costs.” See id. at 365 (quoting T.C.A. §§ 37-10-101, 102). The plaintiffs’ only argument was
that the $10,000 cap did not apply to their case because it did not qualify as an “injury or damage
by juvenile case” within the meaning of the statute and as dictated by binding precedent. See id.
at 365, 368. In other words, the plaintiffs did not raise any constitutional challenges to the
General Assembly’s power to cap their recovery at $10,000. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court
described the statute as “distasteful” because $10,000 was “plainly inadequate and wholly
insufficient to compensate the plaintiffs” for the loss of their son “to a senseless act of malicious
violence . . . .” Id. at 369. Nevertheless, the Court could only resolve the question before it,
which was a matter of statutory interpretation. In the case presently before us, however, there is
no statutory interpretation issue; rather, the question is whether a punitive damages cap exceeds
constitutional bounds. Lavin is therefore unilluminating.
Fourth, citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996), the State
argues that “Tennessee’s statutory cap on punitive damages is a way of ensuring that the level of
punitive damages will meet the Gore due-process standard of normalization and stabilization of
awards.” (Gov. Br. 17.) But Tennessee’s categorical punitive damages cap of “an amount equal
to the greater of: (A) Two (2) times the total amount of compensatory damages awarded; or
(B) Five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000),” T.C.A. § 29-39-104(a)(5), bears no relationship
to Gore’s discussion of the federal constitutional limits on punitive damages:
[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by
a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential
damages to the punitive award. Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages
may properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for
example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of
economic damages. A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the
injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have
been difficult to determine. It is appropriate, therefore, to reiterate our rejection of
a categorical approach. Once again, we return to what we said in Haslip: “We
need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case. We can say, however, that a general concern of reasonableness
properly enters into the constitutional calculus.” In most cases, the ratio will be
within a constitutionally acceptable range, and remittitur will not be justified on
this basis. When the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1, however, the award must
surely raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.