26
At a meeting with members of the media on August 23, 1979, Volcker did make the minor
concession of indicating that interest rates were unlikely to fall in the near future: “I know of no
way to get these interest rates down in the present environment.”
82
The Associated Press report
on Volcker’s remarks (Nokes, 1979) noted his emphasis on the Fisher effect: “The view that
interest rates rise like the tide with inflation was also held by Volcker’s two immediate
predecessors as board chairman, G. William Miller and Arthur Burns.”
83
A turning point in Volcker’s period as chair occurred in October 1979 when the FOMC switched
from targeting monetary growth using the federal funds rate as an instrument to making
nonborrowed reserves the key instrument in monetary targeting. Numerous retrospectives have
interpreted this arrangement, which continued into 1982, as a covert means by which the FOMC
continued to manage the federal funds rate while moving it to high levels.
84
Volcker, however,
would consistently reject interpretations of this kind (see, for example, the discussion in Taylor,
1995, p. 780).
85
Irrespective of one’s view about the materiality of the change in operating
procedures that occurred in October 1979, it is not in doubt that the FOMC shifted at that point
to a posture in which it was willing to countenance greater short-run variation in the federal
funds rate than previously, in the hope of securing desired outcomes for monetary growth. This
——————————————————————————————————————————
policy (see Volcker, 1983, p. 339). Among outside observers who pointed to the forecasts, James Tobin was
especially notable. In 1985, he argued that “the regular summary of the GNP, price and unemployment ‘projections’
of the seven Federal Reserve [Board] governors and twelve Federal Reserve Bank presidents assume major
importance” because they revealed forecasts of the FOMC’s ultimate goal variables (Tobin, 1985, p. 25; p. 183 of
1987 reprint). The Tobin article was reprinted in a book of readings, edited by Ben Bernanke, that appeared in
1987. Twenty years later, Bernanke would bring the policymaker forecasts into far greater prominence by
overseeing a comprehensive overhaul—when the presentation of the forecasts, in more frequent and extensive form,
became the basis for the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) of FOMC participants. Starting in 2012, the SEP
included statistics on individual policymakers’ policy-rate projections.
82
Quoted in Nokes (1979). Of course, as the option was available to reduce short-term interest rates by easing
monetary policy on the margin, Volcker’s statement was not wholly valid. He was likely referring to an interest-rate
reduction that could be sustained and that could be counted on to be registered across the maturity spectrum.
83
As discussed above, this position had been taken by Chairman Martin, too.
84
See, for example, Mishkin (1987, p. 46). Many studies, including the celebrated work of Judd and Rudebusch
(1998) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), have underlined the importance of the October 1979 policy change by
showing how the Federal Reserve’s reaction function, as represented by an estimated federal funds rate rule, shifted
between the pre- and post-1979 periods. Findings of this kind are not necessarily inconsistent with the notion that
the FOMC withdrew from targeting the federal funds rate during the period from 1979 to 1982. One could take the
FOMC’s announced shift to a nonborrowed-reserves regime at face value, while regarding equations for the federal
funds rate estimated over 1979 to 1982 as a valid means of representing monetary policy developments, because
those equations quantify what the nonborrowed-reserves regime implied for the relationship between movements in
the funds rate and in the state of the economy. See also the discussion in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000, p. 163).
85
At an early stage, Volcker placed on the record his rejection of these interpretations of the 19791982 regime.
For example, in the course of Congressional testimony on April 12, 1983, he remarked: “I’m perfectly willing to say
that… we recognize[d] that it might come about that interest rates [would] go higher and be maintained at a higher
level for a considerable amount of time. But I think it is just wrong to suggest that we sat there [at FOMC meetings]
and said: ‘We think, right now, a 16 or 18 percent interest rate is what is called for, in terms of the inflationary
situation.’” (In Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 1983, p. 45.)