protection might be invoked,
1
or if the violation, though perpetuated by
another state, occurred within its territory),
2
it was not certain whether a
state had a legal interest (as opposed to a moral interest) in seeing human
rights norms enforced.
3
The perception that no state may bring a case to
the ICJ on behalf of foreign individuals or groups was reinforced by the
ICJ’s observations in the South West Africa (Second Phase) case that “an actio
popularis, or right resident in any member of a community to take legal
action in vindication of a public interest . . . is not known to international
law as it stands at present.”
4
Therefore, when the ICJ pronounced in its
dictum in Barcelona Traction that certain human rights obligations are
obligations erga omnes, insofar as “all States can be held to have a legal in-
terest in their protection,”
5
it was not clear whether the ICJ intended to
1. See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30); Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), Judgment, 1939 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16 (Feb. 28); Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1955 I.
C.J. 4, at 24 (Apr. 6).
2. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26); see also Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27) (concerning the sponsoring of paramilitary activities by a foreign State within domestic
territory; other examples including extraterritorial abductions within domestic territory).
3. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶
41–59 (July 18) [hereinafter 1966 South West Africa case] (“Humanitarian considerations may
constitute the inspirational basis for rules of law, just as, for instance, the preambular parts of the
United Nations Charter constitute the moral and political basis for the specific legal provisions
thereafter set out. Such considerations do not, however, in themselves amount to rules of law. All
States are interested—have an interest—in such matters. But the existence of an “interest” does
not of itself entail that this interest is specifically juridical in character. . . . In order to generate
legal rights and obligations, it must be given juridical expression and be clothed in legal form.”).
See also Judge ad hoc Skubiszewski in his dissenting opinion in the East Timor case, where he
pointed out that there is always “a myriad of interests” (social, economic, political, and moral)
that States have, as individual members of the international community, in compliance with
certain rules of international law. However, in order for such an interest to be legally enforceable,
it must be one that is legally protected. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 224,
¶ 103–104 (June 30) [hereinafter East Timor] (dissenting opinion by Skubiszewki, J.); see South
West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. 455 (Dec. 21)
[hereinafter 1962 South West Africa case (Preliminary Objections)] (dissenting opinion of Winiarski,
J.) (remarking that, in order to find the applicant States to have obtained the capacity to raise a
claim against the respondent State before the ICJ, there must exist “a subjective right, a real and
existing individual interest which is legally protected.”).
4. 1966 South West Africa case, supra note 3.
5. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase,
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33, 35 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
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