2023.
411 Telstra, Telstra Submission to ACCCs Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 34, accessed 27 June 2023.
412 ACCC, Mobile Infrastructure Report 2022, September 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
413 Optus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,14 September 2022, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
414 Optus, Public submission in response to ACCC market inquiry – Telstra and TPG application for merger authorisation for
proposed spectrum sharing in regional Australia, June 2022, p 9 at [1.20], accessed 27 June 2023.
415 R Feasey, Expert report of Richard Feasey, Annexure O to Telstra and TPG application for merger authorisation, 20 May 2022,
pp 25–26, accessed 27 June 2023.
416 Telstra and TPG Telecom, Public submission in response to ACCC Statement of Preliminary Views – Telstra Corporation
Limited and TPG Telecom Limited arrangement for the sharing of active infrastructure and spectrum in regional Australia,
1November 2022, p 46 at [111], accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Telstra has also previously noted that given its history and prominence, it faces pressure from
government and other stakeholders over its commitment to regional and rural Australia.
417
Telstra
claimed previously that responding positively to these stakeholders by continuing to invest and
innovate in service delivery in regional and rural areas is an important motivator in its decision
making.
418
u Finding17
Although it is generally more costly to build and operate mobile network infrastructure in more
remote areas, Telstra and Optus have made signicant network investments in regional, rural
and remote areas to gain or maintain market share in the national mobiles market.
Telstras advantages in regional areas could raise barriers to
expansion for rival mobile network operators
Expanding coverage and improving the quality of mobile services is highly capital intensive and
costly. This challenge is signicant in a country like Australia with a large geographical area, much of
which is sparsely populated. In Australia, all mobile network operators incur large costs to increase
regional, rural and remote coverage. This may result in only a small amount of gain in incremental
population coverage and may make it more dicult to justify investments in regional areas.
419
The commercial incentives of mobile network operators will be inuenced by a range of factors in
deciding where to extend coverage, including the cost and benets arising from new or improved
mobile coverage.
Optus has previously claimed that challenging market dynamics and government policies have had
the effect of entrenching Telstra’s dominance. As a result, it has been increasingly dicult for Optus
to maintain its historic levels of investment.
420
Nonetheless, Optus noted that it has continued to
invest in building a competitive mobile network infrastructure, which includes the broad rollout of 5G
to urban and regional areas.
421
We consider that Telstra’s competitive advantage in regional areas strongly impacts Optus and TPG
Telecom’s incentives to invest more signicantly in regional areas. It is unlikely that any of Telstra’s
competitors will have the realistic ability to absolutely match Telstra’s network coverage in regional
areas. TPG Telecom supports this notion and noted its view that mobile coverage in signicant parts
of regional Australia constitute a natural monopoly.
422
Telstra noted that it is “not necessary” to match Telstra’s coverage in regional areas for effective
competition.
423
The ACCC considers that equivalence in coverage is likely not a necessary condition
417 Telstra and TPG Telecom, Public submission in response to ACCC Statement of Preliminary Views – Telstra Corporation
Limited and TPG Telecom Limited arrangement for the sharing of active infrastructure and spectrum in regional Australia,
1November 2022, p 46 at [113], accessed 27 June 2023.
418 Telstra and TPG Telecom, Public submission in response to ACCC Statement of Preliminary Views – Telstra Corporation
Limited and TPG Telecom Limited arrangement for the sharing of active infrastructure and spectrum in regional Australia,
1November 2022, p 46 at [113], accessed 27 June 2023.
419 For example, see Telstra, Telstra submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 12, accessed
27 June 2023.
420 Optus, Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023; Optus, Public
submission in response to ACCC market inquiry – Telstra and TPG application for merger authorisation for proposed spectrum
sharing in regional Australia, June 2022, p 67, accessed 27 June 2023.
421 Optus, Public submission in response to ACCC market inquiry – Telstra and TPG application for merger authorisation for
proposed spectrum sharing in regional Australia, June 2022, p 68, accessed 27 June 2023.
422 TPG Telecom, Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
423 ACCC, Domestic mobile roaming declaration inquiry – Final Report, October 2017, page 23, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
for mobile network operators to compete effectively in the mobile services market. In areas where
there is already infrastructure-based competition, it is likely that operators will continue to have
incentives to invest and improve their networks over time. However, Telstra’s enduring competitive
advantage in regional areas may have the potential to negatively impact other mobile network
operators’ incentives to continually invest in expanding mobile coverage into regional areas where
there is currently limited infrastructure-based competition.
The ACCC continues to monitor the state of competition in the mobile services market, including
ongoing investments made by the mobile network operators on mobile infrastructure. We consider
that the competitive dynamics in the mobile service market have shifted in recent years. The ACCC
has observed that 3G and 4G network deployment generally slowed in regional and remote areas
since 2019, with the mobile network operators shifting their focus to 5G rollout , rst in major cities
and then progressively in regional areas.
424
Emerging alternative approaches to improving connectivity in regional areas are still nascent and
unlikely to signicantly reduce the barriers to expansion in regional areas, at least in the short term.
Neutral host models, while having the potential to make the business case for mobile network
infrastructure providers to invest in building new infrastructure easier, has so far had insignicant
take-up by the mobile network operators.
Mobile network operators had contrasting views on the viability of low-Earth orbit satellites to support
the provision of mobile coverage in regional Australia. Telstra stated that the versatility and reliability
of the service is improving and is becoming an increasingly attractive complementary option for
providing regional mobile services.
425
TPG Telecom believes that low-Earth orbit satellites deliver a
lower quality of service compared to terrestrial networks but may be able to serve as a fallback option
if local mobile network coverage is not available due to natural disaster.
426
u Finding18
Telstra’s competitive advantage in regional areas could potentially raise barriers for network
expansion by its competitors. This may undermine competitors’ incentives to continually invest
in improving mobile coverage in regional areas.
424 ACCC, Mobile Infrastructure Report 2022, September 2022, p 3, accessed 19 June 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
425 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023;
Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 3, accessed 27 June 2023.
426 TPG, Telecom Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2023, p 16, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 


Spectrum is a critical input into the supply of mobile network services. Spectrum is highly valuable
and nite. Spectrum is the medium by which signals are carried between consumer devices and the
mobile network operator’s base station and to its wider network. Spectrum enables mobile network
operators to provide coverage and capacity on their network. Without access to sucient spectrum,
operating a mobile network is highly uneconomical. Spectrum therefore inuences mobile network
operator’s demand for mobile towers.
We consider that Telstra, Optus and TPG Telecom all currently have sucient spectrum to supply
mobile network services in rural, regional, remote and peri-urban areas. All 3 have sucient access to
low-band spectrum suitable for various mobile technology generations (e.g. 4G and 5G) that enable
them to provide a wide geographic coverage. Similarly, all mobile network operators have sucient
access to mid-band and high-band spectrum which provide capacity on their network.
However, the ACCC recognises that smaller mobile network operators, such as Pivotel which focuses
on providing mobile services in regional Australia, do not currently have access to the same suite
of spectrum bands as the incumbent operators, and in particular low band spectrum.
427
Pivotel
claimed that the incumbent operators are under-utilising valuable spectrum. Pivotel claimed that the
current approach of allocating licences for low bands on a national basis may mean that due to high
valuations of such licences, only the incumbent operators have the nancial resources to bid and
acquire such licences.
The ACCC considers that there may well be benets in providing operators other than Telstra, TPG
Telecom and Optus with access to spectrum (including low-band spectrum), including in furthering
the development of potential alternative approaches to providing mobile coverage in regional
Australia. The ACCC considers that this may be particularly benecial in cases where the spectrum
may not be currently used.
While the ACCC has not been provided with more detailed information on the proposed alternative
use-cases, the ACCC understands that some international jurisdictions have a ‘use it or lose it’
licence obligation on spectrum licences.
428
‘Use it or lose it’ provisions could potentially promote
more ecient use of spectrum including by incentivising licensees to share spectrum that they do
not use. However, ‘use it or lose it’ obligations may lead to ineciencies where there are, for example,
legitimate reasons for a company to delay rolling out services.
The ACCC also notes that the ACMA has commenced the process of considering whether to renew
spectrum licences due to expire between 2028 and 2032, including the majority of spectrum licences
currently held by the mobile network operators.
429
This process provides an opportunity to consider
how best to allocate the spectrum to maximise the public benet derived from using it, including by
considering whether some of this spectrum could be reallocated to smaller regional players.
We also understand that due to commercial considerations, some spectrum licensed to mobile
network operators may not be utilised in the sense that no services are being provided using this
spectrum. One of the reasons for this includes commercial relationships with the radio access
network vendors and their licensing fees for deploying spectrum. This may mean that the cost of
427 Pivotel, Submission to the Report on Preliminary Findings, 16 May 2023, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
428 For example, the US, Canada, Belgium, New Zealand, and the UK have a variation of ‘use it or lose it’ obligations.
429 See ACMA, Proposed approach to expiring spectrum licences, accessed 23 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
deploying spectrum may, in some cases, inuence whether the mobile network operator will use the
spectrum to provide higher quality mobile coverage.
430
u Finding19
Telstra, Optus and TPG Telecom all currently have sucient spectrum to supply mobile
network services in rural, regional, remote Australia. However, smaller mobile network
operators that have a focus on providing mobile services in regional Australia do not currently
have access to the same suite of spectrum bands as the 3 largest mobile network operators, in
particular low-band spectrum.
To the extent that regional-focused operators can develop alternative means of providing
mobile coverage in regional Australia, there may be benets in providing these operators with
access to such spectrum, particularly where the spectrum may be not currently used.
430 Telstra and TPG Telecom, Response to Optus’ interest party submission and ors (Tranche 2) – Telstra Corporation Limited and
TPG Telecom Limited arrangement for the sharing of active infrastructure and spectrum in regional Australia, 28 July 2022,
pp 36–37, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
 Temporary mobile roaming
The nal issue considered by this Inquiry, as required by the Direction, is whether it is feasible to
provide temporary mobile roaming during natural disasters and other such emergencies.
We dene temporary mobile roaming as:
The ability for a consumer device to connect to a mobile network not owned or operated
by their nominal mobile network provider during a specied emergency event, for a
limited time and in a limited geographical area that is not determined by mobile network
operators but specied by federal/state/territory governments in consultation with
emergency agencies.
431
This means that mobile users could connect to and use another mobile service operator’s network
during a natural disaster or emergency.
 

Several stakeholders submitted that mobile roaming is already feasible, with roaming agreements
in place domestically and internationally. International roaming has been universally adopted for
international visitors and residents travelling overseas. Domestic roaming agreements have also been
used in Australia, for example with TPG Telecom using Optus’s 3G network for roaming.
There is international precedent for disaster roaming
There is international precedent for temporary mobile roaming during natural disasters and other
emergency type events.
In July 2022 the Canadian Government directed mobile operators to reach agreement within
60 days to provide emergency roaming, mutual assistance and a communications protocol in the
event of a signicant outage.
432
This followed a large-scale outage in the core network of one of
Canada’s largest telecommunications providers, with customers unable to contact emergency
services.
433
Thirteen Canadian mobile network operators signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) to enter into bilateral emergency roaming arrangements in September 2022. The MOU
includes protocols covering emergency roaming, mutual assistance and emergency network outage
communications in the case of a triggering event.
434
The Federal Communications Commission (United States of America) adopted a Mandatory Disaster
Response Initiative (MDRI) in June 2022 that superseded a voluntary industry agreement. The
mandatory initiative expanded beyond the scope of the earlier voluntary agreement to ‘incorporate
lessons learned and better support public safety’ and the triggers for activation broadened to cover
431 The Direction asked the ACCC to consider the technical feasibility of temporary mobile roaming, however we note that the
more common industry term is ‘temporary disaster roaming’.
432 Mobile Syrup, 13 telecom providers sign MOU to guarantee emergency calls, other assistances, during outages,
7September 2022, accessed 22 May 2023.
433 Mobile Syrup, Why the Rogers outage was so bad, and how prevent the next one, 13 July 2022, accessed 23 June 2023.
434 Government of Canada, Memorandum of Understanding on Telecommunications Reliability, accessed 23 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
more disasters and emergencies.
435
The new rule took effect from 31 October 2022, with mobile
carriers having 6 months to show compliance.
436
The mobile network operators in Japan also agreed to introduce temporary mobile roaming
capabilities in September 2022. Japan’s second largest carrier suffered a network failure in July 2022
that resulted in over 30 million users being unable to make emergency calls for an extended period.
437
The Japanese government formed a study group to advance the proposal, with its rst report
published in late 2022.
438
Telstra provided the ACCC with an assessment of the Canadian and US arrangements, which may be
useful to consider in an Australian context. Its assessment is summarised in the table below.
Table 12: Summary of the Canadian and US models
Requirement Canada US Telstra’s view on whether these principles could
be adopted if temporary mobile roaming was
implemented in Australia
No harm to existing
customers of host
network
Yes Yes Agree in principle
Requesting network
must take all reasonable
to steps to restore
network
Yes Yes Agree
Provide coverage where
previously no coverage
No No (only where
coverage areas
overlap)
Coverage in limited circumstances (see note)
Network failure other
than natural disaster
Yes (may
be needed
for 911
access)
Yes Disagree
Source: Information provided by Telstra.
Note: Telstra supports temporary mobile roaming being made available in strictly limited circumstances to end users in
locations outside the coverage of their network’s coverage for limited and nite periods, which goes above and beyond
the scope of the US and Canadian approaches.
Optus’s view is that all customers should have equal access to a temporary mobile roaming
capability irrespective of their provider.
439
This could result in a reduction in service for all customers,
including those customers of the host operator. Optus noted that this could lead to complaints to the
Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman and the Australian Communications and Media Authority
by customers on the surviving network who may experience a reduction in their usual quality of
service if temporary mobile roaming was enabled. If this was a policy requirement, regulatory
amendments would be required so the mobile network operators were not penalised if consumers
experienced reduced services in an area where temporary mobile roaming was activated.
440
435 Federal Communications Commission (United States of America), Wireless Network Resiliency During Disasters, accessed
23 June 2023.
436 The Register, As Hurricane Ian hits, FCC rules cell carriers must help each other in disasters, 30 September 2022, accessed
23 June 2023. Smaller carriers have been given an additional 3 months to comply.
437 The Japan Times, KDDI’s network outage rekindles calls for stronger emergency systems, 28 July 2022, accessed
23 June 2023; The Japan Times, Japan’s big mobile carriers say roaming needed during network outages,
28 September 2022, accessed 23 June 2023.
438 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Japan), Publication of the First Report of the Study Group on Roaming
Among Service Providers in a Time of Emergency and Results of Solicitation of Opinions, accessed 23 June 2023.
439 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
440 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
The Australian mobile network operators agree that a temporary mobile roaming solution in
Australia should not be used to cover non-emergency related network outages with its use limited
to events that are considered ‘life or death’ and not for example in response to a network outage
or cyber-attack.
441
Telstra commented that ‘general network quality and resilience are competitive
differentiators… and that normal competitive investment incentives are not undermined by any
[temporary mobile roaming arrangements].
442
International standards have been developed for 5G networks
however more work is required to develop a viable solution for the
Australian market
International standards are being developed that support a temporary mobile roaming capability.
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is a body which develops standards for mobile
telecommunications and denes how mobile devices and networks can ‘talk’ to each other. The 3GPP
recently ratied temporary disaster roaming standards for 5G networks that introduce capabilities
to mitigate the risk to the resilience of the surviving network.
443
The 3GPP solution for 5G disaster
roaming is based on the available network broadcasting a set of network codes which handsets of
any network can use to attach to the available network. The new standards are designed to reduce
the signalling load that would usually be caused by many devices attempting to connect to another
carriers network. This may also include call blocking if the available network is unable to take any
more calls due to capacity reasons. Telstra’s suggested potential solution (for 4G, and also for 5G
based on the 3GPP standard solution) is based on international roaming functionality, which means
that bilateral roaming agreements will need to be established between operators willing to become
a host network or wanting to enable their customers to roam onto another host network if their
network is disrupted. Telstra also notes that implementing temporary mobile roaming based on the
3GPP standard solution for 5G may require changes to every participating operators’ networks in
both the core and radio access network.
444
User devices would also need to have the relevant 3GPP
standards applied.
There are currently no standards for 4G and earlier generation networks. This would therefore likely
require a bespoke solution for the Australian market.
445
The ACCC considers it is not feasible to
implement a solution for 3G networks prior to the network being shut down by the end of 2024.
The ACCC notes that the Australian mobile network operators have formed a working group to
develop a potential solution for 4G networks.
446
This solution is based on broadcasting a temporary
disaster Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) Code.
Normally, every operator has a unique PLMN
code which is broadcast by the base stations and only the handsets which are registered with the
operator can use it to attach to that network. But if a base station is broadcasting the disaster
PLMN code, all handsets can attach to that network. During the disaster, the surviving network
will broadcast both its unique PLMN (home PLMN) and the disaster PLMN. Its own handsets will
connect via the home PLMN while other handsets will connect via the disaster PLMN. Once the
failed network/s is/are up and running, or the disaster threat has passed, the surviving network stops
broadcasting the disaster PLMN code.
447
Telstra notes that this solution does not require changes to
devices. It also does not have control mechanisms for restricting the rate of authenticating devices
nor the trac throttling control mechanisms that are in the 3GPP standards for 5G networks. Telstra
441 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
442 Information provided by stakeholder.
443 Telstra, Public submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
444 Information provided by stakeholder.
445 Telstra, Public submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
446 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
447 Information provided by stakeholder.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
notes that these mechanisms would need to be developed and agreed between network operators as
an essential pre-requisite.
448
During this Inquiry, the mobile network operators submitted that while temporary mobile roaming
is technically feasible, it is a complex solution to implement. Although temporary mobile roaming
technically works in a similar way to other mobile roaming arrangements, Telstra noted that normal
domestic roaming is not designed to be activated and deactivated on a temporary basis.
449
Stakeholders at our industry forum suggested that a working group with the mobile network
operators and key emergency service agencies from various levels of government could be set up if
temporary mobile roaming were a policy priority.
450
Several stakeholders also commented that temporary mobile roaming is only practical in the
following situations:
1. Where there is more than one mobile network operator operating in the area and one of those
networks is still operational, and
2. Where there is only one mobile network operator operating in an area and customers of another
mobile network operator can roam onto that network in a natural disaster.
These scenarios are represented in Figure 6, where the left-hand side shows the usual state and the
right-hand side shows an area affected by a natural disaster with only one surviving network. In this
gure, the customers on the blue network would be able to roam onto the red network (scenario 1).
Secondly, temporary mobile roaming could enable mobile services to customers who don’t otherwise
have coverage in the affected area. The customer on the green network who would normally have not
service as their mobile network operator does not have coverage in the area would also be able to
roam on to the red network as well during a natural disaster (scenario 2).
Figure 6: Temporary Mobile Roaming
ON
Temporary Mobile Roaming Activated
ON
ON
No Roaming
ON
ON
Blue customer
network
disabled but
is roaming on
the red network
Green customer
also roaming on
the red network
Blue Normal
Coverage
Red Normal
Coverage
Areas of
Coverage
Normal
Coverage
Blue Network
Disabled
Areas of
Coverage
TTA
TTA
TTA
TTA
TTA
TTA
TTA
TTA
No Service
Top Tower Amplifier
TTA
Network Disabled
Top Tower Amplifier
TTA
Emergency
Blue Network
Outage
Normal
448 Information provided by stakeholder.
449 Telstra, Public submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 55, accessed 27 June 2023.
450 ACCC, Industry Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 March 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Mobile network operators group base stations into tracking areas to reduce the signalling load on the
network. These tracking areas are likely to be different for each mobile network operator and unlikely
to align with a disaster area. We note that dening the area where temporary mobile roaming is to be
activated requires further investigation both from technical and policy consideration perspectives.
451
 

While we nd temporary mobile roaming to be technically feasible, there are a range of factors
and complexities that need to be considered in its practical implementation, including policy
and commercial considerations. TPG Telecom noted that there ‘are likely large variations in how
temporary mobile roaming could be implemented or designed, depending on location, which will have
a signicant impact on practicality and usability.
452
As discussed above, the mobile network operators are considering how a temporary mobile roaming
solution could be practically implemented in the Australian mobile market.
453
They have dened 3
separate but related streams of work:
454
Technical: what are the technical solutions and complexities, and risk to be managed?
Policy: who, when, where and for how long should temporary mobile roaming be enabled?
Commercial: what is the cost to build and maintain a temporary mobile roaming capability?
The development of a practical solution is likely to be an iterative process. This is because policy
requirements will impact the technical solution, which will in turn impact costs which may then
require policy re-scoping.
455
There are technical parameters that need to be considered
irrespective of any policy or commercial considerations
We received feedback during the Inquiry which noted that there are a range of scenarios for
implementing a temporary mobile roaming solution depending on the policy objectives. We heard
from the mobile network operators that temporary mobile roaming is complex and will require the
co-operation of all operators.
451 For example, TPG Telecom, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary
ndings, 16 May 2023, p 6, accessed 27 June 2023.
452 TPG Telecom, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings,
16 May 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
453 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
454 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
455 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Congestion on the surviving network was identied as the main risk
The main technical risk identied in submissions was the resilience of the remaining operational
network(s) if temporary mobile roaming was activated. The main concern is that this/these
network(s) would become overloaded and make the network unusable for all users. The
mobile network operators noted in their submissions that there are 2 ways the network can
become overloaded:
1. Access congestion: where the volume of users trying to authenticate on the network
increases dramatically.
2. Core congestion: once authenticated, extra users then add more load to the network that it could
not accommodate without some level of trac control or prioritisation.
456
Network congestion on the surviving network(s) may result in worse outcomes for all customers for
the following reasons:
the increase in trac levels will slow data speeds
battery drain of consumer devices as more power is needed to search for a network and send
location updates
a potential inability to contact Triple Zero due to network congestion causing failure of the
surviving network.
There was general agreement from the mobile network operators on a ‘do no harm’ principle and
that temporary mobile roaming should be seen as a last resort.
457
That is, temporary mobile roaming
should not be activated or should cease where there is a risk that the surviving network will become
overloaded and fail.
458
Network capacity may need to be increased to support a temporary
mobile roaming capability
We understand that existing network capacity (both base station and backhaul), especially for
regional, rural and remote areas, is based on normal population characteristics and utilisation of the
network (including some overhead to account for changes in normal user demand). It is likely that
demand would be greater than was accounted for if temporary mobile roaming is implemented. For
example, Optus saw the voice trac of their customers double at the height of the 2022 Lismore
oods.
459
456 For example, refer to Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 50, accessed
27 June 2023; TPG Telecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 14, accessed
27 June 2023.
457 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
458 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
459 Optus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 14 September 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
Lismore oods
Summary
On 28 February 2022, the Wilson River, which runs through Lismore’s CBD, peaked at
14.4metres; 2 metres higher than the previous ood record of 12.11 metres observed in
1954 and 1974.
460
The 2022 NSW Flood Inquiry heard that ood damage caused widespread
telecommunications outages including mobile and xed line networks.
461
Mobile network
operators advised this was ‘largely due to loss of mains power, coupled with inability
to access sites (due to ooding) to deploy backup power generators and keep them
refuelled.’
462
The Inquiry also heard that ‘similar to the 2019–20 bushres, the loss of
telecommunications services caused the most distress to communities because it
affected their ability to request ood rescues, communicate with family and friends, provide
warnings and access post-emergency information.
463
The Inquiry recommended the facilitation of ‘cross carrier roaming arrangements between
carriers and the public for basic text, voice and data during the period of emergency in
areas directly affected by ood.
464
Network capacity is also based on a mobile network operator’s market share. A mobile network
operator with a small market share could see a signicant increase in trac if it is the only
operational network during an emergency. Optus stated that signicant investment would be
required to build additional capacity to meet any potential roaming trac that would not otherwise
be commercially justied.
465
TPG Telecom submitted that adding network capacity takes time and
cannot be quickly added at short notice as this requires site and network upgrades.
466
TPG Telecom
also noted in its response to our preliminary ndings report that in areas with high population density
areas ‘it is unlikely that a single mobile network could handle the additional users of one or both of
the 2 other networks in an emergency roaming situation’, however congestion is likely to be less of an
issue in regional and rural areas where population density is likely to be lower.
467
The ACCC understands from our meetings with the mobile network operators that they are not
proposing to expand network capacity beyond what they currently provide for their existing customer
bases. Expanding network capacity would come with very material added costs as this requires
upgrades to both passive and active infrastructure including power supply; may not be needed to
support basic connectivity; and would be virtually impossible to target accurately for the sole purpose
of supporting potential temporary mobile roaming requirements. Industry stakeholders agreed
that increased capacity/hardening could be considered for high-risk areas as part of other network
460 NSW Flood Inquiry, Summary Report of the NSW Floods Inquiry, 29 July 2022, p 44, accessed 23 June 2023.
461 NSW Flood Inquiry, Full Report of the NSW Flood Inquiry, 29 July 2022, pp 168, accessed 23 June 2023.
462 Telstra, Submission to the NSW Flood Inquiry, 6 May 202, accessed 23 June 2023.
463 NSW Flood Inquiry, Summary Report of the NSW Floods Inquiry, 29 July 2022, p 24, accessed 23 June 2023.
464 Recommendation 9, NSW Flood Inquiry, 2022 Flood Inquiry: Volume Two: Full Report, 29 July 2022, pp 167, accessed
23 June 2023. This is similar to Recommendation 30 in the Final Report of the NSW Bushre Inquiry, 31 July 2020, pp xiii and
205, accessed 23 June 2023.
465 Optus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 14 September 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
466 TPG Telecom, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, p 14, accessed 27 June 2023.
467 TPG Telecom, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings,
16 May 2023, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
resilience improvement programs (such as the Strengthening Telecommunications Against Natural
Disasters Program) if this was a policy priority.
468
Temporary mobile roaming is likely to require additional power reserves
Increased trac would also increase the power load on the network (including the base station
and backhaul), which could require more power and accelerate the depletion of power reserves
(for example, battery back-ups).
469
This could lessen the duration of the network(s) that remain
operational. The mobile network operators also highlighted that the likelihood that one network is
not affected by a disaster or an emergency that disrupts other networks, or that the sole network
survives, is likely to be very low.
470
Temporary mobile roaming is designed to be limited in duration and
geographic spread
The mobile network operators told the Inquiry that temporary mobile roaming should be limited to a
small geographic area and for a short time period. This will mitigate the risk of the surviving network
becoming unnecessarily overwhelmed. Industry stakeholders noted in their submissions that they
have other measures to restore services should a network be down for an extended period, including
power back-up, Cell On Wheels (COWs) and satellites.
471
Temporary mobile roaming is not intended to
replace those solutions.
The processes for deactivating temporary mobile roaming and either returning to normal network
operations or a contingency (such as back up power) also needs to be clearly dened. Mobile base
stations can come back online at various times after a natural disaster, depending on the nature and
severity of the disruption. Telstra notes that the 3GPP standard for temporary disaster roaming sets
up ‘islands’ of temporary mobile roaming. Roaming customers return to their home network when
temporary mobile roaming is deactivated and this needs to be managed so the recovered cells are
not overwhelmed.
472
While the scale and exact location of a natural disaster event cannot be predicted with exact certainty,
stakeholders told us the importance of preparedness and putting contingencies in place prior to an
event occurring. These actions can not only mitigate against the risk of an outage but potentially
decrease the time to restore services. Temporary mobile roaming can only be activated once a
network has been disabled. Registers are used to authenticate a user device and allow it to connect
to a ‘home’ network. Activating temporary mobile roaming while the home network is still operational
could create a ‘ping-pong’ effect as the user device is constantly looking for a network to connect to.
This is more likely on the fringes where coverage is patchy or there is overlapping coverage.
We also note that temporary mobile roaming cannot be implemented ‘on the y. The commercial,
policy and regulation frameworks need to be developed in conjunction with the technical solution and
agreed to prior to activation.
468 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
469 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 56, accessed 27 June 2023;
Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), 1 September 2022, Public submission to the Regional Mobile
Infrastructure Inquiry, p 8, accessed 27 June 2023.
470 Telstra, Public Submission to the ACCC’s Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 53, accessed
27 June 2023; Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, 1 September 2022, Public submission to the Regional
Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, p 9, accessed 27 June 2023.
471 For example, NBN Co., Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 8 August 2022, pp 14–15, accessed
27 June 2023, Optus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 14 September 2022, pp 8–9, accessed
27 June 2023.
472 Telstra, Public submission to the ACCC’s Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 55, accessed
27 June 2023.
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Trac controls could mitigate risk
Several stakeholders commented that trac restrictions could be used to manage congestion
including restricting temporary mobile roaming to users and/or trac classes, however this may not
be desirable from a policy perspective. The following policy factors need to be considered as these
will inuence the practical implementation:
Whether customers on their ‘home’ network continue to receive their agreed level of service, or if
this is reduced to increase capacity for temporary mobile roaming users during an emergency.
Whether roaming customers are only allocated spare capacity on a network, noting that capacity
upgrades require upfront changes to passive and active infrastructure.
The services (voice, text and/or data) that are supported during a period of temporary mobile
roaming.
473
The treatment of Internet of Things devices, including farming machinery, security sensors and
EFTPOS terminals.
474
Whether temporary mobile roaming is restricted to priority users, for example emergency
services personnel.
475
During our stakeholder engagement, there was interest in prioritising certain users, for example
emergency services personnel. For example, stakeholders at our Emergency Services Stakeholder
Forum told us that emergency services require the ability to prioritise their devices on the network.
476
However, trac prioritisation mechanisms on one network cannot be maintained if that service is
disrupted and those users then roam onto another carrier’s network.
477
One option raised at the
forum was for a central government agency to maintain a central register of International Mobile
Subscriber Identities (IMSIs) for devices registered to emergency services organisations that could be
made available to all mobile network operators in a disaster situation and prioritised. Another option
raised was that emergency services personnel could be issued with dual SIM phones which would
keep existing priority arrangements, assuming at least one of the networks is still operational.
478
Telstra recommends that the basic functionality for temporary mobile roaming be developed rst,
and the costs and benets of any possible enhancements considered later. Potential enhancements
include prioritised service for roaming emergency services personnel, blocking of certain trac types
and pre-emptive activation.
479
TPG Telecom commented that while customers of mobile virtual network operators could technically
have access to a temporary mobile roaming capability, this would depend on government policy,
regulations and commercial considerations.
480
473 Most stakeholders told us that voice, SMS and data services were required. For example, refer to ACCC, Consumer
Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed 27 June 2023.
474 Telstra, Public submission to Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 52, accessed 27 June 2023.
475 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, pp 52–53, accessed 27 June 2023.
476 ACCC, Emergency Services Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 2 March 2023, accessed
27 June 2023.
477 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 54, accessed 27 June 2023.
478 ACCC, Emergency Services Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 2 March 2023, accessed
27 June 2023.
479 Information provided by stakeholder.
480 Information provided by stakeholder.
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Temporary mobile roaming is unlikely to require changes to user devices
or spectrum arrangements
We have heard that handset and spectrum limitations would also need to be considered.
481
However,
we understand that newer handsets are able to support most of the 3GPP bands and this is unlikely
to be a barrier to enabling temporary mobile roaming.
u Finding20
Temporary mobile roaming is technically feasible although there are questions of technical
complexity and risk, including congestion, which need to be managed. There are policy
and commercial factors that will determine how temporary mobile roaming is practically
implemented.
 

Business support systems will likely be the most dicult aspect of
implementing a temporary mobile roaming solution
Temporary mobile roaming is a relatively new concept that requires integration of the network and
business operational systems of the 3 mobile network operators. The mobile network operators
submitted that there are changes required to establish network capabilities, overlay procedures and
IT system interfaces. As discussed earlier, additional capacity requirements may also be required
depending on the policy objectives, including additional signalling capacity in core networks. Optus’s
view is that a permanent build is needed as the required hardware and software cannot be easily or
quickly deployed at short notice.
482
Regulatory policy and frameworks are required
Submissions and feedback through the consultation process suggested that activation and
deactivation of temporary mobile roaming is a decision that could be made by a government or
regulatory body. This would require the cooperation of mobile network operators.
There are 2 aspects to consider. Firstly, when temporary mobile roaming should be enabled, and
secondly, the processes for switching it on and off.
The ACCC consulted with key Commonwealth, State and Local government agencies and authorities
involved in disaster management response and coordination. Attendees at our Emergency Services
stakeholder forum suggested a working group could be established to develop the triggers and
protocols for activating temporary mobile roaming. There was agreement this work should initially sit
with the Commonwealth, as telecommunications are a federal matter.
483
481 For example, Optus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 14 September 2022, p 7, accessed
27 June 2023; Department of Regional NSW, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 19 August 2022,
p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
482 Optus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 14 September 2022, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
483 As an example of current arrangements in relation to emergencies, see subsections 313(4A) and 313(4B) of the
Telecommunications Act, which outline the obligations of carriers and carriage service providers to provide assistance if a
national emergency is declared or a disaster or state of emergency. Section 314 of the Telecommunications Act outlines the
terms and conditions on which help is to be given.
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Optus noted in its submission to the Inquirys Report on preliminary ndings that the following
principles should be considered:
That temporary mobile roaming trac is treated on a non-discriminatory basis so customers in
natural disaster or other such emergency can make calls and send messages, irrespective of who
their mobile service provider is.
A non-commercial solution should be preferred with costs borne by the government.
484
The underlying conditions for activating and deactivating temporary
mobile roaming need to be dened
There was consensus across all stakeholder groups that the triggers that would activate
and deactivate temporary mobile roaming need to be clearly dened and agreed to prior
to implementation.
The following factors need to be considered when developing a policy framework for temporary
mobile roaming:
Is a temporary mobile roaming capability required nationally or in designated regions (for
example, high-risk areas)?
What are the triggers or threshold conditions that need to be met prior to activating temporary
mobile roaming?
Who is the person or body with the authority to issue a directive to activate temporary
mobile roaming?
How will the geographic boundary for temporary mobile roaming be dened?
How will user classes and/or trac classes be managed and prioritised?
How will users know if temporary mobile roaming has been activated?
What quality of services will be available?
Will the mobile network operators have a ‘veto’ right to not activate temporary mobile roaming or
suspend it if there is risk to the surviving network(s)?
How long will temporary mobile roaming be enacted?
What are the triggers for deactivating temporary mobile roaming?
Potential triggers for temporary mobile roaming include:
Nature and severity of the event
Availability of other telecommunications infrastructure
Geographic location
Number of impacted people
Expected length of outage
484 Optus, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings,
16 May 2023, pp 6–7, accessed 27 June 2023.
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Operational processes will need to be developed
Stakeholders told us that there are well-established processes in place between industry and
emergencies services organisations during natural disasters and other emergency situations. All
stakeholders agreed that there is additional work required to develop operational processes for
both activating and deactivating temporary mobile roaming. Both Optus and Telstra submitted that
the protocols in place to issue an Emergency Alert SMS or call could be a good starting point for
temporary mobile roaming although any temporary mobile roaming guidelines and policy objectives
will need to address other factors beyond the scope of Emergency Alert.
485
Temporary mobile
roaming is more complex because temporary mobile roaming is activated, left running, and then
deactivated. Implementation of temporary mobile roaming is also more complex because of the
greater risk it poses to the surviving network. For example, Telstra notes that messages and calls
from the Emergency Alert are sent at single points in time while temporary mobile roaming is likely to
be more uid as the disaster situation is likely to evolve.
486
The ACCC has outlined in Figure 7 a suggested high-level process ow for activating and deactivating
temporary mobile roaming. Further consultation will be required between mobile network operators
and relevant government agencies.
Figure 7: Potential process for activating/deactivating temporary mobile roaming
Activate
Pre-defined triggers/threshold conditions met.
Accountable body/agency issue request to the mobile
network operators.
Mobile network operators activate temporary
mobile roaming.
Mobile network operators advise State Control
Centre where temporary mobile roaming
activated/not activated.
Deactivate
Mobile network operators advise of changes to the
network such as mains power back on, generators
in place.
Accountable body/agency issue request to deactivate
temporary mobile roaming for a specified area.
Mobile network operators revert their respective
networks’ settings to normal operation.
Mobile network operators advise responsible agency
that temporary mobile roaming deactivated.
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
485 For example, Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 58, accessed
27 June 2023 and Optus, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary
ndings, 16 May 2023, pp 6–7, accessed 27 June 2023.
486 Information provided by stakeholder.
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The regulatory framework needs to be considered, including any potential
impacts on competition
Any temporary mobile roaming solutions need to be considered in the context of other relevant
codes, guidelines and legislation, including:
The Telecommunications Act
487
State and Territory Emergency Plans and Acts
488
Industry codes and guidelines such as the Communications Alliance Industry Guidelines,
including G663:2022 Telecommunications – Emergency Protocol.
489
The ACCC also notes that policy agencies and regulators would need to consider the regulatory
settings for users and operators as part of setting up a temporary mobile roaming service. Examples
of the regulatory settings may include:
The Competition and Consumer Act
490
The Customer Service Guarantee Standard.
491
A temporary roaming capability will take time to develop and deploy
The time taken to develop and implement a temporary mobile roaming solution will depend on
the solution requirements. As a guide, the 3GPP standard for temporary disaster roaming for 5G
networks was ratied in June 2022. Telstra submitted that it expected it would take 18–24 months to
implement the functionality and then more time to be rolled out into the network.
492
The costs to develop and deploy a temporary mobile roaming
capability will depend on the solution
The ACCC requested that the mobile network operators provide timeframes and costs to develop
and deploy a temporary mobile roaming capability. The mobile network operators submitted that
the time and costs to develop and deploy a temporary mobile roaming capability will depend on the
technical solution that is required to deliver policy objectives. They indicated that any solution will
not be ‘low-cost, however Telstra commented that the ongoing costs of operating temporary mobile
roaming should be relatively low.
493
487 The Telecommunications Act 1997, section 313 4A and 4B outlines the obligations of carriers and carriage service providers
to provide assistance if a national emergency is declared or a disaster or state of emergency. Section 314 outlines the terms
and conditions on which help is to be given. Accessed 27 June 2023.
488 For example see Department of Regional NSW, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry,
19 August 2022, pp 12–16, accessed 27 June 2023.
489 Communications Alliance Ltd, G663:2022 Telecommunications – Emergency Communications Protocol, accessed
23June 2023.
490 The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 is administered by the ACCC and covers industry regulation including
telecommunications services. Schedule 2 – The Australian Consumer Law (ACL) – is enforced by the ACCC and covers the
consumer protections for goods and services.
491 The Telecommunications (Customer Service Guarantee) Standard 2011 is administered by the Australian Communications
and Media Authority (ACMA). It relevantly sets minimum standards for resolving faults to landline services and the
compensation payable if the carriers do not meet those timelines. It does not apply to mobile phone or internet services.
Section 21 of the Standard provides that a carriage service provider is exempt from complying with a performance standard
to the extent that non-compliance is a result of a ‘circumstance beyond the control of the carriage service provider. This
includes natural disasters that cause mass outages and restrict connection to a specied service or rectication of a fault or
service diculty. Accessed 27 June 2023.
492 Telstra, Public Submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 56, accessed 27 June 2023.
493 Information provided by stakeholder.
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TPG Telecom notes that the mobile network operators may be impacted differently and therefore
have different requirements and costs.
494
Mobile network operators submitted that there will be signicant costs to increase capacity in the
network. These costs include increases to network capacity (both backhaul and base stations),
software and vendor equipment upgrades and changes required to business processes and systems.
Telstra advised that most of the costs will be incurred to develop and implement any new trac
management capabilities and processes to activate and deactivate temporary mobile roaming.
495
Commercial arrangements will also need to be agreed upon. The National Farmers’ Federation
submitted that proper mechanisms should be investigated so that ‘costs are appropriately accounted
for and attributed to the right carriers/customers if roaming was to be put in place during these
periods.
496
We consider further scoping work is needed to establish the costs to develop and implement
a temporary mobile roaming capability in Australia. Indicative estimates may be available from
other jurisdictions.
 

Several stakeholders at our stakeholder forums and in submissions stated that any temporary mobile
roaming solution should be considered in the wider policy context of improving telecommunications
resilience, capacity and coverage during natural disasters. They noted the importance of network
hardening and resilience efforts to improve power supply, which is needed for both temporary mobile
roaming and other telecommunications services.
The Australian Communications and Media Authority report into the impacts of the 2019–2020
bushres found the majority of mobile base station outages could be attributed to power outages,
with only 3% of outages caused by re damage to telecommunications facilities.
497
Optus submitted
that ‘the resilience of power should also be considered in any discussion about availability, resilience
or role of mobile services during times of natural disaster or emergency.
498
TPG Telecom commented
that addressing temporary power issues to mobile sites would likely resolve most mobile network
outages in emergency situations and reduce the need for temporary mobile roaming.
499
Field
Solutions Group also submitted that ‘maintaining network up times, including restoration of service, is
key during these times.
500
Attendees at our 3 stakeholder forums also agreed that temporary mobile roaming is one possible
solution, but multiple options are needed during an emergency in case one or more options fail
(such use of Cells On Wheels, cell broadcast, wi- calling if the xed network is intact, and satellites,
including the emerging Low Earth Orbit Satellites). The Local Government Association of Queensland
noted in its submission to the Report on preliminary ndings that ‘the introduction of [temporary
494 Information provided by stakeholder.
495 Telstra, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 30 August 2022, p 59, accessed 27 June 2023.
496 National Farmers’ Federation, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 16 August 2022, p 7, accessed
27 June 2023.
497 Australian Communications and Media Authority, Impacts of the 2019–20 bushres on the telecommunications network,
April 2020, pp 7–9, accessed 23 June 2022. This section of the report presents data on facilities that experienced outages of
4 hours or more.
498 Optus, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 14 September 2022, p 5, accessed 27 June 2023.
499 TPG Telecom, Public submission to ACCC Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 5 August 2022, pp 4, 15, accessed
27 June 2023.
500 Field Solutions Group, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 11 August 2022, p 16, accessed
27 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report
mobile] roaming as part of the available tools in an emergency response is without a doubt
something that should be enabled in Australia.
501
Several stakeholders at our consumer stakeholder
forum commented that they lived in areas without coverage and would not directly benet from
temporary mobile roaming, so needed other options as well.
502
In its submission to the Report on preliminary ndings, Pivotel noted that there are other technical
solutions that could be considered in addition to temporary mobile roaming.
503
It provided an example
of an open or shared access network such as a Cell On Wheels, where all mobile network operators
could share temporary facilities and allow access to all mobile users irrespective of their provider.
Under this model, only one Cell On Wheel would need to be deployed to an impacted area.
The mobile network operators agree that temporary mobile roaming should be activated for short
durations and should not replace other well-established recovery processes already in place, such
as the return of mains power, deployment of generators or Cells on Wheels. Any temporary mobile
roaming capability should be assessed against other potential solutions that will deliver policy
objectives.
504
For example, Telstra noted that cell broadcast ‘can be developed and deployed in a
far shorter timeframe than [temporary mobile roaming], as the technology is mature and available
now.’
505
Temporary mobile roaming may complement a Public Safety Mobile
Broadband capability
There was consensus from Commonwealth and State government agencies involved in disaster
management and coordination that a temporary mobile capability could deliver benets and
complement existing capabilities available to emergency services personnel. There was, however, a
clear preference for a Public Safety Mobile Broadband solution for emergency services personnel.
The Australian Government commissioned a separate review into a Public Safety Mobile Broadband
capability after previous work by the Productivity Commission and the Department of Home Affairs
was paused.
506
This review recommended that the Commonwealth consider ‘how any outcomes and
recommendations from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s Regional Mobile
Infrastructure Inquiry may be relevant to the PSMB program.
507
The Australian Government’s response to the Public Safety Mobile Broadband Review was
announced in May 2023 with the establishment of a taskforce to lead the delivery of a Public Safety
Mobile Broadband capability, led by the National Emergency Management Agency.
508
The ACCC
notes that while not directly related, temporary mobile roaming may complement a Public Safety
Mobile Broadband capability, depending on policy objectives.
501 Local Government Association of Queensland, Public submission to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on
preliminary ndings, 10 May 2023, p 2, accessed 27 June 2023.
502 ACCC, Consumer Stakeholder Forum for the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry, 22 February 2023, accessed
27 June 2023.
503 Pivotel, Public submission in response to the Regional Mobile Infrastructure Inquiry report on preliminary ndings,
16 May 2023, p 7, accessed 27 June 2023.
504 Information provided in condential meetings with the ACCC.
505 Information provided by stakeholder.
506 Productivity Commission, Public Safety Mobile Broadband Research Report, 12 January 2016, accessed 23 June 2023;
Department of Home Affairs, Public Safety Mobile Broadband Roadmap, December 2018, accessed 23 June 2023.
507 Recommendation 9a, Department of Infrastructure, Release of the Public Safety Mobile Broadband Review and the
Government Response, 2 May 2023, p 14, accessed 23 June 2023.
508 National Emergency Management Agency, Public Safety Mobile Broadband, accessed 23 June 2023.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report



u Finding1
Mobile services are vitally important to consumers in regional, rural and remote Australia but
these consumers are concerned about coverage and congestion issues.
u Finding2
Consumers need reliable and resilient mobile services. They have a heightened need for access
to these services during emergency situations such as natural disasters.
u Finding3
Reliable access to the internet is an increasing issue in the agriculture industry. Mobile
connectivity can impact the eciency and competitiveness of farms.
u Finding4
There are areas where there is 3G network coverage but currently no 4G or 5G coverage.
Consumers are concerned that 4G and 5G coverage will not be equivalent to 3G coverage
before the 3G shutdown in 2024.
u Finding5
First Nations peoples living in remote communities often have unreliable communications
services.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report



u Finding6
The cost of building a new tower site typically increases with remoteness. In particular, the cost
of backhaul can be especially high in regional and remote areas compared to urban areas.
As mobile network operators generally bear the cost of connecting sites to backhaul, high
costs to do so can be a key reason for preferring to co-locate on existing infrastructure, where it
exists in the desired areas.
u Finding7
Co-location on existing infrastructure is generally more cost effective than building new towers.
However, where co-location requires signicant upgrade to the tower infrastructure, co-location
can in some cases be prohibitively expensive.
Mobile network infrastructure providers can inuence the business case for co-location by
mobile network operators in 2 main ways:
1. By the decision to build a single or multi-tenant capable tower, noting that the business
case for the initial build may not support multi-tenant towers if the tower provider does not
anticipate demand from multiple tenants.
2. By the access fees they set, noting that high access fees will discourage co-location.
u Finding8
Active sharing arrangements, including neutral host models, can further reduce the cost
of providing mobile coverage compared to co-location, particularly in areas where there is
otherwise no commercial incentive to invest in new infrastructure.
Market dynamics and commercial arrangements after the divestment or transfer of towers
from mobile network operators to mobile network infrastructure providers can inuence
whether a broader market for neutral host provision may develop over time.
u Finding9
Options for capacity upgrades to meet consumer demand for mobile services are more limited
in regional, rural and remote areas compared with urban areas. This is due to higher costs
to increase capacity (particularly backhaul transmission upgrade costs) to meet increasing
demand for data.
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ACCC | Regional mobile infrastructure inquiry | Final report


u Finding10
Land access costs are highly site specic, with considerable variance in costs across states
and territories, areas of remoteness and private and government landlords. Stakeholders
submitted that access to government land is signicantly more expensive than private land in
terms of ongoing lease payments. However, we have found signicant variance in land leases
including between private and public land and that public land is not always more expensive.
u Finding11
Accessing land across different government planning jurisdictions can be complex, lengthy,
and costly. Many industry stakeholders advocate for a range of reforms to improve consistency
of regulations and to better facilitate infrastructure deployment.


u Finding12
There are conicting views among stakeholders about whether commercial arrangements for
access to towers, particularly tower access fees, are working effectively. Some stakeholders
consider that access fees may be too high to promote co-location on existing towers.
It is unclear whether divestment of towers will lead to better access compared with the
situation pre-divestment, based on 2 factors. First, each of the mobile network operators have
become the anchor tenant of the mobile network infrastructure provider who purchased its
towers. This affects the incentives of the mobile network infrastructure provider to compete for
new tenants. Second, there remains vertical integration between some industry players.
u Finding13
The Facilities Access Regimes within the Telecommunications Act are no longer t for purpose.
The Government should consider whether it is necessary for the Facilities Access Regimes
to cover all mobile network infrastructure providers, regardless of whether they have a carrier
licence or are part of a group that has a carrier company.
The Government should also review the Facilities Access Regime itself to ensure that it
remains t for purpose and is effective in promoting access to towers and associated
infrastructure.
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

u Finding14
The provision of new towers and maintenance of existing towers are commercial decisions
of mobile network infrastructure providers driven by demand from mobile network operators,
other service providers and government. Mobile network operators providing greater or
improved mobile coverage drives demand for towers and associated infrastructure.
u Finding15
Governments at both federal and state levels have made signicant investments to reduce the
cost to mobile network operators of investing in additional mobile network infrastructure in
regional areas. In many cases, without government support, mobile network operators would
not have had the incentive to invest in certain regional areas. However, government funding
has had limited success in encouraging sharing of publicly subsidised infrastructure between
multiple mobile network operators. Telstra has been the main beneciary of funding from these
programs.

u Finding16
Mobile network operators have little commercial incentive to invest in regional, rural and remote
areas if providing new or better coverage in these areas does not impact their market share in
the national mobiles market or otherwise generate sucient additional revenue.
u Finding17
Although it is generally more costly to build and operate mobile network infrastructure in more
remote areas, Telstra and Optus have made signicant network investments in regional, rural
and remote areas to gain or maintain market share in the national mobiles market.
u Finding18
Telstra’s competitive advantage in regional areas could potentially raise barriers for network
expansion by its competitors. This may undermine competitors’ incentives to continually invest
in improving mobile coverage in regional areas.
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u Finding19
Telstra, Optus and TPG Telecom all currently have sucient spectrum to supply mobile
network services in rural, regional, remote Australia. However, smaller mobile network
operators that have a focus on providing mobile services in regional Australia do not currently
have access to the same suite of spectrum bands as the 3 largest mobile network operators, in
particular low-band spectrum.
To the extent that regional-focused operators can develop alternative means of providing
mobile coverage in regional Australia, there may be benets in providing these operators with
access to such spectrum, particularly where the spectrum may not be currently used.

u Finding20
Temporary mobile roaming is technically feasible although there are questions of technical
complexity and risk, including congestion, which need to be managed. There are policy
and commercial factors that will determine how temporary mobile roaming is practically
implemented.
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
terms used in this report
3G The third generation in mobile technology standards prepared by the
3GPP global partnership.
3GPP The 3rd Generation Partnership Project is an umbrella term for a
consortium of mobile operators, vendors and international standards
organisations that develop protocols and interfaces for mobile
telecommunications, including 3G, 4G and 5G standards.
4G The fourth generation in mobile technology standards prepared by the
3GPP global partnership.
5G The fth generation in mobile technology standards prepared by the
3GPP global partnership.
ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
Active infrastructure/
equipment
Telecommunications assets and equipment with active radio and
electronic components for signal transmission & reception including
but not limited to, transmitters, receivers, base station electronics,
antennae, feeders, backhaul connectivity and other requisite
equipment and associated civil and electrical works required to provide
telecommunications services.
Active sharing Active sharing arrangements involve the sharing of active infrastructure
in the radio access network such as antennas, transmission and
spectrum.
Associated
infrastructure
Includes:
equipment sheds, ducts, pits, huts, shelter and feeder, foundations
plant and power infrastructure such as cooling, batteries, solar
panels, generators or power lines
associated passive or active radio access network subsystems
installed on or connected to Tower Sites
other passive and active infrastructure used by telecommunications
providers to provide mobile telecommunications services.
Backhaul Mobile backhaul is the network infrastructure (bre, microwave or
satellite) which transports data from the radio access network (base
stations) to an associated core network.
CCA Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
Cellular Repeater Also known as cell phone signal booster or cell phone signal amplier,
is a type of bi-directional amplier used to improve cell phone reception.
A cellular repeater system commonly consists of a donor antenna that
receives and transmits signal from nearby cell towers, coaxial cables, a
signal amplier, and an indoor rebroadcast antenna.
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Co-location A form of passive infrastructure sharing where a mobile network
operator deploys its active equipment on the same passive infrastructure
as another mobile network operator.
Densication Refers to increasing network capacity by adding cell sites, for example,
increasing the number of base stations.
Facilities Access Code The Code of Access Relating to Telecommunications Transmission
Towers, Sites of Telecommunications Transmission Towers and Eligible
Underground Facilities, which was rst made by the ACCC in 1999, under
Clause 37 of Part 5 of Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act. It
governs how access to certain telecommunications facilities owned by
telecommunications carriers, including mobile towers and underground
ducts, is provided to other carriers seeking to install their equipment on
or in those facilities.
Facilities Access
Regimes
There are 2 Facilities Access Regimes:
Parts 3 and 5 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications Act, which
applies to carriers.
Part 34B of the Telecommunications Act, which applies to ‘eligible
companies’.
Internet of Things The Internet of Things (IoT) describes physical objects (or groups of
such objects) with sensors, processing ability, software and other
technologies that connect and exchange data with other devices and
systems over the Internet or other communications networks.
Mobile network
infrastructure provider
A provider of telecommunications infrastructure or facilities (such as
mobile towers) that support the provision of mobile telecommunications
services. Examples include Amplitel, Waveconn and Indara.
Mobile network
operator
A mobile network operator supplies mobile services to customers at the
retail level. Examples include Telstra, Optus and TPG Telecom.
Neutral Host A network infrastructure owned and maintained by a third party that
rents or leases its infrastructure to any network operators looking to
scale up their network capacities.
Passive infrastructure Assets and equipment which are not part of the active layer of a
telecommunications network (the signal path), including but not limited
to sites, buildings, shelters, towers, masts, poles, ducts, trenches, electric
power supply/generators and air conditioning.
Passive sharing Passive infrastructure sharing is where mobile network operators share
non-electronic infrastructure, such as a tower, land, power and other
physical elements.
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Peri-urban The area around an urban area that is the interface between an urban
area with more rural and bushland areas.
Generally, we use the denition in the Peri-urban Mobile Program
(PUMP) program
509
, which denes ‘peri-urban’ as being areas along the
edges of Australia’s major cities.
510
Spectrum The radio spectrum is the part of the electromagnetic spectrum with
frequencies from 3 Hz to 3,000 GHz (3 THz). Active equipment uses
radiofrequency spectrum to provide connectivity to mobile devices.
Telecommunications
Act
The Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)
Tenant Mobile network operators or other access seekers that are located on a
tower are referred to as tenants.
Tower A structure on which a radio base station equipment can be installed.
It includes telecommunications towers that are part of the National
Broadband Network, radio and television broadcasting towers and other
suitable towers or similar structures that could be used to improve
mobile telecommunications coverage or can be used in the supply of
mobile telecommunications and other radiocommunications services,
including rooftops or utility masts.


The Inquiry is focused on regional, rural, remote and peri-urban areas of Australia. For the purposes
of this report on preliminary ndings, we use the Australian Bureau of Statistic’s Australian Statistical
Geography Standard Volume 5 – Remoteness Structure.
511
We use the Australian Bureau of
Statistic’s Remoteness Structure as a proxy for regional, rural, remote and peri-urban Australia in the
following way:
Table 11: Use of Australian Bureau of Statistic’s Remoteness Structure
Region Australian Bureau of Statistic’s Remoteness Structure classication(s)
Remote Remote and Very Remote Australia
Rural Outer Regional Australia
Regional Inner Regional Australia
Peri-urban No direct classication relevant
Urban Major Cities of Australia
509 Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, Peri-Urban Mobile Program,
accessed 17 April 2023.
510 See for example, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, Peri-Urban
Mobile Program Grant Opportunity – GO5331, February 2022, accessed 17 April 2023.
511 ABS 2018, 1270.0.55.005 – Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS): Volume 5 – Remoteness Structure, July 2016,
accessed 23 June 2023.
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Peri-urban areas have a mix of urban, regional and rural characteristics. They will often have a higher
population density compared to urban areas, and can have a mix of agricultural land, commercial
and industrial developments, as well as residential use. Generally, there will be more bushland in
peri-urban areas than urban areas, meaning that they have a higher risk of bushres and other
natural disasters.
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Appendix B: Ministers Direction
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Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and
Associated Infrastructure) Direction 2022
i
Contents
1 Name ........................................................................................................................................1
2 Commencement........................................................................................................................1
3 Authority ..................................................................................................................................1
4 Definitions................................................................................................................................1
5 Direction...................................................................................................................................2
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Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and
Associated Infrastructure) Direction 2022
1
1 Name
This instrument is the Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to
Regional Towers and Associated Infrastructure) Direction 2022.
2 Commencement
(1) Each provision of this instrument specified in column 1 of the table commences,
or is taken to have commenced, in accordance with column 2 of the table. Any
other statement in column 2 has effect according to its terms.
Column 1
Column 2
Column 3
Provisions
Commencement
Date/Details
1. The whole of this
instrument.
The day after this instrument is registered.
Note: This table relates only to the provisions of this instrument as originally made. It will
not be amended to deal with any later amendments of this instrument.
(2) Any information in column 3 of the table is not part of this instrument.
Information may be inserted in this column, or information in it may be edited, in
any published version of this instrument.
3 Authority
This instrument is made under subsection 496(1) of the Telecommunications Act
1997.
4 Definitions
(1) In this instrument:
ACCC means the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
Act means the Telecommunications Act 1997.
towers includes NBN towers, radio and television broadcasting towers and other
suitable towers or similar structures that could be used to improve mobile
coverage.
(2) For the purposes of this instrument, reference to ‘likely users’ in subsections 5(2)
and (3) includes telecommunications carriers, telecommunications service
providers, utilities, emergency service organisations, and other operators of
radiocommunications equipment.
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Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and
Associated Infrastructure) Direction 2022
2
5 Direction
(1) I direct the ACCC to hold a public inquiry under Division 3 of Part 25 of the Act,
commencing no later than 1 July 2022, in relation to:
(a) access to towers and associated passive and active infrastructure provided
by telecommunications and other infrastructure providers in regional, rural,
remote and peri-urban areas within Australia, that can be used in the supply
of mobile telecommunications and other radiocommunications services;
and
(b) the feasibility of temporary mobile roaming services to be provided during
natural disasters and other such emergencies.
Note 1: For the purposes of paragraph (a), reference to ‘telecommunications and other
infrastructure providers’ includes specialist tower operators, neutral host operators,
telecommunications carriers, owners of other suitable infrastructure, utilities, and
emergency service organisations.
Note 2: Under section 505 of the Act, the ACCC must prepare a report setting out its findings
as a result of the inquiry and give a copy to the Minister. The ACCC is expected to
provide a copy of this report to the Minister as soon as is reasonably practicable, or
otherwise within 12 months from the commencement of this inquiry.
(2) The ACCC must have regard to all of the following matters (without limitation)
in connection with the conduct of the inquiry:
(a) the costs of providing towers and associated passive and active
infrastructure that can be used by third party telecommunications providers
and others to supply mobile telecommunications and other
radiocommunications services;
(b) the costs of accessing land to provide the towers and associated
infrastructure referred to in paragraph (a);
(c) the existing commercial and other fee arrangements under which third
party telecommunications providers and other likely users can access the
towers and associated infrastructure referred to in paragraph (a), including
the considerations that contribute to establishing such fee arrangements
(such as the costs of providing such access, as distinguished from the costs
of providing the towers and associated infrastructure);
(d) the effectiveness of current commercial and regulatory arrangements in
enabling third party telecommunications providers and other likely users to
access the towers and associated infrastructure referred to in paragraph (a);
(e) the kinds of matters (including the impact of costs) providers of the towers
and associated infrastructure referred to in paragraph (a) consider in
deciding to:
(i) provide the towers and associated infrastructure referred to in
paragraph (a); and
(ii) provide access to such towers and infrastructure.
(f) how the kinds of matters described in paragraph (e) may affect the
provision of greater mobile coverage;
(g) the implications (if any) for the provision of access to towers and
associated infrastructure referred to paragraph (a) of mobile carriers
divesting their tower and associated infrastructure businesses, including
(without limitation):
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Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and
Associated Infrastructure) Direction 2022
3
(i) the scope of access offered;
(ii) the terms and conditions of access;
(iii) the commercial and other fee arrangements for access; and
(iv) the kinds of considerations that contribute to establishing these
commercial and other fee arrangements for access;
(h) the feasibility of providing temporary mobile roaming services during
natural disasters and other such emergencies, including (without
limitation):
(i) the technical feasibility of providing such services;
(ii) the support systems and business processes required; and
(iii) the associated time and costs expected in providing such services.
(3) The ACCC must consult with the following persons, bodies, and agencies (as
applicable, but without limitation) in respect of the matters described in
subsection (2):
(a) providers of the towers and associated infrastructure referred to in
paragraph (2)(a);
(b) providers of other infrastructure that could similarly be used in supplying
mobile telecommunications and other radiocommunications services;
(c) likely users of the towers and associated infrastructure referred to in
paragraph (2)(a); and
(d) members of the community that may be interested in improvements in
mobile coverage and / or temporary mobile roaming services to be
provided during natural disasters and other such emergencies.
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Explanatory Statement
Issued by the Authority of the Minister for Communications,
Urban Infrastructure, Cities and the Arts.
Telecommunications Act 1997
Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and Associated
Infrastructure) Direction 2022
Authority
This instrument is made under subsection 496(1) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (the
Act).
Purpose
The purpose of the Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and
Associated Infrastructure) Direction 2022 (the Direction) is to direct the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) to undertake a public inquiry into the
matters specified in the Direction.
Background
The Australian Government has had a longstanding interest in improving mobile coverage
and the competitive supply of mobile services in regional, rural, remote and peri-urban
Australia. In this context, it has been considering whether access to mobile towers and
associated infrastructure is supportive of such improvements, noting the Government has
been investing in expanding mobile coverage through programs like the Mobile Black Spot
Program and may make further such investments.
On 13 December 2022 the Regional Telecommunications Independent Review Committee
(RTIRC) submitted its report on the 2021 Regional Telecommunications Review to the
Government.
1
The RTIRC made a number of findings about mobile networks and services
in regional, rural, remote and peri-urban Australia. It highlighted the continuing importance
of mobile services, including in natural disasters. The report considered ways of improving
coverage and competition, such as shared network access as well as access to necessary
inputs. It recommended that the Government continue to support provision of new mobile
coverage, with investments that address coverage, capacity and competition issues and
consider funding vehicles which leverage private sector co-investment (recommendation 2).
The RTIRC also recommended that the Government undertake a feasibility study to
consider the capability for mobile roaming to be deployed in emergency circumstances
(recommendation 9). This could assist members of the public to contact emergency or
rescue organisations, or each other, during natural disasters if they are in an area where their
own mobile provider does not have coverage. While mobile phones in Australia can access
emergency numbers (e.g. 000) via other providers’ networks, where other numbers are
concerned a mobile phone operating on one carrier’s network cannot access another
1
Available at www.infrastructure.gov.au/department/media/publications/2021-regional-telecommunications-
review-step-change-demand.
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2
carrier’s network without technical adjustments being made by mobile carriers and
agreements being in place between carriers.
This direction responds to these mobile service issues already of interest to the Government
and also raised by the RTIRC.
The inquiry is not linked to any specific ACCC regulatory processes under Part XIC of the
Competition and Consumer Act 2010, or under Part 5 of Schedule 1 to the Act. It is not a
direction to commence a new inquiry into domestic mobile roaming. It is instead intended to
generate information that can clarify technical and market issues and contribute to possible
policy and program development to improve regional mobile coverage and competition.
It is envisaged that the ACCC will commence the inquiry by 1 July 2022 and complete it
within 12 months. The ACCC is not expected to make recommendations, but instead to
provide evidence-based findings that facilitate policy development. The ACCC will consult
widely, including infrastructure providers and likely users.
Consultation
The RTIRC consulted widely in developing its recommendations, receiving over 650
submissions. Improvements in mobile coverage, capacity and competition are strong themes
in the report of the Committee, as are access to inputs to supply services and network
sharing models. The Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and
Communications consulted the ACCC on the draft Direction.
The Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) considers that the inquiry does not result in
additional regulatory burden under the Australian Government Regulatory Impact Analysis
Framework as the inquiry is exercised through the ACCC’s existing functions (OBPR
reference OBPR22-01657).
The provisions of the direction are direction are explained in Attachment A.
Statement of compatibility with human rights
A statement of compatibility with human rights for the purposes of Part 3 of the Human
Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 is set out at Attachment B.
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3
Attachment A
Details of the Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to Towers and Associated
Infrastructure) Direction 2022
Section 1 – Name
This section provides that the name of the instrument is the Telecommunications (ACCC
Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and Associated Infrastructure) Direction 2022 (the
Direction).
Section 2 – Commencement
Section 2 provides that the Direction commences the day after it is registered on the
Federal Register of Legislation.
Section 3 – Authority
This section provides that the Direction is made under subsection 496(1) of the
Telecommunications Act 1997 (the Act).
Section 4 – Definitions
Section 4 provides a limited number of definitions relevant to the direction. In general,
terms within the instrument are not defined and therefore would have their everyday
meaning.
Subsection 4(1) provides definitions of relevant terms in the Direction, including ‘ACCC’
and ‘Act’. A definition is also provided for ‘towers’ to make clear that this term includes
NBN towers (i.e., towers that are part of the National Broadband Network), radio and
television broadcasting towers or similar structures that could be used to improve mobile
coverage.
Subsection 4(2) provides that, for the purposes of the Direction, reference to ‘likely users’ in
subsections 5(2) and (3) includes telecommunications carriers, telecommunications service
providers, utilities, emergency service organisations and other operators of
radiocommunications equipment. The intention is to require the ACCC to consider a broad
range of possible users of towers, permitting it to develop a more complete picture of tower
access and use.
Section 5 – Direction
This section provides the specific directions to the ACCC. Subsection 5(1) sets out the two
main issues for the inquiry:
(a) access to towers and associated passive and active infrastructure provided by
telecommunications and other infrastructure providers in regional, rural, remote and
peri-urban areas within Australia, that can be used in the supply of mobile
telecommunications and other radiocommunications services; and
(b) the feasibility of temporary mobile roaming services to be provided during
natural disasters and other such emergencies.
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4
Apart from towers, passive infrastructure would include facilities such as sheds, ducts or
pits. Active infrastructure could include both telecommunications infrastructure such as
backhaul, cabling or radiocommunications devices, and plant and power infrastructure such
as cooling, batteries, generators or power lines.
Regional area, rural area, remote area, peri-urban area, mobile telecommunications services
and wireless services would have their everyday meanings. For the assistance of the reader,
a ‘peri-urban area’ should be understood as the area around an urban area that is the
interface of an urban area with more rural and bushland areas.
Natural disasters includes significant disasters, such as floods, cyclones or major bushfires,
during which telecommunications infrastructure may experience significant damage and
disruption, such that people in the areas affected by the disaster may have difficulty
contacting emergency or rescue organisations, or other people, using their usual
communications channels, raising the potential benefit of alternative communications
means. Other such emergencies would be more short-lived emergencies, but where there
may be also be damage or disruption to telecommunications networks and a similar benefit
in having access to alternative mobile networks.
Two notes are provided for the benefit of the reader. Note 1 specifies that
‘telecommunications and other infrastructure providers’ includes specialist tower operators,
neutral host operators, telecommunications carriers, owners of other suitable infrastructure,
utilities, and emergency service organisations. This makes clear that the ACCC should
consider a broad range of infrastructure providers.
Note 2 advises that, under section 505 of the Act, the ACCC must prepare a report setting
out its findings as a result of the inquiry and give a copy to the Minister. It also advises that
the ACCC is expected to provide a copy of the report as soon as is reasonably practicable,
or otherwise within 12 months from the commencement of the inquiry.
Subsection 5(2) specifies matters to which the ACCC must have regard. The ACCC is not
limited to considering only these matters. Together, the matters go to the Government
better understanding how costs affect tower access fees and broader decisions to invest in
towers and associated infrastructure that could improve mobile coverage, as well as the
feasibility of providing mobile roaming during natural disasters and emergencies.
Paragraphs 5(2)(a)-(c) of the matters require the ACCC to have regard to the costs that
underlie the provision of towers and associated infrastructure, including land access
charges, and the fee arrangements that relate to obtaining access to those towers and that
infrastructure. Together, these paragraphs provide that the ACCC will generate evidence-
based information on the costs that are incurred in providing towers and associated
infrastructure, and how these costs flow through to existing fee arrangements for accessing
towers. Paragraph 5(2)(c) also makes clear that the ACCC must consider the costs of
providing access (for example, relevant business practices and systems) as well as the costs
of providing towers and associated infrastructure themselves.
It is expected that with this information the ACCC could then consider the relationship
between the costs involved in supply and current fee arrangements.
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5
Paragraph 5(2)(d) requires the ACCC to consider the effectiveness of current commercial and
regulatory arrangements in enabling access to towers and associated infrastructure. This will
require it to assess whether the existing settings are effective, however, the ACCC is not
required or expected to undertake a formal technical review of the facilities access regime in
Part 5 of Schedule 1 of the Act or the access regime in Part XIC of the Competition and
Consumer Act 2010, nor implement any reviews under those provisions as a result of this
direction. The focus of the inquiry is on the real world operating environment for access to
towers and associated infrastructure and whether that can better support improvements in
mobile coverage, capability and competition in regional, rural, remote and peri-urban
Australia.
Paragraph 5(2)(e) directs the ACCC to examine the kinds of matters (including the impact of
costs) infrastructure and tower providers consider in deciding to provide towers and associated
infrastructure and provide access to that infrastructure. Paragraph 5(2)(f) requires the ACCC
to consider how the kinds of matters described in paragraph (e) may affect the provision of
greater mobile coverage. Together, the paragraphs will require the ACCC to consider how
costs impact on investment decisions that underlie improvements in mobile coverage.
Paragraph 5(2)(g) requires the ACCC to have regard to the implications (if any) for the
provision of access to towers and associated infrastructure of mobile carriers divesting their
tower and associated infrastructure businesses. This notes that mobile carriers like Telstra,
Optus and TPG have divested, or are divesting, themselves of their tower businesses and this
may impact the dynamics of providing access to towers and associated infrastructure. The
paragraph also identifies areas where the ACCC must consider such implications, namely the
scope of access that may be offered, the terms and conditions of access, the fee arrangements
and the kinds of considerations that contribute to establishing fee arrangements. Paragraph
5(2)(g) will ensure that the ACCC considers whether current actions by mobile carriers to
divest their tower businesses will affect the nature of access and the terms of access.
Paragraph 5(2)(h) provides that matters the ACCC must consider in determining the
feasibility of providing temporary mobile roaming services during natural disasters and
emergencies include the technical feasibility of providing such services, the support
systems and business processes required, and the associated time and costs expected in
providing such services.
Subsection 5(3) provides that the ACCC must consult persons, bodies and agencies as
applicable, and again without limitation in respect of the matters described in subsection
(2). While the ACCC’s inquiry will be public, four examples are provided to ensure the
views of the relevant parties are sought. These are providers of towers and associated
infrastructure, providers of other infrastructure that could similarly be used in supplying
mobile telecommunications and other radiocommunications services, likely users of towers
and associated infrastructure, and members of the community that may be interested in
improvements in mobile coverage and/or temporary mobile roaming services to be
provided during natural disasters and other such emergencies.
As the inquiry will be a public inquiry conducted in accordance with Division 3 of Part 25
of the Act, the ACCC must publish the fact that it is holding the inquiry and invite
submissions. The ACCC may issue a discussion paper and may also hold public hearings.
The ACCC must prepare a report setting out its findings of the result of the inquiry.
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Attachment B
Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights
Prepared in accordance with Part 3 of the
Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011
Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and Associated
Infrastructure) Direction 2022
Overview
The purpose of the Telecommunications (ACCC Inquiry into Access to Regional Towers and
Associated Infrastructure) Direction 2022 (the Direction) is to direct the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) to undertake a public inquiry into the
matters specified in the Direction.
Subsection 5(1) of the Direction specifies two main tasks of the inquiry:
(a) access to towers and associated passive and active infrastructure provided by
telecommunications and other infrastructure providers in regional, rural, remote and
peri-urban areas within Australia, that can be used in the supply of mobile
telecommunications and other radiocommunications services; and
(b) the feasibility of temporary mobile roaming services to be provided during
natural disasters and other such emergencies.
The Australian Government has had a longstanding interest in improving mobile coverage
and the competitive supply of mobile services in regional, rural, remote and peri-urban
Australia. The 2021 Regional Telecommunications Independent Review Committee has also
made recommendations relating to industry and Government investment to improve mobile
coverage, access to inputs for the supply of such services, new neutral host models and the
feasibility of providing temporary mobile roaming services during natural disasters or
emergencies. The direction and inquiry respond to these considerations.
The ACCC will conduct a public inquiry in response to the direction, and call for
submissions. It must publish a report on its findings. The inquiry is expected to commence
by 1 July 2022 and be completed within 12 months.
Human rights implications
The Direction is compatible with the rights and freedoms recognised or declared by the
international instruments listed in subsection 3(1) of the Human Rights (Parliamentary
Scrutiny) Act 2011 as they apply to Australia. The Direction does not engage any of the
applicable rights or freedoms. Access to telecommunications services is, however,
increasingly seen as important to broader social, economic, political and cultural participation.
Conclusion
The Direction is compatible with human rights as it does not raise any human rights issues.