5
Vaikhānasas), a disposition that, in practice, rendered inoperative the move planned by the
DMK. An important question of law was nevertheless reaffirmed: a priest is a servant at a
temple and his appointment is secular (Seshammal, p.832).
As such, hereditary positions are
a matter of convenience and therefore liable to government legislation.
In the present Guruvayur case, however, the KHC chose not to rely directly on this
decision but quoted other Supreme Court judgments: the so-called Shirur Mutt case,
which
established a distinction /p. 10/ between ‘essential’ aspects of religion, protected by Art. 25
and 26 of the Constitution, and non-essential aspects, legitimately subjected to State action;
the Shri Govindalalji case,
which asserted the Courts’ authority for disentangling the
‘secular’ from the ‘religious’; and the Narayana Deekshitulu case,
upholding the abolition
of hereditary rights of priests in Andhra Pradesh.
The latter judgment, written by Justice K. Ramaswamy,
quoted the earlier ruling in
Seshammal and went a step further. The bulk of K. Ramaswamy’s judgment relies on
philosophical and theological considerations about what he saw as the fundamentals of
religion and of Hinduism, with extensive quotes from Swami Vivekananda, Shri Aurobindo
and former President of India Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, among others. This situated
‘religion’ in a rather spiritualist and reformist perspective, a trend that had also been
established in previous judgments; for instance, Justice K. Ramaswamy used a formula taken
from Ratilal (decision by Bombay High Court in 1952):
‘whatever binds a man to his own conscience and whatever moral or ethical principle regulate
the lives of men believing in that theistic, conscience or religious belief that alone can
constitute religion as understood in the Constitution.’ (Narayana Deekshitulu, §86).
The Narayana Deekshitulu judgment concluded that the appointment of priests is a
secular matter, as had already been affirmed in Seshammal, but this time with no limitation in
terms of religious ‘denomination’. Justice K.Ramaswamy argued in favour of /p. 11/
broadening the possibilities of recruiting priests because there could otherwise be a shortage
of them since youngsters were increasingly turning to other, more profitable careers.
According to the Court, what was relevant was to be:
‘an accomplished person in Agama rules having faith and devotion in that form of worship and
also proficiency to perform rituals and rites, ceremonial rituals appropriate to the temple
according to its customs, usages, Sampradayams etc. […] One who fulfils those pre-conditions
is eligible to be considered and appointed to the office of archaka or other similar offices. The
regulation of this secular activity, therefore, does not offend any faith or belief in the
performance of those duties by a person other than one hailing from the family, sect/sub-sect
or denomination hitherto performing the same.’ (Narayana Deekshitulu, §125).
For a discussion see Baird (2005), Fuller (1991: 107, 128ff.), Fuller (2003: 162), Presler (1987: 134ff., 150ff.),
Reiniche (1989: 34ff.).
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sree Lakshmindra Tirtha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 16
April 1954, AIR 1954 SC 282. As Justice Bhagwati (2005: 43) explained, ‘the secular State had to perform this
historic function of confining religion to its essential sphere’. See also Mudaliar (1974: 164ff.), Fuller (1988),
Baird (2005: 25), Mahmood (2006: 773).
Tilkayat Shri Govindalalji v. State of Rajasthan, 21 January 1963, AIR 1963 SC 1638.
Shri A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 19 March 1996, 1996 III AD (SC)135, AIR 1996
SC 1765, JT 1996 (3) SC 482, 1996 (2) SCALE 911, (1996) 9 SCC 548, [1996] 3 SCR 543.
The Bench comprised Justice K. Ramaswamy and Justice B.L. Hansaria.
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi vs State of Bombay, 12 September 1952, AIR 1953 Bom242, (1953) 55 BOM
LR86, ILR 1953 Bom1187.
The original formula in Ratilal (§4) is : « whatever binds a man to his own conscience and whatever moral and
ethiocal principles regulate the lives of men, that alone can constitute religion as understood in the Constitution.’