USGS DDS-43, Conservation and Controversy: National Forest Management 1960

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Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project: Final report to Congress, vol. II, Assessments and scientific basis for management options. Davis: University of California, Centers for

Water and Wildland Resources, 1996.

Conservation and

Controversy: National

Forest Management, 1960–95

ABSTRACT

In the period 1960 to 1995, policies affecting national forest manage-

ment generated a variety of directions for the planning, management,

conservation, and preservation of national forest lands and resources

in the Sierra Nevada. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

forced better disclosure of information utilized by the U.S. Forest

Service, enhanced public awareness of management issues, and

led to increased public involvement in agency decision making. As a

result, efforts to increase timber production in Sierra Nevada national

forests met with increased public scrutiny as well as political and

legal opposition. The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of

1976 mandated extensive planning to promote effective and efficient

conservation of forest resources and to resolve forest management

controversies. Demand for increased public timber supplies, how-

ever, conflicted with demands for increased recreation and wilder-

ness preservation. Contestation over national forest policies did not

begin with NFMA, but the broad scope of land-management plan-

ning generated remarkable public attention and controversy. Public

opposition to potential impacts on wildlife habitat and other aspects

of forest ecosystems and to the increased use of clear-cutting as a

timber harvest method led to legal action challenging national forest

plans. At present, implementation and interpretation of law and ad-

ministrative policies have forced the Forest Service to revise forest

plans in the Sierra to better incorporate species and habitat require-

ments as part of its ecosystem-management strategy.

INTRODUCTION

The origin of this research is an invitation by the Sierra Ne-

vada Ecosystem Project (SNEP) to participate in a workshop

to assist in determining the role that public policies have

played in shaping the ecosystems of the Sierra Nevada. Spe-

cifically, several researchers have been asked to respond to

the question “Which public policies have been most signifi-

cant in shaping the ecosystems of the Sierra Nevada as they

exist today?” These individuals have been asked to concen-

trate on the period from 1960 to the present, with the inten-

tion that a range of policies and their impacts will be analyzed.

I believe that the exercise is a useful one and am delighted to

contribute to this inquiry.

My effort to respond to this question will be primarily to

address policies and issues associated with national forest

management in the Sierra Nevada during the last thirty-five

years. While I am aware that public policies have had a mul-

titude of significant effects in many other areas of the Sierra,

this chapter will not attempt to address them directly. My

approach will concentrate on developing the context for policy

implementation in the national forests during this period and

discussing the effects and implications of these policies. As a

social scientist, I will leave an authoritative determination of

impacts and their significance on ecosystems to my colleagues

on the SNEP Science Team. As part of the effort to organize

thinking about institutional aspects of natural resource

sustainability in the Sierra, I offer some thoughts on ancillary

issues pertaining to policy implementation. This excursus may

prove useful as the Science Team seeks to answer the ques-

LARRY RUTH

Department of Environmental Science,

Policy, and Management

University of California

Berkeley, California

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VOLUME II, CHAPTER 7

tion posed and to consider its implications. Where feasible, I

will refer to other policies that have had significant impacts

on the Sierra. Generally, this will be limited to suggesting ar-

eas for further research or discussion by others. Discussion

pertaining to the impact of policy in the national forests of

the Sierra Nevada will focus on forces that shaped the ad-

ministration of the national forests, the response to public

activism surrounding national forest management, and the

further implications for conservation and management of the

national forests in the Sierra Nevada.

This workshop represents an initial effort to discuss with

some precision the role that public policies have played in

influencing the conditions of Sierra Nevada ecosystems.

Ultimately, statements about policies and their effects on the

ecosystem, particularly regarding the current era, must be

answered by further study. This analysis should be under-

taken in light of the results of the completed SNEP

assessments. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly.

The social scientists engaged in policy review and analysis

are going to present research on various public policies and

their environmental effects and impacts. This work will

necessarily be based on a general knowledge of conditions at

the ecosystem level, as it is presently understood. I also hasten

to point out that research to date is based on an understanding

of environmental conditions that is clearly imperfect and

incomplete. If it were not, SNEP would not be engaged in an

assessment, and we might leave to the administrative or

legislative process the task of defining a policy that would be

consistent with the state of scientific knowledge. After all, it

was public and congressional concern about the lack of

scientific knowledge, understanding, and consensus as to the

ecological health of the Sierra Nevada that led to the articu-

lation of SNEP’s research mission. One may naturally

anticipate that SNEP’s assessments will result in better, more

accessible knowledge about the ecological conditions of the

Sierra. New information that may be presented in the assess-

ments may change the key points about policy that we glean

from our present discussion. Thus, it would prove of

substantial value to renew the discussion of policies and their

impacts in the Sierra in light of the information to be made

available once the assessments are completed. Only then will

it be possible to answer the question “Which public policies

have been most significant in shaping the ecosystems of the

Sierra Nevada as they exist today?” with any degree of

accuracy or precision.

PUBLIC POLICY AND RESEARCH:

CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS

Understanding the influence of policy is an important com-

ponent of SNEP’s assessment of the status of the ecosystems

of the Sierra Nevada. Before discussing specific policies, I

would like to express some concerns relating to the consider-

ation of policies and their effects. I believe the limits of this

kind of enterprise should be understood by the participants

in this workshop. Several fundamental issues occur to me.

These bear not only on the discussion about policies and their

ecological effects and implications but also on the effort to

discuss the broader implications of public policy in the Si-

erra. Ideally, an inquiry into the impact of policies will also

consider the influence of social and economic dynamics on

policy implementation. Describing these interactions is prob-

ably beyond the scope of this workshop. Nevertheless, full

comprehension of the policy context depends on an under-

standing of both formal and informal social and administra-

tive dimensions relating to policy implementation. For this

reason, I particularly appreciate the inclusion of social scien-

tists and others with practical experience in policy implemen-

tation as part of the SNEP Science Team.

A primary concern regarding the question we are asked to

tackle in the policy workshop relates to the ability of indi-

vidual research projects to adequately assess the role of a par-

ticular policy in shaping the ecosystem. Public policies,

defined as the sum of law, regulation, administrative pro-

grams, and public projects together with their funding and

implementation, affect virtually all of the land area and natu-

ral resources in the Sierra Nevada. The effect of public poli-

cies extends across both time and space, with the results of

prior policies exerting an influence on the present status of

resources and ecosystems. Equally, effects and implications

of environmental policies may extend beyond the specific

areas, issues, or programs that they were designed to affect

directly. The breadth and depth of policies, and their effects

on ecosystems, therefore, are likely to be substantial. As a re-

sult, the full extent to which policies have affected and influ-

enced both the current state of the ecosystem and the present

fabric of natural resource institutions will be difficult to es-

tablish. Given the task and its scope, this exercise will neces-

sarily produce an eclectic and incomplete view of the role that

policy has played in shaping ecosystems.

Another cause for concern pertains to difficulties in em-

pirical method. The effects of public policy may appear to be

the result of specific policies. Correlation of the operation of

a specific policy to a particular effect may appear to be intu-

itively obvious, but attempting to go beyond this is a difficult

task. In reality, attribution of specific causation to policies or

establishing their effect with certainty is a difficult task,

complicated by the operation of multiple policies and other

forces that influence the same resources or ecosystems. In

addition, for policy effects for which one hypothesis may be

constructed, other possible explanations generally exist—

some more or less likely. Specific attribution of the effects of

laws, statutes, plans, programs, and projects can thus be a

complicated and error-prone enterprise. Observed effects may

be the indirect results of obscure policies or unintended by-

products of various policy instruments. Precise attribution of

effects is therefore a controversial and contentious exercise,

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Conservation and Controversy: National Forest Management, 1960–95

and one that may exceed the capacities of any research de-

sign or the capability of even the most zealous researcher.

A variety of public policies that have had significant ef-

fects on the environment generally are not characterized by a

specific relation to ecosystems, natural resources, or the envi-

ronment. Examples of this kind pertaining to the Sierra in the

last thirty-five years include the development and expansion

of Interstate 80, the state highway systems, and the national

forest road system. These dramatically improved access to

the entire Sierra Nevada and contributed to the concentra-

tion of urban, commercial, recreational, and commodity-

related development and associated environmental impacts

in particular areas of the range. Individually, all of these de-

velopments have had significant environmental impacts on

the ecosystems in these locations. Another example is the in-

fluence of national and state policies related to air quality and

pollution control. Although evidence suggests that aerial pol-

lutants are beginning to have profound impacts on the Si-

erra, the relationship between policies and these impacts is

complicated (Cahill et al. 1996) and may be isolated and ana-

lyzed only with difficulty.

Additionally, attribution and discussion of public policies

and their effects may be complicated by a number of factors.

Several ostensibly separate policies may together contribute

impacts on a resource or areas, resulting in cumulative ef-

fects that are difficult to attribute to a specific policy instru-

ment. In other cases, funding for one of a number of interactive

policies may be uneven or irregular, affecting implementa-

tion and making it difficult to draw any conclusion as to the

success or failure of impact of particular public policies. Fi-

nally, in some cases the absence of policy may have implica-

tions for the state of the ecosystem that are as significant as or

greater than those from policies that we can more easily de-

fine and observe. SNEP Science Team members, I believe, have

already explored many individual impacts. I am hopeful that

individual assessments will capture some of the effects that

may be traceable to the presence or absence of certain policy

phenomena.

THE NATIONAL FORESTS:

POLICIES, CONTEXT, AND

IMPLICATIONS

National forest management and its ecological implications

in the Sierra Nevada are obvious and important sources of

information regarding the impact of public policies on eco-

systems in the region. Several reasons compel attention to the

role of policy in the management of these lands. A large pro-

portion of the land area of the Sierra Nevada, especially at

middle to upper elevations, is national forest land. Policies

and planning specifically pertaining to national forest man-

agement are the product of a number of laws and adminis-

trative policies, including the National Forest Management

Act of 1976 (NFMA), U.S. Code, vol. 16, secs. 1600–1614 (1976);

the Organic Act of 1897, U.S. Code, vol. 16, secs. 473–482, 551;

the Multiple Use–Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSY), U.S.

Code, vol. 16, sec. 528 et seq.; the Wilderness Act of 1964; the

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), U.S. Code,

vol. 42, sec. 4321 et seq.; the Endangered Species Act (ESA),

U.S. Code, vol. 16, secs. 1531–43 (as amended in 1989); as well

as other environmental laws, annual appropriations legisla-

tion, and a range of administrative policies relating to fire

suppression and fuel management. These policies guide a

range of activities, which necessarily are likely to have sig-

nificant environmental effects. The impact of these activities

is likely to be felt in the national forests, on adjacent lands,

and in ecosystems beyond national forest boundaries. Another

reason that national forest management policies are worth

special attention pertains to the valuable information that may

be obtained by reviewing the impacts and implications of

policies explicitly designed to guide the conservation and

management for large areas of the Sierra Nevada.

In the Sierra Nevada, national forests fulfill several impor-

tant varied functions. These forests serve uses representing a

wide range of natural resource–related values, including the

use of forest resources to produce commodities, such as tim-

ber and forage for grazing. The national forests also contain

other resources, including water, fish, wildlife, minerals, rec-

reational opportunities, and others. Often these uses conflict

or appear to conflict with one another. Natural resource man-

agement in the national forests of the Sierra Nevada has been

the subject of a great deal of scrutiny and continuing contro-

versy during the past thirty-five years. Concern and contes-

tation regarding Forest Service resource policies did not begin

with the enactment of NFMA. It is undeniable, however, that

the NFMA land-management planning process, especially at

certain key decision points over the last fifteen years, has gen-

erated remarkable public interest and caused considerable

controversy. The reason for the intense interest in NFMA and

its effects has to do with several aspects of the statutory man-

date. The law’s provisions were intended to reorder national

forest management to develop coordinated plans for multiple

use and to promote effective and efficient conservation of for-

est resources. The scope of the law, combined with increased

demands on public timber supplies, suggested that NFMA

had the potential to propose and implement management

activities that would have widespread effects on management

of the national forests, including those of the Sierra Nevada.

Before analyzing these elements and the impact of NFMA,

several earlier policies will be discussed in order to explain

the culture of Forest Service administration and to provide a

context for the discussion of recent forest policies and their

impact on the national forests.

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VOLUME II, CHAPTER 7

ADMINISTRATION OF THE

NATIONAL FORESTS IN

THE POSTWAR ERA

During and after World War II, the Forest Service began to

focus on increased timber harvesting and other commodity

considerations in its overall administration of the national

forests. A housing boom had created an unprecedented de-

mand for timber. As private timber was harvested and these

supplies declined, industry pressed for expanded timber sales

in the national forest to fulfill the demand (Clary 1986). The

Forest Service increased timber sales, and as a result, conflicts

between timber harvesting and recreation also increased,

somewhat tarnishing the agency’s reputation.

In the postwar era, Congress recognized that the Forest

Service and other land-management agencies were being pres-

sured to meet the needs of a diverse set of recreation users.

During this period, land-management policy was still primar-

ily guided by the Organic Act of 1897, which offered little

guidance on how to reconcile administration of the national

forests with changing public needs. This act stated that the

forest reserves, as they were originally known, were to be

managed “for the purpose of securing favorable conditions

for water flows and to furnish a continuous supply of timber

for the use and necessity of the citizens of the United States.”

In 1958, Congress created the Outdoor Recreation Resources

Review Commission (ORRRC) to review the situation and

to make recommendations for meeting recreation needs in

1976 and 2000. The Forest Service supported the work of the

ORRRC, because the agency had always encouraged recre-

ational enjoyment in national forests as an adjunct to timber,

range, and other uses. The ORRRC made recommendations

to Congress that called for increased governmental funding

for recreational development and for coordinated planning

within agencies to provide better recreational opportunities.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGE

The Multiple Use–Sustained Yield Act of 1960

Throughout the postwar period, the Forest Service was con-

fident of its ability to manage the forest for many different

uses, including wilderness. The agency sought legislation that

would confirm its authority to manage the expanding array

of uses, enabling it to reconcile timber production and other

commodity uses with public demands for more recreation op-

portunities and for wilderness preservation (U.S. Forest Ser-

vice 1960). The Forest Service recognized that additional

support for a range of other uses and activities, including the

recreational goals of the ORRRC, would bring additional ap-

propriations, allowing for development of uses that were al-

ready present in the national forests. The Sierra Club opposed

this initiative, arguing that the Forest Service commitment to

timber meant that the agency would not make balanced deci-

sions that recognized the importance of other forest resources

(Dana and Fairfax 1980, 203–4). It is also likely that increased

friction between the Forest Service and environmentalists over

legislation proposed to designate areas of federal land, in-

cluding some in the national forest, as “wilderness,” contrib-

uted to this opposition. Despite the opposition, Congress

enacted the Multiple Use–Sustained Yield Act in 1960. This

law stated that the national forests were to be managed for

“the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-

level annual output or regular annual output of the various

renewable resources of the national forest without impairment

of the productivity of the land.” The Forest Service expanded

its utilization of planning in order to coordinate various for-

est uses, or at least to rationalize conflicting uses (Wilson 1978).

A Regional Multiple Use Planning Guide was prepared for

each region to guide local planning. Forest Land Use Plans

were developed for each national forest to guide multiple-

use integration and development (Forest Service 1973, sec.

8213). Unit Plans were then completed to tailor management

specifically to the conditions of watersheds or large drainage

areas ranging in size from fifty thousand acres to several hun-

dred thousand acres. This system essentially ratified Forest

Service determinations of the “greatest good for the great-

est number.” Planning permitted continued timber sales

while also allowing the agency to claim that it had become

the nation’s premier provider of outdoor recreation opportu-

nities.

The Multiple Use–Sustained Yield Act (1960, secs. 528, 529)

recognized the importance of a spectrum of resource uses,

including “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and

wildlife and fish.” The statute also recognized the value and

place of wilderness in the national forests. Legislative ac-

knowledgment of these uses permitted the Forest Service to

serve the public interest by developing a variety of forest

resources and activities appropriate to meet the needs of vari-

ous uses and groups. Even so, the Forest Service, an organi-

zation built on compromise, began to shift its administration

in response to the needs of the public. When opposition to

Forest Service projects occurred in this era, it could be coun-

tered, if not diffused, by locating potentially conflicting uses

in another forest area. Culhane (1981, 388–94) argued that the

many different interest groups involved tended to counter-

act each other’s power, enabling the Forest Service to pursue

a middle course. Timber harvesting could take place in one

area, while fishing, hiking, and other recreation uses could

be located in another. Compromises allowed resource devel-

opment activities to continue, with either the support or the

acquiescence of interested parties and interest groups.

Forest Service policies in this period were not without crit-

ics. Congressional appropriations were primarily oriented

toward timber. To some, however, Forest Service adminis-

tration remained primarily attuned to the most powerful

constituencies in the regions it served. Timber and other com-

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Conservation and Controversy: National Forest Management, 1960–95

modity interests proved to be powerful enough to compel

attention. Agency policies therefore often appeared to reflect

a bias toward timber production rather than attempting to

serve some broader conception of the public interest

(McConnell 1966) or one more closely tied to a growing con-

stituency of national forest visitors whose interest centered

on recreation. Professional foresters, who made up the bulk

of agency personnel and its management, had motivations

and goals different from those of the timber industry. Despite

these tensions, established working relationships between

forester and logger, and between the Forest Service and the

timber industry, appeared to lend credence to conservation-

ist claims that timber considerations dominated the agency’s

agenda. In fairness to the Forest Service, however, Congress

made continuing budget appropriations in order to expand

the agency’s timber program. This strongly suggested that

Congress believed that Forest Service timber management was

consistent with the purpose of furnishing “a continuous sup-

ply of timber for the use and necessity of the citizens of the

United States” and thus squarely served the public interest.

After MUSY was enacted, the Forest Service slowly began

to expand its staff to bring in new kinds of professional ex-

pertise. Even so, the preponderance of foresters in the Forest

Service and the agency’s role in supplying timber to private

industry provoked doubt about the “multiple-use” orienta-

tion of the agency. The multiple-use philosophy allowed the

agency to avoid many management controversies, but as the

following discussion indicates, this approach never satisfied

important segments of the public.

The Wilderness Act of 1964

Advocates in support of the idea that separate areas should

be set aside for wilderness preservation had always opposed

the idea of multiple use as the guiding principle for all forest

lands. They believed that if wilderness was accorded a status

only equivalent to any other use of forest resources, wilder-

ness would necessarily be subservient to timber and other

commodity uses when the agency made determinations. Al-

though the Forest Service had already designated many wil-

derness areas in the national forests,

many conservationists

did not believe that the agency valued wilderness enough to

ensure that the existing “primitive area” designations would

survive the timber industry’s preference for increased timber

harvest levels in national forest lands. The Forest Service

claimed this designation was sufficient to ensure that these

lands would be managed as wilderness. Some wilderness

proponents were unconvinced and sought legislation to make

it impossible for the status of these lands to be altered admin-

istratively (McCloskey 1966). Some of these lands, located in

national forests, national parks, and other federal lands, were

to be reserved as wilderness, and the status of additional ar-

eas was to be reviewed in the following ten years.

Agency efforts to deflect attention from the wilderness is-

sue failed to divert wilderness supporters from their goal of

securing legislative protection for wilderness designations.

In 1964 Congress passed the Wilderness Act, despite the op-

position of the Forest Service. This statute established a Na-

tional Wilderness System. Certain lands administered by the

federal land-management agencies, including 2.1 million acres

of land that previously had been administratively protected

by the Forest Service, were designated as “wilderness” or

“pristine” areas, with the status of other areas to be reviewed

during the following decade. In the Sierra Nevada, a number

of areas in national forests, prized for their scenic beauty and

recreational value, were reserved. These areas were located

mainly in the alpine and subalpine zones. The agencies re-

tained control over wilderness areas under their administra-

tion, but the new designation limited uses on these lands.

Ironically, the designation permitted no timber harvest on

these lands but, subject to presidential review, continued to

permit other development, including mining, grazing, and

water development. Loss of the range of options that the For-

est Service formerly controlled on these lands was something

of a blow to agency prestige, because it implied that the agency

could not be trusted to preserve this land on its own (Dana

and Fairfax, 1980, 227–29).

The National Environmental Policy Act

Enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (1969)

represented a major watershed in public policy. The expres-

sion of public concern for environmental values reflected the

concern of many individuals in this era. NEPA was intended

to ensure that environmental factors would be considered as

part of the decision-making process. A major element in the

law is the requirement that an environmental impact state-

ment (EIS) be prepared for federal actions having a “signifi-

cant effect on the environment (National Environmental

Policy Act 1969, sec. 102 (2)(c), U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 4332).”

NEPA, however, did not require that environmentally ques-

tionable projects be abandoned, so there was no expectation

that preparation of an EIS would lead to dramatic changes in

Forest Service proposals or in the policy of multiple use. The

EIS, however, requires that the public be provided an oppor-

tunity to comment on agency proposals. This element of the

law has had a profound impact, both on the decision-making

processes of all federal agencies and on the relations of these

agencies with the public. Public disclosure of information also

provides citizens with an opportunity to challenge these de-

cisions in the political process and in court. Additionally, in

some cases, the time required to prepare and to complete the

documents required by NEPA has provided another obstacle

that has deterred some project proponents. In this way, the

procedural aspects of NEPA have exerted a significant influ-

ence on a wide range of Forest Service land-management ac-

tivities and programs.

An early example of the procedural aspects of NEPA re-

quirements and their far-reaching effects is amply illustrated

in a celebrated controversy in the Sierra Nevada, where the

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VOLUME II, CHAPTER 7

proposed development of a ski resort in Mineral King (a rela-

tively undeveloped area, then a part of the Sequoia National

Forest) by Walt Disney was ultimately derailed. Although the

ski resort had been approved prior to the enactment of NEPA,

the Forest Service was faced with a lawsuit challenging its

decision. The agency elected to prepare an EIS for the pro-

posed ski resort. The Sierra Club sued, inter alia, to force con-

sideration of the environmental effects on national park

resources due to the expansion of the access road (Sierra Club

v Morton, 405 US 727 [1972]). Although the lawsuit was later

dropped, delays created by the lengthy administrative and

legal process ultimately caused the developer to lose interest

in the project (Ecology Law Quarterly, 1972, 1976). The demise

of the proposed ski resort project meant that Mineral King

would remain largely undeveloped. After several years, this

area was transferred to Sequoia National Park. The ecologi-

cal significance of this result was perhaps limited to the pres-

ervation of one valley and its environs. Nevertheless, it was

perceived as no small victory for conservationists, who were

encouraged in their struggle against what they regarded as

the tendency of the Forest Service to abandon too quickly its

conservation precepts as it sought some compromise in search

of the public interest. In contrast, subsequent efforts by

conservationists to challenge an EIS prepared for Kirkwood,

another ski area in the Sierra, were unsuccessful, and the area

was successfully developed.

The Forest Service, in many respects, pioneered the imple-

mentation of NEPA, but its experience has not been without

some difficulties. Among other early innovations, the agency

developed an environmental assessment (EA), a preliminary

report used to ascertain probable environmental effects and

thereby ␣ determine whether preparation of an EIS was re-

quired. Nevertheless, in the years immediately after NEPA’s

enactment, the Forest Service had considerable difficulty in

adjusting to the law’s requirements. In the first years of

NEPA’s existence, the early 1970s, seasoned agency manag-

ers, almost all of them foresters, generally were not fully aware

of the scope and intricacies of EIS requirements, nor were they

prepared to supervise a comprehensive consideration of en-

vironmental impacts (Taylor 1984, 208). Consequently, on

many occasions, the agency concluded that an EA was suffi-

cient and did not insist on preparation of an EIS for certain

projects. In some of these cases, the agency’s analysis estab-

lished that some projects, including timber harvests (espe-

cially those where clear-cutting was employed), were unlikely

to have a “significant impact” on the environment. Addition-

ally, agency determinations of which projects required an EIS

tended to exclude many projects from this requirement. Prepa-

ration of an EIS entailed an opportunity for public comment

but also allowed the Forest Service opportunities to revise

the project and to respond to its critics before reaching a final

decision. Even when the Forest Service began its early efforts

to produce environmental impact statements, several years

were required to develop the skills to conduct a full analysis

of environmental impacts and to produce an adequate EIS.

Reasons for the agency’s inability were due in part to initial

uncertainty about what preparation of an EIS entailed and

also in part to lack of expertise in analyzing environmental

impacts. Despite the presence of an array of forestry profes-

sionals and other interdisciplinary scientific experts in the

Forest Service, the agency could not immediately deploy and

utilize professionals who possessed skills appropriate for the

preparation of the EIS. As a result, lawsuits successfully chal-

lenged agency decisions regarding the preparation of an EIS

(Kleppe v Sierra Club, 427 US 390 [1976]).

After suffering losses in court, Forest Service managers rec-

ognized that the agency had to learn more about environmen-

tal impact analysis and how to prepare an EIS. It took time to

recruit and to cross-train experts in disciplines not previously

mastered to any significant degree by the Forest Service per-

sonnel. Resistance to formal public participation waned as

the agency became more familiar with the process. As the

agency developed greater interdisciplinary environmental ex-

pertise, it was gradually able to handle sensitive projects and

to prepare an EIS in a professional and more defensible man-

ner (Taylor 1984).

TIMBER SUPPLY AND THE

NATIONAL FORESTS

The forest products industry was also concerned over Forest

Service timber sale policies. The struggle to ensure a reliable

future timber supply is essential to the stability of the indus-

try. As the demand for timber grew in the concluding years

of World War II and in the postwar years, increased cutting

on private lands, particularly in the Northwest, led to short-

ages in the supply of mature timber on these lands. As pri-

vate timber inventories were logged, some harvested lands

were replanted. While these trees were growing, however, the

supply of mature timber on private lands declined. In many

areas, including California, a portion of the cutover lands were

sold or exchanged to the Forest Service to avoid paying for

replanting, fire protection, and taxes. The rotational sequence

caused other operators to become dependent on the national

forests for timber supplies in the middle 1970s. To accommo-

date this need, the forest products industry pressed for in-

creased timber sales on the national forests (Clawson 1975;

Dowdle and Hanke 1985, 85–88). Many foresters and indi-

viduals, both inside and outside of the timber industry, ar-

gued that harvest levels for the national forests have been

and continue to be set substantially below what the national

forests can produce on a sustained yield level (Rey n.d.; John

Zivnuska, Berkeley, California, personal communication,

April 4, 1986).

Industry and its supporters were frustrated by the lack of

any national strategy to respond to the demand for timber. In

addition to frustration over the low timber volume offered

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Conservation and Controversy: National Forest Management, 1960–95

for sale, the timber industry was also somewhat concerned

about the variability in sales levels from year to year. The in-

dustry was perplexed by the uncertainties of the political pro-

cess that necessitates appropriations for Forest Service timber

sales. The amount of timber that would be available for har-

vest in any one year could not be reliably predicted in ad-

vance. This was due to the time required to prepare any sizable

timber sales. These efforts generally required a sustained bud-

get that would permit an effort to continue over several years,

something that was difficult to ensure in advance. Accord-

ingly, varying levels from year to year meant that it was

equally difficult for timber interests to plan capital invest-

ments to meet market demands.

Several timber supply strategies have been proposed to

solve these difficulties. One idea promoted dominant uses and

called for zoning public land areas that were primarily suited

to a certain commodity use (such as timber, grazing, or

mining). Other uses of those areas would be discouraged. This

idea surfaced several times, but it never attracted the neces-

sary support to bring it to fruition. The Public Land Law

Review Commission (PLLRC), which undertook a compre-

hensive review of the management of public lands in 1968,

recommended, among other things, that areas especially

suited for timber production should be established “to man-

age for the dominant use (United States Public Land Law

Review Commission 1970).” This was echoed in 1973 by the

President’s Advisory Panel on Timber and the Environment

(PAPTE). The proposals were made in an earnest attempt to

improve the efficiency of management of public lands. How-

ever, the emphasis of the proposals on commodities develop-

ment and production was out of step with the burgeoning

environmentalist sympathies that began to color public opin-

ion at the time. As a result, no action was taken, and timber

supply remained a central, if unpredictable, aspect of national

forest management (Dana and Fairfax 1980, 235). Industry’s

needs for supplies were largely met from year to year, but

its pleas for stability remained unanswered to this point. In

California, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Forest Service’s Re-

gion 5 harvested about 69% of the biological growth from the

available timbered national forest lands. The level was higher

than in other Forest Service regions. This harvesting was ac-

complished largely, although not entirely, through selection

logging.

THE MONONGAHELA LITIGATION

A lack of willingness on the part of the Forest Service man-

agement to respond more forcefully to public concerns about

clear-cutting, overcutting, and other silvicultural practices

represented a significant miscalculation. In the Sierra Nevada,

timber harvesting was largely accomplished by selection

logging of mature trees or groups, unlike in the Pacific North-

west. Precisely because conservationists and outdoor recre-

ation enthusiasts in other regions found themselves without

recourse in the agency, they sought other means to influence

agency decisions. Ultimately, a coalition of interests unhappy

over plans to clear-cut an area of the Monongahela National

Forest favored for hunting, fishing, and other recreational uses

brought suit to enjoin further clear-cutting in the national for-

est. As a result of the court decision in West Virginia Division

of Izaak Walton League of America v Butz (367 FSupp 422 [1973]),

Forest Service authority to manage timber was severely im-

paired. This case centered around the interpretation of the

Organic Act of 1897 (codified as amended at U.S. Code, vol.

16, secs. 473–82 and 551, in 1982). The Forest Service argued

that these statutes supported its timber harvest practices. The

trial court held that the Organic Act prohibited timber har-

vesting unless the trees were “mature” and individually “des-

ignated” and “marked” for harvest. Since the Forest Service

was employing silvicultural management methods in direct

contravention to this, the agency’s system of timber manage-

ment was effectively halted. This stunned both the Forest Ser-

vice and the timber industry. It was clearly unacceptable to

the timber industry, which depended on the national forests

as part of their available supply. The Forest Service appealed

the ruling, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld

the District Court’s opinion (West Virginia Division of Izaak

Walton League of America v Butz, 522 F2d 945 [4th Cir 1975]).

Although the effect of the ruling was confined to the Fourth

Circuit, the implication was that the timber-harvesting pro-

gram in the national forests, especially in its increasing reli-

ance on clear-cutting, was in jeopardy.

Scientific and technical arguments cited by the Forest Ser-

vice in support of clear-cutting as part of a properly conducted

silvicultural system were of no avail in the face of public op-

position and legal challenges. Finally, the Forest Service was

unable to ignore or to parry the thrusts of its opponents. In

the wake of the Monongahela decision, environmentalists

brought similar cases in district courts in South Carolina,

Texas, Tennessee, Georgia, Alaska, and Oregon (Dana and

Fairfax 1980, 317). The Forest Service faced the prospect of

defeat in all of these cases and, as a consequence, the depri-

vation of management methods on which it had come to rely.

Forest Service personnel believed that these practices were

essential tools for forest management and did not intend to

manage the forests without them. Ultimately, congressional

action was required to restore Forest Service authority to use

clear-cutting to harvest stands that included immature trees

(National Forest Management Act 1976).

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VOLUME II, CHAPTER 7

THE FOREST AND RANGELAND

RENEWABLE RESOURCES

PLANNING ACT OF 1974

As the legal challenge in the Monongahela National Forest

worked its way through the legal system, earlier efforts to

provide for an economically stable management environment

resurfaced in connection with proposals for the establishment

of a strategic planning program for the nation’s forest re-

sources. This culminated in enactment of the Forest and

Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA) in 1974

(Public Law 93-378; Statutes at Large 80 (1974): 476), as

amended by the National Forest Management Act in 1976

(Public Law 94-588; Statutes at Large 90 (1976): 2949), codified

at U.S. Code, vol. 16, secs. 1600–1614 (1982).

The RPA represents an attempt to institute a rational sys-

tem of strategic planning for public and private natural re-

sources in the United States. The statute provided a strategic

framework for economic and physical planning for all forest

resources and uses. These included timber, range, minerals,

development, wilderness, and a host of other commodities

and recreational needs. The statute directed the Forest Ser-

vice to determine the aggregate national demand for all for-

est products. Every ten years, the agency was to inventory

forest resources and public needs and to produce an “assess-

ment” of the state of public and private forest resources in

the United States.

The agency was also to develop a “program” every five

years to meet those needs. Using information obtained from

the national census along with other economic projections, it

projects the future demand for forest resources in the United

States. The program outlines the levels of commodities and

other goods that can be can be supplied by the nation’s for-

ests and allocates a share of national goals to the national for-

est system. To meet these goals, it proposes a budget for the

Forest Service for the next five years. Its recommendations

are submitted to the president, who may use them as a guide

for appropriation requests for the Forest Service that are sub-

mitted to Congress. The budget would reinforce the results

of the program by mandating public expenditures designed

to reach those goals. However, RPA was intended only to

develop a strategic plan. The statute contained no explicit au-

thority to implement the results of the RPA program, deliber-

ately leaving this to the prerogatives of Congress and the

president.

Implementation of these results remained subject to exist-

ing legislation and other political and administrative forces.

Considerable agency resources were devoted to this initia-

tive, which culminated in published reports containing RPA

targets and regional disaggregation, showing how much re-

gions such as California were expected to contribute toward

achieving national goals established for various categories of

forest uses and resources. During the appropriations process,

congressional attention often initially focused on the RPA

documents, the assessment, and the program but was gener-

ally diverted from this focus by the politics of the budget pro-

cess. As a result, the goals of the RPA were only partially

realized over the years. Additionally, enactment in 1976 of

the National Forest Management Act amended RPA, estab-

lishing a separate land-management planning process. This

further complicated strategic planning and budgeting for the

Forest Service.

As part of the review of the Forest Service land-manage-

ment plans (LMPs) (discussed infra), many interested public

and private parties commented on the LMPs. Remarks by the

state of California and others requested that the Forest Ser-

vice more strongly consider RPA goals and that the final plans

for the Sierra Nevada national forests adopt as regional policy

a management strategy that set timber harvest levels closer

to the RPA targets. The state of California’s comments on the

plans for national forests in the Sierra and elsewhere in Cali-

fornia went beyond simply discussing timber targets and

sought to force the Forest Service to employ an approach that

would have led to more careful consideration of a panoply of

issues related to national forest planning. These comments

were intended to reorient agency planning to employ more

integrated views, considering the national forests and their

contribution to part of a larger landscape and region. On the

question of timber, for example, the state suggested that sus-

tained yield calculations for timber should employ a regional

timber inventory, using the stock of timber on both public

and private land as the starting point for sustained yield cal-

culations as opposed to that of a single national forest. State

concerns also extended to a variety of noncommodity issues,

seeking to draw the Forest Service more deeply into plan-

ning for watersheds and regions consisting of multiple na-

tional forests.

Sympathetic to the tenor of these comments, the Forest Ser-

vice considered the requests, featuring them prominently in

its response to public comment on the plans. Ultimately, how-

ever, other criteria contained in NFMA’s provisions (discussed

infra) and neither RPA’s strategic thrust nor its targets con-

trolled land-management planning. Without apparent irony,

the final decisions of forest supervisors and other agency

managers contained little more than an acknowledgment that

RPA’s targets called for higher harvest levels that were ap-

parently not to be achieved under NFMA planning.

RPA’s impact clearly has been decidedly less than the one

intended by its sponsors. Nevertheless, it bears restating that

RPA’s strategic approach offered the Forest Service and oth-

ers concerned with forest resources and ecosystems several

valuable integrative mechanisms. The RPA related to all three

Forest Service functions—the national forest system, research,

and state and private forestry. While these tools were not ex-

ploited, a strategic planning approach could still prove use-

ful in helping to realize shared goals for the conservation and

management of the nation’s public and private natural re-

sources. RPA provided a broader planning authority than

NFMA and is of potential relevance to emerging regional en-

153

Conservation and Controversy: National Forest Management, 1960–95

vironmental planning and management initiatives. This is

particularly the case in regions such as the Sierra Nevada,

where significant ecological issues extend well beyond the

national forests.

An RPA program designed to achieve ecological and other

goals inherent in NFMA, carefully thought out and sensibly

implemented, may have offered something of considerable

value in the present context. This type of strategic plan might

have laid the groundwork and enabled more active integra-

tion of federal and nonfederal lands in a range of cooperative

ventures between different public and private landowners

designed to achieve an entire spectrum of forest-related goals,

not simply RPA timber targets. These ventures might include

watershed and/or multiple national forest planning and re-

gional planning. It is instructive to note that many current

initiatives sponsored by the Forest Service and other groups

to foster ecologically sensitive management suggest that a

cooperative approach is critical, both to the success of these

efforts and to the solution of a variety of national forest policy

issues.

ROADLESS AREAS AND

WILDERNESS, REVISITED

Under the Wilderness Act of 1964, the Forest Service was re-

quired to study certain areas to evaluate their potential for

inclusion into the wilderness system or for multiple use

(“primitive” areas had originally been set aside under the

prior “U” regulations established by the Department of Agri-

culture). The agency undertook this study in 1967, projecting

that the study would be completed within ten years. Of its

own volition, once the initial study of these lands had been

completed, the agency expanded the study to examine the

larger remaining roadless areas within the national forests.

The progress of this review, known as the Roadless Area Re-

view and Evaluation (RARE), provides another example of

an environmentalist challenge to agency initiatives. Conser-

vation groups wanted the agency to pay more attention to

recreation and preservation opportunities on the remaining

forest land as well.

Upon the completion of the review, which indicated that

approximately twelve of fifty-six million acres studied had

wilderness potential, these groups remained unsatisfied. They

wanted the Forest Service to increase the number of areas and

the acreage recommended for wilderness. The Sierra Club

immediately sued to enjoin the agency from adopting the re-

sults of the study, on the grounds that it was not accompa-

nied by an adequate EIS (Sierra Club v Butz, 3 ELR 20071 [ND

Cal 1972]). An out-of-court settlement restricted timber har-

vest in all roadless areas pending the completion of the EIS.

The EIS was released in 1973, but it did not lead to legislative

action. The Forest Service subsequently abandoned the first

study and embarked on a new study in 1977. This study,

known as “RARE II,” was released by the president in 1979.

Although 65.7 million acres were recommended as potential

wilderness, many areas for which the environmentalists

sought protection were not included. The adequacy of the

RARE II EIS was also challenged, this time by the state of

California as well as the Sierra Club and other environmental

groups (California v Block, 483 FSupp 465 [ED Cal 1980] 690

F2d 753 [9th Cir 1982]).

To end the policy stalemate, after an interagency review of

RARE II, Congress took up the question of the disposition of

these roadless areas. The result was a state-by-state review of

the wilderness recommendations by Congress. A new series

of wilderness bills proposed wilderness designations for ad-

ditional acreage located in the national forests, in the national

parks, and in other public land. In 1979 the first California

wilderness bill was introduced by Representative Philip Bur-

ton and was subjected to five years of debate before passage

in 1984. In a pattern repeated in a number of other western

states, this legislation also returned other national forest lands

to multiple use and reserved certain other areas for further

evaluation as to their suitability as wilderness. Congress con-

sidered the Forest Service recommendations and the views

of various interest groups and dealt with the decision as a

political issue. Although the environmentalists compromised

in Congress, accepting less acreage than they had originally

sought, the bills that were passed represented further victo-

ries by the environmentalists in their struggle to force the

government to permanently manage additional acreage as

wilderness. This strategy worked much better for the envi-

ronmentalists than did the administrative process, where they

made little headway in persuading the agency to adopt their

vision in either RARE or RARE II.

The timber industry, in contrast, was concerned that this

initiative would result in the removal of more productive tim-

ber lands from the commercial timber base of the national

forests. Industry was wary of further diminution of the tim-

ber base (Rey n.d.). The timber industry recognized that the

national forests must support recreation wilderness and other

nonconsumptive uses. Their position was that enough land

was already preserved as wilderness, that the remaining tim-

ber should be managed as a renewable resource, and that the

timberlands in question should be made available for har-

vest. Industry wanted to prevent more timber from being re-

moved from the national forest’s available timber base to

ensure that as much timber as possible would remain avail-

able for commercial operations.

The wilderness legislation of 1984 led to additional national

forest land being removed from the full spectrum of multiple

uses. As before, grazing, mining (where already established),

water resource development (as permitted by executive or-

der), recreation, and other interventions such as the planting

of fish were allowed to continue. In the Sierra Nevada, an

additional 1.8 million acres of land in national forest were

reserved by the 1984 legislation, again mainly at high eleva-

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VOLUME II, CHAPTER 7

tion. Notwithstanding this victory, environmentalists re-

mained determined to protect other roadless areas that were

not reserved in this round of wilderness legislation. The new

wilderness areas, along with the areas reserved by the earlier

Wilderness Act of 1964, joined the national parks Yosemite,

Sequoia, and Kings Canyon as the largest areas of contiguous

forest land in the Sierra not subject to human intervention,

save those activities associated with fire suppression.

THE NATIONAL FOREST

MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976

Natural resource management policy for the national forests

of the United States has been dramatically restructured over

the last twenty years. Environmentalism, public interest liti-

gation, and internal agency and congressional initiatives to-

gether worked to force the federal government to respond to

public pressure to change traditional management practices

of the federal resource management agencies, including the

Forest Service.

Background to New Legislation

After the Monongahela decision, Congress considered sev-

eral measures to restore national forest management author-

ity. Legislative debates reflected a continuing competition in

the legislative process between two different visions of forest

management. Several bills were introduced in Congress to

counter the effects of the legal obstacle to the method of tim-

ber sale and harvesting that had been in use by the Forest

Service. S. 2926, introduced by Senator W. Jennings Randolph

of West Virginia, would have allowed timber harvesting in

the national forests only with stringent prescriptions, includ-

ing provisions that would have limited the size of clear-cuts

to a maximum of twenty-five acres and required a 200- to 300-

year “rotation,” or growth period, for all trees (U.S. Forest

Service 1976, 17). A competing bill, S. 3091, presented a man-

agement model more deferential to agency expertise. Spon-

sored by Senator Hubert Humphrey, this bill sought to restore

discretionary authority to the Forest Service to employ a broad

range of management practices. The bill directed the agency

to develop plans that would respond to the diverse condi-

tions encountered in each national forest and provide for man-

agement within certain limitations designed to protect the

environment. This bill, far more than the others, continued

reliance on agency expertise to make management decisions.

After considerable debate, this version, modified by certain

amendments, was adopted as the National Forest Manage-

ment Act.

The National Forest Management Act called for the imple-

mentation of natural resource planning that would attempt

to reconcile public demands relating to resource management

and conservation with the need for timber production and

other natural resource development. Designed to resolve con-

tinuing disputes over national forest management, the new

statute, together with other contemporaneous changes in the

legal environment, sought to increase Forest Service respon-

siveness, especially to environmentalism, but also to economic

efficiency criteria, through greater legalization of agency pro-

cedures. The law’s emphasis on planning was intended to

modify existing agency resource management policies by

developing competence in a variety of scientific disciplines.

Interdisciplinary analysis, once fully developed by the agency,

was to provide reliable scientific information to assist in reso-

lution of the controversies surrounding national forest man-

agement.

Under NFMA, “multiple use and sustained yield” of for-

est resources remained the focus of national forest manage-

ment (National Forest Management Act 1976, sec. 2952, sec.

6e1, codified at U.S. Code, vol. 16, sec. 1604e1 [1982]). The

premise of the planning process was that agency decisions

would respond to natural conditions in the forest and to de-

mands on the natural resources to produce fair and balanced

plans. The plans were to be circulated for public comment to

permit the agency to respond to public comment and to

modify its decisions. Planning contemplated a range of for-

est management activities and land uses that was substan-

tially the same as had existed prior to the Monongahela

decision. Clear-cutting and other harvesting methods that per-

mitted even-aged management were allowed if they could

be shown to be the “optimum” silvicultural method. In this

respect, the statute did not appear to represent a radical de-

parture from prior management of the national forests.

NFMA, however, did incorporate environmental protection

into multiple-use planning of public natural resources.

Also

different in NFMA were the procedures it established requir-

ing the coordination of forest planning, environmental assess-

ment, and public comment on management proposals prior

to the initiation of management actions.

Several aspects of NFMA restructured public land man-

agement to produce more balanced plans and to reduce the

likelihood of legal battles relating to management actions.

First, planning was undertaken pursuant to detailed statu-

tory instructions to ensure that adequate consideration was

given both to resource protection and to development. Sec-

ond, building on an idea of interdisciplinary expertise already

in use by the Forest Service, the statute directed the agency to

develop forest plans using an “interdisciplinary team” con-

sisting of a group of agency scientists and resource profes-

sionals with diverse scientific and professional skills. By

requiring input from new kinds of “experts,” NFMA intended

to make certain that the sustainability of forest resources was

given full consideration during agency decision making.

Third, the law expanded opportunities for public involvement

in the planning process, seeking to permit an unprecedented

level of public participation in management decisions. These

features all promoted new avenues of decision making within

155

Conservation and Controversy: National Forest Management, 1960–95

the agency and distinguished NFMA land-management plan-

ning from earlier Forest Service management. The impact of

these provisions is worth considering because they have

shaped the course of national forest management from the

enactment of NFMA to the present time.

The origins of NFMA’s administrative reforms have to do

with the administrative culture of the Forest Service itself.

The Forest Service was regarded as an example of the effort

to promote expert management in administration (Clarke and

McCool 1984, 41–44) and an able player in national politics

(Hays 1969). Despite controversies over national forest man-

agement, the agency enjoyed an excellent reputation among

politicians and social scientists as a model of effectiveness in

bureaucratic management (Clarke and McCool 1984, 41–44).

After World War II, many aspects of national forest manage-

ment became controversial. As support for Forest Service man-

agement decisions steadily eroded, these decisions were

increasingly subject to challenge. Consequently, support for

management authority itself also eroded significantly. This

legacy makes it particularly intriguing to study administra-

tive change in an agency so rich in tradition and in expertise.

Understanding how the reform affected the Forest Service re-

sponse to NFMA’s objectives also provides insights as to the

difficulties in ensuring the attainment of any complex set of

objectives through legislation and implementation.

NFMA accurately reflected wider political conflicts and

uncertainty over goals for public land use. The statute’s pro-

visions for management reform contain less than definitive

direction and emphasize planning to achieve balanced land-

management plans. The implication of this arrangement is

that controversies over national forest management that Con-

gress could not resolve would remain. Land-management

planning conducted pursuant to NFMA anticipated these

conflicts. Planning was intended not to eliminate national

forest management controversies but to provide procedures

for land and resource planning that would enable conflict reso-

lution and progress toward better management in light of

conflict. Three ideas central to administrative reform are

contained in NFMA’s direction to the Forest Service. First,

the relationship between law and administrative behavior is

specified in the statutory elaboration of the planning process.

Regulations further emphasized full assessment of the for-

ests’ capabilities for diverse uses and decision making con-

sistent with that information. The law recognized that Forest

Service administrators were charged with more than manag-

ing a planning process and that they were policy makers

whose decisions could have a significant impact on the con-

dition of the national forests. The statute gave the adminis-

trators general guidance in decision making but delegated to

agency managers discretion to reach a decision within a range

of possible outcomes that would achieve the greatest “net

public benefit” (NFMA Regulations). Of course, there were

other constraints on administrators. Land-management plan-

ning, like many other public programs, is conducted in a

highly charged political environment. The political implica-

tions of these “administrative” decisions were closely fol-

lowed by successive executive branch appointees. The Forest

Service, therefore, was expected to act with both technical

proficiency and sensitivity to public and political opinion.

The procedural reforms associated with planning and the

NEPA process forced consideration of information that pre-

viously might easily have been undervalued or ignored. Re-

sponding to land-management planning requirements for

analysis was intended to allow the agency to develop local

plans in accord with the statute’s substantive goals for re-

source development and preservation. The new procedures

led to considerable changes in agency operation.

The National Forest Management Act implicitly promoted

a second principle of administrative reform to ensure a stable

management environment that would be responsive to chang-

ing public priorities. Even at the time of its enactment, there

was considerable skepticism among scholars of public land

policy concerning the power of the new law to do so. NFMA,

in seeking to promote this goal, fought against an already

strong tide of activism. Several concerns are worth mention-

ing here. First of all, establishing a comprehensive land-use

planning system, as done under NFMA, which standardizes

analysis and planning direction of natural resources over a

very large area, represents a conceptual challenge. On top of

this ambitious goal, the expectation that this system would

retain flexibility sufficient to permit managers to respond to

varying local needs and conditions was perhaps a forlorn

hope. Early in the planning process, some doubt was ex-

pressed that any Forest Service management policy requir-

ing assent of the public could succeed, as long as those who

opposed it could find a method to block implementation of

agency plans (Behan 1981, 802, 805). This statement later

proved to be fairly prophetic.

Second, the National Forest Management Act explicitly rec-

ognized the continuing validity of multiple-use management.

The Forest Service sought to employ this philosophy to sat-

isfy the needs of timber and other commodity interests while

also attempting to satisfy environmentalist concerns. At the

same time, NFMA implicitly acknowledged that prior

multiple-use management did not sufficiently accomplish this

objective. The newly constructed procedures in national for-

est planning intended to respond to environmental constitu-

encies without sacrificing the virtues of the established

management system. To those familiar with recent public land

management in the United States, who had come to view con-

troversy as the normal condition for public land policy mak-

ing, the effort to blend these conflicting aims was a formula

that would achieve only added conflict and inefficient use of

publicly owned natural resources (O’Toole 1988; Stroup and

Baden 1983; Rosenbaum 1984). Nevertheless, the ambiguity

inherent in NFMA’s mission made land-management plan-

ning the subject of continuing scrutiny by public land schol-

ars, activists, and others.

A third idea inherent in the administrative reform of the

era focused on demands to increase representation and par-

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VOLUME II, CHAPTER 7

ticipation in government is well illustrated on NFMA’s em-

phasis on public participation in planning. Public involve-

ment was intended to reorient administrative decision making

from a strict reliance on expert management toward decision

making that resembled a political dialogue between the ad-

ministrator and the public (Reich 1985; Handler 1988;

Friedmann 1987). Efforts to draw the public into the plan-

ning process resulted from a tacit recognition that forest-plan-

ning decision making, although dependent on Forest Service

expertise, had political implications. Out of necessity, plan-

ning required agency consideration of public opinion during

all stages of the process. NFMA land-management planning

employed various types of public participation so that wher-

ever possible disagreements over administrative decisions

would be settled expeditiously. Public participation allowed

the public and interest groups to comment on agency pro-

posals. The Forest Service experimented with innovative tech-

niques, such as negotiation, that blurred distinctions between

public involvement and conflict resolution in order to resolve

specific policy disputes (Wondolleck 1988), drawing on col-

laborative approaches to settling policy questions utilized in

public land management, and in other administrative and

regulatory settings (Fiorino 1988; Sullivan 1984; Burton 1991).

NFMA: Impact of Land-Management Planning

in the Sierra Nevada

In the middle to late 1980s, the Forest Service produced land-

management plans (LMPs) calling for expanded utilization

of practices, such as even-aged management, that had already

generated considerable controversy. Armed with statutory

language that allowed what remained to be a controversial

practice, the plans clearly laid out the future of every area

within the national forest. Several important elements in the

plans in the Sierra illustrate some significant differences from

the policies previously guiding national forest management.

Forest Service land-management planning proposed to

greatly accelerate clear-cutting in many regions, including the

Sierra Nevada. Overall, this reflected an apparent emphasis

on enhanced productivity on national forest lands devoted

to timber production. This included some related silvicultural

methods, such as seed tree cutting and overstory removal. As

a result of this policy, the new plans proposed significant in-

creases in clear-cutting in the Sierra during the middle 1980s.

Data from national forest timber sales reflects this increase

(Verner et al. 1992, 240–41). The rationale for this increase was

that many forest stands were mainly composed of mature or

overmature trees, well past their peak growth period. Plan-

ning documents presented to the public suggested that as

these stands were cleared and replanted, growth would in-

crease, allowing the forest to supply more timber. Some

conversion of forest types were proposed. Mixed stands, con-

taining conifer and hardwood, were to be logged and re-

planted as conifer (generally pine) stands. This was apparently

part of an effort to improve timber yield. Similarly, other

stands, in which white fir had increased due to the effects of

earlier timber harvests and fire suppression, were to be har-

vested and replanted to resemble more closely the mix of spe-

cies that had occurred before human intervention.

Many foresters were sympathetic to the goals of the Forest

Service. Where a natural mix of species had been or was be-

ing eclipsed by the growth of white fir and the harvesting of

older stands, they regarded the initiative as an effort to re-

store the forest landscape. This group viewed the LMPs as

moving the national forests much closer to the model of a

regulated forest, an ideal of scientific forestry that allows both

greater productivity of forest lands and better modeling of

timber growth. Environmental critics of land-management

plans viewed these arguments as insufficient either to justify

the increased use of clear-cutting or to increase harvest lev-

els. Prior to the adoption of the LMPs, these practices had

already been introduced in many areas in the Sierra Nevada.

In the years immediately following the approval of the LMPs,

utilization of these practices significantly increased.

Exceptions may be seen in the way this practice was

adapted and applied to clear-cut areas around the giant se-

quoia trees located in Sequoia National Forest. Ironically, al-

though justified in part by Forest Service managers as a

method to leave the giant sequoias intact while promoting

sequoia regeneration, these timber sales were regarded by

some as proof of irresponsible stewardship in these relatively

rare areas. They became one of the single most visible aspects

of the changes actually implemented as a result of land-man-

agement planning. This controversy, one of apparent ecologi-

cal significance, sparked appeals and lawsuits and led

eventually to the mediated settlement agreement (MSA),

which is being explored in greater depth elsewhere by SNEP.

Chiefly, the changes in national forest management in the

Sierra had to do with increased intensity of management ac-

tivities, such as clear-cutting, rather than the wholesale adop-

tion of new forest practices. However, when the scope and

intensity of these actions were laid out in the plans, it became

clear that the character of many areas would change drasti-

cally under the hand of management. Predictably, some of

the same individuals and organizations that the Forest Ser-

vice faced in earlier struggles over clear-cutting and wilder-

ness resurfaced to battle the Forest Service again.

OTHER NEW STATUTES AND

THEIR IMPLICATIONS

During this period, several other newly enacted statutes also

significantly modified the Forest Service prerogatives. Al-

though the implications of these laws in the national forests

of the Sierra Nevada will not be examined here in any depth,

it is important to understand that these laws dramatically al-

tered federal prerogatives with respect to natural resource

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Conservation and Controversy: National Forest Management, 1960–95

planning and management. The Federal Land Policy and

Management Act, as amended (U.S. Code, vol. 43, secs. 1701–

84 [1976]) (FLPMA), directed the Bureau of Land Manage-

ment (BLM) to undertake comprehensive land and resource

planning for the public lands similar in scope to what NFMA

required for the national forests. At the same time FLPMA

revised and modified authorities related to the entire Forest

Service lands program, altering management of rights of way,

acquisition, small tracts of noncontiguous land, etc. The law

also revised the administration of the minerals programs of

the Forest Service and BLM.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (U.S. Code, vol.

33, sec. 1251 et seq. [Clean Water Act]) and the Clean Air Act

transferred to the states the authority to regulate practices on

federal lands, provided the state had obtained approval for

its own program to enforce these laws. For the first time, air-

and water-quality standards, as well as the authority to issue

permits for a range of regulated activities, applied to federal

lands, limiting federal prerogatives on public land. Forest

Service discretionary authority in planning is also subject to

the operation of other laws with which public forest manage-

ment must also comply. The Clean Water Act requires that

the activities likely to affect the quality of certain water sys-

tems must be conducted under approved procedures, or “best

management practices.” The Forest Service’s interpretation

of its responsibility in California under this law was chal-

lenged in court, resulting in the modification of certain man-

agement actions (Northwest Cemetery Protective Association v

Peterson [764 F2d 581 (9th Cir 1985)]).

The Federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (U.S. Code, vol. 16,

secs. 1271–87) is another statute with specific mandates

and established standards that the Forest Service was required

to take into account in the preparation of its land-manage-

ment plans.

CONSERVATION OF THE

CALIFORNIA SPOTTED OWL

Reshaping Resource Planning and

Management in the Sierra Nevada

The present legal environment for resource management in

the national forests is principally comprised of three statutes,

NFMA (1976), NEPA (1969), and the Endangered Species Act

(1989) (ESA). The legal requirements for protection for plant

and animal species contained within these laws is significant

enough to have played an important role in the evolution of

federal and state resource management. More precisely, it is

clear that procedural requirements for national forest plan-

ning have substantive effects. Legal protections for sensitive

species contained within these laws, and their regulatory

progeny, operate to modify any Forest Service land-manage-

ment plan that fails to take account of the needs of the species

or to provide for its habitat requirements. Scientific analysis

intended to help administrators make decisions consistent

with the law may effectively dictate policy choices that have

profound effects for forest management.

The California spotted owl (Strix occidentalis occidentalis),

one of three subspecies of spotted owls, is related to the north-

ern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) and the Mexican

spotted owl (Strix occidentalis lucida) (American Ornitholo-

gists’ Union 1983). The California spotted owl’s range extends

from the Pit River (at the northern end of the Sierra Nevada)

southerly through the Sierra Nevada, along the central Coast

Range south of the Golden Gate, and throughout the forested

areas of southern California, including the higher montane

regions. The majority of California spotted owl habitat in the

Sierra Nevada is within national forests, entirely within the

Pacific Southwest Region (Region 5) of the Forest Service (the

range of the northern spotted owl lies mostly in the Cascade

Mountain system and includes part of both the Pacific North-

west Region and the Pacific Southwest Region of the Forest

Service). In the late 1980s, Forest Service management prac-

tices for both the northern and California spotted owls sought

to preserve small areas of owl habitat, known as Spotted Owl

Habitat Areas (SOHAs). The SOHA strategy permitted par-

tial timber harvesting in parts of SOHAs not immediately

adjacent to nest trees. Lands outside of SOHAs also were uti-

lized for nesting, roosting, and foraging by the owls, but the

SOHA policy did not affect timber harvests on the remainder

of forest lands. A more complete explanation of the SOHA

strategy can be found in U.S. Forest Service 1993a, III-1-2.

Research conducted on the northern spotted owl raised the

possibility that the SOHA strategy did not sufficiently pro-

tect owl habitat and that the continued use of clear-cutting

was detrimental to the spotted owl. As the Interagency Sci-

entific Committee study on the northern spotted owl was

nearing completion in 1989, research indicated that the exist-

ing management strategy would not sufficiently ensure the

survival of the northern spotted owl and that its continued

use would lead to further decline in northern spotted owl

numbers (Thomas et al. 1990, 427). The Fish and Wildlife Ser-

vice (FWS) listed the northern spotted owl as a “threatened”

species under the ESA in June 1990. The Mexican spotted owl

was also listed under the ESA (Federal Register 58, no. 49 [16

March 1993]: 14248–71). The research suggested that the

SOHA policy and subsequent administrative actions em-

ployed to protect the habitat of the California subspecies also

were inadequate and were as vulnerable to legal challenge

as those employed for the conservation of the northern spot-

ted owl.

The Forest Service had already designated the California

spotted owl as a “sensitive species.” This required an inter-

nal evaluation of any plans or projects to determine their ef-

fects on the spotted owl. Yet there were few demographic or

ecological studies specific to the California subspecies. Ac-

cordingly, the lack of biological information made it difficult

to justify any change in management guidelines or to offer

158

VOLUME II, CHAPTER 7

guidance as to what type of habitat management should be

adopted. This uncertainty caused some concern among re-

source managers and the public. NFMA and its regulations

require that the Forest Service maintain viable populations of

native and select non-native wildlife species (Code of Federal

Regulations, vol. 36, sec. 219.19 [1988]). The Forest Service in-

stituted a new policy, known as cumulative effects analysis

(CEA), to supplement the SOHA strategy. CEA called for spe-

cific consideration as to how individual projects would affect

owl habitat in relation to habitat conservation measures gen-

erally required for known or probable owl sites for pairs or

resident single owls (Verner et al. 1992). Environmental groups

continued to express concerns about the adequacy of the con-

servation measures and challenged Forest Service decisions

to continue using the SOHA strategy for management of owl

habitats. Eventually, environmental groups filed a number of

administrative appeals challenging a number of timber sales

in the region (e.g., “Appeal of the Tahoe National Forest Land

Management Plan,” Natural Resources Defense Council, 15

March 1991).

The decision of the Forest Service was to attempt to resolve

the controversy by pursuing a remedy without waiting for

the results of the administrative and legal process. This de-

velopment may be regarded as the clearest signal that the land-

management plans were not going to be fully implemented.

The new policy precluded any large-scale use of clear-cut-

ting or other methods intended to achieve even-aged man-

agement strategies for the Sierra. The law’s mandates,

especially the element of the regulations requiring the Forest

Service to ensure that its plans would provide a “minimum

viable population” of forest species, ultimately worked to

ensure that NFMA’s implementation did not lead to the

wholesale changes in the forest that the Forest Service had

proposed.

Developing a New Management Strategy

In June 1991, in response to growing public concern about

the status of the California spotted owl, state and federal agen-

cies convened the “California Spotted Owl Assessment and

Planning Team (‘Steering Committee’).” The goal of this group

was to assess the status of the owl and explore alternative

management strategies that would conserve the subspecies

and its habitat. The steering committee, co-chaired by Ron

Stewart, then regional forester for the Pacific Southwest Re-

gion, and Douglas Wheeler, secretary of the Resources Agency

of California, included representatives from the Resources

Agency, the Forest Service, the California Department of For-

estry and Fire Protection (CDF), the National Park Service

(NPS), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the Bureau of Land

Management (BLM), the Board of Forestry (BOF), and the

Department of Fish and Game (DFG). Observers from county

government, and nongovernmental observers from environ-

mental groups, timber and forest products industries, and sev-

eral other organizations were also invited to attend. Agency

representatives agreed to plan the implementation of conser-

vation measures, especially those required if the subspecies

were to be listed under the ESA. The charter for this project

directed federal and state natural resource agencies to

work cooperatively . . . to assess local research, inven-

tory and monitoring information for the . . . spotted owl

[and that as] more information becomes available . . .

agencies will continue to work cooperatively to incor-

porate other species and habitat needs into a long-term

ecosystem planning strategy for the Sierra and South-

ern California ecosystems (“California Spotted Owl As-

sessment and Planning Team,” ms., 14 May 1991).

The steering committee immediately created two teams, a

“technical team” to provide expertise in avian biology and

ecology and a “policy implementation planning (PIP) team”

to provide policy and economic analysis. The project was to

produce several results:

• a review by the technical team of the status of the Califor-

nia spotted owl, to be published as a technical report

• recommendations by the technical team for a management

strategy to maintain viable populations of the owl, includ-

ing an assessment of alternative measures considered

• analysis by the PIP team of socioeconomic effects resulting

from the implementation of the management recommen-

dations of the technical team, including an “evaluation of

alternative institutional strategies” and regulatory appli-

cations to be considered for adoption by state and federal

agencies

The technical team evaluated several alternative manage-

ment strategies for the owl. The team analyzed the status of

the owl and offered a set of recommendations, known as the

“CASPO report,” to the steering committee in May 1992. Fol-

lowing a period of review and comment, the report, “The

California Spotted Owl: A Technical Assessment of Its Cur-

rent Status,” was published in late 1992 (Verner et al. 1992). A

review of the impacts of this policy may be found in Ruth

and Standiford (1994). The scientific analysis suggested that

existing policy measures used to protect the spotted owl and

its habitat were inadequate. The technical team investigated

the loss of suitable habitat in the Sierra Nevada. The team

noted that suitable owl habitat probably was once more ex-

tensive and concluded that habitat loss has been caused by

even-aged silvicultural practices and catastrophic fire. Their

research attributed further diminution in habitat to the ac-

tivities of miners and sheepherders in the nineteenth century

(Verner et al. 1992, 10–11, 225, 232–33, 240–41, 248–53). The

team noted that in the present era current land-management

policy called for increased clear-cutting and other forms of

regeneration harvests. The emphasis within the plans on har-

vesting large-diameter trees was also viewed as detrimental

159

Conservation and Controversy: National Forest Management, 1960–95

by the technical team (J. K. Verner, project leader, Wildlife

Monitoring and Range Research, USFS, Pacific Southwest

Research Station, personal conversation with the author, July

22, 1993). These harvests removed forest structures upon

which the owl was dependent. Under the LMPs for the Sierra

Nevada national forests, the technical team estimated that the

amount of suitable habitat would further decline at a rate of

229,000 acres per decade (Verner et al. 1992, 11 and chap. 13).

The team also emphasized that suppression of fire had accel-

erated the accumulation of fuels and significantly increased

the likelihood of fires that would destroy timber stands, in-

cluding those essential to the spotted owl. The technical team

concluded that these management actions had detrimental

effects on spotted owl habitat and proposed an interim strat-

egy of thinning and fuel management to begin to address these

problems (Verner et al. 1992, chap. 1).

CURRENT POLICY FOR THE

NATIONAL FORESTS IN THE

SIERRA NEVADA

To adopt the CASPO recommendations as management policy,

the agency complied with planning and public participation

requirements of NFMA (1976) and NEPA that must be com-

pleted prior to making changes in management direction.

Pursuant to NEPA, the Forest Service prepared the “Califor-

nia Spotted Owl Sierran Province Interim Guidelines Envi-

ronmental Assessment” (EA) (U.S. Forest Service 1993a,

III-1-2). The EA incorporated substantially all of the CASPO

management recommendations into an interim management

plan for the Sierra Nevada national forests. The regional

forester’s decision amended the regional guidelines for land

management in the seven Sierra Nevada national forests. This

procedure satisfied the requirements of NEPA, as these

amendments were judged to be nonsignificant actions (U.S.

Forest Service 1993b, DN-13-15) (Cal. Owl NOI). On January

13, 1993, the regional forester formally adopted the plan as

management direction for these national forests.

This decision was not immediately accepted by the entire

steering committee. A number of administrative appeals filed

by timber interests, and others brought by affected counties,

challenged the adequacy of the EA. In addition, members of

the steering committee representing state and federal agen-

cies alleged that the Forest Service decision to change policy

abrogated the interagency agreement and departed from the

exercise of shared authority they believed to be implicit in

the owl assessment process. The Forest Service argued that

there was no breach of this agreement, maintaining that it

was clear that the long-term survival of the population of the

owl could not be assured if existing policy permitting exten-

sive clear-cutting and other forms of regeneration harvests

remained in force. The Forest Service noted that the data sub-

mitted in the technical team’s report left no choice: The agency

was legally required to revise its management policy. The

agency maintained that the steering committee’s involvement

in the development of policy pertaining to national forests

was strictly advisory. At the same time, the agency agreed to

remain part of the interagency process as it continued the

preparation of the EIS.

Members of the steering committee representing the state

of California found themselves in an awkward position. They

fully understood and accepted the Forest Service’s desire to

avoid a legal challenge to its management policies. Never-

theless, state support for the California Spotted Owl Assess-

ment had always been conditioned on the principle that in

this process, the federal government had an obligation to con-

sider the implications of conservation planning and manage-

ment for national forest lands on the larger region in which

they were situated. Ten years earlier, similar concerns moti-

vated the state to comment on Forest Service plans, suggest-

ing that the land-management plans needed to more fully

consider regional effects and a more cooperative regional

approach to planning. For their part, state officials had recog-

nized the dramatic changes in theories pertaining to natural

resource conservation and management. Evidence of the

state’s support for a more ecologically integrated, regional

approach to management is reflected in the state’s strong sup-

port in the drafting, adoption, and implementation of the

“Memorandum of Understanding on Biological Diversity”

(The Resources Agency 1992). Accordingly, state officials

sought to better integrate measures to conserve habitats for

multiple species while maintaining the viability of local

economies into Forest Service planning and decision making.

Although the state’s views of how these goals should be ac-

complished have provoked criticism, from both environmen-

tal groups and commodity groups, the state continues to

articulate these same concerns. It may be argued that the For-

est Service’s failure to pay heed to state concerns regarding

the land-management planning process of the prior decade

led to increased state support for initiatives to focus more lo-

cal and regional attention on Forest Service planning. These

initiatives include the California Spotted Owl Assessment, the

Council on Biological Diversity, Sierra Nevada Research Plan-

ning (SNRP), and the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project itself.

At the present time, early in 1996, the Forest Service con-

tinues to revise the “Draft EIS: Managing California Spotted

Owl Habitat in the Sierra Nevada National Forests of Califor-

nia” (U.S. Forest Service 1995) (DEIS). The DEIS will more

fully address conservation planning for the broader suite of

species living in the Sierra Nevada (Cal. Owl NOI), eventu-

ally permitting the Forest Service to revise its management

policies. Currently, forest management activities in the na-

tional forests of the Sierra must continue to conform to the

CASPO policies as articulated in the Cal. Owl NOI. These are

subject to change upon adoption of the final EIS.

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VOLUME II, CHAPTER 7

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

Until quite recently, environmental and natural resource–

related policies operated without explicitly considering the

ecosystem as a point of reference for policy formation, imple-

mentation, or evaluation. It is certainly true that some poli-

cies implemented in the Sierra Nevada by the Forest Service

have had profound effects upon the landscape and, most prob-

ably, the state of Sierran ecosystems. As mentioned above,

other policies—some of them largely or entirely unrelated to

natural resources—have also had significant impacts on the

ecosystems of the Sierra Nevada. The point of this retrospec-

tive policy analysis is not solely to establish that certain pub-

lic policies positively or negatively affected ecosystems in the

Sierra Nevada. Nor is it just an opportunity to call attention

to those policies that the SNEP Science Team believes should

be favored or avoided in the future. This retrospective, and

indeed, the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project itself, provides

a larger opportunity to review the operation of environmen-

tal and natural resource–related policies and should help to

reflect on the complexity of the institutional setting surround-

ing the implementation of these policies. This approach will

materially assist the SNEP Science Team, public officials, and

the public in understanding and evaluating existing and pro-

posed policies.

SUMMING UP NFMA’S

IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS

IMPACT: SUBSTANTIAL OR

UNDERWHELMING?

Implementation of bold land-management initiatives pro-

posed by the Forest Service, such as even-aged management,

upon a landscape where almost any large-scale activity ap-

parently has the potential to cause substantial environmental

impacts, was unsuccessful. Examination of Forest Service

policy, of the operation of NFMA, and of recent extraordi-

nary efforts to resolve continuing controversies over natural

resource management demonstrates that much of the oppo-

sition to Forest Service plans has been due to the inability of

the agency to satisfy the ecological protection provisions of

federal law and policy. Despite the mandate of national for-

est management policies to implement an ecological approach

to natural resource planning, conservation, and management,

the Forest Service has generally not been able to do so. Until

comparatively recently, most successful agency policy initia-

tives tended to be responses to single-purpose functional de-

mands, such as timber, range, or recreation. Implementation

of NFMA, despite explicit requirements for the protection of

ecosystem attributes and functions, has had only limited suc-

cess in incorporating an ecological approach into its general

land and resource planning. Forest Service efforts to comply

with these requirements continue to face political and bud-

getary directives that complicate resource management. Con-

flicting directions often appear to be supported by elements

within NFMA itself.

Political and social activism related to dissatisfaction with

national forest management activities remains another impor-

tant force, leading to political challenges and to heightened

legal scrutiny of Forest Service decisions. In many instances,

activists are able to draw on elements of NFMA that tend to

support a particular position. The agency, in contrast, gener-

ally must try to balance the operation of a particular provi-

sion with that of other goals within NFMA. In many instances

it has done so only to find that a decision will not meet with

legal or regulatory approval. Scientific and technical knowl-

edge are essential components of decision making, but this

expertise has not solved the riddle of how to meet either the

demands of NFMA’s several conflicting forest management

goals or the conflicting demands of the public. Satisfying these

objectives, especially habitat conservation and commodities

production, has forced the Forest Service to promulgate poli-

cies that are effectively compromises intended to arrive at a

decision that reconciles several conflicting objectives. Forest

Service actions continue to face certain scrutiny, which quickly

translates into opposition if the agency displays a lack of at-

tention to legal or administrative mandates pertaining to en-

vironmental protection. The outcome—unintended by the

Forest Service—is that implementation of plans and manage-

ment activities poised to have a substantial impact on the eco-

system were prevented from being fully implemented.

The intense public attention focused on NFMA has been

an understandable source of frustration to many Forest Ser-

vice managers. Public involvement in resource planning trans-

lated into administrative and legal mechanisms to influence

national forest planning, however, represents a self-correct-

ing mechanism for policies that do not comply with the in-

tent of the law and its attendant regulations. Imperfect and

unsatisfactory as it may appear, the ongoing Forest Service’s

effort to conserve the California spotted owl is an example of

the process at work. Simultaneously, however, experience

during the recent decades with the transient nature of Forest

Service policies strongly suggests that policies established to

provide for management of the Sierran national forests have

not yet successfully ensured long-term sustainability for the

natural resources and ecosystems. Irrespective of an ongoing

search for solutions, the Forest Service has been unable to

implement either broad policies or land-management plans

that survive longer than a few years (Yaffee 1994; Ruth 1990).

No proposal for managing the national forests of the Sierra

Nevada thus far has elucidated a strategy that will demon-

strably satisfy the ecological, socioeconomic, legal, and po-

litical criteria by which these policies are judged. Producing

land-management plans that respond to current national for-

est management priorities in the Sierra Nevada—providing

for habitat and species conservation while promoting fuel

161

Conservation and Controversy: National Forest Management, 1960–95

management and commodities production—continues to be

a difficult technical problem. Achieving solutions, of course,

is complicated by various conflicting views among key pub-

lic actors, both individuals and groups, as to what methods

will best accomplish particular goals. Recognition of the dif-

ficulty in integrating ecological, technical, and social concerns

into a successful management plan is part of the motivation

for the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project. Public concerns re-

garding the management and conservation of national forest

ecosystems will not be resolved by the SNEP Science Team or

by direct application of its final report. The fruits of the project,

the scientific assessment and the scenarios developed by the

Science Team, however, should provide a useful step in the

search for solutions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the staff

of the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project (SNEP), members of

the SNEP Science Team, and many other individuals con-

nected with this endeavor. In particular, Professor Harrison

Dunning, organizer of the SNEP Policy Retrospective, held

on May 17, 1995, deserves special thanks and recognition. All

those who reviewed and commented on an earlier version of

this chapter provided invaluable and constructive criticism.

NOTES

1. As early as 1929, at the instigation of foresters within the agency,

areas in the national forests had already been removed from har-

vesting and other management activities. This practice originated

with the “L-20” regulation in 1929, which allowed the Forest Ser-

vice to protect certain “primitive areas.” This authority was ex-

panded and more precisely defined in 1939 with the “U”

regulations. Over the objections of commodity users, additional

land was removed at this time. Three different types of designa-

tions were established. Regulation U-1 defined “wilderness” as

unroaded, undeveloped tracts 100,000 acres or more. These ar-

eas were to be designated by the secretary of agriculture. Areas

that had similar characteristics but were smaller in size could be

set aside as “wild” areas by the chief forester. A third category

allowed tracts of 100,000 acres or more to be designated by the

chief forester as roadless areas to be managed for recreation “sub-

stantially in their natural condition.” See Dana and Fairfax (1980,

157–58).

2. Senator Humphrey’s original bill was amended to provide legis-

lative assurances to conservation interests that required the For-

est Service to eschew certain extractive resource policies. One

provision required the use of a sustained yield forestry practice

known as “nondeclining even flow.” This provision mandated

that timber sales from each forest were to be “equal to or less

than a quantity which can be removed from such forest on a sus-

tained yield basis: Provided, That, in order to meet overall mul-

tiple use objectives, the Secretary may establish an allowable sale

quantity for any decade which departs from the projected

long-term average sale quantity that would otherwise be estab-

lished. . . . [S]uch planned departures must be consistent with

the multiple-use management objectives of the land management

plan” (sec. 11). Although this practice had already been adopted

by the Forest Service in 1973 (see earlier discussion), the amend-

ment committed the agency to plan timber harvest levels on each

forest at a rate that was sustainable indefinitely.

The timber industry and many economists opposed this pro-

vision. In their view, nondeclining even flow was too restrictive

because it prevented major variations in the allowable cut on a

national forest that could increase economic returns while still

meeting sustained timber yield goals. To accommodate this ob-

jection, the final version of the bill allowed for exceptions from

the “non-declining even flow” policy in order to achieve mul-

tiple-use goals. This arrangement was emblematic of the design

for national forest planning. This compromise enabled Congress

to delegate discretionary authority to the Forest Service to oper-

ate within certain limits. This also allowed Congress to defer re-

sponsibility to the Forest Service for many controversial decisions

regarding the determination of management priorities, land al-

locations, and levels of commodity development and other re-

source uses.

3. As a precursor to new national forest planning, NFMA contained

several provisions intended to remove the threat of delays re-

sulting from legal challenges to new planning. The statute pro-

vided that existing plans for an area would remain in force until

a new land-management plan was adopted. Primarily, this meant

the unit plans and timber management plans and other special

use plans developed under the auspices of the Multiple Use–

Sustained Yield Act of 1960. This allowed the Forest Service to

continue to manage the national forests as it had before the Na-

tional Forest Management Act, pending the completion of the

new plans. Notwithstanding the decision in the Monongahela

case, this provision tacitly permitted the use of clear-cutting on

the forests, pending the release and final approval of the National

Forest Management Act plans, including the period during which

a new plan might be appealed. In order to remove any further

doubt as to whether clear-cutting was permitted, section 11 of

the statute explicitly repealed the language of the 1897 Organic

Act, which had stipulated that trees could not be harvested un-

less the trees were “mature” and individually “designated” and

“marked.”

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