Is there a relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning

Is there a relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning?

Abstract

What connection is there between linguistic sounds and meaning? The present study claims that

there is no such connection, and that linguistic sounds are the same as meaning. It is traditionally

accepted that there is an arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and meaning. In the

present paper, drawing from the concept of language authority for mind, I will talk about a

distinction between live time of understanding - in which linguistic sounds are produced and

understood - and non-live or historical time of understanding. Through making this distinction, I

will show that in live time of understanding, assuming any relationship between the mental state

of linguistic sounds and that of meaning is inadequate, and that the best way to explain why

linguistic sounds are understood instantly and effortlessly as soon as they are heard is to imagine

that linguistic sounds are the same as meaning or that at least we are only faced with a single

sound-meaning mental state. In addition, making a comparison between hearing linguistic

sounds and seeing objects helps us consider linguistic sounds the same as meaning in the context

of live time of understanding.

Keywords: Linguistic sounds; Meaning; Arbitrary relationship; Live time of understanding;

Language authority.

1. Introduction

Linguistic symbols can refer to meanings, and this way, a symbol that is usually considered

neutral becomes alive. But, this referral power of language symbols creates a relationship

between them and the meaning they refer to. It is clear that a linguistic symbol, such as a

linguistic sound has some kind of relationship with the meaning it represents. In the modern

literature of linguistics, an arbitrary association is considered between language sounds (or

symbol) and their meaning. Here, arbitrary means that there is no essential relationship between

linguistic sounds and their meaning or the semantic structure of language.

In the present paper, I challenge the argument that there is an arbitrary relationship between

linguistic sounds and meaning, and maintain that linguistic sounds and meaning are the same

phenomena. This claim and the arguments presented in its support are inspired by the works of

Behin Arbabi (2007; 2010). In the first step, I will clarify the idea that there is an arbitrary

association between linguistic sounds and meaning, and will argue in support of this idea. The

arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and meaning seems obvious based on common

sense. However, in the literature, this idea has been challenged by other arguments in favor of a

non-arbitrary relationship between the two constructs. From a historical aspect, Cratylus argued

in favor of a non-arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and meaning by formulating the

naturalism theory. Naturalism in its excessive form is based on the idea that every name

completely describes its object, so that a group of sounds that are less accurate in describing an

object cannot be also its name (Sedley, 2018: 4$).

But, the most important challenge in considering an arbitrary association between linguistic

sounds and meaning comes from the recent studies that increasingly show that in some cases,

participants recognize a non-arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and their meaning.

In the second part of the present paper, I will examine the findings of these studies, and will

show that further evidence is needed to prove a non-arbitrary association between linguistic

sounds and meaning.

Then, I will begin the main discussion. The present paper claims that there is no association

between linguistic sounds and meaning; therefore, the main argument of the present paper is in

contrast to arguments in favor of an arbitrary or a non-arbitrary association between linguistic

sounds and meaning. In order to prove this point, first of all, I will argue in favor if the concept

of language authority for mind; and in the third part of the paper, I will show the authority of

meaning over mind. In discussion of authority of meaning, I will both talk about the inability of

an individual or the society to change the meaning of a specific sound that has been described by

Saussure (1916/1959), and discuss another kind of authority that includes the imposition of

meaning when understanding a linguistic sound from a language we are familiar with. Authority

of meaning alone cannot tell us anything about an arbitrary or non-arbitrary association between

linguistic sounds and meaning; however, drawing from this discussion and using a mental

experiment called “Takhi”, I will make a distinction between live time of understanding - in

which a linguistic sound is produced or understood and non-live time of understanding. In fact,

the goal of this section is to draw the reader's attention to a historical aspect where a meaning is

assigned to a linguistic sound, and how it differs from using linguistic sounds in the present

moment.

With the help of this distinction and also through a comparison with visual perception (I

maintain that there is no arbitrary or non-arbitrary association between seeing an object and

understanding it), I will argue in favor of no association between linguistic sounds and meaning.

Here, I will ask the following question: “What do we mean by a relationship between linguistic

sounds and meaning?” Assuming an arbitrary or a non-arbitrary association necessarily means

that linguistic sounds and meaning exist as two separate phenomena with a special connection.

Sound is physical, while meaning is not; therefore, the question arises as to how there can be a

connection between a physical and a non-physical construct. Even if we somehow consider a

relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning, another question arises as to how an

association between linguistic sounds and meaning can be formed in our mind. Therefore, I will

show that we should either consider linguistic sounds and meaning a single mental state, or

explain this issue differently.

In parts 1-4, I will examine the ideas provided by Wittgenstein (1953) and McDowell (1998)

who do not consider meaning as mental state, and I will show that these kind of theories that

usually emphasis the concept of “capacity or ability” cannot answer the questions as to why

meaning has a subjective aspect or why we have a subjective experience when hearing linguistic

sounds. Therefore, I will argue that meaning should be considered a mental state. But, as will be

shown in the final section of the paper, if we suppose that meaning is a mental state, and

linguistic sounds are also mental states, then any kind of association between two mental states

would not be consistent with the concept of language authority over mind. Therefore, as claimed

in the present paper, the best way to explain understating a phrase through a linguistic sound is to

imagine that linguistic sounds and meaning are the same, just as we believe that perception of an

object is the same as the object itself, and to suppose that there is no association here, whether

arbitrary or non-arbitrary.

2. Non-live symbols

Linguistic symbols of a language are meaningful for a person who knows the language. Meaning

is something that makes a linguistic symbol alive. In an acceptable picture, symbols are non-live

phenomena, and meaning is their soul. Wittgenstein (1953: 432$) writes: Every symbol alone is

dead. Where does it get its soul from? A symbol becomes alive in application

. The relationship

between a linguistic symbol (sound) and meaning is believed to be arbitrary. For example, there

is no necessary association between “cheetah” and the four-legged animal that is represented by

it. This principle has been formulated by Saussure (1916/ 1959: 67) who calls it the first

principle of semiotics. The arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and meaning seems to

be obvious, and conventional intuition also supports the idea that there is no necessary

relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning.

Several arguments can be provided in support of the idea that language symbols are non-live.

One argument is based on polysemy words. For example, “prune” has different meanings in

different contexts. In one context, it refers to a kind of plum, while it means “to trim” in another.

This shows that a symbol in itself is not important, but what makes it important is meaning,

according to which the symbol is used to convey something.

Another argument is based on different linguistic sounds in different languages to express a

single meaning. This shows that there is no particular reason to use a linguistic sound for a

special meaning. A certain animal is called “horse” in English, “asb” in Persian, “pferd” in

German, “cheval” in French, and “misatim” in Hindi. If there was a necessary relationship

between linguistic sounds and meaning, it would be clear beyond language differences.

Common sense also supports the lack of a necessary association between linguistic sounds

and meaning. For example, it can be imagined that instead of “chair”, another symbol like

“cheir” represent the actual object that is used for sitting on; therefore, there is no necessary

association between “chair” as a symbol and its meaning. But, it is not possible to see something

else and perceive it as a chair. For example, we cannot see a refrigerator, but perceive it as a

chair.

Therefore, although a linguistic symbol is a physical object like other physical objects, it has

an arbitrary relationship with meaning; therefore, it is in itself a non-live symbol that becomes

alive through its meaning. However, some empirical studies have challenged the idea that

linguistic symbols are neutral or non-live in relation to meaning.

3. A non-arbitrary relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning

However, in contrast to the idea that a symbol becomes alive in application, it can be argued that linguistic

symbols become alive not in application but in something subjective, objective, or abstract (ideas). What is clear is

that a symbol is a non-living thing.

Today, a growing body of literature suggests that a non-arbitrary association between sounds

structure and semantic aspects of language also exit. This literature suggests that those who hear

a non-familiar language are sensitive to correspondence between linguistic sounds and linguistic

category, and that we can talk about a relationship between sounds and semantic properties of

what we hear (Köhler, 1929/1947; D’Anselmo, et. al., 2019; Tzeng et. al., 2017).

For example, D’Anselmo, e. al. (2019) asked their 215 Polish and Italian participants to listen

to words from four non-Indo-European languages (Finnish, Japanese, Swahili, and Tamil), and

try to guess the best meaning for each word by choosing from three alternatives shown on the

computer screen. The alternative words were defined for the participants in their native language,

and the three words were in the form of verbs, nouns, and adjectives. According to the results,

the participants performed well in guessing the meaning of words based on auditory symbols for

Finnish and Japanese words and also for nouns and verbs; the results were statistically

significant. Because there was no significant difference between the performance of Polish and

Italian participants, the authors concluded that auditory symbols act independent of one’s native

language.

Dingemanse, et al. (2015) talk about two types of non-arbitrary relationship between sounds

and meaning: iconic and systematic. In the iconic relationship, there is an association between

the form of a word and its meaning. Onomatopoeic words are the most famous examples of this

type of non-arbitrary relationship between sounds and meaning. These words directly imitate the

sounds they describe, such as meows describing a cat’s sound in English etc. In these words,

sounds imitate the actual meaning, and here, there is maximum perceptual similarity between

sounds and meaning.

Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) reported that participants who were not familiar with

picture-sound simulation, matched words like “maluma” and “bouba” with curved shapes, and

matched words like “takete” and “kiki” with shapes with acute angels. According to these

studies, there is some sort of correspondence between the auditory structure of a word and the

perceptual properties of what is described by it. In a study among English-speaking adults,

Thompson and Estes (2011) found that a word like “wodolo” was more likely to be matched with

bigger objects and a word like “kiete” was more likely to be matched with smaller objects.

Another type of non-arbitrary relationship between sounds and meaning is systematic. It

refers to a meaningful association between patterns of sound for a group of words and their

meaning. For example, vowel quality, syllable duration, and stress those help to distinguish

between nouns and verbs in the English language (Dingemanse, et al. 2015). Another type of

such relationship is statistical similarity between sounds and meaning, such as “sl” that usually

referring to negative or repellent properties, like slum, slur, slow, or slime (Monaghan, et. al,

2014), or “gl” that often refers to bright things, such as glisten, gleam, glitter, or glow (Bergen

2004; Hutchins, 1999).

Results of the aforementioned studies refer to a non-arbitrary association between sounds and

meaning, or at least indicate that in a group of words, this association is less arbitrary and sounds

are not just a neutral symbol, but having a semantic quality.

The non-arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and meaning can have different

explanations; for example, due to a common mental/brain structure, speakers of a particular

language may consider a group of linguistic sounds related to a group of meanings, while this

relationship may not be observed in another language. In other words, the association between

linguistic sounds and meaning in a particular language may be due to the common mental

structure of speakers of that language. It can be argued that this association is not related to the

mental structure of language speakers, but the phonological structure of a particular language has

created a specific semantic structure or vice versa. The aforementioned studies seem to be more

based on this type of association; however, more research is needed on this subject. It must be

noted that the results of these studies about the relationship between linguistic sounds and

meaning apply to a limited number of sound groups, and do not indicate a non-arbitrary

relationship between most words. In fact, we are still in early stages of research on the

relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning, and showing that a few words have a non-

arbitrary relationship with meaning does not necessarily indicate that there is a general non-

arbitrary relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning.

4. Authority of meaning

According to authority of meaning, when we see a linguistic symbol or hear a linguistic sound, it

seems that the meaning is attached to it and the symbol cannot be perceived independent of its

meaning. Here, two different types of authority of meaning should be distinguished from each

other. The first type is when a person or the society as a whole is not able to attach a special

meaning to a sound. It is similar to a point made by Humpty Dumpty, a character in a novel by

Lewis Carroll (1917), tilted “Through the Looking-Glass”:

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty says scornfully, “it means just what I choose it to

mean—neither more nor less.” Alice responds, “The question is whether you can make words

mean so many different things.” Humpty Dumpty answers, “The question is which is to be

master—that's all.”

Here, authority of meaning indicates that we cannot be master of words. Saussure who has

formulated the principle of arbitrary relationship between sounds and meaning also pays

attention to this point, and maintains that the principle of arbitrary relationship does not mean

that an individual or even the society as a whole can arbitrarily attach a different symbol to a

particular meaning. We know that neither individuals nor societies can change linguistic symbols

freely. For example, we cannot use “tree” instead of “sky” in the following sentence, and

perceive it the same as before: “Sky is blue”. Saussure (1916/ 1959: 71) writes: Although a

symbol (signifier) is considered a free choice in relation to the concept it reveals, it is not freely

chosen in the language community that uses it, but it is imposed. The public is not involved in

choosing linguistic symbols at all, and cannot replace a symbol with the one that language has

chosen. This seems to include a paradox that can be called colloquially "the stacked deck." “We

say to language: "Choose!" but we add: "It must be this sign and no other."… Neither an

individual nor the society can change the existing symbols and have total authority over them”.

Therefore, the idea that there is an arbitrary relationship between linguistic sounds and

meaning does not mean that an individual or a society can freely change the meaning of

linguistic symbols. The fact that the relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning cannot

be changed does not necessarily mean that there is a non-arbitrary association, but authority of

meaning in this sense indicates that when a word finds its application, the application cannot be

easily changed by the user. However, this does not show a necessary association leading to

assignment of a certain meaning to a linguistic sound.

Another type of authority of meaning can be call “authority of words”. Smith (2012)

maintains that when we talk rapidly and effortlessly, we understand the meaning attached to our

words, and we have no authority over the meaning of what we hear. We discover the meaning of

what we hear through what has been said, and only understand what has been said. Elsewhere, I

(2013) defended the idea that the meaning of words is imposed on the mind. The power of words

is beyond imposing meaning, and hearing of a word or phrase can lead to different emotions,

such as shame, excitement, happiness, anger etc. Everyone can be excited by words, and the

listener has no control over this. In other words, it appears that words and phrases are imposed

on the listener, and people have no authority over the meaning of what they hear. For example,

the sentence “Pay more attention” implies blame or criticism in some contexts, and upon hearing

this sentence, the listener may feel ashamed. This indicates that the meaning of the sentence has

been imposed on the person. All words and phrases have such a quality.

Therefore, a language user has no control over the meaning of what they hear: for example,

one cannot understand “apple” while hearing the word “refrigerator”. In “Modularity of Mind”

and drawing from Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1981), Fodor (1983) tries to explain such

phenomenon. In a discussion on word recognition, Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1981) state: Even

when participants are asked to pay attention to phonological properties, they seem not to be able

to avoid recognizing words… this indicates that some sort of processing is involved in word

recognition that is done through automatic processes that function in an involuntary manner

(Fodor, 1983: 53).

However, authority of language over mind is not in contrast with the idea that language is

conventional. Because it can be argued that words are conventionally attached to meanings, so

that when we hear a world or a linguistic symbol, its meaning comes to our mind. Therefore,

authority of words is not related to conventionality or non-conventionality of linguistic symbols,

but it is related to the performance of mind when facing linguistic symbols. For example, when

we hear a word like “chair”, its meaning is automatically represented in our mind. Therefore,

under certain conditions, linguistic symbols activate meaning in our mind. However, authority of

meaning can be shown that there is no arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and

meaning, at least when we hear or see a word, and that linguistic sounds have meaning that has

been attached to them conventionally.

4-1. Authority of words, live time of understanding, and arbitrary association as a

historical association

Distinguishing between live and non-live time of understanding can help in understanding

authority of language and association between linguistic sounds and meaning. Read the

following fiction story:

“Once upon a time, there was a city surrounded by the enemy’s army that wanted to capture

it. The city was protected by long walls; but, a small group of people in the city conspired with

the enemy with the hope of ruling the city. This small group that made up only 5% of the city’s

population, betrayed their own people and let the enemy in, but the residents of the city protected

it effectively, and finally defeated the enemy. After defeating the enemy, the residents decided to

separate the traitors from other residents. They agreed on attaching a symbol, like an orange

cotton, to traitors’ clothes. From then on, the traitors wore that sign on their clothes. At first, the

sign was just artificial, i.e. residents of the city and people from other cities knew the story,

considered every person with an orange sign attached to their clothes a traitor. Over time, the

traitors had children, and their children also wore the orange sign. After some time, this became

a tradition, and people perceived treason as soon as they saw the orange sign. In other words, the

orange sign no longer reminded people of the actual story of treason, but it was treason itself. It

can be imagined that residents of city even forget where the orange sign has come from and the

story behind it, but the orange sign still brings treason to their mind. In other words, they may

wonder, “There is an orange sign, so he/she is a traitor” becomes “orange sign is equal to

treason”. In fact, treason becomes part of the identity of the orange sign. In other words, “{being

a traitor}; …; and/or {having the orange sign}; become more or less equivalents (Arbabi, 2007:

69-73).

It made no difference if another thing like a necklace or a completely orange suit was used

instead of the orange cotton. Traitors could have been distinguished by a sign on their foreheads,

or they and all their children could have been distinguished by an orange skin made by genetic

modification.

All these signs are like the original orange cotton sign, i.e. at first, the orange color is meant

to show treason, but after some time, even when the story behind the treason is forgotten, it

brings treason to mind; in other words, treason has become part of the identity of orange skin.

Instead of these signs, traitors can be called by a specific name. For example, we can call

them “Takhi”. In other words, there could be no external sign to indicate treason, and traitors

could be known as “Takhi”. In that case, every time someone hears the word “Takhi”, they will

think about treason, and after a while, treason becomes part of the identity of the word “Takhi”.

Therefore, at first, the word “Takhi” or an orange sign is selected to refer to traitors; but, after

a while, when the sign has been heard or seen many times, it automatically brings treason to

mind. When the sound “Takhi” finds its application, neither an individual nor the society can

change the relationship between it and its meaning. In addition, when this sound finds its

application, we understand its meaning instantly and effortlessly, even if we are unaware of why

it had been selected in the first place.

Here, when we say or hear the word “Takhi” and understand it, that is when we understand or

produce this sound we are in live time of understanding, and when it is assigned to a specific

meaning or when we discuss it, for example talking about its history, why it has been named that

way etc. we are in non-live time of understanding. It is worthwhile to note that this distinction is

only used to show our point, and un-live time of understanding is not found in the real word.

When we use words, whether understand them or produce them, we are in live time of

understanding; in other words, un-live time of understanding is only a matter of discussion.

In the example of “Takhi”, it can be observed that the arbitrary association between a sign

and its meaning is not limited to language, and can be used for anything else. Orange colored

cotton, a necklace, or even color of skin all can be a sign referring to a specific meaning. For

example, if orange colored skin was assigned to mean treason, residents of the city would

instantly consider every person with an orange colored skin a traitor. It can be even imagined

that next generations of orange skin people are marginalized due to being rejected by the society

and lack of access to education and money; therefore, poverty and crime rates will be higher in

people with an orange skin. This leads to some sort of discrimination against orange skin people,

while this discrimination or bias is not clearly related to treason anymore. The word “Takhi” can

undergo the same process. As soon as one realizes that someone is from the “Takhi” tribe, they

form a negative attitude towards them in the live time of understanding. Here, it is not important

where the word “Takhi” has come from, and it acts like an orange skin. In other words, the word

“Takhi” gains authority over people’s minds.

Therefore, although live time understanding and authority of meaning do not provide any

evidence of a necessary relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning, it should be noted

the idea that there is an arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and meaning is based on

the fact that at a certain point in history, a specific meaning has been assigned to a specific word.

In other words, one reason why a non-arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and

meaning cannot be understood from live time of understanding and authority of meaning is that

we intuitively know that a different world could have been assigned to a specific meaning.

Because of the historical aspect of this relationship, when we are in the live time of

understanding and when words have authority over mind, we still talk about an arbitrary

relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning.

To put it more clearly, when we see an object like a chair, we see and perceive it as a chair.

Here, there is no reasonable reason to suppose that our visual perception of chair has an arbitrary

relationship with the external object. In fact, such an assumption is in contrast to our

conventional understanding of visual perception. The performance of our auditory perception in

live time of understanding is similar to that of our visual perception. That is when we hear a

linguistic sound, we understand it the same way we see and perceive a visual object. We consider

an arbitrary association between a word and its meaning because of the historical aspect of this

relationship, but due to lack of such a historical aspect, we do not consider an arbitrary

association between visual objects and their meaning.

However, a powerful intuition supports the idea that even if we accept a distinction between

live time of understanding and arbitrary association as a historical association, we should still

suppose that there is no necessary association between linguistic sounds and meaning. The fact

that we can talk about an arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and meaning in the non-

live time of understanding shows that a relationship could be imagined between two different

phenomena, i.e. meaning and linguistic sounds, and because such a relationship is not necessary,

it should be arbitrary. In the following, I will try to challenge the idea that there is a relationship

between linguistic sounds and meaning in order to show that even selecting a meaning for a

sound does not indicate an arbitrary association between them.

5. Sound, meaning, and mental state

When we talk about a relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning, we suppose that we

are faced with two different things. Supposing an arbitrary association between linguistic sounds

and meaning is based on the same logic; in other words, it is supposed that a sound is not

meaningful in itself, and because no aspect of a sound represents a specific meaning, it must

have an arbitrary association with meaning. When we hear a sound, our sense of hearing is

activated, and the sound represents a specific meaning. Such a process is not found in visual or

tactile perception. In other words, when we see an object, the related region in our brain is

activated, and we understand the object; but, here, there is no association similar to what is seen

between linguistic sounds and meaning.

In other words, when seeing, touching, smelling, or tasting things, or even when hear a sound

in the nature, we can talk about an association between our perception and what is perceived;

but, not a relationship like what is found between linguistic sounds and meaning that can be

arbitrary or non-arbitrary. A linguistic symbol is a sign with a relationship with its meaning that

is based on referring, but when we see a tree, we do not talk about a symbol referring to

something else. In all types of perception, there is a relationship between what occurring in the

brain and what has caused it, and such a relationship is also present when hearing a linguistic

sound. However, seeing, tasting etc. are occur in the brain; therefore, here we cannot talk about a

relationship with an external object, or at least we should imagine that the association between an

external object and our perception is different from that between linguistic sounds and their

meaning. Something independent from perception (that occurs in the brain) is found in the

association between linguistic sounds and meaning that is in an arbitrary or even non-arbitrary

association with linguistic sounds.

Therefore, On the one hand, there is a linguistic symbol that is perceived by our auditory

perception, and on the other hand, there is something called “meaning”. Now, if there is an

association between these two, they must be of a material that allows this relationship. For

example, in substance dualism, the question is asked as to how a physical thing like brain can

have a relationship with mind as a non-physical thing. In other words, if we talk about an

association between two things, we should be able to explain how such an association (supposing

that the two things are of different types) occurs. Therefore, today, the mind-body relationship is

called “the hard problem of consciousness”. This problem asks “How can a physical

phenomenon like a neurological process have a conscious experience?” Therefore, it can also be

asked “How can a sound as a physical thing have a relationship with meaning that is supposedly

a non-physical thing?”

An answer to this question is that the association between a linguistic sound and its meaning

is not a relationship between a physical and a non-physical thing, but here, we talk about a

relationship between a mental or brain state with meaning. In live time of understanding, i.e.

when we hear some linguistic sounds, we have a mental experience of hearing the sound, and

meaning, by any definition, is a mental state that forms a relationship with the mental state of

linguistic sounds. In other words, because sound and meaning should be of the same material in

order to have a relationship with each other, and also because everyone can experience such a

relationship, when a linguistic sound is heard, both the sound and its meaning should be of the

same material as the mind or the brain.

For example, when we see the symbol “” in a restaurant that means not smoking, this does

not mean that this symbol is of the same material as understanding the concept of not smoking,

but when we see this symbol, we experience a mental state that is related to “not smoking”. The

relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning also refers to a relationship between the

mental state of hearing a sound and the mental state of meaning. But the problem is that when we

hear a linguistic sound in live time of understanding, there is nothing in our mind (at least

consciously) as mental state of meaning. That is it is not the case that we hear a sound, and then

relate to a meaning that is been assigned to it. Even if there is an un-arbitrary relationship

between linguistic sounds and meaning, there is still no mental state of “meaning” that can be

regarded as having a non-arbitrary association with a sound. When we are faced with linguistic

sounds in the language we are familiar with, we understand them instantly, effortlessly, and

without the mediation of words and phrases (Wright, 2001; 177), and hearing a sound can be

regarded some sort of auditory experience (Smith, 2009; Pettit, 2002; O’Callaghan, 2010) that is

a mental state

. Therefore, we should either suppose that there is no such a thing as mental state

of meaning and there are only linguistic sounds in which case we must explain what we mean by

the relationship between sounds and meaning, or that we are faced with two different mental

states, and mental state of meaning as an unconscious state is automatically attached to linguistic

sounds.

Therefore, we are faced with two different explanations. One indicates that there is no such a

thing as mental state of meaning; if we accept this idea, then we must show how a neutral

symbol can be assigned to a specific meaning in the first place. The other explanation argues in

favor of a mental state for meaning; if we accept this idea, then we must explain the role of this

mental state in the mind and its relationship with linguistic sounds, in a way that is compatible

with our description of hearing linguistic sounds and instantly understanding their meaning. In

the following parts, I will argue in favor of the first explanation, i.e. lack of a mental state of

“meaning”. In the existing literature, at least two views can be identified in support of the idea

that there is no mental state of meaning. In the next section, I will review the two views, and then

examine what relationships a mental state of meaning could have with linguistics sounds, if such

a mental state existed. Finally, as the main claim of the present paper, I will explain the view that

there is no mental state of meaning.

5-1. Meaning as a mental state

In order to show that a linguistic sound is some sort of experience, Smith (2009) asks us to intuitively consider the

difference between hearing a sound from a familiar language compared to hearing a sound from an unfamiliar

language. Hearing words and phrases from a familiar language is totally different from hearing those from an

unfamiliar language. He also maintains that the experience of hearing a sound from an unfamiliar language is

different from hearing a non-linguistic sound. For example, we can intuitively guess that when we hear a linguistic

sound (such as a sound from the Chinese language that we are not familiar with), we know that the sound we hear is

linguistic, especially if we consider this experience compared to when we only hear sounds from the environment

that are not experienced as linguistic sounds. O'Callaghan (2010: 4) is also among the researchers who consider

hearing linguistic sounds as a kind of auditory perception. He maintains that the difference between hearing a

linguistic sound from a familiar language compared to hearing a sound form a non-familiar language is related to the

type of experience. According to him, experience refers to any specific mental phenomenon, including emotions,

bodily sensations, or imaginations. Prinz (2006: 452) also maintains that when a monolingual English-speaking

individual hears “Hund” that is a German word meaning dog, they have a totally different experience compared to a

German-speaking person who hears “Hund” and understands its meaning.

In “Philosophical Investigations” at § 138, Wittgenstein explains a paradox: “…We understand

the meaning of a word when we hear or say it: we grasp it in a flash and what we understand this

way is surely different from its “use” that is continued over time!” From § 143 to § 197, he

explores what understanding is and what it is not. In these paragraphs, he tries to explain that

“use” as the main aspect of word meaningfulness, is not a mental experience, nor a mental

process, nor a mental state, nor a dispositional state of brain or mind. The point of his argument

is that if there is a mental state or process involved in hearing and understanding linguistic

sounds, then we should suppose that there is a mental state behind all our correct uses of words

and phrases that is considered their unifying aspect (§ 146). Therefore, if we consider meaning a

mental state involved in word understanding, then this understanding that occurs instantly seems

to have all the correct uses of the word that is understood, and as pointed out by McDowell

(2009: 85), understanding is believed to have a quasi-magical effect. According to Wittgenstein,

understanding does not have such a characteristic; that is, it is not a mental state, and it must be

understood in relation to the concept of ability (Baker & Hacker, 1983/ 2005, part I: 380-385).

Specifically, Wittgenstein maintains that meaning cannot be a mental state, and that we

cannot even have a mental experience of it. In Philosophical Grammar (1974: 49-50), he talks

about different experiences of two people who are watching a chess game. They have different

experiences because one of them knows the rules, while the other one does not. But this does not

mean that cognition is some sort of experience. Therefore, it can be argued that if language

understanding is considered equal to knowing the meaning of what is said, we cannot still

consider language understanding some sort of mental experience, even if it brings to mind a

specific experience.

Wittgenstein’s view on this subject is in contrast with conventional intuition according to

which when we hear a word or phrase and understand its meaning, we are in specific mental

state. As pointed out in the previous paragraphs, the experience of hearing a word or phrase from

a familiar language is completely different from that of hearing a word or phrase from an

unfamiliar language; this shows that understanding words and phrases is a mental experience,

therefore a mental state. Rejecting Wittgenstein’s view on this matter, Goldfarb (1992) also

writes: “The argument that there is no specific mental state or process constitutive of

understanding, remembering etc. is something that needs more clarification, because surely when

we understand a word, phrase, sentence, or a series of algebraic formula, we are in a specific

mental state, i.e. the state of understanding.

In addition, it was previously stated that it is generally believed that linguistic sounds and

meaning are two different things, and that there is an arbitrary or non-arbitrary association

between them. Now, if meaning is considered the same as usage or even some sort of ability that

is not a mental state, then it cannot be of the same material as linguistic sounds that are

considered either a physical or a mental state (when a linguistic sounds are heard and

transformed into a mental state); therefore, Wittgenstein’s view on this subject cannot explain the

relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning. I will further explain this issue at the end of

this section.

The second view that belongs to McDowell maintains that meaning is not a mental state.

According to him (1998b: 315), others’ statements are nothing but accessible facts that we can

know about others’ linguistic behavior. He (1998b: 99) also argues that when we understand a

statement, it is not like that we hear some linguistic sounds and then infer a meaning from what

we have heard, but meaning is something present in words themselves, something in words that

can be heard or seen by the person who perceive them. According to McDowell, in order to

explain why we understand words and phrases as soon as we encounter linguistic sounds, we

must accept that at the language level, meanings are present in our language behavior, not that

they are hidden behind our linguistic sounds. He argues that our language behavior is meaningful

only when we are part of a language community. In other words, our language behavior is a

report of what our language community knows. He writes (1998a: 253) being part of a language

community is not important because it explains the external dimensions of our language behavior

or our observable behaviors, but because it enables us to make our mind accessible to others.

Utilizing language and being part of a language community allow us to reveal our mind to others

through what is found outside. The key point of McDowell’s argument is that a language

community is not just a community consisted of people who speak the same language, but it

makes us ready for meeting of minds (McDowell, 1998a: 253), something that occurs by

language behavior through linguistic sounds.

McDowell also maintains that meaning exists at the language level, but not as a physical

entity like sounds. In other words, although it is present as the language level, it is not a mental

entity; here, the question arises as to how the relationship between linguistic sounds and

meanings can be explained. When we hear a linguistic sound and understand its meaning, we are

in a mental state. According to McDowell, the language capacity that is acquired through being a

member of a language community enables us to understand words and phrases we hear.

Therefore, when a language user understands a word or phrase, they have only one mental state,

i.e. the sound-meaning state. In other words, here, we are not faced with two different states

occurring outside the mind; therefore, when we understand something, there are only meaningful

sounds, not two different mental states as sounds and meaning.

Therefore, both Wittgenstein and McDowell relate language understanding through linguistic

sounds to our understanding capacity. According to Wittgenstein, this capacity is created as a

result of having a specific form of life, and according to McDowell, it is a result of living in a

language community. By rejecting the idea that meaning is a mental state, both of these views

can show that when we hear and understand a word, we only hear meaningful sounds; therefore,

they both provide an explanation for the sound-meaning relationship in live time of

understanding. Despite providing good explanations of the concept of capacity, how it works,

and its relationship with the mind, these theories do not answer the question as to how a sound-

meaning relationship is possible outside the mind, considering that sound is a physical entity,

while meaning is not.

6- Sound-meaning relationship

If meaning is a mental state, then it should be supposed that the relationship between linguistic

sounds and meaning is a relationship between two different mental states, and the type of

relationship between them should be explained. Here, I only explore possible sound-meaning

relationships and the question whether there is an arbitrary or a non-arbitrary relationship

between them will be explored in the next section. In order to examine the sound-meaning

relationship, it is first explored in relation to live time of understanding, i.e. when hearing

linguistic sounds and understanding their meaning. The present examination of different types of

sound-meaning relationship is based on Arbabi’s works (2007).

When we hear a sound, even if we do not understand its meaning, for example a word from a

non-familiar language, we still have a mental experience of hearing it. As I previously stated,

based on our experience of hearing linguistic sounds from a familiar language compared to that

of hearing those from an unfamiliar language, some philosophers (Smith, 2009; O’Callaghan,

2010; Prinz: 2006; Siegel, 2006; Strawson, 1994; Block, 1995; & Tye, 2002) conclude that

understanding a word or phrase is a mental experience or a mental state. Therefore, sounds from

an unfamiliar language and even meaningless sounds constitute a mental state, because we can

compare them to mental states of familiar words. Therefore, when hearing a sound like “Takhi”

that is meaningless to us, we still have a mental state.

A possible explanation of sound-meaning relationship is that a mental state like “Takhi” is

synonym of another mental state that is familiar to us like “treason”, where the former mental

state is a sound and the latter is its meaning. Therefore, here we are faced with two mental states

that we connect to each other consciously. This is a synonym relationship. Therefore, the sound-

meaning relationship can be like the relationship between two synonyms. This synonym

relationship can also be between sounds and any other mental state. For example, the sound of

“chair” is a synonym for the mental state of chair that is based on imagining its picture.

However, this cannot explain the sound-meaning relationship in live time of understanding. The

main reason for this is that when we hear linguistic sounds, we understand them instantly and

without any conscious effort. While, if there is a synonym relationship between sounds and

meaning, linguistic sounds must be consciously connected to another mental state in the process

of hearing a linguistic sound and understanding its meaning, but we know that such a

relationship is not found.

The relationship between the mental state of linguistic sounds and that of meaning may also

be unconscious. In other words, the two mental states are associated with each other

automatically. By association, we mean a relationship between two mental states that are

automatically connected to each other according to one’s personal experience. In other words,

being in a mental state consistent with one’s personal experience and environment automatically

evokes another mental state. In the episode of the madeleine in the first section of the last volume

of his novel “In Search of Lost Time”, Marcel Proust has provided one of the most brilliant

descriptions of association, where the narrator is suddenly and involuntarily thrown into past

memories after tasting madeleine’s biscuits

. In this type of sound-meaning relationship, one

involuntarily goes from one mental state to another consistent with their personal experience and

by being in a specific situation. Because the sound-meaning relationship is not consistent with

No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my palate than a shudder ran through me and I

stopped, intent upon the extraordinary thing that was happening to me. An exquisite pleasure had invaded my

senses, something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its origin. And at once the vicissitudes of life had

become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory—this new sensation having had on me the

effect which love has of filling me with a precious essence; or rather this essence was not in me it was me. ...

Whence did it come? What did it mean? How could I seize and apprehend it? ... And suddenly the memory revealed

itself. The taste was that of the little piece of madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray (because on those

mornings I did not go out before mass), when I went to say good morning to her in her bedroom, my aunt Léonie

used to give me, dipping it first in her own cup of tea or tisane. The sight of the little madeleine had recalled nothing

to my mind before I tasted it. And all from my cup of tea.

personal experiences or environments, this relationship must be a general one that is the same for

every person.

A possible explanation for such a relationship is that every time we hear a sound like “chair”,

the picture of a chair automatically comes to our mind. This relationship must be fast and

automatic. However, we intuitively know that we instantly understand words and phrases

without necessarily imagining their picture. In contrast to the synonym relationship that is

voluntary, such a mental state that is based on imagination can be involuntary. In addition, it

does not apply to many words and phrases; for example, there is no commonly-accepted picture

for the verb “to be”.

In order to explain the sound-meaning relationship based on association, it should be

supposed that there is a mental state of meaning that is unconscious, because when we hear a

linguistic sound, we understand it instantly while experiencing no mental state other than that of

understanding. In addition, this unconscious mental state, i.e. meaning must have an automatic

and necessary relationship with the mental state of linguistic sounds.

The concept of synaesthesia can help us imagine such a relationship. In synaesthesia,

experiencing a sensation automatically leads to another sensation. For example, when a specific

sound is heard, a sense of color is experienced, or a certain color, like green is experienced as

result of seeing a particular number, like 5 or 6 (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). Although in

synaesthesia we talk about a relationship between two different sensations, this relationship can

be seen in a wider context. For example, Aryani et al. (2020) speak about relationships between

some phonemes and emotions. Motoki et al. (2020) also referred to associations between some

words and tastes. We can clearly see the relationship between linguistic sounds and the written

system in our native language. When we see a text, at the same time, we experience the related

sounds in our mind, and it can be argued that there is a non-voluntary or even unconscious

relationship between our visual perception of written symbols and our auditory perception of

linguistic sounds

Now, it can be argued that the sound-meaning relationship is similar to those described

above. In other words, we experience the mental state of meaning as a result of experiencing the

mental state of linguistic sounds. In synaesthesia, there is an association between two sensations,

but based on this relationship, it can be argued that we have a mental state of linguistic sounds

and another mental state of meaning that are connected to each other in live time of

understanding in an involuntary, automatic, or unconscious manner.

In showing a relationship between linguistic sounds and meanings, whether voluntary or non-

voluntary, this explanation is faced with some objections. The most important objection is that in

both association and synaesthesia, we are faced with two mental states that are automatically and

non-voluntarily related to each other, but every mental state can be sensed or come to awareness

in any other situation. For example, when one hears the number 5 and at the same time feels the

color green, the feeling of color green is also experienced in other situations. However, this does

not apply to meaning. In other words, we have no understanding of the pure form of meaning,

i.e. without an accompanying sound, image etc. In addition, if there is a mental state of

Whether synaesthesia or the relationship between linguistic sounds and sensations is an association-like function or

another brain function is still a matter of debate. To get more information, see Arbabi (2007, 2010).

“meaning”, the question arises as to how meaning can be automatically attached to linguistic

sounds in our mind, while we do not even recognize that we have achieved the “meaning” in the

first place.

In addition, if we suppose that there is a mental state of “meaning” that has been attached to a

sound, and is un-voluntarily related to some linguistic sounds in its current use, we should

suppose that we consciously have the mental state of “meaning”, or that we have something as

“meaning” at the start of learning. For example, when the sound “Takhi” was attached to treason,

the meaning of “Takhi” must have been a mental state. It is clear that “treason” cannot be

considered a synonym of “Takhi”, and “treason” can only act as something that defines or gives

meaning to the sound “Takhi”. If “Treason” has the same meaning as “Takhi”, we are faced with

two different linguistic sounds that exactly mean the same, while when “Takhi” is used as a

linguistic word, it is nothing more than a synonym for “treason”, like other synonyms that have

different mental states. If synonyms had exactly the same meaning, it would be meaningless to

assign new synonyms. Regarding synonyms, it can only be argued that they have similar

meanings.

Therefore, if meaning is a different mental state than linguistic sounds, the question arises as

to how the two constructs can be connected. In fact, if we suppose any type of association other

than those described above, we need to believe in a mental state of meaning that we do not even

know how it has been acquired and that we can never access it independent of the linguistic

sounds we hear. Even if we try to become aware of the mental state of meaning independent of

linguistic sounds, we will be still unable to do that.

7. Sound is the same as meaning

As shown earlier, the sound-meaning association cannot be explained based on different types of

relationship, and even we cannot imagine “meaning” a mental state. However, we can suppose

that linguistic sounds and meaning are the same as each other, or that we are faced with a single

phenomenon, i.e. sound-meaning. In addition, the ideas of Wittgenstein and McDowell

indicating no mental state of “meaning” finally lead to the same conclusion.

But the idea that linguistic sounds are the same as meaning seems unusual. Auditory symbols

are inanimate because, as previously described, different symbols in different languages can have

the same meaning, and new words can be assigned to a specific meaning, like “Takhi” that was

assigned to mean “treason”; this shows that meaning is something different form linguistics

sounds.

In addition to these, some neurological disorders can show a distinction between linguistic

sounds and meaning. For example, a disorder called “word-meaning deafness” may show that

linguistic sounds and meaning are different mental states. In this disorder, the patient is unable to

understand a word when it is spoken, but they can repeat and understand it when reading it

(Kohn & Friedman, 1986). In other words, the patient’s linguistic knowledge is not disturbed,

because they can hear linguistic sounds and repeat them (Pettit, 2010), and are only unable to

understand the meaning of the sounds they hear. This disorder can show a distinction between

linguistic sounds and meaning.

Therefore, here, we are faced with two ideas that are in contrast to each other. On the one

hand, meaning and linguistic sounds are clearly different phenomena. On the other hand, when

using language or in live time of understanding, it cannot be shown that we are faced with two

different mental states as meaning and linguistic sounds.

In the Takhi story that was described earlier, residents of the city assigned the word “Takhi”

to a treacherous minority group, and from then on, they used this word to call them. Years later,

even when the main reason for calling the minority group “Takhi” had been forgotten, people

still used it to call them. We argued that when we talk about “Takhi” and why or when it has

been adopted, we are in non-live time of understanding; and when we talk about the uses of

Takhi, i.e. when we hear and understand it, or when we are producing it, we are in live time of

understanding. There is a clear distinction between linguistic sounds and meaning in non-live

time of understanding; therefore, when we talk about an arbitrary association between linguistic

sounds and meaning, we are in fact in non-live time of understanding. But as stated earlier, when

we hear the sound “Takhi” in live time of understanding, we cannot talk about a separate mental

state of “meaning”, because this word has authority over us. In other words, we are faced with a

single understanding or mental state, i.e. sound-meaning. Therefore, in live time of

understanding, we cannot talk about linguistic sounds and meaning as separate mental states.

In other words, when we talk about a relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning and

consider it arbitrary, we are in non-live time of understanding. New research indicating a non-

arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and meanings, speak about sound and meaning as

two different phenomena connected by a non-arbitrary relationship. I also maintain that this

association is non-arbitrary, but not because of a meaningful relationship between the symbolic

system and the semantic system, but, as previously stated, because it is impossible to have two

separate mental states in live time of understanding.

To put it more clearly, in non-live time of understanding, we are only faced with linguistic

sounds that we hear and understand as meaningful sounds, not because a meaning has been

attached to them or because there is an automatic sound-meaning relationship, but because in the

live time of understanding, linguistics sounds are the same as meaning. Here, the question arises

as to where the meaning is. As mentioned earlier, a meaning has been assigned to some linguistic

sounds in non-live time of understanding; therefore, there must be a meaning. Now, if linguistic

sounds are the same as meaning, the question is, where is the meaning?

All the reasons mentioned here for neutrality of linguistic sounds, such as the idea that a

linguistic sound does not necessarily refer to a meaning are applicable to non-live time of

understanding, and none of them is applicable to live time of understanding. In addition, we

intuitively know that in live time of understanding, there is no meaning independent form

linguistic sound. In fact, a meaning assigned to some linguistic sounds is in fact another sound or

something else that gives meaning to the respective sounds, not a meaning independent form

them. Everything that is initially assigned to some linguist sounds is in fact their synonym not

their meaning.

Imagine a man form 1000 years ago comes to the present using a time machine, and sees a

car. We give him some information about the car, describe its function and how it works, and

even teach him how to drive it. After a while, every time he sees a car does not perceive it as a

large piece of metal. As a result of our descriptions and also the functions of the car he has

personally experienced, car has become a meaningful thing for him. Therefore, when he sees a

car, we do not say that he saw the car and then the meaning of what he saw was attached to the

image of the car, or that another mental state is activated before he recognizes the car.

The same is true for linguistic sounds. It is of no use to say what meaning has been assigned

to certain linguistic sounds, because it is not in fact their meaning but it is something that causes

them to have meaning; and when we hear linguistic sounds, we hear the sounds themselves, like

the example of a person from the past who sees a car not a large piece of metal. Now if we

maintain that there is a distinction between seeing a car and meaning of the car, and that we are

faced with two different mental states as car and its meaning, the same can be argued about

linguistic sounds, but if we do not consider an association between seeing a car and meaning of

the car, the same should be applied to linguistic sounds in live time of understanding; in other

words, here, we only hear a sound that is in itself meaningful.

Such an explanation can show why words have authority over mind, because they are real

like other things that we can see, and it is not the case that they become meaningful through their

relationship with something else like meaning. In other words, they are not neutral symbols, but

they are alive symbols in live time of understanding. In addition, we can explain why there is a

non-arbitrary association between linguistic sounds and meaning: there is no such an association

at all. In other words, linguistic sounds and meaning are the same as each other.

However, as stated earlier, word-meaning deafness can show the existence of meaning and

linguistic sounds and a distinction between them. The fact that there is a semantic system on the

one hand and a system for linguistic sounds on the other hand is not the only explanation for this

disorder, and other explanations can be provided that do not require two separate mental states.

Here, I cannot provide such an explanation, but I can introduce a similar disorder of visual

perception.

One form of agnosia is associative agnosia in which the patient can perceive what they see,

for example they can draw it, but they cannot recognize it (Kumar & Wroten, 2019). Now if we

consider, based on this disorder, a duality between seeing things and perceiving their meaning, or

a distinction between seeing something and understanding it, then we can apply the same

argument to the relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning. But if we cannot conclude

that there is a duality between seeing and understanding things, the same argument is applicable

to linguistic sounds and meanings. In other words, we cannot conclude a duality between sounds

and meanings based on the word-meaning deafness disorder.

8. Conclusion

I started the present paper by mentioning relatively obvious reasons for considering an arbitrary

association between linguistic sounds and meaning, and finally, I tried to show that there is no

relationship between linguistic sounds and meaning, at least in the mind of the person who hears

some linguistic sounds. In fact, the main focus of the present paper in terms of the sound-

meaning relationship was on the relationship between mental states of linguistic sounds and

meaning. Therefore, I did not discuss the nature of meaning, and I finally concluded that if there

is meaning, when grasping it we are in a mental state that meaning is its content.

In this paper, I examined possible associations between mental states of linguistic sounds and

meaning, and I showed that any relationship between them is unable to explain either why we

instantly and effortlessly recognize and understand linguistic sounds in the languages we know,

or how the mental state of meaning, i.e. a pure mental state of meaning can exist independent of

linguistic sounds.

One of the main focuses of the present paper was to show similarities between hearing a

sound and seeing an object. Linguistic sounds are real things, but their relationship with meaning

has caused us to have different views on auditory perception of linguistic sounds and visual

perception of objects. In the present paper, I tried to talk about similarities between these two. If

this claim is true, then we can have a different view on linguistic sounds and meanings, and

instead of focusing on the nature of meaning, we can talk about loading of a sound when it is

understood; this way, we can further our understanding of linguistic sounds and even language

and meaning.

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