19
The Court went on to note that “if a government action is found to be impermissible—
for instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is so arbitrary as to
violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry.” Id.
10
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 646 (Tex. 2004).
11
“The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
12
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994).
13
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992).
14
See Property Rights Act § 2007.003(b), exemptions (6), (7), and (13) (set forth infra in
section 2.12 of these Guidelines).
15
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 n.6.
16
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (referring to Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978)); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
17
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542. Although the Texas Supreme Court adopted the “substantial
advancement” test, see Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933–35 (Tex. 1998),
the Court has had no opportunity to address whether the test still applies in Texas
“takings” law post-Lingle. See, e.g., Park v. City of San Antonio, 230 S.W.3d 860, 868 n. 6
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet. denied). At least one state court of appeals has
predicted the Texas Supreme Court will likewise abandon the substantial advancement
test. See 2800 La Frontera No. 1A, Ltd. v. City of Round Rock, No. 03-08-00790-CV, 2010
WL 143418, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 12, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
18
Selinger v. City of McKinney, No. 05-19-00545-CV, 2020 WL 3566722, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas July 1, 2020, no pet.).
19
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. The rough-proportionality test, however, has not been
extended beyond the special context of exactions. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999).
20
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
21
Reahard, 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992), supplemented, 978 F.2d 1212, rev’d, 30 F.3d
1412 (1994).
22
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2079, 210 L. Ed. 2d 369 (2021).
23
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
24
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002).
The Court went on to analyze the circumstances in Tahoe-Sierra within the Penn Central
framework. Id.; see Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (regulatory takings jurisprudence