Cooperative Federalism and
Marijuana Regulation
Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman,
Allen Hopper, and Sam Kamin
ABSTRACT
e struggle over marijuana regulation is one of the most important federalism conicts
in a generation. e ongoing clash of federal and state marijuana laws forces us to
consider the preemptive power of federal drug laws and the appropriate roles for state
and federal governments in setting drug policy. is conict also creates debilitating
instability and uncertainty on the ground in those states moving from prohibition to
regulation of marijuana.
While the courts have yet to establish the precise contours of federal preemption doctrine
in this context, we argue that the preemptive reach of the federal Controlled Substances
Act (CSA) is relatively modest. Recognition of this legal reality likely played a signicant
role in the recent Department of Justice (DOJ) decision not to challenge the Colorado
and Washington State ballot initiatives legalizing and regulating marijuana for adult
use. Yet even if the federal government honors its commitment to not enforce federal
drug laws against those complying with robust state regulatory regimes, the ancillary
consequences owing from the continuing federal prohibition remain profound. Banks,
attorneys, insurance companies, potential investors, and others—justiably concerned
about violating federal law—are reluctant to provide investment capital, legal advice, or
other basic professional services necessary for marijuana businesses to function. ose
using marijuana in compliance with state law still risk losing their jobs, parental rights,
and many government benets if their marijuana use is discovered.
We suggest an incremental and eective solution that would allow willing states to
experiment with novel regulatory approaches while leaving the federal prohibition intact
for the remaining states: e federal government should adopt a cooperative federalism
approach that allows states meeting specied federal criteria—criteria along lines that
the DOJ has already set forth—to opt out of the CSA provisions relating to marijuana.
State law satisfying these federal guidelines would exclusively govern marijuana activities
within those states opting out of the CSA but nothing would change in those states
content with the CSA’s terms. is proposed solution embodies the best of federalism
by empowering state experimentation with marijuana regulation while maintaining a
signicant federal role in minimizing the impact of those experiments on states wishing
to proceed under the federal marijuana prohibition.
UCLA LAW REVIEW
62 UCLA L. Rev. 74 (2015)
AUTHOR
Erwin Chemerinsky is the Dean and a Distinguished Professor of Law at the University
of California, Irvine School of Law. Jolene Forman is a Criminal Justice and Drug Policy
Fellow at the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California; she holds a B.A.
with honors from the University of California, Santa Cruz, an M.Sc. from the London
School of Economics and Political Science, and a J.D. from the University of California,
Berkeley School of Law. Allen Hopper is the Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Director
at the American Civil Liberties Union of California; he holds a B.A. from the New
College of Florida (Honors College of Florida), and a J.D. from the University of
California, Davis. Sam Kamin is a Professor and the Director of the Constitutional
Rights and Remedies Program at the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law; he
holds a B.A., summa cum laude, from Amherst College, a J.D., Order of the Coif, from
the University of California, Berkeley, and a Ph.D. from the University of California,
Berkeley.
e authors wish to thank David Ball, Douglas Berman, Emma Andersson, Robert
A. Mikos, Pat Oglesby, Ezekiel Edwards, Rachel Hoerger, and Micaela Davis for their
generous comments on previous drafts of this document. All errors and omissions
remain the responsibility of the authors alone.
75
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I...............................................................................................................77
I. T H M R F
P .................................................................................................81
II. P P C F P ................................90
A. Banking ........................................................................................................ 91
B. Tax Law .......................................................................................................94
C. Access to Law and Lawyers .........................................................................95
D. Risks to Patients and Consumers ...............................................................97
1. Employment .......................................................................................98
2. Probation and Parole ..........................................................................98
3. Family Law ......................................................................................... 99
III. T CSA F P S M L ...............100
A. e Preemption Doctrine, the Supremacy Clause,
and the Anticommandeering Counterweight ...........................................102
B. Congress Intended at the CSA Preempt Only State Laws at
Positively Conict with Federal Law ........................................................104
1. Implied Preemption and the Strong Presumption
Against Preemption .......................................................................... 107
2. More Permissive State Marijuana Laws Are Consistent With
the Purposes and Objectives of the CSA .........................................110
IV. C F L A S M L ........ 113
A. Proposed Federal Marijuana Bills .............................................................. 113
B. State and Federal Joint Enforcement of Marijuana: Permissive
or Cooperative Federalism ......................................................................... 114
1. Permissive Federalism .......................................................................115
2. Cooperative Federalism ....................................................................116
a. Existing Examples of Cooperative Federalism .......................117
i. e Clean Air and Clean Water Acts .............................117
ii. e Establishment and Operation of Health Care
Exchanges Under the Aordable Care Act ....................118
b. Applying the Cooperative Federalism Approach
to Marijuana Laws .................................................................118
c. Amending Section 903 of the CSA to Allow
Cooperative Federalism .......................................................... 120
C ................................................................................................................122
76
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 77
I
NTRODUCTION
The
struggle over marijuana regulation is one of the most important
federalism conflicts in a generation. Unprecedented public support for
legalizing marijuana has emboldened Brandeisian experimentation
1
across the
country. Since 1996 twenty-three states have legalized marijuana for medical
purposes
2
and in November 2013 Colorado and Washington State went even
further, legalizing marijuana for adult recreational use.
3
And while the
Obama administration has thus far utilized its enforcement discretion to
allow those state policy experiments to play out, marijuana remains a
prohibited substance under federal law.
4
The ongoing clash over marijuana
laws raises questions of tension and cooperation between state and federal
governments and forces policymakers and courts to address the preemptive
power of federal drug laws. Divergent federal and state laws also create
debilitating instability and uncertainty on the ground in those states that are
pioneering new approaches to marijuana control.
In
the fall of 2013, Deputy Attorney James M. Cole issued a
memorandum (Cole Memorandum II) on behalf of the federal Department
of Justice (DOJ) that announced the DOJ will not prioritize the enforcement
of federal marijuana laws in states with their own robust marijuana
regulations and specified eight federal enforcement priorities to help guide
state lawmaking.
5
This announcement has been widely interpreted to signal
1. Brandeisian experimentation refers to the idea that states may experiment with new practices
before they are adopted by the rest of the country. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). Justice
Brandeis was the first to describe this notion of states being laboratories of democracy. Id.
2. See infra note 139.
3. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 46.04.586, 46.04.5055, 46.20.308, 46.61.502–506 (West
2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.50.101–609 (West 2014); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
314-55-005–540 (West 2014); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2013) Colo. Const. art.
XVIII, § 16; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-43.4-101–1101 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 18-3-106, 18-3-205 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1301 (West 2014); 1
COLO. ADMIN. CODE 212-2.102–1401 (West 2014).
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012).
5. The eight federal enforcement priorities listed in Deputy Attorney James M. Cole’s memorandum
(Cole Memorandum II) are: (1) preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; (2) preventing
revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; (3)
preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some
form to other states; (4) preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a
cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; (5) preventing
violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana;
78 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
that the federal government will not enforce its stricter marijuana laws against
those complying with the new Washington and Colorado laws so long as the
new state regulatory regimes effectively prevent the harms the DOJ has
identified as federal priorities.
6
Yet even if the federal government voluntarily
refrains from enforcing its drug laws against those complying with robust
state regulatory regimes, the ancillary consequences flowing from the
continuing federal prohibition remain profound.
We suggest an incremental and effective solution that would allow
willing states to experiment with novel regulatory approaches while leaving
the federal prohibition intact for the remaining states. The federal government
should adopt a cooperative federalism approach that allows states meeting
criteria specified by Congress or the DOJ to opt out of the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) provisions relating to marijuana.
7
State law satisfying
these federal guidelines would exclusively govern marijuana activities within
(6) preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences
associated with marijuana use; (7) preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the
attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands;
and (8) preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (2013)
[hereinafter Cole Memo II], available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382
9132756857467.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, Obama Administration Will Not Block State Marijuana Laws if Distribution is
Regulated, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
obama-administration-will-not-preempt-state-marijuana-laws—for-now/2013/08/29/b725bfd8-
10bd-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html;
Ashley Southall & Jack Healy, U.S. Won’t Sue to
Reverse States’ Legalization of Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2013, at A11, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/us/politics/us-says-it-wont-sue-to-undo-state-marijuana-
laws.html;
John Ingold, Federal Government Won't Block Colorado Marijuana Legalization, DENVER
POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 11:32 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_23973568/
federal-government-wont-block-colorado-marijuana-legalization;
Steven Nelson, DOJ: Marijuana
Stores Can Open in Colorado and Washington, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 29, 2013, 9:08 AM), http://www.us
news.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/08/29/doj-marijuana-stores-can-open-in-colorado-and-
washington.
At the same time the Department of Justice (DOJ) has made clear that if states legalize
marijuana under state law without also implementing a strict regulatory framework, the
federal government will continue to enforce the CSA’s marijuana provisions in those states.
See Timothy Phelps, California Needs Stronger Marijuana Regulation, Federal Official Says, LA
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.latimes.com/la-me-attorney-general-
marijuana-20141017-story.html
(quoting Deputy Attorney James M. Cole as warning, “If
you don't want us prosecuting [marijuana users] in your state, then get your regulatory act
together[.]”). The article also noted that, “Unlike most other states that have legalized
marijuana in some form, California has no statewide regulatory regimen, leaving counties and
cities to create a hodgepodge of rules and protections.” Id.
7. Our proposed amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 903, set out in Part IV.B.2.c, infra, incorporate
the guidelines from the Cole Memorandum II as the criteria states would need to meet in
order to opt out. See Cole Memo II, supra note 5. Of course, Congress could use those
guidelines or could create new or additional criteria in consultation with the DOJ.
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 79
those
states opting out of the CSA. But nothing would change in those states
content with the CSA’s terms.
Our
Article proceeds as follows. We begin in Part I with a brief
overview of the history of marijuana regulation from the 1930s to the present,
explaining how the current tension over the appropriate roles of the state and
federal government arose. We then catalog in Part II many of the problems
flowing from the clash between federal and state laws and demonstrate that,
despite the DOJ’s announced enforcement leniency, the continuing federal
prohibition significantly hampers the new state laws. Banks, attorneys,
insurance companies, potential investors, and others—justifiably concerned
about breaking federal law—are reluctant to navigate complex state and local
regulations and provide investment capital, legal advice, and other basic
professional services necessary for businesses to function. Federal tax rules
treat these marijuana business activities like any other federal drug crime,
which enormously increases tax liability by disallowing deductions for
common business expenses. And those engaging in marijuana activity
entirely legal under state law—whether recreational or medical—still risk
losing their jobs, parental rights, and many government benefits. Although
President Obama has said that state policy experiments in Washington and
Colorado are “important” and should go forward,
8
the continuing federal
prohibition of marijuana substantially undermines these new state laws.
In
Part III we turn to a discussion of federal preemption law as it applies
to the CSA. This Part explains why the DOJ, even if it wished to do so,
could not simply shut down all state marijuana legalization efforts using the
federal government’s preemption power under the Supremacy Clause. While
the courts have yet to establish the precise contours of federal preemption
doctrine in this context, the preemptive reach of the CSA is relatively modest.
Recognition of this legal reality likely played a significant role in the recent
DOJ decision not to bring preemption challenges against the Colorado and
Washington State ballot initiatives.
9
Finally,
in Part IV we turn to legislative solutions to the current,
unstable status quo. Legislators, policy experts, and commentators have
proposed possible solutions to this quandary. Some have suggested amending
8. See David Remnick, Annals of the Presidency: Going the Distance, On and Off the Road With Barack
Obama, NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 2014), available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2014/01/27/140127fa_fact_remnick?currentPage=all
(noting that “[President Obama] said
of the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington that ‘it’s important for it to go
forward because it’s important for society not to have a situation in which a large portion of
people have at one time or another broken the law and only a select few get punished.’”).
9. See Cole Memo II, supra note 5; see also Southall & Healy, supra note 6.
80 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
federal law to reschedule marijuana, while others have proposed less sweeping
but still significant changes to the CSA to ease the federal prohibition.
10
We
discuss the various pieces of legislation that have been introduced in Congress
but have not gained significant traction thus far. We then suggest a more
incremental solution that would allow willing states to experiment with novel
regulatory approaches while leaving the federal marijuana prohibition
unchanged for the remaining states. We refer to this approach as cooperative
federalism. Under our cooperative federalism approach the Attorney General
would be required to create a certification process allowing states to opt out of
the CSA’s marijuana provisions if state laws and regulatory frameworks
satisfy enforcement criteria that the DOJ has already announced.
11
In opt-
out
states certified by the Attorney General, only state law would govern
marijuana-related activities and the CSA marijuana provisions would cease to
apply. Federal agencies could continue to cooperate with opt-out states and
their local governments to jointly enforce marijuana laws, but state law rather
than the CSA would control within those states’ borders. Equally important,
nothing would change in those states content with the status quo under the
CSA. This proposed approach embodies the best of cooperative federalism;
10. See, e.g., Respect States’ and Citizens’ Rights Act of 2013, H.R. 964, 113th Cong., (2013)
(amending the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to provide that no provision of the Act
shall be construed as indicating congressional intent to occupy the field or preempt state law);
MARK EDDY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33211, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: REVIEW
AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES 45 (2010), available at http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/RL33211.pdf
(noting that beginning in 1972 the National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws has petitioned the Drug Enforcement Administration to
reschedule marijuana); Mark A.R. Kleiman, Cooperative Enforcement Agreements and Policy
Waivers: New Options for Federal Accommodation to State-Level Cannabis Legalization, 6
DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 6 (2013) (proposing a system of legislatively-authorized policy
waivers or cooperative agreements authorized by the executive branch that would allow states
to explore new policies within their own borders); Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State
Marijuana Legalization: Room for Compromise?, 91 ORE. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2013)
(suggesting a model based on Netherlands’ marijuana policy, which would require a
Congressional amendment to the CSA that would allow retail marijuana sales but continue
to ban all commercial manufacturing and wholesale distribution); Robert A. Mikos, On the
Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal
Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1446 (2009) (noting that states possess legal authority to
enact permissive laws despite contrary federal policy); Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the
Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 23 (2013) (proposing that
courts and lawmakers employ a narrow direct conflict preemption rule that only permits state
law to be preempted when state law requires a violation of the CSA); STUART TAYLOR, JR.,
MARIJUANA POLICY AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: HOW TO AVOID A FEDERAL-
S
TATE TRAIN WRECK, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS (2013) (proposing that
the president create clear contractual cooperative agreements permitting state-regulated
marijuana businesses to operate legally while protecting federal interests).
11. See Cole Memo II, supra note 5.
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 81
those
states that prefer the status quo may keep it while those states that
embrace marijuana law reform will be allowed to experiment with alternative
models of marijuana regulation. As the nation moves ever closer to a repeal of
the federal marijuana prohibition, our proposed solution would allow the
states to operate as laboratories of ideas, generating regulatory models that
could serve as templates for federal policy.
I. T
HE HISTORY OF MARIJUANA REGULATION FROM THE 1930S
TO THE PRESENT
For
most of American history, marijuana was legal to grow and
consume.
12
Beginning in the 1910s, however, a number of states moved to
criminalize the drug for the first time.
13
It has been well documented that the
move to regulate marijuana was motivated in large part by racism and
xenophobia.
14
During the 1920s and 1930s, marijuana came to be associated
in the public imagination with both crime and black and Latino migrant workers.
15
12. EDDY, supra note 10, at 1 (“For most of American history, growing and using marijuana was
legal under both federal law and the laws of the individual states.”).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, THE MARIJUANA
CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 51–53
(1974) (charting the path of marijuana prohibition in the states); Michael Vitiello, Proposition
215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 707, 749–51 (1998) (“In 1937, Harry J. Anslinger was serving as the United States
Commissioner of Narcotics. He had served in the Treasury Department where he
aggressively enforced the Harrison Act and headed the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the
Treasury Department. Anslinger's appeal to racism and hysteria was unabashed. He and
other proponents of the Marijuana Tax Act argued that marijuana caused criminal and violent
behavior. During the brief hearings on the Act, Anslinger stated that, ‘[m]arihuana [was] an
addictive drug which produce[d] in its users insanity, criminality, and death.’”).
14. See, e.g., Martin D. Carcieri, Obama, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Drug War, 44
AKRON L. REV. 303, 325 (2011) (“U.S. marijuana prohibition has long been motivated
largely by racism”); Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry Into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA.
L. REV. 971, 1011 (1970) (“From a survey of contemporary newspaper and periodical
commentary we have concluded that there were three major influences [on states’ decisions to
criminalize marijuana]. The most prominent was racial prejudice.”).
15. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A
SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 16 (1972), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=
mdp.39015015647558;view=1up;seq=5
(“As the Mexicans spread throughout the West and
immigrated to the major cities, some of them carried the marihuana habit with them. The practice
also became common among the same urban populations with whom opiate use was
identified.”); id. at 7 (“For decades its use was mainly confined to the underprivileged
socioeconomic groups in our cities and to certain insulated social groups, such as jazz
musicians and artists.”).
82 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
As these workers moved throughout the country, marijuana prohibition soon
followed from the American West to the Northeast.
16
In
1937 the federal government set out to regulate the drug for the first
time.
17
That year, Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act,
18
which led to
dropping marijuana from the Federal Pharmacopoeia,
19
the list of permissible
medicines approved by the federal government. Although the American
Medical Association (AMA) opposed the reclassification of marijuana,
20
those trumpeting its association with crime and disfavored minority groups
ultimately prevailed.
Marijuana’s
verboten status was solidified with the passage of the CSA
in 1970.
21
Marijuana, along with LSD, heroin, and other serious narcotics,
was classified as a Schedule I drug, defined as a drug with a high likelihood of
addiction and no safe dose.
22
Under the CSA, the manufacture, distribution,
16. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 13, at 51–53 (mapping the progress of marijuana
prohibition from the West, through the Midwest, and to the Northeast). Interestingly, the
current policy trend toward decriminalization is following a similar geographical pattern by also
starting in the West. See Marijuana Law Reform Timeline, NORML, http://norml.org/about/
item/marijuana-law-reform-timeline
(last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
17. See LISA N. SACCO & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43164, STATE
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES: IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT 3 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43164.pdf (“Until
1937, the growth and use of marijuana was legal under federal law. The federal government
unofficially banned marijuana under the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. . . .”).
18. Pub. L. No. 75–238, 50 Stat. 551 (enacted Aug. 2, 1937) (repealed Aug. 10, 1956).
19. EDDY, supra note 10, at 2–3.
20. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 13, at 164 (“Dr. William C. Woodward . . . appeared
on behalf of the AMA to oppose the [Marijuana Tax Act]. Dr. Woodward methodically challenged
the validity of each of the assumptions upon which the legislation was based.”). For a
thorough discussion of the long history of marijuana’s medicinal use, see LESTER
GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE (1997).
21. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
22. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1), 812(c)(c)(10) (2012); see also Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v.
Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“A drug is placed in
Schedule I if (1) it ‘has a high potential for abuse,’ (2) it has ‘no currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States,’ and (3) ‘there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the
drug . . . under medical supervision.’”) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (1988)). It is
debatable whether marijuana actually meets these criteria; in fact, Congress itself “debated
whether marijuana should even be included in Schedule I. The legislative history for the
[CSA] notes that marijuana is not a narcotic, not addictive, and does not cause violence or
crime. Marijuana was retained in Schedule I only because the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Health
and Scientific Affairs recommended this classification ‘at least until the completion of certain
studies now underway.’” K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption
Equation: A Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 279 (2005). The
“studies now underway” referred to studies by the Shafer Commission, established by Pub.
Law No. 91–513, § 601(e) (1970). See U.S. v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d
1086, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 1998). The Shafer Commission recommended decriminalizing
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 83
and
possession of Schedule I narcotics is prohibited and punishments can
extend to life in prison for large volume manufacturers and dealers.
23
The
Supreme Court has upheld the power of the federal government to regulate
marijuana, including marijuana grown and consumed within a single state,
24
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently
declined to characterize as arbitrary and capricious the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA)’s refusal to reschedule marijuana.
25
Moreover, because Schedule I narcotics are not approved for any
medical use, doctors cannot prescribe them lest they risk losing their DEA
license. The very classification of marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic hampers
an accurate determination of its dangerous or addictive properties. In a classic
Catch-22, Schedule I classification makes double-blind testing
26
normally
conducted on medical products next to impossible. For this reason the AMA
has recommended that marijuana’s classification be reviewed with an eye to
making clinical trials of the drug more feasible.
27
possession and distribution of small amounts of marijuana. Id. (citing FIRST REPORT OF
NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING 152 (1972)). Other commentators have noted that Congress’s
decision to place marijuana in Schedule 1 when enacting the Controlled Substances Act was
not supported by the scientific and medical evidence available at the time. See, e.g., Matthew
A. Christiansen, A Great Schism: Social Norms and Marijuana Prohibition, 4 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 229, 235 (2010) (“[An] historical examination of marijuana prohibition shows
the initial prohibition was largely a byproduct of social forces present in the 1930s and was
not based on scientific research.”); id. (quoting Raymond P. Shafer, Foreword to RICHARD J.
BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY
OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES, at xi (2d ed., The Lindesmith
Center 1999) (1974)) (“[S]ocial scientific evidence was not used or was ignored as ‘the federal
narcotics bureaucracy made no serious effort before the decision to seek federal legislation to
find out what the drug’s effects really were.’ In addition, the chief architect of the 1937
marijuana bill ‘ignored the contrary findings of every scientific inquiry which had been
conducted.’ As a result, this bill ‘was tied neither to scientific study nor to enforcement
need.’”). Nonetheless, the federal courts have upheld numerous refusals by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) to remove marijuana from Schedule I, most recently in
Americans for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 706 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012).
24. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
25. Americans for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 440–41 (2013); see
also supra note 22 (providing a more detailed history of federal courts’ upholding the DEA’s
classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug).
26. The term double-blind is “used to describe an experiment that is done so that neither the
people who are doing the experiment nor the people who are the subjects of the experiments
know which of the groups being studied is the control group and which is the test group.” Double-
bind
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/double-
blind
(last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
27. See AM. MEDICAL ASS’N, REPORT 3 OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (I-
09):
USE OF CANNABIS FOR MEDICINAL PURPOSES 2 (2009), available at http://www.ama-
84 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
After the CSA’s passage, marijuana was prohibited in all fifty states.
28
In
fact, state marijuana laws provide the basis for nearly every marijuana arrest in
the country. Since the CSA’s implementation more than forty years ago,
nearly all marijuana enforcement in the United States has taken place at the
state level. For example, of the nearly 900,000 marijuana arrests in 2012,
arrests made at the state and local level dwarfed those made by federal officials
by a ratio of 109 to 1.
29
Beginning in 1996, however, marijuana policy slowly began to change at
the state level. For a variety of reasons—the apparent futility of prohibiting a
substance that remained universally available, the racially disparate impact of
marijuana laws,
30
or the enormous number of resources that the enforcement
of marijuana laws consumed
31
—states started to rethink their marijuana
assn.org/resources/doc/csaph/csaph-report3-i09.pdf (“Our AMA urges that marijuana's status as a
federal Schedule I controlled substance be reviewed with the goal of facilitating the conduct
of clinical research and development of cannabinoid-based medicines, and alternate delivery
methods.”). Clinical research necessary to move marijuana through the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval process, which is required to make it available as a
prescription medicine, is further stymied by limited access to marijuana. Unlike any other
Schedule I drug, the only legal source of marijuana for researchers in the United States is the
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which has broad discretion to refuse to sell its
marijuana to researchers. See Lindsay Stafford Mader, The State of Clinical Cannabis Research
in the United States, 85 HERBALGRAM J. AM. BOTANICAL COUNCIL 64, 64–67 (2010),
available at https://www.maps.org/media/herbalgramnidamonopolyfeb2010.pdf (describing the
DEA and NIDA's obstruction of medical marijuana research and a proposed alternate
marijuana production facility at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst); see also id. at 67
(“While more people are able to obtain marijuana for treatment under some states’ laws, little
research is being done to document the efficacy and safety of cannabis as a medicine.”).
28. See, e.g., David Lamb, Other Emotional Issues on Ballots Nationwide: Five States Are Apparently Ready to
Adopt Lotteries, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-11-05/news/mn-
15354_1_lottery-initiative
(reporting that Oregon was the first state “to decriminalize possession of
small quantities of marijuana”).
29. In 2010 there were 889,133 marijuana arrests at the local level. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WASTED ON
RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 8 (2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-
reform/war-marijuana-black-and-white-report
(citing FBI/UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
PROGRAM DATA: COUNTY-LEVEL DETAILED ARREST AND OFFENSE DATA, 1995–2010,
NAT’L ARCHIVE OF CRIM. JUSTICE DATA). In comparison, there were only 8,117 marijuana
arrests at the federal level in 2010. See MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2010,
at 8 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs10.pdf.
30. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 29, at 4 (“The report also finds that, on
average, a Black person is 3.73 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than a white
person, even though Blacks and whites use marijuana at similar rates. Such racial disparities in
marijuana possession arrests exist in all regions of the country . . . .”).
31. See, e.g., RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE WAR ON
MARIJUANA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WAR ON DRUGS IN THE 1990S, at 9–10 (2005),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_waronmarijuana.pdf (“[W]e
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 85
prohibitions.
This shift was initially driven by increasing popular and
political support for the use of medical marijuana by seriously ill patients.
32
In
1996 California became the first state to permit the use of marijuana for
medical purposes, with voters passing Proposition 215 by a margin of 55.6
percent to 44.4 percent.
33
Becoming the model for other states that soon
followed suit, Proposition 215 permitted marijuana use by those who had received
an oral or written recommendation from a doctor.
34
The recommendation
language was carefully chosen; Supreme Court precedent in the abortion
context had established the proposition that doctors could not be banned
from discussing or recommending particular health care options.
35
Thus, a
doctor who might lose her DEA license for prescribing the drug could
“recommend” it with impunity.
36
Alaska,
Oregon, and Washington State legalized medical marijuana two
years later, with Hawaii, Colorado, and Nevada following in 2000.
37
By the
time Barack Obama was sworn into office as the forty-fourth president of the
United States in January 2009, thirteen states had enacted medical marijuana
estimate that $2.1 billion, or 2.9% of the entire law enforcement budget nationally, is spent on
marijuana arrests. Of this, approximately $430 million is spent on marijuana trafficking and
$1.7 billion on marijuana possession arrests.”).
32. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, AMERICA’S NEW DRUG
POLICY LANDSCAPE 3 (2014), available at http://www.people-press.org/2014/04/02/americas-
new-drug-policy-landscape
(“Majorities across nearly all demographic and partisan groups say the use
of marijuana should be legal, at least for medicinal use.”); ART SWIFT, GALLUP POLITICS, FOR
THE FIRST TIME, AMERICANS FAVOR LEGALIZING MARIJUANA 2 (2013), available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx (“The
increasing prevalence of medical marijuana as a socially acceptable way to alleviate symptoms of
diseases such as arthritis, and as a way to mitigate side effects of chemotherapy, may have also
contributed to Americans’ growing support.”).
33. See Votes For and Against November 5, 1996, Statewide Ballot Measures and Constitutional Amendments,
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (1996), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/1996-general/votes-
for-against.pdf;
Proposition 215: Text of Proposed Law, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (1996) [hereinafter
Prop. 215], available at http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/215text.htm (codified as The
Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (2013)).
34. See Prop. 215, supra note 33; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (2013).
35. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing a physician’s First Amendment right not to speak); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 200 (1991) (noting that regulations on physician speech may “impinge upon the doctor-
patient
relationship”).
36. The DOJ, under then President Bill Clinton, threatened to take disciplinary action against
doctors who recommended marijuana to patients under Proposition 215. But a federal court
enjoined the DOJ from doing so, clearing the path for the medical marijuana law to survive
and flourish. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632, 638–39 (9th Cir. 2003).
37. ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010–080 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (2007); WASH. REV.
CODE § 69.51A (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-121–128 (2013); COLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, §16 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453A.010–240 (2013).
86 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
provisions.
38
President Obama’s election would prove a turning point in the
movement for marijuana law reform. During the campaign he hinted that he
might relax the nation’s marijuana laws if elected
39
and, once President Obama
took office, his Attorney General, Eric Holder, stated that his boss’s views
would now be federal policy.
40
A more detailed statement of federal policy
came that fall in the now infamous Ogden memorandum. In that memorandum,
Deputy Attorney General David Ogden wrote to U.S. Attorneys around the
country, providing them with enforcement priority guidance in light of
changing law in the states: “As a general matter, pursuit of [federal] priorities
should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions
are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing
for the medical use of marijuana.”
41
Although
the Ogden memorandum was loaded with cautionary
language,
42
many took it, perhaps too optimistically, as the announcement of
38. See Marijuana Law Reform Timeline, supra note 16 (showing that the following states passed
medical marijuana laws: California (1996), Alaska (1998), Oregon (1998), Washington
(1998), Maine (1999), Nevada (2000), Colorado (2000), Hawaii (2000), Montana (2004),
Vermont (2004), Rhode Island (2006), New Mexico (2007), and Michigan (2008)).
39. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Next President Might Be Gentler on Pot Clubs, SFGATE.COM (May 12, 2008,
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Next-president-might-be-gentler-on-pot-clubs-
3284500.php;
John Tierney, Obama to Stop Raids on Marijuana Clinics, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2008,
12:14 PM), http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/obama-to-stop-raids-on-marijuana-
clinics.
40. See, e.g., David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Obama Administration to Stop Raids on Medical Marijuana
Dispensers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
03/19/us/19holder.html
(“Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. on Wednesday outlined a shift in the
enforcement of federal drug laws, saying the administration would effectively end the Bush
administration’s frequent raids on distributors of medical marijuana.”); see also Stu Woo & Justin
Scheck, California Marijuana Dispensaries Cheer U.S. Shift on Raids, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, at
A6, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123656023550966719 (“The attorney
general signaled recently that states will be able to set their own medical-marijuana laws, which
President Barack Obama said during his campaign that he supported. What Mr. Obama said
then ‘is now American policy,’ Mr. Holder said.”).
41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM
FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN
STATES AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA 1–2 (2009) [hereinafter
Ogden Memo].
42. Id. at 2 (“Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law, and the list of factors
above is not intended to describe exhaustively when a federal prosecution may be warranted.
Accordingly, in prosecutions under the Controlled Substances Act, federal prosecutors are
not expected to charge, prove, or otherwise establish any state law violations. Indeed, this
memorandum does not alter in any way the Department’s authority to enforce federal law, including
laws prohibiting the manufacture, production, distribution, possession, or use of marijuana
on federal property. This guidance regarding resource allocation does not “legalize”
marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it intended to create
any privileges, benefits, or rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any individual,
party or witness in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. Nor does clear and unambiguous
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 87
a
hands-off policy to enforcing federal marijuana laws in those states authorizing
the drug under state law. The reaction on the ground to these statements was
swift. In Colorado, for example, the number of marijuana dispensaries, which
were not specifically authorized by state law, increased from a handful to as
many as a thousand in the 2009 calendar year.
43
In California, a largely
unregulated medical marijuana industry expanded just as quickly, with giant
dispensaries emerging to serve thousands of marijuana patients.
44
Yet it quickly became apparent that the federal government was not
comfortable with the rapid expansion of marijuana entrepreneurship in the
states. In 2010, Attorney General Holder weighed in as California considered
becoming the first state in the nation to legalize marijuana not just for
patients, but for any adult user.
45
With the legalization initiative, Proposition
19, leading in the polls, Holder warned Californians in highly publicized
statements that while the federal government had tolerated their experiment
with medical marijuana, a move to fully legalize the drug would not be met with
such leniency.
46
After Holder’s threats, public support for Proposition 19
dropped and it ultimately failed by a vote of 53.5 percent to 46.5 percent.
47
In
2011 the DOJ released a new memorandum to U.S. Attorneys
around the country, making clear that those who had read the Ogden
memorandum as a green light to the states to permit marijuana use had
misread it:
compliance with state law or the absence of one or all of the above factors create a legal defense to a
violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this memorandum is intended solely as a
guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion.”).
43. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Marijuana at the Crossroads: Keynote Address, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 977,
981 (“While there were press reports that famously blared that there were more dispensaries
than Starbucks in Denver and that there were more than 1,000 stores open state-wide, the
truth is that no one knew for sure.” (citation omitted)).
44. See, e.g., John Hoeffel, Cities, Counties No Longer Mellow About Pot Dispensaries, L.A. TIMES (Nov.
10, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/10/local/me-pot-bans10 (“[H]undreds of medical
marijuana dispensaries have opened this year in a startling rollout across California . . . .”); Karl Vick,
In California, Medical Marijuana Laws Are Moving Pot Into the Mainstream, WASH. POST POLITICS
(Apr. 12, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/11/AR2009
041100767.html.
(“Los Angeles officials say applications for retail outlets surged after Feb. 26, when
U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. announced that the Drug Enforcement Administration
will no longer raid such stores.”).
45. See Feds Warn, Indict California Medical Marijuana Dispensary Operators, KABC-TV (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/state&id=8383655 [hereinafter Feds Warn]
(describing recent federal law enforcement actions against California marijuana dispensaries).
46. See John Hoeffel, Holder Vows Fight Over Prop 19, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, at A4,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/16/local/la-me-marijuana-holder-20101016.
47. See Votes For and Against November 2, 2010, Statewide Ballot Measures, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE
(2010), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/07-for-against.pdf.
88 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
The Ogden Memorandum was never intended to shield such
activities from federal enforcement action and prosecution, even
where those activities purport to comply with state law. Persons
who are in the business of cultivating, selling, or distributing
marijuana, and those who knowingly facilitate such activities, are
in violation of the Controlled Substances Act, regardless of state
law. Consistent with the resource constraints and the discretion
you may exercise in your district, such persons are subject to federal
enforcement action, including potential prosecution. State laws or local
ordinances are not a defense to civil enforcement of federal law
with respect to such conduct, including enforcement of the CSA.
48
Enforcement actions in the fall of 2011 made clear that the
administration meant what it said. The four U.S. Attorneys in California
combined forces in a concerted action against California’s medical marijuana
industry;
49
Montana’s industry was essentially shut down by law enforcement
actions;
50
and Colorado dispensaries within a thousand feet of a school were
told they must either relocate or close their doors.
51
By
the end of 2011, the federal government stood in a very antagonistic
position vis-à-vis those states authorizing marijuana for medical purposes.
But then events on the ground seemed to outstrip those in the nation’s capital.
In November 2012, three states considered adult use initiatives
52
and two of
them—Colorado and Washington State—passed them, becoming the first
American jurisdictions to replace their marijuana prohibitions with a system to tax
and regulate marijuana.
53
The two initiatives were similar; they immediately
48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM
FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING THE OGDEN MEMO
IN JURISDICTIONS SEEKING TO AUTHORIZE MARIJUANA FOR MEDICAL USE 2 (2011)
[hereinafter Cole Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011-
for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf.
49. See Feds Warn, supra note 45 (describing recent federal law enforcement actions against
California marijuana dispensaries).
50. See Jamie Kelly, Former Grizzly Pleads Not Guilty to Federal Drug Charges, MISSOULIAN (Jan. 19,
2012, 8:00 PM), http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/former-grizzly-pleads-not-guilty-
to-federal-drug-charges/article_5166136a-4304-11e1-a886-0019bb2963f4.html#ixzz1k1FXdfT4.
51. See Medical Marijuana: Federal Crackdown, Similar to That in California, Begins in Colorado,
HUFFPOST DENVER (Jan. 12, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/12/
medical-marijuana-federal_n_1202725.html.
52. The three states were: Colorado (Amendment 64 (2012)); Oregon (Measure 80 (2012); and
Washington (Initiative 502 (2012)).
53. See, e.g., Keith Coffman & Nicole Neroulias, Colorado, Washington First States to Legalize Recreational
Pot, REUTERS, Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-marijuana-
legalization-idUSBRE8A602D20121107;
see also Amendments and Propositions, COLO. SEC’Y OF
STATE, http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Abstract/2012/general/amendProp.html
(last visited Nov. 11, 2014); NOVEMBER 6, 2012, GENERAL ELECTION ABSTRACT OF VOTES,
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 89
repealed
criminal penalties for possession of small amounts of marijuana and
instructed their legislatures to implement a regulatory scheme for the taxation
and regulation of recreational marijuana production and sale.
54
All
eyes turned immediately to the DOJ to see what the federal response
would be. After months of agonizing silence, the federal government
surprised many by announcing that it would forgo, for the time being, legal
challenges to the new laws and allow Colorado and Washington to
OR. SEC’Y OF STATE (2012), available at http://www.oregonvotes.gov/doc/history/nov62012/G12_
Abstract.pdf;
November 06, 2012 General Election Results, Initiative Measure No. 502 Concerns
Marijuana, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE http://vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Initiative-Measure-No-
502-Concerns-marijuana.html
(last visited Nov. 11, 2014). In contrast to 2010, the Department of
Justice made no effort to prevent the passage of the legalization initiatives considered by the
states in 2012.
54. Colorado’s Amendment 64 amends the state constitution to allow adults older than twenty-
one
years of age to possess, use, display, purchase, and transport up to one ounce of
marijuana; however, the use of marijuana in public remains prohibited. The measure allows
adults to grow their own marijuana, to share marijuana with other adults over twenty-one years old,
and to purchase marijuana from a licensed retail marijuana store. It permits adults twenty-
one
years of age and older to grow up to six marijuana plants, of which three or fewer are
mature, flowering plants, and to harvest the marijuana from the plants, provided they adhere
to strict home cultivation requirements. See 2012 STATE BALLOT INFORMATION BOOKLET,
LEGIS. COUNCIL COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY 727-397-14, at 30–31 (2012), available at
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey
=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251822971738&ssbinary=true.
Amendment 64
also requires the Colorado Department of Revenue (DOR) to adopt regulations concerning
licensing and security requirements for marijuana establishments, the prevention of marijuana
sales to underage persons, labeling requirements for marijuana products, health and safety
standards for marijuana manufacturing, advertising restrictions, and civil penalties for violations. The
DOR is required to issue licenses and renewals for marijuana cultivation, product manufacturing,
testing facilities, and retail stores. Id. at 9–10. In addition, this measure requires an excise tax on
marijuana, which will generally be collected at the wholesale level and passed on to consumers in the
retail price. Marijuana cultivation facilities will pay the excise tax when selling marijuana to either
marijuana product manufacturing facilities or to retail marijuana stores. Id. at 7. Similarly,
Washington’s I-502 removed state civil and criminal prohibitions against persons over twenty-one
years of age who grow, manufacture, and distribute marijuana in a manner consistent with the state
marijuana licensing and regulatory system. It legalizes, under state law, the purchase and possession
of limited amounts of marijuana by persons over twenty-one years old. However, it remains illegal for
persons under twenty-one years old to grow, sell, or possess marijuana, and for anyone to sell products
containing marijuana to a person under twenty-one years old. Proper licenses are necessary in order to
legally grow and distribute marijuana under state law. Separate licenses are available for
production/cultivation, wholesale distribution, and retail sales. I-502 also places limits on marijuana
advertising and mandates regular quality testing of marijuana products. An excise tax is placed on all
sales of marijuana in the amount of 25 percent of the selling price, which is collected at each level of
production and distribution. In addition, the measure specifies how the state may spend these tax
revenues. Finally, the measure amends the law to prohibit driving under the influence of
marijuana. See COMPLETE TEXT: INITIATIVE MEASURE 502, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE (2012),
available at https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/2012/
General-Election/Documents/I-502_complete_text.pdf.
90 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
implement their regulatory regimes unimpeded.
55
This new memorandum
emphasized eight priorities that drive federal marijuana enforcement policy
and then noted that states that could demonstrate compliance with these
priorities would largely be left to their own devices.
56
While
this policy guidance constitutes a welcome step back from the
federal government’s previous brinksmanship, it hardly solves the federalism
problems caused by marijuana’s dual legal status. As Part II demonstrates,
marijuana’s continued status as a prohibited substance under federal law
significantly hampers the states’ capacity to effectively implement new state
taxation and regulatory policies.
II. P
ROBLEMS POSED BY CONTINUING FEDERAL PROHIBITION
Part
I made clear that the threat of criminal prosecution against those
operating marijuana businesses under the aegis of state law is more remote
now than it has been in recent years. The federal government has announced
a wait-and-see approach to state-level regulation,
57
creating metrics for measuring
whether states are up to the task of taxing-and-regulating rather than
prohibiting marijuana outright.
58
But the threat of federal enforcement is
only one of the potential problems stemming from the continuing federal
prohibition of marijuana.
59
In
this Part, we point out the often dire consequences that continue to
flow from marijuana’s categorization as a Schedule I narcotic. Even if the
promise of federal nonenforcement were made permanent—which cannot be
done by executive action alone because enforcement decisions made by one
presidential administration could easily be overturned by the next—federal
55. See Cole Memo II, supra note 5, at 2–3; see also Southall & Healy, supra note 6.
56. Cole Memo II, supra note 5, at 1–3.
57. Southall & Healy, supra note 6.
58. See Cole Memo II, supra note 5, at 1 (“The Department is . . . committed to using its limited
investigative and prosecutorial resources to address the most significant threats in the most
effective, consistent, and rational way. In furtherance of [these] objectives, as several states
enacted laws relating to the use of marijuana for medical purposes, the Department in recent
years has focused its efforts on certain enforcement priorities that are particularly important to the
federal government . . . .”).
59. As Robert Mikos has noted, the continuing federal prohibition of marijuana also makes the
regulatory task more difficult in those states discarding their own prohibitions. See Robert A.
Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other Federal Crimes, 2010 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 222, 258 (2012) (arguing that the continuing federal ban will frustrate state
“monitoring of marijuana distribution by preventing consolidation of the marijuana market”);
id. at 260 (“[P]rohibition gives drug distributors ample incentive to hide from law enforcement
authorities—this hinders monitoring that is necessary for effective collection of civil taxes.”).
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 91
prohibition
operates to present substantial obstacles to businesses and adults
seeking to implement and avail themselves of new state laws authorizing
marijuana distribution and use.
A. Banking
Perhaps
the most profound and well-documented consequence of
marijuana’s prohibited status at the federal level is the unavailability of even
the most rudimentary banking services for those engaged in marijuana
commerce.
60
The threat of money laundering prosecutions—often made
explicit—has made banks unwilling to engage in any transactions with marijuana
businesses.
61
As a result, marijuana businesses complying with state laws are
forced to operate solely in cash.
62
The lack of commercial banking is more
than a dignitary harm for those operating in the marijuana industry; for many
it is a sincere safety concern. Marijuana businesses present an easy target for
thieves who are aware that these businesses often have no choice but to keep
large quantities of cash on hand.
63
60. See, e.g., Sam Kamin & Joel Warner, Your Money Stinks: Why Banks Won’t Do Business With the
Marijuana Industry (And Why It’s a Huge Problem), SLATE (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/altered_state/2014/01/colorado_marijuana_busi
nesses_have_a_big_problem_banks_won_t_take_their.html;
Jack Healy & Matt Apuzzo, Legal
Marijuana Businesses Should Have Access to Banks, Holder Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, at A20,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/legal-marijuana-businesses-should-have-
access-to-banks-holder-says.html
(Attorney General Holder, at the Miller Center at the University of
Virginia, stated, “There's a public safety component to this. Huge amounts of cash, substantial
amounts of cash just kind of lying around with no place for it to be appropriately deposited [due to
banks refusing to grant checking accounts], is something that would worry me, just from a law
enforcement perspective.”).
61. See, e.g., Cole Memo, supra note 48, at 2; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE
REGARDING MARIJUANA RELATED FINANCIAL CRIMES 3 (2014), [hereinafter DOJ Banking
Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/co/news/2014/feb/DAG%20Memo%20-
%20Guidance%20Regarding%20Marijuana%20Related%20Financial%20Crimes%202%2014%2
014.pdf
(“Neither the guidance herein nor any state or local law provides a legal defense to a violation
of federal law, including any civil or criminal violation of the CSA, the money laundering and
unlicensed money transmitter statutes, or the BSA, including the obligation of financial institutions
to conduct customer due diligence.”) Thus, financial institutions that engage in transactions
involving the proceeds of marijuana activity may also be in violation of federal money laundering
statutes and other federal financial laws. Id.
62. See, e.g., David Migoya, Pot Businesses in Colorado Cannot Bank and No Solution Is Ahead, DENVER
POST (March 10, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_22751888/colorado-
pot-businesses-cannot-bank-and-nosolution-is (“[T]here is little that those businesses can legally do
with their cash other than put it in a safe or bury it. No bank, credit union or financial services
company can knowingly accept business accounts with any trace of a marijuana connection. If they
do, it’s a federal crime.”).
63. See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Eric Holder Promises to Reassure Banks About Taking Marijuana Money ‘Very
92 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
Regulators in Colorado and Washington State grasped early on that
resolution of this problem would be one of the key concerns of the administrative
process
64
—marijuana businesses are much more difficult to regulate and tax if
they are operating on a cash basis. But lawmakers in both states also realized fairly
quickly that given the predominantly federal nature of banking regulation, there
was little that could be done at the state level alone. Although the Obama
administration announced in early 2014 that marijuana businesses should
have access to banking services
65
and promulgated a pair of memorandums
purporting to loosen banking restrictions on the marijuana industry,
66
there is
Soon,’ FORBES (Jan. 24, 2014, 1:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/01/24/eric-
holder-promises-to-reassure-banks-about-taking-marijuana-money-very-soon
(quoting Attorney
General Eric Holder as stating, “There’s a public safety component to this. Huge amounts of cash,
substantial amounts of cash just kind of lying around with no place for it to be appropriately
deposited, is something that would worry me, just from a law enforcement perspective”). Moreover,
armored car services report that they have been pressured to drop their marijuana clients. See, e.g.,
Steven Nelson, Pot Clinics: DEA Threatening Armored Car Firms out of Providing Security, US NEWS
(Aug. 26, 2013, 12:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/2013/08/
26/marijuana-dispensaries-fear-theyve-become-robbery-target-after-alleged-dea-action-to-scare-
off-security;
see also Sadie Gurman, Denver Cops Barred From Working Off-Duty Security Jobs at Pot
Shops, DENVER POST (Dec. 12, 2013, 8:22 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_24713153/denver-
cops-barred-from-working-off-duty-security.
64. See, e.g., Govs. Hickenlooper, Inslee Call for Flexibility in Federal Banking Regulations for Marijuana
Businesses, COLORADO: THE OFFICIAL STATE WEB PORTAL (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.
colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?c=Page&childpagename=GovHickenlooper%2FCBONLayout&cid=12
51646488031&pagename=CBONWrapper (“Access to the banking system by these state-licensed
businesses is a necessary component in ensuring a highly regulated marijuana system that will
accurately track funds, prevent criminal involvement, and promote public safety.”); see also Letter
from John W. Hickenlooper, Governor, State of Colo. and Jay Inslee, Governor of Wash., to Jacob
J. Lew, Secretary, Sec’y of the Treasury, Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve, Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller
of the Currency, Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, and Debbie Matz,
Chairman, Nat’l Credit Union Admin. (Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/
Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blobheadername2=Content-
Type&blobheadervalue1=inline%3B+filename%3D%22Govs.+Hickenlooper%2C+Inslee+call+for
+flexibility+in+federal+banking+regulations+for+marijuana+businesses.pdf%22&blobheadervalue2
=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251893131086&ssbina
ry=true;
Matt Ferner, Marijuana Businesses Need More Flexibility in Federal Banking Regulations:
Govs. Hickenlooper, Inslee, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2013, 4:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/10/ 03/marijuana-banking_n_4038955.html.
65. See, e.g., Healy & Apuzzo, supra note 60.
66. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED
BUSINESSES, GUIDANCE: FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (2014), available
at http://extras.mnginteractive.com/live/media/site36/2014/0214/20140214_113553_Guidance-
Marijuana-Related-Businesses.pdf;
DOJ Banking Memo, supra note 61.
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 93
little
that the executive branch can do unitarily; the core of the banking
problem is the continuing illegality of marijuana at the federal level.
67
For
example, even if the federal government were to promise never to
pursue money laundering charges against those banks doing business with the
marijuana industry, it is not at all clear that banks would actually begin to
treat marijuana businesses the way they treat other businesses. Because the
CSA and its forfeiture provisions remain good law, the assets of a marijuana
business remain subject to forfeiture
68
even in the face of a federal promise not
to pursue such actions, and it is difficult to see how those assets could be seen
by a bank as sufficiently secure against government seizure to be worth the risk.
69
It was for this reason that the reaction of the marijuana industry to the new
banking guidelines was decidedly tepid.
70
67. See, e.g., Serge F. Kovaleski, Banks Say No to Marijuana Money, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/us/banks-say-no-to-
marijuana-money-legal-or-not.html.
68. Any DOJ suggestion that it will voluntarily elect not to enforce a valid federal law would not
be binding in court and would not constitute an absolute defense to a forfeiture action.
While a bank could raise some defenses based on good faith or collateral estoppel arguments,
the federal government could still pursue forfeiture and the bank’s funds would be at risk. A change
to federal law could, however, protect banks working with legitimate marijuana businesses.
An initial step toward such reform took place on July 16, 2014, when the Republican-led
House of Representatives passed a bipartisan amendment preventing the Treasury Department
from spending money to penalize banks and other financial institutions for providing services
to marijuana businesses that are legal under state law. Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations Act of 2015, H.R. 5016, 113th Cong. § 916 (2014) (passing out of
the House of Representatives by a vote of 231 to 192).
69. See, e.g., Washington Bankers Association, Banking and the Marijuana Industry, http://www.aba.
com/Groups/Documents/MarijuanaBankingWBABankingandtheMarijuanaIndustry(1).pdf
(last visited Aug. 12, 2014) (“All financial institutions are currently prohibited from lending to the
marijuana industry. Financial institutions cannot lend against inventory or receivables because the
collateral is illegal at a federal level.”).
70. See, e.g., Evan Perez, Banks Cleared to Accept Marijuana Business, CNN (Feb. 17, 2014, 8:39
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/14/politics/u-s-marijuana-banks (“Michael Elliott—
executive
director of the Marijuana Industry Group, the largest marijuana business association in
Colorado—said . . . ‘While we believe today’s guidance should provide banks some of the
assurances they need to begin doing business with the marijuana industry, it doesn't solve all
the problems . . . .’ Elliott’s group wants Congress to approve pending legislation that would
‘provide certainty for banks and allow our industry to operate just like any other business. . . .’”);
Clayton Sandell, Legal Cash-Only Pot Sellers Supermarkets for Crooks, ABC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2014, 7:26
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/02/legal-cash-only-pot-sellers-supermarkets-
for-crooks
(“The marijuana industry said that real safety would only come when Congress changed
banking laws.”).
94 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
B. Tax Law
A
little-known provision of federal tax law makes the operation of a
successful marijuana business—even one operating in clear compliance with
state law—an incredibly difficult proposition. Federal Tax Rule 280E
71
requires any trade or business operating in violation of federal drug laws—and
only federal drug laws
72
—to pay federal income tax and to do so on
disadvantageous terms. Under 280E a marijuana retailer cannot deduct her
expenses before calculating her taxable income; other than the cost of
obtaining the goods for sale, a marijuana business is required to pay taxes on
its gross receipts.
73
All other usual business expenses—retail rent, employee
payroll, lights, and heating and cooling—cannot be deducted as they can in
any other business, either legitimate or illegal.
Even
if the federal government does not seek to prosecute marijuana
businesses for violating federal law, and even if it does not seek to forfeit the
assets of businesses in violation of that federal law, it is already applying rule
280E against those businesses in ways that may prove nearly as crippling to
the industry. For example, in 2011 the Internal Revenue Service ruled that
Harborside Health Center, California’s largest medical marijuana dispensary,
owed millions in taxes under the application of 280E.
74
Steve DeAngelo,
Harborside’s owner, stated that a literal interpretation of 280E would ruin
not just his business but also the entire industry: “No business, including
Harborside, could survive if it's taxed on its gross revenue. All we want is to
be treated like every other business in America.”
75
71. I.R.C. § 280E (2006).
72. See, e.g., Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 523,
533 (2014) (“To be clear, this over-taxation of a marijuana seller’s income is not simply the
result of her engaging in an illegal business activity. If she were engaged in murder for hire,
she would owe federal income tax on the profits she made from such activity, but would be
allowed to deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses the cost of her gun and bullets,
the cost of overnight travel to and from the crime scene, any amounts she paid to employees
or contractors who helped her carry out her crime, and other expenses associated with her
criminal activity.”).
73. See id. at 532 (“The situation is not quite as dire as it initially may seem. A marijuana seller is
not required to actually calculate her income tax strictly as a percentage of her gross income.
The Tax Court has explained that ‘[cost of goods sold] is not a deduction within the meaning
of [the tax code] but is subtracted from gross receipts in determining a taxpayer’s gross
income.’” (quoting Olive v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 19, 20 n.2 (2012))).
74. See Lisa Leff, Harborside Health Center, Oakland Pot Shop, Hit with $2.4 Million Tax Bill,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/04/
harborside-health-center-tax-bill_n_995139.html.
75. See id.
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 95
C. Access
to Law and Lawyers
So
long as marijuana remains illegal at the federal level, marijuana
businesses will have difficulty operating as full legal citizens. One of the
biggest obstacles facing marijuana businesses is finding attorneys who are
willing to provide them with legal services. The Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility and the ethics rules of nearly every state prohibit an attorney
from knowingly facilitating a client’s criminal conduct.
76
Because nearly all
the actions of a marijuana business remain violations of federal law, any
assistance that a lawyer gives to a business that she knows to be in violation of
federal law could be construed as an ethical violation. This is true not only
when the lawyer helps a marijuana retailer purchase product from a marijuana
grow facility—in other words, when she assists in the actual violations of
federal law—but also when the lawyer incorporates the marijuana business,
helps draft a lease, lobbies local government officials for a zoning exemption,
or negotiates an employment agreement. Because all these tasks help a
marijuana business to break federal law, there is a plausible argument that the
lawyer subjects herself to discipline for knowingly doing so.
State
bar committees considering the ethics of representing the
marijuana industry have largely split on the issue. Most recently, the Ethics
Committee of the Colorado Bar Association concluded that, as the Colorado
Rules of Professional Conduct are currently drafted, lawyers put themselves
at risk when they perform many legal tasks for marijuana clients:
A lawyer cannot comply with Colo.RPC 1.2(d) and, for example,
draft or negotiate (1) contracts to facilitate the purchase and sale of
marijuana or (2) leases for properties or facilities, or contracts for
resources or supplies, that clients intend to use to cultivate,
manufacture, distribute, or sell marijuana, even though such
transactions comply with Colorado law, and even though the law
or the transaction may be so complex that a lawyer’s assistance
would be useful, because the lawyer would be assisting the client in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal under federal law.
77
76. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983) (“A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”).
77. Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Opinion 125–The Extent to Which Lawyers May
Represent Clients Regarding Marijuana-Related Activities, 42 COLO. LAW. No. 12, 19 (2013).
96 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
The State of Arizona came to exactly the opposite conclusion, reasoning
that the assistance of lawyers was necessary to help the state achieve its goals
of maintaining a regulated medical marijuana regime:
[W]e decline to interpret and apply ER 1.2(d) in a manner that
would prevent a lawyer who concludes that the client’s proposed
conduct is in “clear and unambiguous compliance” with state law
from assisting the client in connection with activities expressly
authorized under state law, thereby depriving clients of the very
legal advice and assistance that is needed to engage in the conduct
that the state law expressly permits. The maintenance of an
independent legal profession, and of its rights to advocate for the
interests of clients, is a bulwark of our system of government. . . . A
state law now expressly permits certain conduct. Legal services are
necessary or desirable to implement and bring to fruition that
conduct expressly permitted under state law.
78
Even
if a state were to explicitly empower lawyers to assist marijuana
clients, those lawyers would have to tell those clients that they are in a state of
profound legal uncertainty. Take, for example, the little known case of
Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II.
79
In Hammer, a pair of Arizona citizens
sued a Colorado medical marijuana dispensary in Arizona state court to
recover a $500,000 loan on which the dispensary had stopped making
payments.
80
The court sided with the defendant, holding that neither legal
nor equitable relief was available to the plaintiffs who had knowingly lent
money to defendant for criminal purposes.
81
The court recognized the
absurdity of this result—excusing the defendants from repaying the loan
because they were, in the eyes of the law, drug dealers—but was unwilling to
give the plaintiffs the benefit of their bargain when the conduct envisioned by
78. State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Op. 11–01 (2011) (Scope of Representation); see also, Sam Kamin
& Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. L. REV. 869, 906 (2013)
(“Without the guidance of lawyers, lay clients would often be unable to ascertain the meaning
and application of the law and would therefore be denied the ability to decide how to conduct
themselves under the law in an informed manner. If lawyers were to face disciplinary charges
for ‘assisting’ clients whenever they merely know of the clients’ criminal conduct, lawyers
would be inhibited from representing clients, and the ability of those clients to meaningfully
direct their own conduct would necessarily be compromised.”).
79. Judgment of Dismissal, Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, CV2011-051310 (Ariz. Super.
Ct. April 17, 2012).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 4 (“The explicitly stated purpose of these loan agreements was to finance the sale and
distribution of marijuana. This was in clear violation of the laws of the United States. As
such, this contract is void and unenforceable”).
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 97
the
agreement remained illegal under federal law.
82
An insurance case from
Hawai’i produced an equally disquieting result. A homeowner whose twelve
marijuana plants had been stolen from her home sued her insurance company
for failing to pay out on a policy insuring, among other things, “loss to trees,
shrubs, and other plants.”
83
The court rejected the claim on the basis that
state law did not purport to and could not authorize marijuana cultivation
under federal law and that enforcement of the insurance contract would thus
be contrary to both federal law and policy.
84
These
cases, along with the restrictions on lawyer availability,
demonstrate the unsettling expectations for those in the marijuana industry.
They cannot rely on the contracts they sign or the insurance they pay for. They
may or may not be able to secure legal representation to help them through
the legal minefield created by complex state regulatory apparatuses.
Although they are required to pay their taxes, they cannot deduct their
expenses the way other businesses can. The reason in each case is the same:
In the eyes of the law, they are engaging in criminal conduct.
D. Risks
to Patients and Consumers
If
the previous concerns have largely been localized to those trying to
make a living in the industry, other burdens fall on those who are simply
seeking to use marijuana—either recreationally or medically—within those
states purporting to authorize marijuana for some purposes. In this Subpart
we nonexhaustively categorize some of the potential consequences for those
taking advantage of their states’ weakening of their marijuana prohibitions.
82. Id. (“The rule is that a contract whose formation or performance is illegal is, subject to several
exceptions, void and unenforceable. But this is not all, for one who enters into such a
contract is not only denied enforcement of his bargain, he is also denied restitution for any
benefits he has conferred under the contract.”); see also Order, Haeberle v. Blue Sky Care
Connection, LLC., No.11CV709 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2012), at 8 (“[C]ontracts for the sale of
marijuana are void as they are against public policy. Accordingly, the contract here is void
and unenforceable”).
83. Tracy v. USAA Casualty Ins., Co., No. 11-00487, 2012 WL 928186, at *1 (D. Haw. March
16, 2012).
84. Id. at *13 (“[T]his Court cannot enforce the provision because Plaintiff’s possession and
cultivation of marijuana, even for State-authorized medical use, clearly violates federal law.
To require Defendant to pay insurance proceeds for the replacement of medical marijuana
plants would be contrary to federal law and public policy, as reflected in the CSA, Gonzalez
[v. Raich], and its progeny.”).
98 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
1. Employment
Loss
of employment is perhaps the biggest concern for marijuana users if
their use is discovered. In January 2014 the Colorado Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case of Coats v. Dish Network LLC.
85
Brandon Coats, a
quadriplegic medical marijuana patient, was fired by his employer when his
off-duty marijuana use was discovered by means of a drug test.
86
Coats
alleged that his dismissal violated Colorado’s “lawful activities” statute,
87
which created an exception to Colorado’s at-will employment rules
forbidding the firing of an employee for engaging in lawful conduct while off
duty. A divided Court of Appeals panel held that the firing did not violate
the statute because Coats’s marijuana use was not legal: It remained
prohibited by federal law. The court explained, “[F]or an activity to be
‘lawful’ in Colorado, it must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state
and federal law. Conversely, an activity that violates federal law but complies
with state law cannot be ‘lawful’ under the ordinary meaning of that term.”
88
Thus, federal prohibition can justify the firing of employees who use medical
marijuana even in states where such use is permitted.
2. Probation
and Parole
It
is a condition of nearly every sentence to probation or parole that the
defendant agrees to obey all laws while serving his noncustodial sentence.
89
85. No. 13SC394, 2014 WL 279960 (Colo. Jan. 27, 2014).
86. Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 149 (Colo. App. 2013), cert. granted, No.
13SC394, 2014 WL 279960 (Colo. Jan. 27, 2014).
87. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24–34–402.5 (2013).
88. Coats, 303 P.3d at 150–51. Similar results were reached by the Sixth Circuit and the state
supreme courts in California and Oregon. See Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d
428, 435–37 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act protects
registered adults against criminal liability and other adverse action by the state, but private
employers are not required to accommodate the use of medical marijuana); Ross v. RagingWire
Telecomm. Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204–07 (Cal. 2008) (holding that California’s medical
marijuana law provides immunity from criminal liability but does not require employers to
accommodate employee use of marijuana because, in part, it remains illegal under federal
law); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 529–33
(Or. 2010) (holding that the CSA preempts the provisions of the Oregon Medical Marijuana
Act, which affirmatively authorizes the use of medical marijuana, but does not preempt other
provisions that exempt marijuana-related activities from criminal liability).
89. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–1.3–204(1) (2013) (“[T]he court shall provide as [an]
explicit condition[] of every sentence to probation that the defendant not commit another
offense during the period for which the sentence remains subject to revocation.”). CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (2013) (permitting rearrest of a probationer or parolee if she “has
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 99
Like
the debate over what constitutes lawful off-duty conduct in the
employment context, there is a lingering question of whether marijuana use—
if
permitted by state law but still forbidden by federal law—constitutes the
commission of a new offense sufficient to warrant the revocation of a
probationer or parolee’s release. Colorado courts have held that a medical
marijuana patient is not entitled to use the drug while on probation or parole,
yet courts in Montana and California have come to different conclusions
citing the state policy interest in making marijuana available as a medicine for
those it might benefit.
90
Although the issue, like the question of off-duty
conduct, could be resolved by state statute, at the moment courts continue to
grapple with whether it is permissible for marijuana patients to use the drug
while on probation or parole. The rights of these patients remain unsettled.
3. Family
Law
While
there is little case law on point, it is becoming increasingly clear
that marijuana use will likely play a role in family law proceedings, particularly
in child custody disputes. Some courts have held that a parent’s medical
marijuana use alone cannot form the basis of diminishing her parenting
rights.
91
But there is no guarantee that marijuana use—even use sanctioned
by state law—will not provide a basis for diminishing a parent’s rights. Since
subsequently committed other offenses, regardless whether he or she has been prosecuted for
such offenses.” (emphasis added)).
90. Compare People v. Watkins, 282 P.3d 500, 506 (Colo. App. 2012) (concluding that the
requirement that probationers commit no new offenses includes federal offenses like
marijuana possession and that the passage of medical marijuana provisions did nothing to
change that requirement), with People v. Tilehkooh, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1433, 1437 (2003)
(finding that “the defendant was entitled to assert California's medical marijuana use statute
as a defense against the revocation of his probation”), and State v. Nelson, 195 P.3d 826, 834
(Mont. 2008) (holding that the trial court exceeded its authority in imposing a probation
condition that required the defendant to comply with federal drug laws that conflict with the
state’s medical marijuana statute).
91. See, e.g., In re Alexis E., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 44, 56 (2009) (finding that while the “use of
medical marijuana, without more, cannot . . . bring[] the minors within the jurisdiction of the
dependency court,” further facts about the parent’s marijuana use justified restrictions on his
parental rights); In re Marriage of Parr, 240 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. App. 2010) (“In the absence
of an evidentiary hearing, which the district court could have held . . . , the record does not
show that father's use of medical marijuana represented a threat to the physical and emotional
health and safety of the child, or otherwise suggested any risk of harm. Thus, father's use of
medical marijuana cannot support the trial court's restriction on his parenting time.”); see also
David Malleis, The High Price of Parenting High: Medical Marijuana and Its Effects on Child
Custody Matters, 33 U. LAVERNE L. REV. 357, 357 (2012) (collecting cases in which courts
“have used legal parental marijuana use, in and of itself, as probative negative evidence when
deciding child custody matters”).
100 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
the purchase, cultivation, and possession of marijuana are still violations of
federal law, a court could quite easily conclude that allowing such a parent
extensive supervision of a minor child is not in the child’s best interest.
92
*
* *
This
cursory survey of the issues shows that states seeking to legalize and
regulate marijuana face substantial impediments due to marijuana’s continuing
illegality under federal law. Before turning to a discussion of potential ways
to resolve this tension, we first examine an important preliminary issue: Why
did the federal government decide not to enjoin the new state marijuana laws
as preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution? Part III reveals that even when states legalize marijuana
activity prohibited by federal law, the CSA does not preempt these state laws.
The Tenth Amendment and the CSA itself significantly limit the federal
government’s ability to simply shut down the state marijuana policy
experiments using its Supremacy Clause powers.
III. T
HE CSA AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE
MARIJUANA LAWS
As
Californians were preparing to go to the polls in 2010 to vote on
Proposition 19, which would legalize, tax, and regulate marijuana for adult
recreational use, a group of former heads of the DEA sent a highly publicized
letter expressing their “grave concern.”
93
They urged Attorney General
Holder to publicly oppose the initiative and, if voters approved it, to file a
lawsuit to “uphold the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the
preemption provision of the CSA to prevent Proposition 19 from becoming
law.”
94
This group sent a similar letter to the Attorney General in the fall of
92. See Malleis, supra note 91, at 377 (“Medical marijuana patients who are also full or part time
custodial parents of minor children have reason to fear that their marijuana use may cause
them to lose custody of their children.”). This fear is likely grounded in the fact that
marijuana use, even in states legalizing the drug for some purposes, still carries a significant
stigma due to its illegality under federal law.
93. Letter from the Former Adm’rs of the Drug Enforcement Admin., 1973–2007, to Eric Holder,
U.S. Att’y Gen. (Aug. 24, 2010), available at http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2010/09/Letter-
from-Former-DEA-Administrators-to-AG-Holder.pdf.
94. Id. The letter had its desired effect. Attorney General Holder subsequently made several highly
publicized statements opposing Proposition 19 just weeks before the election. See John Hoeffel,
Holder Vows Fight Over Prop. 19, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, at A4, available at http://articles.
latimes.com/2010/oct/16/local/la-me-marijuana-holder-20101016
(reporting that Holder stated
the DOJ’s “strongly opposes” Proposition 19; that he “promised to ‘vigorously enforce’ federal
drug laws against Californians who grow or sell marijuana for recreational use even if voters
pass the legalization measure;” and that in a letter responding to the one he received from the
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 101
2012
decrying the Washington and Colorado legalization ballot initiatives.
95
They referenced their 2010 letter and asserted that “the CSA clearly states
that federal law trumps state laws when there is a conflict. Since these
initiatives would ‘tax and regulate’ marijuana, there is a clear and direct
conflict with federal law.”
96
No
federal court opinion has yet addressed this broad federal
preemption argument. Yet several state courts have ruled against local
government officials advancing similar arguments seeking to invalidate state
medical marijuana laws as preempted by federal law, and the U.S Supreme
Court denied certiorari when it was sought in these cases.
97
Moreover, when
former DEA administrators, he warned “that a period of turmoil, pitting the federal
government against pot legalization backers, will ensue if voters approve Proposition 19”).
95. Letter from the Former Adm’rs of the Drug Enforcement Admin., 1973–2007, to Eric Holder,
U.S. Att’y Gen. (Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www.saveoursociety.org/sites/saveour
society.org/files/Ltr%202%20to%20AG%20Holder%202012.pdf.
96. Id. Among other things, the letter called on Holder to publicly oppose the state initiatives because
they violated the CSA. Id.; see also Alex Dobuzinskis, Ex-DEA Heads Urge Holder Oppose Marijuana
Ballots, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 2012, 9:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/08/us-usa-
marijuana-holder-idUSBRE8861CI20120908
(reporting in September 2012 that nine former
heads of the DEA sent a letter to Attorney General Holder urging him to oppose the Washington
and Colorado legalization ballot initiatives, citing the primacy of federal law). In a subsequent letter
a year later, the same group urged Holder to file a lawsuit to have the state laws declared preempted
by the CSA. Letter from the Former Adm’rs of the Drug Enforcement Admin., 1973–2007, to
Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.saveoursociety.org/sites/
saveoursociety.org/files/Holder_ltr_090613.pdf
(the letter stated that the Colorado and Washington
state marijuana laws are in “direct conflict with federal law” and called for Holder to live up to his oath
of office and reconsider his decision not to challenge the state laws). The Huffington Post later
reported on a follow-up conference call with reporters in which former directors of the DEA and the
federal Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) explained their view that, “Federal law, the
U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court decisions say that this cannot be done because federal law
preempts state law.” Matt Ferner, States Legalizing Marijuana Will Violate Federal Law, Trigger
Constitutional Showdown: DEA, Drug Czars, HUFFPOST DENVER (Oct. 15, 2012, 10:04 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/15/dea-drug-czars-states-leg_n_1967363.html.
97. See Town of Wakefield v. Coakley, No. CV2013-01684 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 7, 2013)
(rejecting both conflict and obstacle preemption arguments brought against state medical
marijuana provisions); Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 544 (Mich. 2014)
(holding unanimously that the CSA does not preempt the Michigan Medical Marihuana
Act); People v. Crouse, No. 12CA2298, 2013 WL 6673708, at *7–9 (Colo. App. Dec. 19,
2013) (holding that returning improperly seized marijuana to its owner would not violate the
CSA and that the CSA does not preempt state marijuana provisions); Cnty. of San Diego v.
San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 461, 481–83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct.
2380 (2009) (holding that the CSA does not preempt provisions allowing patients to obtain
medical marijuana identification cards because they do not positively conflict with the CSA
so that simultaneous compliance with both sets of laws is impossible; and, the identification
card provisions do not pose significant impediment to federal objectives embodied in the
CSA); City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 4th 355 (2007), cert. denied,
129 S.Ct. 623 (2008) (holding that a medical marijuana patient was qualified to invoke the
protections of California’s medical marijuana law, was entitled under state law to the return
102 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
announcing the most recent iteration of federal marijuana enforcement policy
in the wake of the Colorado and Washington ballot initiatives, the DOJ
explicitly reserved its prerogative to ask federal courts to enjoin state marijuana
laws in the future.
98
A careful analysis of federal preemption doctrine in the
context of state marijuana laws and the CSA is thus warranted here.
A. The
Preemption Doctrine, the Supremacy Clause,
and the Anticommandeering Counterweight
The
preemption doctrine is based on the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause, which makes federal law “the supreme law of the land” trumping
conflicting state laws.
99
The constitutional question that will determine the
outcome of any preemption lawsuit seeking to invalidate state marijuana laws
is whether state laws allowing the sale, cultivation, and use of limited amounts
of marijuana create an impermissible “conflict”—as that term has been
defined by the Supreme Court—with the CSA provisions prohibiting
marijuana altogether.
But
there is a significant constitutional counterweight to the Supremacy
Clause: the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering doctrine.
100
The federal
government may not commandeer states by forcing them to enact laws or by
requiring state officers to assist the federal government in enforcing its own
laws within the state.
101
Under this doctrine, the federal government cannot
of his seized marijuana, and that the return of the marijuana was not precluded by federal
preemption). Although private employers in some medical marijuana states have successfully
argued the supremacy of federal law to defend disciplinary actions against employees based on
drug tests indicating marijuana use, courts in these cases have limited their holdings to the drug
testing issue and left most of the state medical marijuana law provisions in place. See Casias
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 435–37 (6th Cir. 2012); Ross v. RagingWire
Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204–07 (Cal. 2008); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v.
Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 529–33 (Or. 2010).
98. See Southall & Healy, supra note 6 (“If federal prosecutors believe that a state’s controls are
inadequate, ‘the federal government may seek to challenge the regulatory structure itself in
addition to continuing to bring individual enforcement actions, including criminal prosecutions,’
Mr. Cole wrote.”).
99. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
100. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked
Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1446 (2009) (“Though expansive,
Congress‘s preemption power is not, in fact, coextensive with its substantive powers, such as
its authority to regulate interstate commerce. The preemption power is constrained by the
Supreme Court‘s anti-commandeering rule.”).
101. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997) (noting that Congress is also prohibited
from commandeering the states to enforce federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 162 (1992) (observing that “the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon
Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions”).
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 103
require
states to enact or maintain on the books any laws prohibiting
marijuana.
Taken
together, the commandeering prohibition and the Supremacy
Clause help define the contours of our federalist system of coexisting state and
federal governments. A state can constitutionally decide not to criminalize
conduct under state law even if such conduct offends federal law. While states
cannot stop the federal government from enforcing federal law within their
territory, the federal government cannot command the state to create a law
criminalizing the conduct.
102
“No matter how powerful the federal interest
involved, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require
the States to regulate.”
103
The
U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the federal government’s ability to
enforce the CSA even against those complying with more lenient state
marijuana laws.
104
Because Congress has the authority under the Commerce
Clause to prohibit even the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana,
no state can erect a legal shield protecting its citizens from the reach of the
CSA. But at the same time, states’ decisions to eliminate state marijuana
prohibitions are simply beyond the power of the federal government. The
federal government cannot command any state government to criminalize
marijuana conduct under state law.
105
From that incontrovertible premise
flows the conclusion that if states wish to repeal existing marijuana laws or
partially repeal those laws, they may do so without running afoul of federal
preemption.
102. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 912; New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
103. New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
104. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op, 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (holding that there
is no medical necessity exception to the CSA’s marijuana prohibitions); see also Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (The Court held that the CSA can still be applied to intrastate
manufacturing and possession of medical marijuana in compliance with state law. Such local
activities are part of an economic “class of activities,” which have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. CSA regulation of these activities is necessary because of enforcement difficulties in
distinguishing between marijuana grown locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, as well as
concerns about the marijuana’s diversion into illicit channels).
105. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, “the Constitution has never been understood to confer
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’
instructions.” New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
104 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
B. Congress Intended That the CSA Preempt Only State Laws That
Positively Conflict With Federal Law
Although
Congress had the authority to occupy the field of controlled
substances regulation when it enacted the CSA, it explicitly chose not to do
so. Section 903 of the CSA includes an antipreemption provision expressly
disclaiming preemptive intent in all but a narrow set of circumstances:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which that
provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of
any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be
within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict
between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that
the two cannot consistently stand together.
106
As previously noted, the preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy
Clause
107
and the “fundamental principle of the Constitution that Congress
has the power to preempt state law.”
108
But the doctrine is not without limits:
Every preemption case starts “with a presumption that the state statute is
valid” and asks whether the party arguing for preemption “has shouldered the
burden of overcoming that presumption.”
109
Two basic principles guide all
preemption analyses. First, the purpose of the legislation must be analyzed to
determine whether it was the intent of Congress to preempt state law.
110
Second, “[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied,’ [courts] ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”
111
Courts
have “identified four ways in which Congress may preempt state
[or local] law:” express, field, conflict, and obstacle preemption.
112
Whether
federal law preempts state or local law is “fundamentally a question of
106. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (1988) (emphasis added).
107. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
108. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
109. Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 661–62 (2003).
110. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (“[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone in every pre-emption case.”) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996));
see also Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 162 P.3d 569,
574 (Cal. 2007).
111. Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
112. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 862 (Cal. 2010) (quoting In re Jose C.,
198 P.3d 1087, 1098 (Cal. 2009)); see, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372.
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 105
congressional
intent.”
113
When Congress includes an explicit preemption
clause within a statute, courts may rely on the plain text of the clause to
identify congressional intent to preempt state and local laws.
114
When no
express preemptive intent is provided, state laws must yield to a congressional
act when “Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the field.’”
115
But courts
have long presumed that state law is valid when Congress legislates in a field
traditionally occupied by the states.
116
Even in the realm of traditional state
power, however, state law may be preempted to the extent it conflicts with a
valid federal law.
117
In such instances, courts will find a state law to be
preempted when simultaneous compliance with both federal and state law is a
“physical impossibility”
118
or when it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of” a federal statute.
119
The
phrase “positive conflict . . . so that the two cannot consistently
stand together” in section 903 has been interpreted as narrowly restricting the
preemptive reach of the CSA to “cases of an actual conflict with federal law
such that ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
113. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) (citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline
Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988)); see, e.g., Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485 (“[T]he purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”).
114. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011) (“When a
federal law contains an express preemption clause, we ‘focus on the plain wording of the
clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.’”) (citing
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (“When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption
and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and
when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state
authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the
substantive provisions of the legislation.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978))); Cal. Fed.
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987)); English, 496 U.S. at 79
(“[W]hen Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the
courts' task is an easy one.”); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–32 (1947);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1941).
115. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989));
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
116. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2188–89; Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at
485; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
117. See, e.g., Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
118. See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 (2000) (“We will find preemption where it is impossible for a
private party to comply with both state and federal law . . . .”); Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state
law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”).
119. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
106 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
impossibility.’”
120
Justice Scalia has written that the plain language of section
903 states a congressional intent that the CSA preempt only state laws that
require someone to engage in an action specifically forbidden by the CSA.
121
As a California appellate court succinctly put it, “mere speculation about a
hypothetical conflict is not the stuff of which preemption is made.”
122
It
is not physically impossible to comply with both the CSA and state
marijuana laws; nothing in the more liberal state laws requires anyone to act
contrary to the CSA. Only if a state law required a citizen to possess,
manufacture, or distribute marijuana in violation of federal law would it be
impossible for a citizen to comply with both state and federal law. Similarly,
if a state were to make state officers the manufacturers or distributors of
marijuana, it might well be impossible for those officials to comply with both
state and federal law. No state marijuana law, however, has attempted to
require state or local officials to violate the CSA in this manner.
There
is a reasonable argument that this straightforward analysis should
entirely settle the preemption question in the context of all state marijuana
laws that are more permissive than the CSA but do not require anyone to
violate the CSA. The express language of section 903 establishes Congress’s
intent that preemption claims under the CSA be analyzed under a conflict
preemption rubric and, as conflict preemption is applied by the U.S. Supreme
Court, there simply is no conflict between permissive state marijuana laws
and the CSA. But the Court has suggested in some of its preemption
decisions that even when there is an express statutory preemption provision
under which a reviewing court finds no federal preemption, courts should in
some circumstances still undertake an “implied preemption” analysis.
123
120. See S. Blasting Servs., Inc. v. Wilkes Cnty, 288 F.3d 584, 591 (4th Cir. 2002). In rejecting a
federal preemption claim concerning county and federal regulations governing explosive
materials, the court in Southern Blasting Services analyzed the express preemption provision
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 848, which uses language that is materially identical to that in 21
U.S.C. § 903. Section 848 provides:
No
provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of
the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the
exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter, unless there is a
direct and positive conflict between such provision and the law of the State so
that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.
S.
Blasting Servs., 288 F.3d at 590.
121. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 290 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the CSA
“does not purport to pre-empt state law [regarding assisted suicide] in any way . . . unless . . .
some States require assisted suicide”).
122. Solorzano v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161, 169–70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
123. See Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL’Y 5, 23 (2013) (advocating that the Supreme Court adopt a direct conflict approach
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 107
Under
this analysis federal law will preempt if the state law or action at issue
creates an “obstacle to the purposes and objectives” of the federal law.
124
We
therefore turn to consider whether state laws legalizing marijuana
for medical or recreational use are preempted under the Court’s implied
obstacle preemption test. The next Subpart demonstrates that even under
this broad implied obstacle preemption analysis,
125
the CSA does not preempt
more lenient state marijuana laws because such state laws are consistent with
the CSA’s purposes and objectives.
126
1. Implied
Preemption and the Strong Presumption
Against Preemption
The
implied obstacle preemption analysis begins with a strong
presumption against the preemption of state statutes, particularly when, as
here, such statutes operate in a field within which states have traditionally
which “would help courts to avoid the mistakes [of overly broad obstacle preemption tests],
without necessarily running the risk of permitting too many conflicts to go unresolved”).
124. Id.
125. Although the CSA explicitly dictates a conflict preemption analysis, some lower courts have
analyzed claims that the CSA preempts state marijuana laws under an implied obstacle
preemption analysis. See, e.g., Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d
461, 480–83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2380 (2009) (“Because Congress
provided that the CSA preempted only laws positively conflicting with the CSA so that the
two sets of laws could not consistently stand together, and omitted any reference to an intent
to preempt laws posing an obstacle to the CSA, we interpret title 21 United States Code
section 903 as preempting only those state laws that positively conflict with the CSA so that
simultaneous compliance with both sets of laws is impossible. . . . Although we conclude title
21 United States Code section 903 signifies Congress's intent to maintain the power of states
to elect to serve as a laboratory in the trial of novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country all state laws that do not positively conflict with the CSA, we
also conclude the identification laws are not preempted even if Congress had intended to
preempt laws posing an obstacle to the CSA.” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
126. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867–86 (2000) (citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 572–81 (2009)
(analyzing a federal preemption claim under the implied obstacle preemption test after
finding no preemption under an express statutory preemption provision); id. at 593–604
(Thomas, J., concurring) (denouncing the Court’s purposes and objectives preemption
jurisprudence because it “facilitates freewheeling, extratextual, and broad evaluations of the
‘purposes and objectives’ embodied within federal law . . . giving improperly broad pre-
emptive
effect to judicially manufactured policies, rather than to the statutory text enacted by
Congress pursuant to the Constitution . . . lead[ing] to the illegitimate—and thus,
unconstitutional—invalidation of state laws.”).
108 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
regulated.
127
Congress specifically left a significant role for the states in
regulating controlled substances like marijuana, thus triggering this
presumption.
128
The CSA itself addresses areas traditionally regulated by the
states and their subdivisions: public health and medical care,
129
land use,
130
and state and local government’s power to criminalize conduct.
131
Since our
nation’s founding, it has been chiefly state and local governments, not the
federal government, that have taken responsibility for crafting and enforcing
laws designed to promote health and protect safety. In the field of drug
control, specifically, states have long experimented with laws and policies
aimed at reducing the harms caused by the misuse of controlled substances
while maximizing their social and medicinal benefits.
The
U.S. Supreme Court recently reiterated that its “precedents
‘establish that a high threshold must be met if a state law is to be preempted
for conflicting with the purposes of a federal Act.’”
132
“Implied preemption
analysis,” the Supreme Court cautioned, “does not justify a ‘freewheeling
judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal
127. See Cole Memo II, supra note 5, at 2 (“Outside of [the eight federal marijuana enforcement
priorities], the federal government has traditionally relied on state and local law enforcement agencies
to address marijuana activity through enforcement of their own narcotics laws.”).
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (1988).
129. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269–70 (2006) (holding that regulation of the
public health falls within the States’ police powers) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 475 (1996)); see also N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995) (noting that health care has historically been a matter of
local, not federal, concern); Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 719 (1985) (“[T]he regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and historically,
a matter of local concern.” (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947))); Olszewski v. Scripps Health, 69 P.3d 927, 939 (Cal. 2003).
130. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (citing
Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)) (“[R]egulation of land
use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.”); see also Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402 (1979).
131. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (“[F]oremost among the prerogatives of
sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal code.”); Alfred L. Snapp & Son v.
P.R., ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (identifying States’ “sovereign power over
individuals and entities,” including “the power to create and enforce a [criminal] legal code”);
M’Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 418 (1819) (“The good sense of the public has pronounced,
without hesitation, that the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised,
whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his constitutional powers.”); see also In re
Jose C., 198 P.3d 1094, 1097 (Cal. 2009); Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr.
3d 461, 478–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
132. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (Roberts, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110
(1992)) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 109
objectives.’”
133
Indeed, the requisite congressional intent to impliedly
preempt state law may be inferred only “to the extent [the state law] actually
conflicts with federal law.”
134
Moreover, “[t]he case for federal pre-emption is
particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation
of state law in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand
by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between
them.’”
135
When it enacted the CSA, Congress was well aware that there were
many existing state laws concerning marijuana cultivation, sale, and use and
that not all these laws punished this conduct as harshly as the new federal
drug laws; Congress nonetheless “decided to stand by both concepts and to
tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.”
136
The CSA punishes
possession for personal use as a misdemeanor subject to up to one year in
federal prison. Long before the 2012 Washington and Colorado ballot
initiatives, numerous other states already had laws punishing marijuana
offenses much more leniently than the CSA.
137
Several had laws making
possession of up to an ounce of marijuana an infraction punishable only by a fine.
138
133. Id. (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 111) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987).
135. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)). In this sense, the CSA preemption language is clearly
distinguishable from that contained in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA). 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. In July 2014, the Third Circuit held that PASPA
preempted New Jersey’s attempt to regulate sports gambling within the state. NCAA v.
Christie, 730 F.3d 208 (3d. Cir. 2014). The court held that the purpose of PASPA was to
preempt attempts by the states to authorize sports gambling. Id. at 216. Clearly, no such
intent is present in the CSA. Furthermore, although the Third Circuit’s reading of PASPA
would invalidate state attempts to tax and regulate sports gambling, the anti-commandeering
doctrine nonetheless prohibits Congress from requiring the states to keep their existing
sports-gambling bans on the books.
136. See id. (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 166–67; 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012)).
137. Possession of limited amounts of marijuana intended for personal use is classified as a
submisdemeanor offense subject to no jail time in the District of Columbia and the following
states: California, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi (first offense only), Nebraska (first
offense only), New York (first and second offenses only), Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
In addition, the following states do not require jail time for possession of marijuana for personal use,
despite continuing to classify the offense as a misdemeanor: Minnesota, Nevada (first and second
offenses only), North Carolina, and Oregon. See State Info, NORML, http://www.norml.org/
states
(last visited June 23, 2014); State Policy, MPP, http://www.mpp.org/states (last visited June
23, 2014); Marijuana Possession Decriminalization Amendment Act of 2014, B20-409, Council
Period 20 (D.C. 2014).
138. See supra note 137; Washington, D.C., Simple Possession of Small Quantities of Marijuana
Decriminalization Amendment Act of 2013, B20-409 (Mar. 31, 2014).
110 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
Similarly, twenty-three states
139
and Washington, D.C.
140
have enacted laws over
the past eighteen years that allow limited use of marijuana for medical purposes
while federal marijuana law has no exception for medical use.
141
Of
course, the federal government can and does enforce the stricter CSA
provisions even in states that have decriminalized possession or where patients,
other users, and suppliers are in compliance with state medical and
recreational marijuana laws. No one contests the power of the federal government
to do so. The federal government has never argued, however—nor has any court
ever held—that the CSA completely preempts state marijuana laws that are
more permissive than federal law.
2. More
Permissive State Marijuana Laws Are Consistent With
the Purposes and Objectives of the CSA
The
argument that state laws legalizing marijuana activity prohibited by
the CSA pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of federal law has an
139. The twenty-three states that have passed medical marijuana laws are: Alaska (Ballot Measure
8 (1998)), Arizona (Proposition 203 (2010)), California (Proposition 215 (1996)), Colorado
(Ballot Amendment 20 (2000)), Connecticut (House Bill 5389 (2012)), Delaware (Senate
Bill 17 (2011)), Hawaii (Senate Bill 862 (2000)), Illinois (House Bill 1 (2013)), Maine
(Ballot Question 2 (1999)), Maryland (H. Bill 1101 (2013); H. Bill 180 (2013)),
Massachusetts (Ballot Question 3 (2012)), Michigan (Proposal 1 (2008)), Minnesota (S.F.
2470 (2014)), Montana (Initiative 148 (2004)), Nevada (Ballot Question 9 (2000)), New
Hampshire (House Bill 573 (2013)), New Jersey (Senate Bill 119 (2010)), New Mexico
(Senate Bill 523 (2007)), New York (A. 6357/S. 7923 (2014)), Oregon (Ballot Measure 67
(1998)), Rhode Island (Senate Bill 0710 (2006)), Vermont (Senate Bill 76 (2003)), and
Washington (Initiative 692 (1998)).
140. Washington, D.C. legalized medical marijuana with the Legalization of Marijuana for
Medical Treatment Amendment Act of 2010, B18-622 (May 4, 2010).
141. Very limited allowances exist under federal law for FDA approved research projects and the FDA’s
Compassionate Investigational New Drug program, under which four people continue to receive
marijuana from the federal government for their medical treatment. In 1976 Robert Randall, a
glaucoma patient who had lost a significant portion of his vision, successfully established a defense of
medical necessity in his marijuana possession case. U.S. v. Randall, 103 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2249,
2252–54 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 1976). After his court victory, Mr. Randall sued the federal
government, resulting in a 1978 settlement that established a federal medical marijuana program
that served twenty patients suffering from debilitating diseases. See Mohamed Ben Amar,
Cannabinoids in Medicine: A Review of Their Therapeutic Potential, 105 J. ETHNO-
P
HARMACOLOGY 1, 2 (2006) (“In 1978, in response to the success of a lawsuit filed by a glaucoma
patient (Robert Randall) . . . the U.S. Government created a compassionate program for medical
marijuana . . . . This program was closed to new candidates in 1991 by President Bush . . . .”). Under
the program, patients legally receive Food and Drug Administration approved marijuana cigarettes
from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Id. Only four patients remain in the program.
See, e.g., U.S. Government Provides Marijuana to Four Americans, Including 72-Year-Old Eugene
Woman, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 28, 2011, 9:56 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-
northwest-news/index.ssf/2011/09/us_government_provides_marijua.html.
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 111
intuitive
appeal. After all, these states have removed criminal sanctions for,
and thus allow citizens to engage in, conduct that federal law prohibits. How
could that not pose an obstacle to the CSA’s objectives of “combating drug
abuse and controlling the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled
substances”?
142
The problem with this argument is that it confuses the
common definition of “obstacle” with the distinct legal concept developed in
the Supremacy Clause jurisprudence governing federal preemption of state law.
The proper obstacle preemption analysis can be discerned through the
use of a simple thought experiment. Recall the Tenth Amendment’s
anticommandeering proscription discussed above: A state clearly can decide not
to criminalize conduct under state law even if such conduct is prohibited by
federal law. Just as the federal government cannot command the state to create a
law criminalizing conduct,
143
neither can it command the state to leave current
state laws on the books.
144
Imagine, then, that tomorrow a state chooses to
repeal all its state laws concerning marijuana. The CSA would still be in
effect and the federal government could continue to enforce its prohibition
of marijuana within that state, but that conduct would not be illegal under
state law.
Under
those circumstances, the federal government could not require
the state either to reenact its repealed marijuana laws or to assist the federal
government in enforcing the CSA. That would violate the anticommandeering
principle the Court has said is inherent in the Tenth Amendment. Would
such a repeal of state laws, in effect legalizing any and all marijuana use under
state law, pose an obstacle to the CSA’s objectives? It is true that removal of state
sanctions and assistance would make the federal enforcement of its own laws
more difficult in that the federal government would lose an enforcement
partner.
145
But that loss of state assistance cannot constitute an obstacle for
142. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250 (2006).
143. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (observing that “the Constitution has
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern
according to Congress’ instructions”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997) (noting
that Congress is also prohibited from commandeering the states to enforce federal law).
144. See Mikos, supra note 123, at 28 (“The CSA does not, and, as discussed above, cannot, oblige
state officials to punish people for possessing, cultivating, or distributing marijuana.”).
145. In fact, the United States would lose quite a formidable partner when one considers that state
and local law enforcement, rather than federal agencies such as the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), make more than 99 percent of all marijuana arrests in the country annually.
Compare AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 29, at 8 (showing that state and local law
enforcement made 889,133 marijuana arrests in 2010), with MOTIVANS, supra note 29, at 9
(indicating that there were only 8,117 marijuana arrests by the DEA in 2010).
112 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
purposes of the federal preemption analysis.
146
As Judge Kozinski noted in his
concurring opinion in a 2002 Ninth Circuit decision analyzing California’s
medical marijuana laws, “[t]hat patients may be more likely to violate federal law if
the additional deterrent of state liability is removed may worry the federal
government, but the proper response—according to New York and Printz—is to
ratchet up the federal regulatory regime, not to commandeer that of the state.”
147
Now
carry the thought experiment one step further: Imagine that the
day after repealing all its marijuana laws, the same state enacted a new
regulatory scheme under which only adults twenty-one and over would be
allowed to possess marijuana and only up to one ounce. Assume further that
this new state regulatory scheme empowered local jurisdictions to license
commercial cultivation and the sale of marijuana to adults; production and
sales conforming to these regulations—but only such sales—would now be
permitted. Under these new state regulations, possession of more than one
ounce, unlicensed cultivation or sale, and distribution of marijuana to a minor
would all become new criminal offenses. Enacting these new state laws,
creating a tightly regulated marijuana market, and adding new criminal
penalties, could not be deemed an obstacle to the CSA’s objectives of
“combating drug abuse and controlling the legitimate and illegitimate traffic
in controlled substances.”
148
The state’s new laws are a greater support to the
federal goals on day two than they were on day one. On day one the state
permitted all marijuana activity; on day two it prohibited most marijuana
activity, permitting only regulated sales and possession of small amounts. If
the state can remove all its marijuana prohibitions on day one despite the
CSA’s prohibition and despite the Supremacy Clause—and it clearly can—
the state can certainly add some prohibitions back on day two without
running afoul of the CSA.
Doctrinally,
the outcome of the federal preemption analysis in this
context cannot turn upon whether a state first repeals all its marijuana laws
and then subsequently enacts a regulatory scheme or jumps straight from
146. A construction of the CSA that deemed state regulatory systems obstacles for preemption
purposes would raise serious constitutional questions under the Tenth Amendment that
should be avoided when another reasonable construction is available. See Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (“The so-called canon of
constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language
be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.”); see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
147. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (referring to New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
148. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250 (2006).
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 113
prohibition
to regulation. For the same reasons that states may repeal any and all
state marijuana laws, they may remove some or even all criminal penalties and
impose a state system to regulate marijuana activity instead.
Given
the significant limitations on the federal government’s ability to
nullify state laws legalizing marijuana, and the increasing public support for
liberalizing marijuana laws, the number of states doing away with their
marijuana prohibitions is likely to only grow in the years to come. In the next
Part we examine some possible solutions to the tensions between state and
federal regulation of marijuana.
IV. C
HANGING FEDERAL LAW TO ACCOMMODATE STATE
MARIJUANA LAWS
In
Part III, we demonstrated that even if no criminal marijuana
prosecutions are brought under the CSA, the tension between federal law and
state laws with regard to marijuana enforcement generates an untenable status
quo. Expectations are unsettled and state policy goals are frustrated by the
legal-but-not-entirely-legal status of marijuana in twenty-three states. In this
Part, we discuss a number of possible changes to federal law that could resolve
this clash of federal and state authority.
A. Proposed
Federal Marijuana Bills
Several
federal marijuana-related bills have been introduced in Congress in
recent years, but none have gained much traction. Separately, these bills proposed
to: (1) remove marijuana from the CSA schedule of drugs and the enforcement and
punishment provisions of the federal code;
149
(2) reschedule marijuana to allow
marijuana for medical use in the states where medical marijuana has been legalized
and to ensure “an adequate supply of marijuana is available for therapeutic and
medicinal research;”
150
(3) provide an affirmative defense for medical marijuana-
related
activities conducted in compliance with state law and mandate the return
of property seized by the federal government in connection to marijuana
prosecutions;
151
(4) amend the asset forfeiture provisions of the CSA to
prohibit the seizure of real property used in activities performed in
149. Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, H.R. 499, 113th Cong. § 101 (2013).
Federal law would continue to prohibit trafficking and the unlicensed cultivation, production,
manufacturing, and sale of marijuana.
150. States’ Medical Marijuana Patient Protection Act, H.R. 689, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013).
151. Truth in Trials Act, H.R. 710, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2013).
114 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
compliance with state marijuana laws;
152
(5) amend the CSA preemption
provision (21 U.S.C. § 903) to specify that the CSA shall not be construed to
indicate that Congress intended to occupy the field of marijuana enforcement
or preempt state marijuana laws;
153
(6) prohibit the DEA and the DOJ from
spending taxpayer money to raid, arrest, or prosecute medical marijuana
patients and providers in states where medical marijuana is legal;
154
(7)
prohibit any provision of the CSA from being applied to any person acting in
compliance with state marijuana laws;
155
and (8) provide legal immunity from
criminal prosecution to banks and credit unions providing financial services to
marijuana-related businesses acting in compliance with state law.
156
Some
of these solutions—such as removing marijuana from the CSA
entirely or completely disclaiming any congressional intent to preempt any
state marijuana law—would largely eliminate the collateral consequences
identified in Part II. Since Congress does not yet appear inclined to
completely end or even to significantly curtail the federal prohibition of
marijuana, we describe more incremental permissive and cooperative
federalism approaches that could allow states meeting specified federal
criteria to opt out of the CSA provisions relating to marijuana while leaving
federal law unchanged in those states content with the status quo.
B. State
and Federal Joint Enforcement of Marijuana: Permissive
or
Cooperative Federalism
Under
either a permissive or cooperative federalism approach, the
federal government could allow states to govern marijuana laws and
regulations within their borders so long as the state regulatory schemes comply
with specified federal requirements such as those set out in the Cole
Memorandum II.
152. States’ Medical Marijuana Property Rights Protection Act, H.R. 784, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013).
153. Respect States’ and Citizens’ Rights Act of 2013, H.R. 964, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
154. H. Amdt. 748, 113th Cong. (2013–14) (amending Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 4660, 113th Cong. (2013–14)). Substantially similar
versions of this amendment had been introduced in at least six other legislative sessions. The
amendment finally passed in the House on May 5, 2014.
155. Respect State Marijuana Laws Act of 2013, H.R. 1523, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
156. Marijuana Business Access to Banking Act of 2013, H.R. 2652, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013).
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 115
1. Permissive
Federalism
Under
a permissive federalism approach, Congress could allow an
administrative agency to grant state-level temporary, revocable waivers of the
CSA marijuana provisions based on specified criteria. During the period of
the waiver, participating states could experiment with their own laws and
regulations while the federal government agrees not to enforce federal law.
For example, several federal welfare statutes allow the federal and state
governments to share authority over welfare policy provided that state policies
meet federal guidelines.
157
The federal government is authorized to use
revocable waivers to grant states temporary oversight over a set of policies for
specified periods of time.
For
instance, section 1115 of the Social Security Act (SSA) authorizes
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) to
waive specified statutory requirements of the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) program, thereby allowing states to experiment
with novel welfare strategies.
158
The Secretary may issue these waivers to the
extent, and for the period of time, necessary to enable states to carry out pilot
programs that promote the objectives of the TANF program.
159
The waivers
last only for the duration of the demonstration projects, which are typically
granted for less than five years.
160
Thus, the SSA permits a state to establish
an experimental welfare project if it furthers the federal objectives of the
TANF program and the Director of HSS grants the state a time-limited
waiver of its federally statutory obligations.
161
157. See Shelly Arsneault, Welfare Policy Innovation and Diffusion: Section 1115 Waivers and the
Federal System, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 49, 49–50 (2000).
158. See 42 U.S.C. 1315 (2013); Arsneault, supra note 157, at 151, 158–59; see also OFFICE OF
FAMILY ASSISTANCE, TANF-ACF-IM2012-03 (GUIDANCE CONCERNING WAIVER AND
EXPENDITURE AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 1115) (2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/programs/ofa/resource/policy/im-ofa/2012/im201203/im201203;
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., STATE WELFARE WAIVERS: AN OVERVIEW (2001), available at http://aspe.
hhs.gov/hsp/isp/waiver2/waivers.htm.
Similar waivers were allowed under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program before the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
replaced it. See id.; Arsneault, supra note 157, at 151.
159. 42 U.S.C. 615 (2012). Under TANF, states may be granted welfare waivers to pursue pilot
projects in any of the following categories: work and training requirements, time limits,
family cap provisions, income disregards, resource limits transitional assistance, eligibility for
two-parent families, and child support enforcement. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 158.
160. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 158.
161. See, e.g., Michael Wiseman, State Strategies for Welfare Reform: The Wisconsin Story, 15 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 515 (1996); Arsneault, supra note 157, at 57–58.
116 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
Revocable waivers could be a good first step toward permitting states to
experiment with novel approaches to legalizing and regulating marijuana.
Marijuana policy expert Mark Kleiman has proposed a revocable waiver
approach under which an administrative agency could grant state-level
waivers of the CSA marijuana provisions based on specified criteria.
162
In
effect, the revocable waiver would provide a more reliable nonenforcement of
federal law guarantee that the Cole Memorandum II implies. But as long as
the federal government merely agrees not to enforce federal law in opt-out
states, and thus conduct is illegal but not prosecuted, most, if not all, the
ancillary problems flowing from the continued illegality under federal law are
likely to remain.
2. Cooperative
Federalism
In
light of this concern with a permissive revocable waiver, we suggest
that a cooperative federalism approach is a better solution. Congress could
amend the CSA to allow states to opt out of most
163
of the CSA’s marijuana
provisions within its borders, thereby making conduct allowed by state law
actually legal under federal law within that state.
Cooperative
federalism has been described as “a partnership between the
States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective.”
164
Put
differently, cooperative federalism allows federal and state laws to solve
problems jointly rather than conflict with each other. In the interest of
cooperation, certain federal statutes permit cooperative agreements between
the federal government and the states to solve issues of mutual concern. In
the context of marijuana policy, such agreements would provide that only state
law governs marijuana enforcement within opt-out states so long as the states
comply with federal guidelines. In all other states, the CSA would continue
to control.
162. Mark A.R. Kleiman, Cooperative Enforcement Agreements and Policy Waivers: New Options for
Federal Accommodation to State-Level Cannabis Legalization, 6 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 6 (2013).
163. Because a cooperative federalism framework would only allow state marijuana laws to govern
activities taking place within opt-out states, the CSA would continue to govern all interstate
and international marijuana trafficking. Obviously, no state would be able to regulate or
punish marijuana trafficking that affected states or territories outside of its control.
164. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992).
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 117
a. Existing
Examples of Cooperative Federalism
Examples
of cooperative frameworks can be found in several federal
statutes, including the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Clean Air Act
(CAA), and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).
i. The
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts
The
plain language of the CAA
165
and CWA
166
states a congressional
intent that the federal government and the states work together to prevent
pollution. Under the CAA, each state has primary responsibility for the air quality
within its geographic area.
167
States may promulgate their own air pollution
prevention plans, but if those plans do not meet the requirements of the CAA
then a federal plan will be promulgated instead.
168
Along
the same lines, the CWA grants states primary responsibility for
water quality standards, but the federal government may take a more active
role if a state fails to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)’s mandates.
169
The CWA requires states to periodically review and
165. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) (2006) (stating that the goal of the CAA “is to encourage or otherwise
promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions, consistent with the provisions of
this chapter, for pollution prevention”); see 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2006) (“The Administrator shall
encourage cooperative activities by the States and local governments for the prevention and
control of air pollution . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 7402(b) (2006) (“The Administrator shall
cooperate with and encourage cooperative activities by all Federal departments and agencies . . . so as
to assure the utilization . . . of all appropriate and available facilities and resources within the
Federal Government.”).
166. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to
plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land
and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority
under this chapter. It is the policy of Congress that the States manage the construction grant
program under this chapter and implement the permit programs under sections 1342 and
1344 of this title. It is further the policy of the Congress to support and aid research relating
to the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, and to provide Federal technical
services and financial aid to State and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection
with the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution.”).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (2006) (outlining the
requirements for what shall be included in the plans and revisions, including requirements for
data collection and analysis that must be provided to the Administrator upon request). States
are required to submit implementation plans and may submit revisions specifying “the
manner in which . . . air quality standards will be achieved and maintained within each air
quality control region in such State,” including the establishment of procedures for
monitoring air quality and collecting and analyzing data. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (2006).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2012).
169. The CWA mandates two sets of water quality measures: “effluent limitations,” which are
promulgated by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and “water quality
118 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
update these standards, subject to EPA approval.
170
If a state fails to comply,
the EPA is authorized to directly promulgate water quality standards on
behalf of the state.
171
It
is easy to see how these statutes avoid running afoul of the
anticommandeering doctrine. States are not obligated to do a thing. They
may legislate if they wish—subject to federal guidelines—or they may do
nothing and be subject to federal regulation instead.
ii. The
Establishment and Operation of Health Care Exchanges Under
the Affordable Care Act
Similar
to the CWA and CAA, section 1321 of the ACA establishes a
cooperative federalism model for implementing and running healthcare
exchanges in each state.
172
The ACA authorizes states to establish their own
health care exchanges, subject to the standards established by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services pursuant to section 18041(a) of the ACA.
173
The Secretary is mandated to establish and operate an exchange within states
electing not to run their own healthcare exchanges or failing to make their
exchanges operational.
174
Thus, states can elect to have as much or as little
federal involvement in their healthcare exchanges as they choose as long as
they comply with federal regulations.
b. Applying
the Cooperative Federalism Approach to Marijuana Laws
We
propose below an amendment to the CSA that would allow states
and the federal government to cooperatively enforce and regulate marijuana.
standards,” which are generally promulgated by the States. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 101; 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1313–14 (2012). The two water quality measures are meant to supplement
each other in order “to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels.” See
Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 101 (citing EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205, n. 12 (1976); 40 CFR § 131 (1991)).
170. See Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 101 (“[T]he Act requires . . . that state authorities periodically
review water quality standards and secure the EPA's approval of any revisions in the standards.”).
171. See id. (referencing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)).
172. In the statute, Congress expressly granted states “flexibility” related to the establishment and
operation of healthcare exchanges. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 186 (2010) Part III of the
ACA, “State Flexibility Relating to Exchanges” is codified under 42 U.S.C. §§ 18041–18042 (2012).
173. Id.
174. Id. Since the implementation of the ACA, seventeen states have chosen to run their own
healthcare exchanges, twenty-seven have federally-run exchanges, and six have a hybrid
model. See, e.g., Christina Scotti, Why State-Run Health Exchanges Are Faring Better, FOX BUS.
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2013/10/16/why-state-run-
health-exchanges-are-faring-better).
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 119
As
with the CAA, CWA, and ACA, state law would govern in states that
have legalized recreational or medical marijuana. Federal law would
supplement state law only when states defer to federal law or fail to satisfy
federal requirements.
175
Just as the EPA works with states to enforce air and
water pollution laws, federal agencies could continue to cooperate with opt-
out
states and local governments to enforce marijuana laws. But state laws and
regulations would control within those states’ borders rather than the CSA.
Amending the CSA to include a cooperative federalism framework for
marijuana laws would give the federal government influence over the
enforcement and regulatory priorities of those states that choose to ease
prohibitions on marijuana. By requiring opt-out states to comply with
specific federal marijuana enforcement and regulatory priorities, such an
approach would incentivize states—which have much greater drug enforcement
resources than the federal government
176
—to use local law enforcement resources
to help achieve federal priorities. Simply stated, the federal government can
incentivize state marijuana enforcement and regulatory priorities by requiring
opt-out states to comply with enumerated guidelines in order to avoid CSA
oversight within their borders.
Importantly,
modifying the CSA to allow cooperative agreements
between the states and the federal government would allow the federal
government to guide state policy without commandeering the state
legislatures while giving states the freedom to develop the best approach for
regulating marijuana. Furthermore, variations among the state laws and
regulations would allow for experimentation just short of full legalization.
While some states would maintain their current marijuana prohibitions,
others would likely test out different regulatory schemes permitting more or
less marijuana activity. The relative successes and failures of the various
marijuana legalization models would help inform other states—and possibly
the federal government—about the best practices for legalizing marijuana for
adults while maintaining public safety. Moreover, this model mitigates the
impact of marijuana legalization on states choosing to maintain the status quo.
175. These federal requirements could incorporate the eight marijuana enforcement priorities
listed in the August 29, 2013, memorandum issued by Deputy Attorney General Cole. See
Cole Memo II, supra note 5, at 1–2.
176. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
120 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
c. Amending Section 903 of the CSA to Allow Cooperative Federalism
As
noted in Part IV, Congress included an explicit antipreemption
provision in section 903 of the CSA. Section 903 sets out the limited
circumstances under which the CSA will preempt state laws. We propose
adding a new section 903A to effect the cooperative federalism approach
discussed above. This new section reads as follows:
Section 903. Application of State Law
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which that
provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of
any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise
be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive
conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State
law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.
Section 903A. CSA Marijuana Control Law Opt-Out Procedure
for States
(1) Notwithstanding
any other provision of law:
(a) No
provision of this subchapter or any other federal
statute concerning marijuana, including but not limited to
criminal and civil penalties, shall apply to any acts which
take place within the jurisdiction of any State during any
time period in which such State is certified as a CSA
Marijuana Control Opt-Out State by the Attorney
General under the procedure established in subdivision
(2), except to the extent the certified State’s laws expressly
provide otherwise.
(b) In
any State certified under subdivision (2) during any
period of time the State is so certified:
i. The certified State’s laws concerning marijuana
shall supersede and have full effect and control
to the exclusion of this subchapter’s provisions
concerning marijuana.
ii. No
Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted
by any certified State for the purpose of
regulating marijuana.
(2) The Attorney General shall, as soon as practicable after the
enactment of this Section, issue regulations establishing a
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 121
procedure by which States may request certification as a CSA
Marijuana Control Opt-Out State. The regulations shall
require the Attorney General to certify any requesting State
within a reasonable time period unless the Attorney General
determines that State’s marijuana control laws do not create
strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems
reasonably able to prevent the following:
(a) the
distribution of marijuana to minors;
(b) revenue
from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal
enterprises, gangs and cartels;
(c) the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal
under state law in some form to other states;
(d) state-authorized
marijuana activity from being used as a
cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or
other illegal activity;
(e) violence
and the use of firearms in the cultivation and
distribution of marijuana;
(f) drugged
driving and the exacerbation of other adverse
public health consequences associated with marijuana use;
(g) growing
of marijuana on public lands and the attendant
public safety and environmental dangers posed by
marijuana production on public lands;
(h) preventing
marijuana possession or use on federal
property.
(3) The
certification granted under subdivision (2) shall be for a
period of two years. Before the expiration of this two-year
certification period the Attorney General shall reassess the
State’s marijuana control laws unless the State notifies the
Attorney General it is not seeking recertification. The State
shall be recertified every two years unless the Attorney
General determines that the State’s marijuana control laws
no longer meet the standards set out in subdivision (2).
(4) Any
determination that a State seeking certification under
subdivision (2) does not satisfy the certification standards set
out in that subdivision shall be conveyed in writing and shall
specify all the criteria provided in subdivisions (a) through
(h) of subdivision (2) that the State’s marijuana control laws
fail to satisfy. Any such written determination shall also
include specific changes to the State’s marijuana control laws
that would bring the State into compliance with the specified
criteria and allow certification.
(5) The
regulations issued under subdivision (2) shall include:
122 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015)
(a) Emergency procedures by which the Attorney General
may seek to revoke a certification granted under
subdivision (2) before the expiration of the two-year
certification period if a certified State’s marijuana control
laws no longer meet the standards set out in subdivision
(2) and there is an imminent threat of significant harm to
a person or persons unless federal law is reinstated; and
(b) Procedures
by which a State may seek administrative
review of any decision to deny certification under
subdivision (2) or revoke a certification previously
granted.
CONCLUSION
With
growing majorities of Americans in favor of legalizing
marijuana,
177
the tension between state and federal law will not resolve itself.
Short of a decision by Congress to drop marijuana from the CSA entirely—
an
unlikely political outcome even given the majority of Americans who
might favor it—a more modest federal legislative solution is needed. The
cooperative federalism solution that we suggest is both feasible and
effective—it will allow state experimentation to proceed while giving the
federal government the ability to influence the direction of that legal change.
177. See, e.g., Majority Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR PEOPLE & THE
PRESS (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/04/majority-now-supports-legalizing-
marijuana;
Art Swift, For First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP POLITICS
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizing-
marijuana.aspx;
CNN/ORC Poll Regarding Marijuana Legalization, CNN & ORC INT’L (Jan. 6,
2014), at p. 2, http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2014/images/01/06/cnn.orc.poll.marijuana.pdf
(showing that 54 percent of Americans polled believe that Marijuana should be made legal). The
New York Times further evidenced this growing trend by becoming the first major national
newspaper to officially endorse marijuana legalization. See The Editorial Board, Repeal Prohibition,
Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/
high-time-marijuana-legalization.html?_r=0.
In addition, the New York Times went as far as
endorsing three state marijuana legalization initiatives on the November 2014 ballot. The Editorial
Board, Yes to Marijuana Ballot Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
10/06/opinion/alaska-oregon-and-the-district-of-columbia-should-legalize-pot.html?_r=1.
