National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics | NCSES 21-201
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packaged, shipped, and produced juices directly for the consumer. This closed-loop system advertised Juicero as more
than just an at-home juicing machine, but also a protector of consumer health (Thompson 2017). To some consumers,
however, it may have been seen as attempt to lock them into purchasing Juicero-branded products so long as they
intended to use the Juicero countertop machine.
In spring 2017, the mechanics of the machine were proven to be over-engineered and unnecessary to produce juices from
Juicero-branded produce packets. In a video uploaded to a popular news site, it was shown that a pair of human hands
was able to produce roughly the same amount of juice from the Juicero produce packets in less time than the supposed
four tons of force produced by Juicero’s metal plates (Huet and Zaleski 2017). The combination of the high price point
and the revelation that the machine was, at most, as effective as human hands caused demand for Juicero to collapse.
Before closing operations, Juicero offered a full refund to anyone who had purchased a machine. Juicero executives cited
the reason for closure to be that “creating an effective manufacturing and distribution system for a nationwide customer
base requires infrastructure that [Juicero] cannot achieve on [its] own as a standalone business” (Levin 2017).
Sedasys (Launched 2015)
Launched in 2015, Sedasys was developed by Johnson & Johnson to assist in administering anesthesia to patients at U.S.
hospitals. The purpose of Sedasys was to automate the sedation of patients undergoing certain low-risk procedures,
reducing the need for anesthesiologists. The removal of anesthesiologists was intended to significantly reduce the cost of
routine, low-risk procedures conducted at hospitals, such as colonoscopies; anesthesiologists cost hospitals anywhere
from $600 to $2,000 per procedure, whereas Sedasys cost roughly $150 per procedure (Tobe 2013). Sedasys was able to
administer the popular anesthetic propofol at rates specific to each patient, allowing for the same quick recovery times as
when anesthesiologists administered the drug (Frankel 2015).
To sell Sedasys to health care providers, Johnson & Johnson was required to secure approval from the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). Due to the machine’s anticipated displacement of highly paid anesthesiologists, Johnson &
Johnson faced strong opposition from the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA). To appease both the FDA and
the ASA, Johnson & Johnson agreed to limit the use case of Sedasys to endoscopic procedures, which are inherently low-
risk procedures with relatively short recovery times. When using Sedasys for these procedures, a registered nurse would
initiate the sedation process with the press of a button, which would begin the flow of propofol to the patient via IV. The
Sedasys machine would monitor patient breathing, blood oxygen level, and heart rate, ensuring that the patient was not
having an adverse reaction to the anesthetic; if Sedasys detected any abnormalities, it could slow the flow of propofol or
stop it altogether (Frankel 2015).
Though Johnson & Johnson was able to secure FDA and ASA approval for the more limited use case of endoscopic
procedures, Sedasys did not find commercial success in the medical technologies market. A primary cause of Sedasys’s
underperformance was the limited use case; while endoscopic procedures are among the most common services
conducted in U.S. hospitals, the inability of hospitals to use Sedasys for more intensive procedures limited the potential
cost savings. Similarly, though ASA approved of the limited use case, anesthesiologists were still needed by hospitals for
more complicated procedures. It became easier for hospitals not to purchase Sedasys at all rather than use them only
under certain circumstances. Due to the limited sales, Johnson & Johnson stopped selling Sedasys in 2016.
Google Glass (Launched 2013)
Launched to a limited group of pre-selected individuals in 2013 at $1,500, Google Glass (Glass) was advertised as a voice-
controlled head-mounted computer that could be worn similarly to a pair of glasses.
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Glass was web-connected, allowing
the device to do many of the things a smartphone could do, such as make phone calls, browse the Internet, and take
photos (Dashevsky and Hachman 2014). With a battery life of 2 to 3 hours, Glass was primarily a means of
complementing smartphones, rather than replacing them, which it did by integrating smartphone capabilities into a
wearable device that did not require manually accessing a smartphone every time a call needed to be made or answered.