the guarantees and assurances under the covenants of personal
rights, privileges and dignities, but unlike the guarantee of
payment of the privy purse in Article 291, the guarantee under
Article 362 is of the obligation under the original covenants and
agreements executed by the Rulers, barring those regarding which
there is express legislation enacted to give effect to certain
personal rights and privileges e.g., Income Tax Acts, 1922 and
1961, Wealth Tax Act, 1957, Gift Tax Act, 1958, notifications
under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. A Ruler seeking to
enforce privileges which parliamentary statutes have recognised
relies for right to relief upon the mandate of the statutes, and not
of the covenant.”
(Emphasis added)
The majority Judgment went on to observe: -
“134. In dealing with the dimensions of exclusion of the exercise
of judicial power under Article 363, it is necessary to bear in mind
certain broad considerations. The proper forum under our
Constitution for determining a legal dispute is the Court which is
by training and experience, assisted by properly qualified
advocates, fitted to perform that task. A provision which purports
to exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts in certain matters and to
deprive the aggrieved party of the normal remedy will be strictly
construed, for it is a principle not to be whittled down that an
aggrieved party will not, unless the jurisdiction of the Courts is
by clear enactment or necessary implication barred, be denied his
right to seek recourse to the Courts for determination of his rights.
The Court will interpret a statute as far as possible, agreeably to
justice and reason and that in case of two or more interpretations,
one which is more reasonable and just will be adopted, for there
is always a presumption against the law maker intending injustice
and unreason. The Court will avoid imputing to the Legislature
an intention to enact a provision which flouts notions of justice
and norms of fair play, unless a contrary intention is manifest
from words plain and unambiguous. The provision in a statute
will not be construed to defeat its manifest purpose and general
values which animate its structure. In an avowedly democratic
polity, statutory provisions ensuring the security of fundamental
human rights including the right to property will be, unless the
contrary mandate precise and unqualified, be construed liberally
so as to uphold the right. These rules apply to the interpretation
of constitutional and statutory provisions alike.