The Prohibition Against Recovering Attorney Fees in Mortgage Foreclosure: Itâ•Žs Time for Delinquent Debtors to Pay the Piper in North Dakota

58:/(15:((=",<0,=58:/(15:((=",<0,=

&52;3,

;3),8

%" &#$

  " $ '" 

8:0*2,



$/,!85/0)0:054.(049:",*5<,804.::584,>,,90458:.(.,$/,!85/0)0:054.(049:",*5<,804.::584,>,,90458:.(.,

58,*259;8,:@9$03,-58,2047;,4:,):589:5!(>:/,!06,80458,*259;8,:@9$03,-58,2047;,4:,):589:5!(>:/,!06,804

58:/(15:(58:/(15:(

#:,6/,4(8954

5=+5,9(**,99:5:/09=581),4,A:>5;,:;9145=

5225=:/09(4+(++0:054(2=5819(:/::69*533549;4+,+;4+28

!(8:5-:/,(=533549

",*533,4+,+0:(:054",*533,4+,+0:(:054

(8954#:,6/,4$/,!85/0)0:054.(049:",*5<,804.::584,>,,90458:.(.,58,*259;8,:@9

$03,-58,2047;,4:,):589:5!(>:/,!06,80458:/(15:(

58:/(15:((=",<0,=

&525

8:0*2,

<(02()2,(:/::69*533549;4+,+;4+28<52099

$/095:,09)85;./::5>5;-58-8,,(4+56,4(**,99)>:/,#*/5525-(=(:%#*/52(82>533549:/(9),,4

(**,6:,+-5804*2;90540458:/(15:((=",<0,=)>(4(;:/580?,+,+0:585-%#*/52(82>53354958358,

04-583(:05462,(9,*54:(*:;4+*53354920)8(8>;4+,+;

THE PROHIBITION AGAINST RECOVERING ATTORNEY

FEES IN MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: IT’S TIME FOR

DELINQUENT DEBTORS TO PAY THE PIPER

IN NORTH DAKOTA

ABSTRACT

Shortly before North Dakota entered into statehood, the Legislature for

the Dakota Territory adopted a statutory prohibition against the collection

of attorney fees in certain debt instruments. This statutory prohibition was

carried over into North Dakota law and has remained materially unchanged

for well over 100 years. In its current form, North Dakota Century Code

section 28-26-04 places a categorical prohibition against any provision in

certain debt instruments for the collection of attorney fees in the event of

default. Included among these debt instruments are mortgages. Accord-

ingly, North Dakota law prohibits the collection of attorney fees in

mortgage foreclosure. This statutory prohibition in conjunction with North

Dakota’s only available method of foreclosure—judicial foreclosure—and

anti-deficiency statutes for certain residential mortgage foreclosure has

created a harsh economic reality for lenders. As a result, the lender and

both its current and potential customers are adversely impacted by higher

costs and a change in lending standards.

North Dakota remains one of the only states in the union to both

prohibit the collection of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure and not

allow the less expensive and faster method of foreclosure—nonjudicial

foreclosure. In order to remedy this disparity between lenders and

delinquent debtors, North Dakota should reform its foreclosure laws by

authorizing nonjudicial foreclosure, allowing the collection of reasonable

attorney fees in judicial foreclosure, and statutorily limiting the collection

of attorney fees in nonjudicial foreclosure.

256 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255

I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 256

II. BACKGROUND OF NORTH DAKOTA

CENTURY CODE SECTION 28-26-04 .................................... 257

A. HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA

CENTURY CODE SECTION 28-26-04 ..................................... 258

B. RATIONALE BEHIND NORTH DAKOTA

CENTURY CODE SECTION 28-26-04 ..................................... 259

III. THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS ............................................. 260

A. JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ...................................................... 261

B. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ............................................... 262

IV. DIRECT AND INCIDENTAL FORECLOSURE COSTS ......... 263

V. THE IMPACT OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE

SECTION 28-26-04 ON THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

PROCESS IN NORTH DAKOTA.............................................. 265

VI. OVERVIEW OF THE RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN

RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE IN NORTH DAKOTA,

MINNESOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA, AND MONTANA ............ 267

A. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN SOUTH DAKOTA ........... 268

B. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN MONTANA .................... 269

C. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN MINNESOTA .................. 270

VII. PROPOSAL TO REFORM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

LAWS IN NORTH DAKOTA.................................................... 271

I. INTRODUCTION

Across the United States, one in every 501 homes entered into

foreclosure in December of 2010.

During this same time period, the rate of

homes entering into foreclosure in North Dakota was only one in 10,805.

Despite enjoying one of the lowest foreclosure rates in the country, North

Dakota remains one of the only states in the union that still prohibits

stipulations in certain debt instruments providing for the collection of

1. See Seth Fiegerman, Why the Midwest Fared Best in the Recession, MAINSTREET.COM

(Jan. 17, 2011), http://www mainstreet.com/article/moneyinvesting/news/why-the-midwest-fared-

best-in-the-recession.

2. Id.

2011] NOTE 257

attorney fees, including home mortgages.

The prohibition applies even in

situations where specific provisions for such costs were previously contem-

plated by the mortgagor and mortgagee.

The rationale for the preclusion of

such stipulations is that such agreements are “against public policy and

void.”

This note argues the rationale behind North Dakota Century Code

section 28-26-04 is outdated, archaic, and no longer accurately reflects the

public policy of North Dakota. Part II summarily describes the history of

the statutory prohibition and its underlying rationale. Part III will provide a

brief overview of the foreclosure process. Part IV assesses the direct and

incidental costs of foreclosure. Part V describes the limited impact North

Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04 has had on North Dakota case law.

Part VI discusses how North Dakota’s neighboring states approach the

recovery of attorney’s fees in foreclosure actions. Finally, Part VII con-

cludes that the North Dakota Legislature should reform North Dakota’s

mortgage foreclosure law in order to equitably protect both mortgagors and

mortgagees in the foreclosure process.

II. BACKGROUND OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE

SECTION 28-26-04

Generally speaking, each party to a civil lawsuit is responsible for

paying its own attorney fees.

This principle is known as the “American

rule.”

By requiring each party to bear its costs individually in a lawsuit,

the “American rule” seeks to “avoid stifling legitimate litigation by the

threat of the specter of burdensome expenses being imposed on an unsuc-

cessful party.”

In other words, the rule discourages parties from pursuing

“unnecessary litigation and abuse of the legal system.”

It also attempts to

make certain that court proceedings are focused on the actual damages at

issue because legal costs are only incidental to the matter.

3. Kenneth J. Warren, Recovering Attorney Fees in Ohio: When Do We Reach the Twentieth

Century, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1233 (1989).

4. Commercial Bank of Mott v. Stewart, 429 N.W.2d 402, 403 (N.D. 1988) (noting that

attorney fees can be awarded if agreed to but are limited by North Dakota Century Code section

28-26-04).

5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04 (2010).

6. In re Pederson Trust, 2008 ND 210, ¶ 22, 757 N.W.2d 740, 746.

7. Danzl v. Heidinger, 2004 ND 74, ¶ 6, 677 N.W.2d 924, 926.

8. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 55 (2010).

9. MATT GEHRING, MINN. HOUSE RESEARCH DEP’T, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN

MINNESOTA STATUTES 1 (2008), available at http://www house.leg.state mn.us/hrd/pubs/

attyfee.pdf.

10. Id.

258 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255

However, there are two exceptions to the “American rule.”

Either a

statute must authorize the collection of attorney fees, or the recovery of

attorney fees must be specifically authorized by a contractual provision.

In North Dakota, neither exception exists. There is no statutory authority

providing for the collection of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure

actions. In fact, not only does North Dakota not statutorily authorize the

collection of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure actions, but it expressly

prohibits the collection of such fees even if the parties have agreed to

include the recovery of such fees in the event of default.

North Dakota

Century Code section 28-26-04 states

any provision contained in any note, bond, mortgage, security

agreement, or other evidence of debt for the payment of an

attorney’s fee in case of default in payment or in proceedings had

to collect such note, bond, or evidence of debt, or to foreclose such

mortgage or security agreement, it is against public policy and

void.

Broadly understood, the statute places a categorical prohibition against

the collection of attorney fees in most debt instruments. Accordingly, the

general rule relating to mortgage foreclosure in North Dakota is that, in the

absence of any statutory liability, attorney fees incurred by a party in

litigation are not recoverable as an item of damages.

A. HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 28-26-04

On March 9, 1889, the Dakota Territory adopted a statute,

which

provided the basis for North Dakota’s current statutory prohibition

against

the collection of attorney fees in most debt instruments. Around that same

time, the United States Congress passed the Enabling Act of 1889, which

authorized certain states to form their own state governments.

The

Enabling Act further provided for division of the Dakota Territory into

11. Strand v. Cass Cnty., 2008 ND 149, ¶ 9, 753 N.W.2d 872, 875 (“Generally, under North

Dakota law, each party to a lawsuit bears its own attorney's fees absent statutory or contractual

authority.”).

12. Id.

13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04 (2010).

14. Id.

15. Act of Mar. 7, 1889, ch. 16, § 1, 1889 N.D. Laws 31 (“That any provision contained in

any note, bond, mortgage or other evidence of debt for the payment of an attorney fee in case of

default in payment or of proceedings had to collect such note, bond or evidence of debt or to

foreclose such mortgage is hereby declared to be against public policy and void.”).

16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04.

17. Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, § 1, 25 Stat. 676 (1889).

2011] NOTE 259

North Dakota and South Dakota.

Following the ratification of their

respective state constitutions and the election of state officers in October of

1889, North Dakota and South Dakota were officially recognized as states

in November of that year.

Both states carried over the laws of the Dakota

Territory and began the process of adapting those laws into their consti-

tutions and statutory systems.

One such law was the original version of North Dakota Century Code

section 28-26-04, which has remained largely unchanged. In fact, the only

material change came in 1965 when the North Dakota Legislature amended

the statute to include security agreements as another type of debt instrument

that is precluded from enforcing provisions for the collection of attorney

fees in the event of default.

Besides adding security agreements to the list

of debt instruments, no other material statutory changes have occurred. In

fact, a careful reading of the original and current statutes side-by-side shows

almost no differences.

B. RATIONALE BEHIND NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE

SECTION 28-26-04

The general rule in American jurisprudence is “that courts will not

enforce illegal contracts.”

Historically, contracts that violated public

policy were deemed illegal.

Naturally, the question arises as to why some

contracts violate public policy while others do not. The basic under-

standing in the late nineteenth century was that if a contract “conflicts with

the morals of the time, and contravenes any established interest of society,

it is void, as being against public policy.”

Today, commentators have

acknowledged the difficulty of defining just exactly what public policy

means in context of illegal contracts but generally understand it to mean

“no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the

public good.”

Based on those two understandings, the “interest of the

public good” appears to be the primary standard for assessing the voida-

bility of contracts on public policy grounds.

18. Enabling Act § 2.

19. CLEMENT A. LOUNSBERRY, EARLY HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA: ESSENTIAL

OUTLINES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 415 (1919).

20. Id. at 449-50.

21. 1965 N.D. Laws 296.

22. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 280 (1999).

23. WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 674 (5th ed. 1874).

24. Id.

25. 17A C.J.S., supra note 22, § 215.

260 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255

The mere existence of North Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04

raises two interesting and important questions relating to the evolution of

public policy. First, when the statute in its original form was adopted, why

was the collection of attorney fees in debt instruments against public

policy? Second, and more importantly, does the statute, in its current form,

violate the public policy concerns of today?

Because no direct authority exists

regarding the underlying public

policy concerns for the statutory prohibition against the collection of

attorney fees in debt instruments when first adopted by the Territorial

Legislature, one can only speculate as to the driving force behind the enact-

ment of the statute. However, the answer to the second question is less

tenuous because we, as a society, say what the public policy concerns are

for the day. When considering whether or not section 28-26-04 violates

public policy today, one can arrive at one of two conclusions. Either the

collection of attorney fees has the tendency to be injurious to the public

good, or section 28-26-04 is based on archaic ideals and no longer reflects

the present public policy concerns of North Dakota. If the public policy of

every other state in the union can be used as a litmus test for determining

the public policy of North Dakota, the latter answer is likely more accurate.

III. THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS

A “mortgage is the most common real estate security” used for

obtaining and financing real estate.

The underlying purpose of fore-

closure is to have the mortgaged property applied to a mortgagor’s debt

with the hopes of satisfying that debt, or at least a substantial portion

thereof.

Foreclosure is generally only limited by the rules of equity in that

when there is default on a debt secured by a mortgage, the mortgagee

should be made whole.

However, it is also understood under the rules of

equity that the mortgagee should not be made better off than if the agree-

ment had been fully performed.

In a conventional residential mortgage foreclosure, the process of fore-

closure is governed by the type of foreclosure being employed and on the

state law governing that foreclosure. In a typical residential mortgage, two

26. There are no extant legislative history records from the Territorial Legislature.

27. 1 WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 8:3 (2002).

28. 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 573 (2010).

29. Id.

30. Id.

2011] NOTE 261

primary parties are present: the mortgagor and the mortgagee.

The

mortgagor is often an individual seeking to purchase property, and a

mortgage is often the necessary security device used when the individual

needs to borrow funds from a lender in order to make the purchase.

The

individual, or mortgagor, then enters into a mortgage agreement with the

mortgagee, most often a lender.

The mortgage agreement functions as the legal basis of security for the

mortgagee. By entering into such an agreement, the mortgagee gains a

legal interest in the purchased property for the sole purpose of protecting its

investment.

Said another way, the mortgage functions as a consensual

lien on the property in favor of the mortgagee. If the mortgagor defaults on

the mortgage agreement, the mortgagee has the right to claim title of the

property and sell it to satisfy the mortgagor’s remaining debt on the

property.

This process is referred to as foreclosure. In most states, there

exist two types of foreclosures: judicial foreclosure and nonjudicial

foreclosure.

A. JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE

Judicial foreclosure is a type of foreclosure supervised by the courts

and sometimes involves the intervention of the court, hence the name

“judicial” foreclosure. Black’s Law Dictionary defines judicial foreclosure

as “[a] costly and time-consuming foreclosure method by which the

mortgaged property is sold through a court proceeding requiring many

standard legal steps such as the filing of a complaint, service of process,

notice, and a hearing.”

All states permit judicial foreclosure, and some

states require it.

For example, North Dakota forbids private lenders from

foreclosing by sale.

Consequently, in North Dakota, lenders are required

31. Eric M. Marshall, The Protective Scope of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:

Providing Mortgagors the Protection They Deserve from Abusive Foreclosure Practices, 94

MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1273 (2010).

32. Id.

33. Id.

34. 55 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 28, § 573.

35. Id.

36. Marshall, supra note 31, at 1273.

37. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009).

38. Id.

39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-22-01 (2010) (“Every mortgage of real property held by the state

or any of its agencies, departments, or instrumentalities, containing a power of sale, upon default

being made in the conditions of such mortgage, may be foreclosed by advertisement in the manner

provided by law. No other mortgage of real property shall be so foreclosed, but must be

foreclosed by action.”) (emphasis added).

262 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255

to foreclose upon property using the costly and time-consuming method of

judicial foreclosure.

Judicial foreclosure is initiated by the mortgagee when a mortgagor

defaults on the mortgage agreement.

In order to recover the debt owed by

the mortgagor, the mortgagee must file a lawsuit against the mortgagor and

any other parties who have an interest in the secured property.

The

mortgagee files complaint as well as a notice of Lis Pendens.

The

complaint contains information about the mortgage agreement and

describes how the mortgagor has defaulted on the agreement.

Also

outlined within the complaint is the amount of debt owed by the mortgagor

and those named as defendants by the mortgagee, often the mortgagor and

any third party with interest in the property.

All parties are then served a

notice of the complaint either directly or publicly, and litigation proceeds.

To satisfy the debt, the lender has the right to recover funds from the

secured property.

In the process of judicial foreclosure, it is the court’s

responsibility to first determine if the mortgagee is entitled to foreclosure.

If foreclosure is granted, the court then orders a sheriff’s sale to auction off

the property.

The court then decides how the proceeds from the property

sale will be distributed to satisfy the debt.

B. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE

Nonjudicial foreclosure includes power-of-sale foreclosure, foreclosure

by advertisement, and voluntary nonjudicial foreclosure.

Nonjudicial

foreclosure is almost always faster and less expensive than judicial fore-

closure.

It is less expensive primarily because formal legal representation

is not required for judicial proceedings and it is typically a faster method of

40. Marshall, supra note 31, at 1273.

41. Id. (citing Christopher A. Camardello, Understanding Foreclosure on Real

Property, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2008, at 20-21).

42. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Lis Pendens § 1 (2010) (‘Lis pendens’ is a common-law and statutory

doctrine which has the effect of providing constructive notice to the world of an alleged claim of a

lien or an interest in property. A properly filed notice of lis pendens places a subsequent

purchaser of the affected real estate on notice of the interest asserted in the lis pendens.”).

43. Marshall, supra note 31, at 1273.

44. Id.

45. Id.

46. 55 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 28, § 573.

47. Marshall, supra note 31, at 1273.

48. Id. at 1273-74.

49. Id.

50. See, e.g., 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, L. DISTRESSED REAL EST. app.19A (2010).

51. See 5 id. § 68:7.

2011] NOTE 263

foreclosure. As a result, lenders incur less administrative expenses during

the foreclosure process.

Many states allow nonjudicial foreclosure as an alternative to judicial

foreclosure because it provides a way to avoid the delay and expense of

judicial proceedings.

In fact, most states have adopted statutes explicitly

authorizing types of nonjudicial foreclosure.

In order to nonjudicially

foreclose, the mortgage must either contain a power of sale clause or a con-

tractual right that grants the mortgagee the legal ability to sell the property,

or the right must be implied by law.

In sum, under the nonjudicial foreclosure process, the lender is

authorized by law or contract to foreclose on the mortgaged property in the

event of default in order to satisfy the mortgagor’s outstanding obligation

without the formalities of judicial proceedings. Because nonjudicial fore-

closure is less expensive and faster, it often functions as a desirable

alternative to judicial foreclosure from a lender’s perspective.

IV. DIRECT AND INCIDENTAL FORECLOSURE COSTS

When a mortgagor defaults on his or her mortgage payments, lenders

incur substantial costs through the delinquency period, the foreclosure

process, and the post-foreclosure process.

In fact, lenders begin incurring

costs the very moment a borrower stops making their mortgage payments.

Because most of the costs associated with loan default are time-dependent,

a lender’s expense continues to grow until the mortgagor either satisfies the

debt or when foreclosure is sought by the mortgagee and that process is

completed.

When a debtor becomes delinquent on a loan, the lender loses out on

income from stopped principle payments, interest payments, and servicing

fees.

Additional costs that begin to accrue once the loan becomes delin-

quent include increased servicing costs and collection fees.

In addition,

the lender becomes responsible for maintaining the property if the debtor is

52. See Soufal v. Griffin, 198 N.W. 807, 809 (Minn. 1924).

53. See infra Part VI (explaining that most states utilize nonjudicial foreclosures).

54. 1 BROWN, supra note 27, § 8:17.

55. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, CONGRESSIONAL EDUCATION SERIES BRIEFING: LENDER’S

COST OF FORECLOSURE 4-5 (May 28, 2008), available at http://www nga.org/Files/pdf/

0805foreclosuremortgage.pdf.

56. Id. at 4.

57. Id.

58. Id.

59. Id. at 5.

264 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255

not doing so himself.

Costs associated with maintaining the property

include property maintenance, tax payments, and insurance payments.

When seeking foreclosure, the lender is then faced with the legal and

administrative costs associated with foreclosure and post-foreclosure.

These costs include, but are not limited to, court fees, attorney fees, fees to

publicize foreclosure notices, auctioneer fees, and title fees.

After the

property sale, the lender may even take another financial loss if the

principle from the sale is less than the outstanding debt owed by the

debtor.

As a result of these collected losses and accrued costs, lenders are

forced to pass the costs off onto its current and future customers and change

its lending standards.

These changes do not benefit the general public and

make mortgage lending a less consumer-friendly practice.

In examining the costs incurred by mortgage lenders in the event of

loan delinquency and foreclosure, it is evident the extent of costs accrued

would differ depending on whether the foreclosure was judicial or

nonjudicial. With costs being time-dependent, it is safe to assume that a

judicial foreclosure would increase costs for the lender. This might be

assumed not only because of the often-increased time needed to complete

the foreclosure, but also on account of the direct costs associated with

entering into a legal proceeding itself. Another major consideration for

lenders is the fact that a personal bankruptcy proceeding often accompanies

foreclosure.

As a result, legal costs soar even higher because the lender

must also acquire legal representation for that proceeding in order to

enforce its rights to the property.

In 2007, the Joint Economic Committee released a report stating the

average foreclosure costs approximately $77,935.

Of the total cost, local

governments incur $19,227 in lost property taxes, unpaid utility bills,

property, upkeep, sewage, and maintenance.

Neighboring homeowners

lose approximately $1508 on their home values.

Foreclosure results in

$7200 in legal and administrative costs for the homeowner.

Lastly,

60. Id.

61. Id. at 4-5.

62. Id.

63. Id. at 5.

64. JOINT ECON. COMM., SHELTERING NEIGHBORHOODS FROM THE SUBPRIME

FORECLOSURE STORM 14 (Apr. 2007), available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.

Serve&File_id=8c3884e5-2641-4228-af85-b61f8a677c28.

65. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 55, at 5.

66. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 64, at 16.

67. Id.

68. Id.

69. Id. at 14.

2011] NOTE 265

lenders bear the brunt of the cost, averaging $50,000 in legal and

administrative expenses.

Because lenders have incurred an overwhelming majority of the costs

associated with mortgage foreclosure, they have had to change their lending

standards.

Consequently, customers and potential customers are ad-

versely affected by higher fees and rates and increased difficulties in

obtaining financing.

It stands to reason that because lenders incur most of

the cost associated with foreclosure and because the mortgagor is almost

always the breaching party, lenders should be permitted to recover their

legal costs in order to mitigate their losses for the benefit of the general

public.

V. THE IMPACT OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION

28-26-04 ON THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCESS IN

NORTH DAKOTA

North Dakota has deemed provisions for the recovery of attorney fees

in loan agreements “void and against public policy” since its inception as a

state. The statutory prohibition has had a lasting impact on residential

mortgage foreclosure in North Dakota. The impact has been nothing less

than a strict categorical prohibition against the recovery of legal costs in

foreclosure for well over 100 years. In fact, aside from the statutory change

relating to security agreements in 1965, North Dakota Century Code section

28-26-04 has undergone only one major development in North Dakota case

law, at least with respect to mortgages.

Late in March of 1983, Joe and Magdelena Obrigewitch

(Obrigewitchs) executed a mortgage as security for their debt with

Production Credit Association of Mandan (PCA).

In June of that same

year, the parties entered into another loan agreement, which established the

terms and conditions for the repayment of the debt.

Nearly four years

later, in October of 1987, the Obrigwitchs entered into yet another loan

agreement to supplement their previous two agreements with PCA.

this new contract, they agreed to pay PCA the outstanding principal balance

on their debt by February 1, 1988.

The Obrigwitchs failed to adhere to

70. Id.

71. Id.

72. Id. (“Indeed, substantial losses have led many of these lenders to tighten their lending

standards, which will make it even more difficult for families facing foreclosure to refinance their

homes, or purchase another if they have already foreclosed.”).

73. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Obrigewitch, 462 N.W.2d 115, 116 (N.D. 1990).

74. Id.

75. Id.

76. Id.

266 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255

the terms of this supplementary agreement.

Consequently, PCA initiated

an action to foreclose on the Obrigwitchs’ mortgage and eventually

obtained default judgment.

The Obrigwitchs appealed arguing, among

other things, a provision in the first loan agreement, which provided for the

recovery of legal costs in the event of default, rendered the entire agreement

void.

Two years before the Obrigwitchs’ case was appealed to the North

Dakota Supreme Court, an argument similar to the Obrigwitchs was

advanced by a consumer involved in a retail contract dispute in Commercial

Bank of Mott v. Stewart.

In that case, James Stewart (Stewart) executed a

retail installment contract with an automotive dealership for the purchase of

a car.

The retail installment contract granted the seller a security interest

in the car, and the contract was subsequently assigned to the Commercial

Bank of Mott (CBM).

Not long after executing the installment contract,

Stewart defaulted on the car payments, and CBM obtained default judgment

against him.

Stewart appealed from default judgment, arguing, among

other things, that the default judgment was defective due to the fact that it

authorized the recovery of legal expenses out of the sale of the collateral.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Stewart’s argument,

concluding that the trial court erred by authorizing the recovery of

attorney’s fees.

The court, however, disagreed with Stewart on whether

the default judgment was entirely defective as a result of that error.

The

court reasoned North Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04 merely limits

an agreement to not allowing for the recovery of attorney’s fees but does

not void the entire agreement itself.

In other words, the court ruled only

the authorization of the recovery of attorney fees was void, not the entire

agreement.

The decision in Mott set the stage for a predictable outcome in

Production Credit Association of Mandan v. Obrigwitch.

Relying solely

on its holding in Mott, the court rejected the Obrigwitchs’ argument with

77. Id.

78. Id. at 116-17.

79. Id. at 118.

80. 429 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1988).

81. Stewart, 429 N.W.2d at 402.

82. Id.

83. Id. at 402-03.

84. Id. at 403.

85. Id.

86. Id.

87. See id.

88. 462 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1990).

2011] NOTE 267

almost no discussion and held that North Dakota Century Code section 28-

26-04 voided only the provision for attorney fees in the loan agreement, not

the entire loan agreement.

Thus, the ruling in Obrigwitch accurately

reflects the only development and the current state of affairs relating to the

recovery of legal expenses in mortgage foreclosure actions in North Dakota.

VI. OVERVIEW OF THE RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN

RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE IN NORTH DAKOTA,

MINNESOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA, AND MONTANA

All states in the United States allow judicial foreclosure in private

residential foreclosure.

About half of the states also permit nonjudicial

foreclosure.

North Dakota is not one of these states.

Moreover, of the

89. Obrigwitch, 462 N.W.2d at 118.

90. See ALA. CODE § 35-10-3 (Supp. 2010); ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.170 (2010); ARIZ. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 33-721 (2007 & Supp. 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-49-103 to -105 (2003); CAL.

CIV. CODE §§ 2924 to 2924l (Deering 2005 & Supp. 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-101

(2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-1 to -31 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5061(a)

(1999); FLA. STAT. §§ 702.01, 45.031 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-49 (2002); HAW. REV.

STAT. § 667-1 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1502 (Supp. 2011); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §

5/15-1501 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-1-3 (West 2002); IOWA CODE § 654.1 (2009);

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2410 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.525 (West 2006); LA. CODE

CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3721 to 3753 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321 (2003); MD.

CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 1 (West

2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3101 to 600.3180 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); MINN.

STAT. § 581.01 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-55 (1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 443.190 (West

2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2137 (2008); NEV. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 40.430 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479.10 (2001);

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:50-1 to -21 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-1 (West 2010); N.Y. REAL

PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 1301-1391 (Consol. 1981 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-4 to -

21.33 (2009 & Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-01 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §

2323.07 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 88.010 (West

2003); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1680.402c (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-27-1

(1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-630 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-47-1 (2004); TENN. CODE

ANN. §§ 35-5-101 to -112 (2007 & Supp. 2010); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.005 (West 2010);

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-901 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4526 (2002);

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-59 to -66.6 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.040 (LexisNexis

2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-12-1 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.01 (West 2007);

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-18-101 (2011).

91. See ALA. CODE § 35-10-12; ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-

807; ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-108; CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-38-100.3

to -114; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-1 to -31; GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162; HAW. REV. STAT.

§ 667-5; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505; IOWA CODE § 654.18; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §

6203-A; MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 14 (2010);

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3201 to .3280; MINN. STAT. § 580.01; MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-

1-55; MO. ANN. STAT. § 443.290; MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-313 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-

1001 to -1018 (2009 & Supp. 2010) (deeds of trust only); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.080

(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479.25; N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW

§§ 1301-1391; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-4 to -21.33; OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 43 (2001); OR. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 86.735; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-22 (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-48-1;

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-5-101 to -112; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.005; UTAH CODE ANN. §

57-1-24 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531a (Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-59 to -66.6;

268 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255

states that permit only judicial foreclosure, North Dakota is one of the only

remaining to place a categorical prohibition against the recovery of attorney

fees in debt instruments.

Therefore, not only does North Dakota law

prohibit lenders from recovering the legal costs associated with foreclosure,

it also precludes a lender from availing itself of the faster and less

expensive method of foreclosure, nonjudicial foreclosure.

Adding insult to injury, North Dakota also forbids mortgagors from

obtaining deficiency judgments in many residential mortgage fore-

closures.

As a result, the current mortgage foreclosure landscape in North

Dakota provides a no-win situation for lenders.

In contrast, North Dakota’s neighboring states have more amenable

statutory procedures and less harsh restrictions for lenders who foreclose on

delinquent debtors. Yet, at the same time, each state’s statutory procedures

and limitations on the collection of attorney fees are very different.

Regardless of their differences, each state’s foreclosure laws create a

friendlier environment for lenders than the mortgage law landscape in North

Dakota. Of significant relevance is South Dakota’s statutory foreclosure

system because it shows how South Dakota overcame the statutory pro-

hibition adopted by the Dakota Territory. In addition, both Montana and

Minnesota’s statutory limitations on the collection of attorney fees are

relevant for North Dakota’s consideration because they provide two

different but equitable approaches to the recovery of attorney fees in non-

judicial foreclosure.

A. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN SOUTH DAKOTA

South Dakota is similar to North Dakota in that it authorizes lenders to

initiate foreclosure by the judicial foreclosure process.

However, unlike

North Dakota, South Dakota law does permit lenders to initiate foreclosure

by the nonjudicial foreclosure process if a “power of sale” clause is

included within the mortgage agreement.

The “power of sale” clause is

necessary to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure because it authorizes the lender

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.030; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (LexisNexis 2005). But see

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-102(a); 1 EDWARD J. PRONLEY, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES:

METHODS OF PRACTICE § 7.2 (4th ed. 2010) (“Despite the repeal of the nonjudicial foreclosure

procedure in Wisconsin, it seems all mortgages used in Wisconsin still contain a power of sale

clause.”).

92. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-22-01 (2004). North Dakota law only permits the state, or

state agencies, to foreclose by advertisement. Id.

93. See Warren, supra note 3, at 1233.

94. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-03 (forbidding deficiency judgments for mortgage

foreclosures on residential property of four or less units).

95. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-47-1.

96. Id. § 21-48-1.

2011] NOTE 269

to sell the property to satisfy the balance due in the event of default. In

sum, South Dakota allows mortgagees to foreclosure nonjudicially only if

the contract provides for nonjudicial foreclosure, as opposed to a system

that permits nonjudicial foreclosure even if the contract does not provide for

it.

Also similar to North Dakota, South Dakota carried over into its laws

the prohibition against the collection of attorney fees which had previously

been enacted by the Territorial Legislature in 1889.

However, unlike

North Dakota, South Dakota has materially altered their statute and, as a

result, now permits the recovery of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure.

Accordingly, attorney fees are now recoverable in both judicial and

nonjudicial foreclosures in South Dakota and they are limited only by the

court’s discretion.

B. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN MONTANA

Montana’s foreclosure laws are in many ways similar to those of South

Dakota. For example, Montana allows lenders to foreclose on deeds of

trust or mortgages in default by either judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure.

100

One of the major differences between the South Dakota and Montana

foreclosure processes is the limitation each state places on deficiency judg-

ments. In South Dakota, deficiency judgments are permitted in most cases

with the exception of where the mortgage is foreclosed by nonjudicial

voluntary procedure.

101

In contrast, Montana does not permit deficiency

judgments following nonjudicial foreclosure.

102

Rather, deficiency judg-

ments are available to mortgagors only if judicial foreclosure is utilized.

103

Another difference between the foreclosure laws in South Dakota and

Montana is the amount of attorney’s fees that are recoverable in the event of

default. Montana, like South Dakota, authorizes the court to award

reasonable attorney fees in judicial foreclosure.

104

However, unlike South

97. Id. § 15-17-39.

98. See 1993 S.D. Sess. Laws 221; see also infra Part VII.

99. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-17-38 (“Attorney fees may be taxed as disbursements on

mortgage foreclosures either by action or advertisement.”).

100. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-222, -313 (2011).

101. See id. § 21-48A-1(2). Nonjudicial voluntary foreclosure is different than judicial and

nonjudicial foreclosure in that the foreclosure is not forced by the mortgagee. Rather, the parties

mutually agree to foreclose. In effect, the mortgagor gives up all interest in the property, and the

mortgagor waives any rights to a deficiency judgment. Id.

102. Id. § 71-1-317.

103. See id. § 71-1-305. But see id. § 71-1-232 (forbidding deficiency judgments in judicial

foreclosure where the parties had executed a purchase money mortgage).

104. Id. § 15-17-38 (“Attorney fees may be taxed as disbursements on mortgage foreclosures

either by action or advertisement.”).

270 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255

Dakota, Montana limits the recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial fore-

closure to reasonable attorney fees “not [to] exceed, in the aggregate, [five

percent] of the amount due on the obligation, both principal and

interest . . . .”

105

For example, if a home with the remaining obligation of

$150,000 is nonjudicially foreclosed upon, the lender may recover a maxi-

mum of $7,500 in attorney fees under Montana law. In sum, a lender in

Montana or South Dakota has the option to foreclose by the method of

either judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure and may also be permitted to

recover a substantial amount of attorney’s fees associated with the

foreclosure.

C. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN MINNESOTA

Minnesota foreclosure law is similar to both South Dakota and

Montana in that it too permits both judicial

106

and nonjudicial

107

foreclosure, and because it allows deficiency judgments in foreclosures.

108

Minnesota also allows the recovery of attorney fees in judicial and

nonjudicial foreclosure.

109

In judicial foreclosure, the court establishes and

limits the award of attorney fees using its discretion. When determining the

fee, the courts in Minnesota consider time spent on the matter, abilities and

experience of the attorneys, the disputed amount involved, responsibilities

assumed by the attorneys, and the results of the foreclosure.

110

Accordingly, when judicial foreclosure is used in Minnesota, attorney fees

are limited only by the court’s discretion.

On the other hand, nonjudicial foreclosure has an objective statutory

limitation in Minnesota. Like Montana, Minnesota statutorily limits the

recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial foreclosures.

111

While Montana limits

the recovery of attorney fees to five percent of the remaining obligation,

Minnesota limits the recovery using certain statutory fees established by a

sliding scale relating the original principal of the loan.

Specifically, the statutory fees are based on the amount of debt secured

by the mortgage and the date the mortgage was executed.

112

For example,

for mortgages executed after May 31, 1971, where the original principle

105. Id. § 71-1-320.

106. See MINN. STAT. § 581.01 (2010).

107. See id.

108. See id. § 582.30(1). But see id. § 582.30(2) (not allowing deficiency judgments where

nonjudicial foreclosures have a redemption period of less than six months).

109. Id. § 481.02(4).

110. STEVEN J KIRSCH, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: METHODS OF PRACTICE § 50.7 (3d ed.

2009).

111. See MINN. STAT. § 582.01; see also KIRSCH, supra note 110, § 49.25.

112. See MINN. STAT. § 582.01; see also KIRSCH, supra note 110, § 49.25.

2011] NOTE 271

amount secured by the mortgage exceeds $10,000, the maximum allowance

for attorney fees in nonjudicial foreclosure is $275, plus $35 for each

additional $5000 of the original principal amount. The minimum amount of

attorney fees available in nonjudicial foreclosure for mortgages executed

after July 31, 1992 has been updated to $500. Thus, if a lender borrowed

$150,000 to a mortgagor after July 31, 1992 and then foreclosed under the

nonjudicial foreclosure process sometime after, it would be entitled to an

amount not to exceed $1480.

113

In sum, Minnesota law permits both judicial and nonjudicial

foreclosure. In the event a lender forecloses using judicial foreclosure, it

would be allowed to recover reasonable attorney fees which would be

established and limited by the court’s discretion. In the event a lender fore-

closes using nonjudicial foreclosure, it would be entitled to the award of

attorney fees not to exceed the statutory limitations determined by a sliding

scale based on the original principle amount secured by the mortgage and

the date the mortgage was executed.

VII. PROPOSAL TO REFORM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE LAWS IN

NORTH DAKOTA

Lenders incur substantial losses when delinquent debtors default on

their mortgages. As a consequence, lenders change their lending strategies

and pass on those costs to other customers. To mitigate their losses, lenders

avail themselves of the foreclosure processes that best protect their business

interests in a given situation. Under the current law in North Dakota,

lenders are limited to one foreclosure process—judicial foreclosure—which

is the slower and more expensive method of foreclosure. In addition, North

Dakota remains the only state in the union to categorically prohibit the

recovery of legal costs in all methods of mortgage foreclosure.

114

That said, it is time for delinquent debtors to pay the piper in North

Dakota. North Dakota’s foreclosure laws should be modernized and made

more amicable to lenders. This modernization would include two minor

reforms that would have a substantial impact on North Dakota’s foreclosure

landscape. First, North Dakota should follow South Dakota’s lead and

amend its statute to allow for exceptions for the collection of attorney fees

in certain debt instruments. Second, North Dakota should adopt a statutory

113. See MINN. STAT. § 582.01. The amount recoverable is not to exceed $500 for the first

$10,000 of the original principal secured by the mortgage plus $35 for each additional $5000 of

the principal.

114. See discussion supra Part IV.

272 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255

procedure allowing nonjudicial foreclosure since they are faster and less

expensive.

When the South Dakota Legislature amended its prohibition against the

collection of attorney fees in debt instrument by adding the qualifying

phrase “except as elsewhere authorized,” South Dakota’s foreclosure laws

drastically changed. One year earlier, South Dakota “elsewhere authorized”

the collection of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure, resulting in a more

equitable environment for lenders in the state.

Accordingly, amending North Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04

by adding the qualifying phrase “except as elsewhere authorized,” or its

functional equivalent, would be the first step to permitting the collection of

attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure. The second step involves statutorily

authorizing courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees in judicial

foreclosure actions. The final step would include adopting a statutory

procedure for nonjudicial foreclosure which reasonably limits the recovery

of legal costs similar to the systems in South Dakota,

115

Montana,

116

Minnesota.

117

If these three minor revisions are made, it would simul-

taneously modernize and beneficially change the mortgage foreclosure

landscape in North Dakota for lenders and the general public.

Stephen D. Larson*

115. South Dakota limits the recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial foreclosure by the court’s

discretion. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-17-38 (2010).

116. Montana limits the recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial foreclosure based on the

outstanding debt obligation. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-320 (2011).

117. Minnesota limits the recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial foreclosure by a statutory

schedule based on the original principal amount of the mortgage. See MINN. STAT. § 582.01.

*J.D., University of North Dakota School of Law, 2011. A special thank you to my wife

Frieda and my daughter Ruby who inspire me in so many ways and to my parents who have been

instrumental in shaping my career and have faithfully supported all my endeavors.