Presidential Veto Powers

International IDEA

Constitution-Building Primer

Elliot Bulmer

International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 14

Second edition

First published in 2015 by International IDEA

International IDEA publications are independent of specic national or political interests.

Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA,

its Board or its Council members.

The electronic version of this publication is available under a Creative Commons Attribute-NonCommercial-

ShareAlike 3.0 (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) licence. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the publication as well

as to remix and adapt it, provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, that you appropriately attribute the

publication, and that you distribute it under an identical licence.

For more information on this licence visit the Creative Commons website:

<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/>

International IDEA

Strömsborg

SE–103 34 Stockholm

Sweden

Telephone: +46 8 698 37 00

Email: info@idea.int

Website: <http://www.idea.int>

Cover design: International IDEA

Cover illustration: © 123RF, <http://www.123rf.com>

Produced using Booktype: <https://booktype.pro>

ISBN: 978-91-7671-117-0

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................  3
Advantages and risks ................................................................................................  3
2. What is the issue?................................................................................................... 4
3. Nature and purposes of the veto power ...............................................................  6
Where does the veto come from?..............................................................................  6
How does the veto relate to the separation of powers and checks and balances?........  7
How does the veto power affect the role and functions of the president? ..................  8
4. Basic design options ............................................................................................ 12
On what grounds may the veto be exercised?..........................................................  12
How can the veto be overwritten? ..........................................................................  13
5. Additional design considerations ....................................................................... 18
Should the president have a line-item veto? ............................................................  18
Timelines and the pocket veto................................................................................  19
Need to consult before exercising a veto .................................................................  21
Statement of reasons...............................................................................................  21
Presidential amendments........................................................................................  21
Referring bills to the people....................................................................................  22
6. Contextual considerations................................................................................... 23
Contents

Timing of elections ................................................................................................  23
Legislative structure................................................................................................  24
The whole package of presidential powers ..............................................................  24
Political culture and expectations ...........................................................................  26
7. Alternatives to the presidential veto...................................................................  27
8. Decision-making questions ................................................................................. 28
9. Examples ...............................................................................................................  30
References ................................................................................................................. 32
Annex.......................................................................................................................... 34
About the author....................................................................................................  34
About International IDEA .....................................................................................  34
About this series .....................................................................................................  35

International IDEA 3

1. Introduction

A presidential veto is a constitutional mechanism that enables an elected head of

state to refuse assent to a legislative bill (proposed law) that has been passed by the

legislature, but not yet finally enacted. The effect of the presidential veto is to

stop the bill from becoming law, unless the veto is overridden according to a

constitutionally prescribed procedure which normally involves a super-majority

decision in the legislature. The grounds on which the veto power may be

exercised and the difficulty of overriding the veto vary between jurisdictions.

This Primer focuses on the legislative veto power in presidential and semi-

presidential democracies, where popularly elected presidents exercise substantial

powers and are expected to play a relatively active political role. The veto power

can be a powerful tool, in such systems, in strengthening the president's influence

over policy and legislation. The Primer also mentions vetoes exercised by heads of

state in parliamentary democracies, but only in brief.

Advantages and risks

Historically, the veto power was intended mainly as a passive instrument to

protect the constitutional separation of powers and the rights of citizens as part of

a system of checks and balances. It retains this function in many cases but has also

emerged as an instrument of inter-institutional policy bargaining in democracies

characterized by presidential leadership.

The veto power puts great power and responsibility in the hands of one person:

why should one person’s decision outweigh the decision of a whole legislative

assembly? Excessive presidential veto powers may unbalance the working

relationship between the executive and legislative branches, resulting in a

combination of autocracy and deadlock.

4International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

2. What is the issue?

In a society governed by the rule of law, it is important to have a clear statement

of what the law is. It is therefore necessary to make an unambiguous distinction

between a mere legislative proposal and an adopted law. This distinction is made

at the moment of enactment or promulgation (procedures and terminology vary

between jurisdictions) and is typically marked by the formal signature of the bill

that is about to become a law by the head of state. In granting his or her

signature, or assent, to the new law, the head of state gives it finality and formal

legitimacy.

Assenting to a bill usually implies at least the possibility of refusing or

withholding assent. The power of a head of state to refuse or to withhold assent to

legislation is known as the veto power. The veto power is, by nature, an essentially

reactive instrument. It does not enable a president to initiate change but rather to

protect the status quo by preventing change. In principle, this allows a president

to protect the constitution, to uphold the balance and separation of the powers,

to prevent the enactment of rushed or badly drafted legislation and to thwart

legislation that serves special interests rather than the common good.

However, the veto power is not only reactive. Since the veto power increases a

president’s political bargaining power with respect to the legislature, a skillful and

popular president can also use the veto power in proactive ways, as a potentially

potent tool for policy leadership and agenda-setting.

Since the presidential veto power can play such a vital role in executive–

legislative relations, those involved in designing a constitution need to consider

whether the president should have a veto power, and, if so, on what grounds and

under what circumstances it may be used. It is also important to consider how the

veto power fits into the internal logic of the proposed constitution and relates to

the overall balance of powers in a democratic system.

International IDEA 5

2. What is the issue?

Strong presidential veto powers are typically found in older presidential

democracies that are based on the classical 19th-century model of the separation

of the powers. Semi-presidential democracies usually have relatively weaker

presidential veto powers, as do some recent presidential constitutions (especially

in Latin America). In most presidential and semi-presidential democracies,

however, presidents enjoy at least some discretionary veto power, enabling them

to halt or hinder the enactment of legislation.

In contrast, heads of state in parliamentary democracies, who are expected to

act mainly as civic and ceremonial figureheads, usually have only a very limited

veto power, if any. In those countries, the head of state's veto tends to be more of

a constitutional safeguard or a symbolic measure, rather than a tool for regularly

influencing policy. For more information on veto powers in parliamentary

systems, see International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer No. 6, Non-

Executive Presidents in Parliamentary Democracies, and Constitution-Building

Primer No. 7, Constitutional Monarchs in Parliamentary Democracies.

Excessive veto powers may produce a deadlocked political system in which

necessary decisions cannot be taken, and in which policy coherence,

accountability and good governance are forfeited. In most cases, therefore,

presidential vetoes can be overturned or overridden by the legislature by certain

specified procedures or in certain specified circumstances. The precise

formulation of these rules can, depending upon the political circumstances, have a

substantial impact on policy decisions and on governance outcomes.

6International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

3. Nature and purposes of the

veto power

Where does the veto come from?

The origins of the modern legislative veto power exercised by elected presidents

can be traced back to the right of medieval European kings to reject proposals and

requests put to them by their parliaments. In so doing, the king, who was

supposed to be the guardian of justice and of the common good, was placing his

universal judgment above the particular interests of the representatives of the

feudal estates.

In the period following the American (1776) and French (1789) revolutions,

some democratic constitutional thinkers, including Thomas Paine and Thomas

Jefferson, sought to abolish the veto power, in part because of its associations with

monarchy. For these radical republicans, freedom was expressed primarily

through the right of the people to exercise control over, and to participate in,

their government. They placed their faith in local democracy, active public

engagement and frequent elections. The presidential veto power was seen as a

‘dangerous’ and ‘arbitrary’ restraint on the authority of the people’s elected

representatives, which would give too much power to one person (Paine, 1805).

Meanwhile, more conservative thinkers, such as Alexander Hamilton and John

Adams, were sceptical of such populist notions. Understanding freedom primarily

in terms of the limitation of power (including the power of the people), they were

concerned with protecting private interests and property rights. They regarded

the veto as a necessary protection against the so-called ‘tyranny of the majority’,

which they thought to be an inherent consequence of lodging power in an

unrestrained legislature. They justified presidential veto powers as ‘a salutary

International IDEA 7

3. Nature and purposes of the veto power

check upon the Legislative body, calculated to guard the community against . . .

any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a

majority of that body’ (Hamilton 1788).

These disputes between 18th-century radical democrats and their conservative

counterparts are not merely of historical interest. For constitutional designers

today, they continue to illuminate an important and enduring principle: the veto

power originated as a way to restrain the power of the elected representatives of the

people. In essence, the veto is a counter-majoritarian instrument, the direct effect

of which is to privilege the status quo, to make it harder to pass laws and to make

social change through the action of the legislative majority harder to achieve. The

extent to which this is the case, of course, varies depending on the exact veto and

override rules in place, on the electoral system and on other contextual factors.

How does the veto relate to the separation of powers and

checks and balances?

According to the classical doctrine of the separation of powers, the power of

enacting laws (legislative power) should be separated from the power of

administering the state (executive power) and the power of interpreting and

applying the laws to particular cases (judicial power). However, constitutions

adhering to this doctrine do not typically keep the branches of government

entirely separate. As James Madison argued, the doctrine allows for each of the

three branches of government to have some involvement in, or control over, the

acts of the other two. This partial mixture of mutually controlling powers is

known as a system of checks and balances.

Madison regarded the executive’s power to veto legislation as one of the most

important of these checks and balances, noting approvingly that it existed in

many of the early US state constitutions (Madison 1788). However, the veto

power is only one of the ways in which the three main branches of government

interact and restrain one another. For example, a president might (depending on

the constitutional rules in the country in question) have the right to propose

legislation, to call urgent meetings of the legislature, to issue decrees with the

force of law in certain circumstances, to appeal to the people in a referendum or

even to dissolve the legislature and call early elections. For its part, the legislature

might have the power not only to override the veto according to a special

procedure but also to impeach the president, to approve certain important

presidential nominations and to oversee the conduct of the administration

through committee hearings and special inquiries.

When designing the provisions of a constitution referring to presidential veto

powers (and legislative override procedures), it is helpful to think about these

provisions in relation to the whole constitution and as part of an overall system of

checks and balances. If there are too few checks and balances, the government

8International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

might become arbitrary and autocratic, as well as incoherent and corrupt; but if

checks and balances are too strong, government might be strangled, making good

governance difficult and so inviting extraconstitutional means of augmenting

power (e.g. coups, coercion, bribery). Some typical checks and balances within a

modern constitution based on separated powers are shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Separation of powers and checks and balances in the Constitution of

Liberia (1986)

Branch of government Checks on the

legislature

Checks on the

executive

Checks on the

judiciary

Legislature (House and

Senate)

Enacts laws (article 29)

 Legislature can:

Appropriate money

(article 34)

Ratify treaties (article

34)

Override presidential

veto (article 35)

Impeach the

president (article 62)

Legislature can:

Impeach and remove

judges (article 43)

Approve judicial

appointments (article

54)

Organize the judiciary

(article 65)

Propose constitutional

changes (article 91)

Executive (President)

Conducts the administration

in accordance with the

country’s laws (article 50)

Executive can:

Call special sessions

(article 32)

Veto bills or line items

(article 35)

Propose bills (article

58)

Executive can:

Nominate judges

(article 54)

Grant pardons (article

59)

Judiciary (Courts)

Interprets laws and applies

them to litigants (article 65)

Judiciary can:

Determine

constitutionality of

laws (article 66)

Judiciary can:

Determine legality of

executive acts (article

66)



How does the veto power affect the role and functions of the

president? 

When considering the scope and extent of the veto power, it may be helpful to

examine how the constitution’s checks and balances reflect, and relate to, (a) the

central role of leadership within the constitution; and, therefore, (b) what role the

veto power is supposed to play in checking or facilitating leadership.

International IDEA 9

3. Nature and purposes of the veto power

Presidential veto as a means of protecting the constitution

One of the traditional functions of the presidential veto power is to protect the

public against legislation that is blatantly unconstitutional or that has not been

enacted in accordance with the proper constitutional procedure. The president’s

role is essentially that of a constitutional guardian, whose function is to conduct

an executive review of proposed legislation (in contrast to the more widely

known judicial review). This understanding of the veto power necessarily

assumes that the primary centre of political leadership lies elsewhere besides the

presidency (e.g. in the Cabinet in the case of a semi-presidential system, or in the

leaders of the legislative majority in a presidential system). According to many

scholars, the protection of the constitution was the original purpose of the veto as

envisaged by the authors of the Constitution of the United States. The veto

power, by this account, was initially conceived as a reactive, and quite

exceptional, instrument that would be used only occasionally and that could only

‘be applied legitimately to legislation that was clearly unconstitutional,

encroached on executive power, or was badly drafted’ (McCarty 2009: 369).

Presidential veto as a protection against harmful policies and corruption

In many jurisdictions, the veto power can be used by presidents to prevent the

passage of legislation that the president finds objectionable on policy or

substantive grounds, without having to make any complaint against the

constitutional or procedural propriety of the bill in question. In addition to being

deployed against legislation to which the president is ideologically opposed, the

veto power is often relied upon as a means of preventing the enactment of so-

called pork-barrel bills (where legislators vote for public funds to be spent on

projects in their own districts) or special-interest legislation (where lobbyists

attempt to influence legislators to enact laws that privilege a certain section of

society against the common good).

This understanding of the veto power, in contrast to the veto exercised solely

on constitutional or procedural grounds, widens the scope of presidential

discretion. It calls on the president, as a figure representing a national

constituency, to consider the merits, wisdom and necessity of a bill, and to act as

the guardian of general interests. Yet it is still essentially a reactive and negative

power that asks the president to review, and to approve or reject, legislative

proposals initiated by others (e.g. congressional leaders). It views the president as

an autonomous policy actor, but not necessarily as the sole or primary policy

initiator.

Veto as a tool of presidential leadership

One of the major developments that has occurred in presidential democracies

over the past century is a change in the position and perception of presidential

10International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

leadership. In the classical model of the separation of the powers, as it developed

in the 18th and 19th centuries, the president was in principle regarded as the

leader of the executive branch and as the head of the administration, but not

necessarily (at least not in times of peace) as the leader of the country or of the

political system as a whole; domestic policy leadership was assumed to be shared

between the president and the legislature.

Presidential leadership was transformed, however, by urbanization and

industrialization. Regulating expanding commerce and promoting industrial

development, while also responding to the demands of the urban poor and

correcting the ill-effects of development, resulted in an increased demand for, and

expectation of, presidential leadership in domestic policymaking. In the United

States, this change occurred during the so-called Progressive Era (1890s–1920s)

and during the New Deal (1933–45). Broadly parallel developments occurred in

Latin American presidential democracies; the Chilean Constitution of 1925,

which concentrated more policymaking power in the President, was a notable

example (Gargarella 2013). In African states, presidential leadership was widely

seen as necessary to promote development and meet the needs of increasingly

urban populations after independence in the 1960s. Faced with a need to provide

coherent policy leadership, presidents in many countries are seen not only as the

chief executive but also as the chief legislator, who is expected to take initiative

and to provide the impetus for legislation.

Think Point 1

Where is the balance of power in the constitution? Is the president supposed to be the primary

policy leader, one among a number of policy actors or a guardian who does not get involved in day-

to-day policymaking? What, therefore, is the purpose of the veto in the political system?

This shift in the primary position of leadership and initiative has consequences

for the nature of the veto power (see Table 3.2). A president who is a policy

leader cannot also be the main check against bad legislative policy. In this context,

the presidential veto power has emerged as a tool of influence, or bargaining chip,

that presidents can use strategically and proactively in order to pursue their policy

agendas. The veto power ‘guarantees the President a place at the legislative

bargaining table’, which enables them to ‘kill legislation he opposes or, more

frequently, wrest policy concessions from majorities loathe to relinquish

them’ (Cameron 2009: 1). The increased use of the veto as a ‘political weapon’

has ‘allowed the president to become more involved in legislative matters, and has

changed the presidential-congressional dynamic so that Congress is no longer the

International IDEA 11

3. Nature and purposes of the veto power

dominant force in government—as it was until the end of the nineteenth

century’ (Slezak 2007).

It is not even necessary for the veto to be used in order for it to have political

importance. Its mere existence, if accompanied by convincing signals of the

president’s willingness to use it, can have the effect of moderating legislation

according to the president’s wishes (Cameron 2009). As McCarty (2009: 370)

notes, however, this tempering effect can backfire: instead of making concessions

to the president in order to prevent the exercise of the veto, the legislative

majority may decide—if it judges that the political conditions are ripe (e.g. in an

election year)—to pass a bill that it knows the president will have to veto and

thereby force the president to take a policy position that may be unpopular with

certain sections of the public.

Table 3.2. Schema of typical presidential roles and corresponding veto powers

President’s

constitutional

role

Active powers Reactive

powers

(legislative

veto)

Primary

purpose(s) of

the veto

Examples Notes

Policy leader

(activist

presidency)

Strong:

Legislative

initiative,

decree-making

powers,

agenda-setting

powers

Variable:

Ranges from

merely

symbolic veto

power to veto

power that is

quite difficult

to override.

Tool for

leadership

Many Latin

American

constitutions

(e.g. Bolivia,

Colombia)

The more active

power a

President has,

the less

reactive the

power that is

needed to

achieve policy

goals

Head of the

administration

(classic

‘separation of

powers’

presidency)

Weak:

Constitution

does not allow

president to

introduce

legislation or

control agenda;

decree-making

powers limited

Strong: Veto

power that is

difficult to

override

Protecting

against

harmful

legislation

and

procedural or

constitutional

irregularities

United

States,

Liberia

In practice, the

president in

such systems is

often able to

use informal

sources of

power to

transform veto

into a more

proactive tool

Defender of the

common good/

constitutional

order

(guardianship

presidency)

Weak:

President may

have power to

propose

legislation but

does so only in

exceptional

circumstances;

decree-making

powers limited

Weak: Veto

power may be

limited to

matters of

procedural

regularity or

constitutional

validity; vetoes

on policy

grounds may

be easy to

override

Protecting

against

procedural or

constitutional

irregularities

Premier-

presidential

(weak semi-

presidential)

systems

The president is

not expected to

be the major

policy leader,

but may be

expected to

intervene in

certain extreme

circumstances

12International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

4. Basic design options

There are two basic design choices that must be made in relation to the veto

power: (a) what are the grounds on which the veto can be exercised; and (b) how

can the veto be overridden by the legislature?

On what grounds may the veto be exercised?

Veto on constitutional or procedural grounds

Constitutions may restrict the veto to matters of constitutional or procedural

propriety. The Constitution of Austria, for example, specifies that, ‘The adoption

of federal laws in accordance with the constitution is authenticated by the

signature of the Federal President’ with the countersignature of the Federal

Chancellor [Prime Minister] (art. 47). This implies that the president is obliged

to promulgate laws and may only refuse to do so only in extreme circumstances, if

the law is clearly not, procedurally or substantively, passed ‘in accordance with the

Constitution’ (Koker 2014).

A presidential veto on constitutional grounds usually takes the form of

referring legislation to the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court for a ruling on

its constitutionality. This power is found, for example, in the Constitutions of

Bulgaria (art. 150) and Ireland (art. 26). This is a form of abstract or a priori

judicial review. While the president acts as a gatekeeper, the final decision-

making power with respect to the constitutionality of laws rests with the courts.

Veto on policy grounds

Conversely, in democracies where the president is expected to take a more active

role in leadership and policymaking, it is usual to allow the president a broad

discretionary veto power that may be exercised on any grounds the president sees

International IDEA 13

4. Basic design options

fit. The president may therefore veto legislation because of substantive policy

objections without any need to demonstrate procedural or constitutional

irregularities.

Prohibition of veto for certain types of legislation 

Certain types of legislation are not treated in the same way as ordinary legislative

acts and may be immune to a presidential veto. For example, presidents that

otherwise possess a veto power over all ordinary legislation may be denied the

right to veto constitutional amendments (which may have a different process of

final approval, such as being endorsed by the people in a referendum).

Alternatively, a president may have a veto only over specified types of

controversial or fundamental legislation. In Singapore, for example, the president

has veto powers only in relation to a fairly narrow range of bills, which includes

certain budgetary matters.

How can the veto be overwritten?

Absolute veto

In rare cases, constitutions grant the president an absolute veto power that cannot

be overturned by the legislature. In principle, this means that no law can come

into effect without the president’s approval even if a large majority of legislators

are strongly in favour.

• Because this would greatly strengthen the president’s position in the

balance of powers, beyond the bounds of what is normally required by the

principles of the separation of the powers and checks and balances, an

absolute veto on policy grounds is rare in democratic constitutions.

However, some early and conservative constitutions, such as the 1833

Constitution of Chile, did provide for an absolute veto.

• An absolute veto is more usual in situations where the veto can be

exercised only on grounds of unconstitutionality. This is because, in

principle, no majority can render constitutional a bill that is

unconstitutional, and the proper remedy, in such cases, is to amend the

constitution or change the bill. In Colombia, for example, the legislature’s

right to overturn a presidential veto does not apply in the case of bills

vetoed on grounds of unconstitutionality. In such cases, the bill, if

reapproved by an absolute majority of the legislature, is referred to the

Constitutional Court, whose decision—to approve or reject the bill—is

binding on the president (art. 167).

14International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

Strong qualified veto (with high thresholds for legislative override) 

A veto that can be overridden by a subsequent decision of the legislature is

sometimes known as a ‘qualified’ veto. Most constitutions that provide for

presidential vetoes on policy grounds also allow the legislature to override the

president’s veto by means of a supermajority vote.

• The required size of the supermajority varies from country to country. A

two-thirds majority is most common (e.g. Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El

Salvador, Ghana, Mexico, Philippines, Nigeria, Zambia), although in

some cases only a three-fifths majority is required (Poland, for example).

• The rationale behind the requirement for a supermajority is that the

president’s veto is deployed in order to prevent the passage of partisan

legislation or of legislation that is divisive or controversial or of legislation

that does not promote the common good. The re-passage of a bill by a

supermajority indicates that these objections have been met and overcome.

It is evidence that the bill—far from being partisan, divisive or

controversial—enjoys a broad consensus of support in the legislature.

In practice, however, the effect of such provisions is to allow the president to

unilaterally alter the size of the majority necessary to enact laws: if the

president supports a bill, an ordinary majority is sufficient; if the president

opposes a bill, a supermajority is required. This gives the president the option of

influencing the outcome of legislative decisions by exercising what amounts in

effect to a large negative ‘bloc vote’.

The effect of this ‘negative bloc vote’ obviously depends on circumstantial

factors, such as whether there is a supermajority in the legislature that is ready to

pursue a coherent policy in opposition to the president. In many situations, the

exercise of a presidential veto will, in effect, be absolute, since the chances of

building a sufficiently broad legislative coalition to reach the supermajority

threshold and so to override the veto may be very slim. In the United States, for

example, from the election of Ronald Reagan (1980) to the end of Barack

Obama’s first term (2012), the veto was used a total of 173 times by all

presidents, of which only 16 cases (9.2 per cent of the total) were overridden by

Congress (Peters 2016).

Weak qualified veto (with low thresholds for override)

Some constitutions allow presidents to veto legislation by returning bills to the

legislature for reconsideration, while allowing the legislature to insist on the bill in

a second vote without a demanding supermajority requirement. In many cases, an

International IDEA 15

4. Basic design options

absolute majority (50 per cent plus one) of the total number of members of the

legislature is required.

• Such vetoes are usually associated with parliamentary systems and with

semi-presidential systems in which the prime minister is the leading

political figure. For example, the Constitution of the Czech Republic (art.

50) allows the president to return bills to the Chamber of Deputies, but a

bill so returned will still come into effect, regardless of any presidential

objections, if reapproved by an absolute majority of deputies. Similarly, in

Bulgaria (art. 101), the approval of an absolute majority of the members of

parliament is required to overturn the president’s legislative veto.

• However, such weak vetoes are also found in some presidential systems:

the Constitutions of Brazil (art. 66), Colombia (art. 167) and Peru (art.

180), for example, allow their legislatures to override presidential vetoes

with an absolute majority in both chambers.

When the legislative majority is resolute and united, such a weak veto may

have a mainly symbolic effect. It allows the president to express his or her

objections to a bill and to request the legislature to reconsider it, but without

ultimately having the authority to prevent its enactment. However, when the

legislative majority is uncertain or disunited, even such a weak veto can

potentially be decisive. By forcing a delay and reconsideration (which allows

members of the legislature to realign themselves or even to change their minds

without loss of face), the president might prevent the enactment of laws that

would otherwise have been passed.

Different supermajorities for different types of legislation 

Constitutions may establish different supermajority requirements for different

classes of legislation.

• In Cyprus, for example, the president has an absolute veto over legislation

in the fields of foreign affairs, defence and security, but only a symbolic

veto, which may be overridden by a simple majority, over other legislation

(arts 50 and 51). Such rules recognize the special role and responsibility of

the president in these areas of what might be termed ‘high politics’.

• In Tunisia, the legislature may override presidential vetoes by an absolute

majority vote, except in the case of organic laws, for which a three-fifths

majority is required (art. 81). In Portugal, likewise, presidential vetoes can

be overturned by an absolute majority, except for organic laws, laws on

external relations, laws on the electoral system and laws on the basic

economic structure of society, which require a three-fifths majority (art.

16International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

136). This reflects the principle that ordinary laws should be enacted by

ordinary majorities, but that organic laws and other laws of special

institutional or structural importance should be enacted by a process that

requires broader consensus and higher standards of deliberation and

inclusion.

Suspensive veto 

There are some instances in which the presidential veto holds a bill in suspense

for a specified period of time. During this period, the veto power is, in effect,

absolute, since it cannot be overridden. Override becomes possible, however,

when the period of suspense has elapsed.

• In Ecuador, for example, the president’s veto cannot be overridden for a

period of one year; thereafter, the legislature can insist on passing the bill

with a two-thirds majority vote (art. 138). The rationale behind this rule is

that the president’s veto acts as a delaying power to provide time for

political passions to cool and for wider deliberation to take place.

• The suspensive veto is rather unusual in the world’s contemporary

constitutions, but it might have advantages in some situations, especially

when it is combined with a relatively low threshold requirement (such as

an absolute majority). It could filter out hasty legislation motivated by

sudden and momentary passions, and allows more time for public debate

to influence the direction of legislation, but it does not allow the minority

to thwart the settled will of the majority.

• One possible alternative (which is not known to exist in any current

constitution, but is discussed here as a speculative option) is to enable a

supermajority to override the veto at any time, while allowing an absolute

or simple majority to override it after the period of suspension has elapsed.

This would enable the legislative minority—in conjunction with the

president—to delay legislation but not to halt forever the enactment of

legislation upon which the majority robustly and resolutely insists.

Making design choices 

A high supermajority requirement (e.g. two-thirds or three-fourths) may make it

very difficult for legislatures to override a presidential veto. This, in turn, may

make periods of divided government (when the legislative majority and the

presidency are held by opposing parties) more problematic, since relatively small

minorities may have disproportionate power to block necessary legislation. On

the other hand, a low majority requirement (e.g. a simple majority or an absolute

International IDEA 17

4. Basic design options

majority) may provide insufficient constraints on the ill-considered, partisan or

corrupt actions of the legislative majority unless other mechanisms are in place to

prevent this.

To judge the advantages and disadvantages of these options, constitutional

designers may wish to consider, above all, the general purposes, ethos and intent

of the constitution. Is the constitution primarily intended as a way to express and

to give effect to the democratic will of the majority, or is the principal purpose of

the constitution to enforce a system of limited government, individual rights and

minority protection? Most constitutions, of course, do both of these things but

with very different degrees of emphasis.

18International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

5. Additional design

considerations

In addition to the basic features of the veto discussed above, there are a number of

additional design considerations and options to consider. These include the line-

item veto, timelines and the pocket veto, the need for official consultation before

exercising the veto and presidential amendments.

Should the president have a line-item veto?

The process of negotiating legislation and steering bills through the legislature

may result in bills that, while retaining some semblance of the initial proposal, are

riddled with special-interest provisions or particular spending commitments

designed to win the support of individual legislators or lobby groups. In

aggregate, dependence on appeasing such particular interests can lead to

incoherent policies and poor budget management, which undermines the general

interest.

A line-item veto allows a president to partially object to a bill (including

particular spending items) while allowing other parts of the bill to be signed into

law. This means the president can veto the special-interest provisions that are

added onto the bill during its passage through the legislature.

In theory, this should improve the coherence of legislation, prevent corruption

and impose financial discipline. For these reasons, the line-item veto has become

common in US states (about 90 per cent of US states allow governors to exercise a

line-item veto) and at the national level in Latin America (e.g. Argentina, art. 83;

Brazil, art. 66; Paraguay, art. 208). The practical effect of the line-item veto on

curbing irresponsible spending may be limited. According to Baker (2000: 64–

65), there is ‘no systematic impact of enhanced veto authority on the level of

International IDEA 19

5. Additional design considerations

government spending’, and ‘[m]uch of this work serves to dispel the common

misconception that enhanced veto power restrains a government’s spending’.

Nevertheless, it is self-evident that a line-item veto increases the president’s power

over the budget and, as a result, over the whole range of public policy.

Timelines and the pocket veto

Period within which the veto can be exercised

Most constitutions providing for a presidential veto power specify a time period

within which the president can consider a bill and decide whether or not to veto

it.

• This period varies, but 10 days (Costa Rica, United States) to 30 days

(Ecuador) is usual; a period of three months (Finland) is exceptional.

• A further possibility is to reduce the period during which the president

may exercise a veto in times of urgency. In Benin, for example, the

president ordinarily has 15 days in which to consider a bill and to either

enact it or to veto it, but the legislature may declare a bill to be urgent, in

which case this period is reduced to just five days.

What happens if the president neither vetoes a bill nor signs it?

There may be circumstances in which a president fails, or refuses, to sign a bill

but does not actively reject, veto or return it to the legislature within the period

prescribed by the constitution. In these cases, the constitution can resolve the

impasse in various ways.

• In some constitutions, a bill that has not been signed or vetoed by the

president within the prescribed period automatically becomes a law at the

end of that period regardless of the president’s inaction. The Constitution

of Argentina (art. 80), for example, states that, ‘Any bill not returned

within ten working days is to be considered approved by the Executive

Power’.

• The US Constitution allows 10 days during which the president may veto

a bill. At the end of this period, the bill automatically becomes law ‘in like

manner as if [the President] had signed it’. Unlike in Argentina, however,

the bill does not become law if Congress has adjourned and thereby has

prevented the president from returning the bill. In these cases, the bill does

not become law and simply lapses at the end of the ten days (art. 1, s. 7),

meaning that if Congress wishes to insist on the bill, it must recommence

the legislative process from the beginning in the next session. This is

20International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

known as the pocket veto (as if the president were to put the bill in his or

her pocket and walk away with it).

• In Mexico, a bill not returned within 10 working days is deemed to have

been approved unless Congress in not in session, in which case the bill

must be returned on the first day on which Congress is next in session (art.

72). In effect, this means that the president can delay the promulgation of

a bill by simply refusing to sign it when Congress is not in session, but the

bill will become law automatically when Congress reconvenes unless the

president actively returns the bill.

• In Benin (art. 57), if the president neither signs nor returns a bill within

the permitted period, then the bill is deemed to have been vetoed, and, as

such, the legislature can then override the veto through the usual process

(in Benin’s case, by an absolute majority vote).

Some constitutions do not specify a time period during which the presidential

veto may be exercised. In the absence of a time limit or an override mechanism,

the president’s approval is absolute, and no bill can become law without it. Such

open-ended provisions are usually only found in constitutions (e.g. Austria) where

it is expected that the president will use the veto only rarely and only on

constitutional or procedural grounds. Even in these circumstances, however, the

absence of clear timelines may result in a lack of procedural certainty. If the

constitution specifies the time period in which the veto may be exercised and

what happens if the bill is neither signed nor vetoed at the end of that period,

then this may prevent inter-institutional conflicts from arising later. Crucially, the

situations in which a veto power is likely to be exercised are extraordinary

situations, and it is at such times that procedural clarity is most important if

constitutional crises are to be avoided.

Time restrictions on reintroducting vetoed legislation

Constitutions may place time restrictions on the reintroduction of legislation that

has been vetoed. In Costa Rica, for example, a bill that has been vetoed and that

the legislature has not repassed by the two-thirds majority required to override the

veto cannot be proposed a second time during the same session of the legislature

(art. 127). Such restrictions may stop the escalation of conflicts between the

legislature and executive, and can hinder the absorption of excessive legislative

time by one issue over which no agreement can be reached. By enforcing a ‘pause

for thought’, time restrictions also allow for temperatures to cool and for attitudes

to soften, so that acceptable compromises may be reached in due course.

International IDEA 21

5. Additional design considerations

Need to consult before exercising a veto

A constitution may require the president to consult with other institutions or

officials before exercising the veto power—for example, with the speaker or

presiding officer of the legislature, with the chief justice or with a special council

of state established to advise the president. The need to consult may help prevent

a president from acting in a capricious or arbitrary manner, and may enable other

political and institutional actors to influence or restrain presidential decisions,

perhaps forcing the president to think more clearly about the consequences of his

or her decision.

In Ireland, for example, the president’s power to refer legislation to the

Supreme Court for a ruling on its constitutionality may be exercised only after

hearing the advice of the Council of State, which consists of various appointed

and ex officio advisers. In Singapore, the president, before exercising certain

discretionary powers, including the power to veto budgetary decisions, is required

to consult with the Council of Presidential Advisers. In these cases, the advice

tendered to the president is confidential, and although required to seek it, the

president is not bound to act upon it (if this were not the case, real power would

lie with the advisers, and not with the president, whose function would then be

merely symbolic).

Statement of reasons

Another way in which a constitution can prevent the arbitrary or capricious use of

the veto power, while keeping responsibility in the hands of the president, is to

require any veto to be accompanied by a statement of the president’s objections,

giving a reasoned justification for the exercise of the veto power (e.g. art. 2, sect. 7

of the US Constitution). The accompanying veto statement also gives the

president an opportunity to lay out precisely what is wrong with the bill and to

specify how the bill could be improved. In this way, the veto power also becomes

—albeit indirectly—an agenda-setting power through which the president is able

to exercise political leadership, to define policy stances to the electorate and to put

political pressure on legislators.

Presidential amendments

Some constitutions go further than just allowing the president to make comments

on a bill when returning it. They allow the president to propose specific

amendments to the bill, and allow the legislature to pass the bill a second time, by

an ordinary majority, if the president’s proposals are fully adopted.

22International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

This power to propose amendments is a powerful tool of presidential

leadership, which enables the president to set the legislative agenda and to

proactively shape legislation (Tsebelis and Alemán 2005).

• In Chile, a bill that has been vetoed by the president may be passed by an

ordinary majority if amended by the legislature in accordance with the

president’s proposals. If the legislature does not amend the bill in

accordance with the president’s proposals, however, the veto may be

overturned only by a two-thirds majority in both chambers (art. 73).

• In Kenya, likewise, a bill that has been vetoed by the president becomes

law if the legislature, by an ordinary majority, amends the bill in

accordance with the president’s proposals, while a two-thirds majority is

necessary to enact a bill that has not been so amended (art. 115).

Referring bills to the people

Some constitutions allow the president to refer bills that have been adopted by

the legislature to the people in a referendum. The president of Iceland, for

example, can refer newly passed laws to the people, whose decision on whether to

accept or repeal the law is final (art. 26). In effect, this can be regarded as a form

of democratic veto, since the ultimate decision is made not by the president or the

legislature, but by the people. Provisions relating to referendums are more fully

discussed in International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer No. 3, Direct

Democracy.

Enabling the people to be the final arbiter on a piece of proposed legislation

can have two positive effects depending on the threshold for overcoming a

presidential veto. In contrast to allowing a simple majority of the legislature to

override a veto, referring a decision to the people can be more effective at

preventing the adoption of unpopular legislation. In contrast to allowing override

only by a large majority of the legislature, a referendum can prevent stubborn

minorities from blocking popular legislation. This may be an advantage in

situations where there is a desire to create an effective and active state that can

legislate effectively for the benefit of the majority, but where this power is subject

to democratic constraints to protect the people against its abuse.

Referring bills to the people can also take another form, in which the legislature

uses reference to the people as a way of bypassing the president and the

president’s potential veto power. In Argentina, for example (art. 40), Congress

may submit a bill for popular consultation (a referendum). Such bills are not

subject to a presidential veto, as they are automatically promulgated if approved

by ‘the affirmative vote of the people’.

International IDEA 23

6. Contextual considerations

Timing of elections

Since presidential and semi-presidential forms of government allow the people to

vote separately for the president and the legislature, they can be prone to periods

of so-called divided government. Divided government occurs when the president

and the legislative majority (and, therefore, the Cabinet in semi-presidential

systems) are politically opposed to one another. It is during these periods that the

veto is most likely to be used, as the president attempts to block legislation

proposed by his or her political opponents. In the United States during the period

1945–92, for example, only about 2 per cent of all congressional legislation was

vetoed, but 20 per cent of important legislation was vetoed during periods of

divided government (Cameron 2009).

The timing of elections can greatly influence the likelihood of divided

government and, therefore, the extent to which the presidential veto is used. As a

general rule, divided government is less likely when elections to the presidency

and legislature occur at the same time, and more likely to occur when the

elections happen at different times. This is because (a) when elections are

concurrent, legislative candidates from the same party as a popular presidential

candidate are swept into office on his or her coat-tails; and (b) when elections are

non-concurrent, grievances and general dissatisfactions against an incumbent

president may be expressed by voting for legislators from opposition parties.

Concurrent terms of office can also strengthen the president’s popular

mandate, since there will not be a time when a sitting president is confronted by a

legislature whose electoral mandate is more recent—and therefore, more valid—

than the president’s own.

24International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

Legislative structure

Bicameralism versus unicameralism

In a bicameral system, especially when the two chambers are incongruent

(selected by different means, or at different times, such that there is likely to be a

substantial difference in the partisan composition of the chambers), it may be

much harder to attain a given supermajority requirement in order to overturn a

presidential veto than it would be to reach the same supermajority threshold in a

unicameral system. For example, all other things being equal, a greater degree of

consensus would have to be built in order to reach a two-thirds majority in both

houses of the US Congress (which has two differently composed houses, with

staggered election dates and over-representation of rural states in the upper house)

than to reach a two-thirds majority in Zambia’s unicameral parliament, for

example.

Electoral system and party system

Reaching a two-thirds majority in a two-party system merely requires that these

two parties agree (assuming most members vote on party lines). If there is a

multiparty system, then reaching the same two-thirds majority may require a

much broader agreement between perhaps half a dozen political parties. Similarly,

if parties are coherent and have centralized leadership structures, peak-level

agreements between the leaders will be sufficient to bring the legislative caucuses

into line, while highly fragmented parties may require that agreements be made

with the leaders of factions or with individual legislators, thereby increasing the

difficulty of attaining any specified supermajority threshold. In addition, the

degree of ideological polarization—and even personal trust or antipathy—

between the parties may be a relevant consideration: a given supermajority

requirement will be harder to reach if the parties are mutually antagonistic, and

easier to reach if they are mutually cooperative. These circumstantial factors can

vary over time, and it is not necessarily the role of the constitutional designer to

design provisions that are perfectly adapted to the present time; rather, given the

expectation that a constitution should last for decades or generations, designers

should think about how the mechanisms they propose would work under various

contextual circumstances, and they should avoid making decisions based on

assumptions about a political context that might not hold in the future.

The whole package of presidential powers

The possibility of using the veto power as a bargaining chip means that its

effectiveness depends not only on the rules regarding the exercise of the veto

power, but also on the other rules that structure inter-institutional bargaining and

International IDEA 25

6. Contextual considerations

shape the political relationships between the president and the legislature (or, in

semi-presidential systems, between the president and the prime minister).

In designing the presidential veto power, constitutional designers must

therefore think about the whole package of powers vested in the various state

institutions, and consider the political interactions between them, rather than

treating each part of the institutional design in isolation (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1. Veto powers and override powers are part of a balance of powers

This package of powers may include, for example, the ability to set the legislative

agenda by proposing legislation and budgets, as well as the power to bypass

legislative decision-making to achieve policy objectives through the use of quasi-

legislative regulations or emergency decrees. Even powers that are seemingly

26International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

unrelated to the legislative process, such as the power to nominate judges, to

appoint members of independent commissions or to award public honours, may

be employed by presidents and legislatures as part of their overall policy-

bargaining strategy.

One of the greatest powers at the disposal of (some) presidents is the power of

dissolution—the ability to dismiss the legislature and call new elections. This is a

‘big stick’ that a president might use to prevent the enactment of unfavourable

legislation or, conversely, to coerce the legislature into passing legislation that the

president supports. Another powerful presidential tool is the referendum, which

may give the president the ability to bypass legislators and appeal directly to the

people on a major policy issue. But these tools are unwieldy and unpredictable.

They are effective when the president enjoys the support of a majority of the

people for his or her actions; however, a president who miscalculates the extent of

his or her public support, and is defeated at the polls, whether in an election or a

referendum, may lose a lot of the legitimacy and goodwill necessary to govern

effectively.

Political culture and expectations

The actual distribution of political power in a state may differ substantially from

the distribution of powers established on paper. Political culture, including long-

established customs, conventions and expectations, will play an important role in

establishing this difference. Constitution-makers wishing to transform the

operation of a political system should be aware that culture is often ‘sticky’: it is

slower to change and more resilient to external shocks than changes in

institutional form.

So countries with a long history of excessive presidential power, or that have a

particular presidential candidate who has a very large personal following, may

tend towards presidential autocracy even if the powers of the president are curbed

on paper. If the intention is to change these ingrained habits, particular care must

be taken in drafting the constitution to allow as little room as possible for

autocratic regression.

International IDEA 27

7. Alternatives to the presidential veto

7. Alternatives to the

presidential veto

There are few alternatives to the presidential veto power. Most constitutions that

provide for a directly elected president with more than a ceremonial function

allow the president to exercise some form of veto if only in the form of a

constitutional or procedural veto, a policy veto that can be easily overridden or

the right to refer legislation to the people in a referendum. If it is decided not to

allow any presidential veto power, while retaining a system of government in

which the president has more than a figurehead or ceremonial function, then it

would be necessary to strengthen the presidency’s other powers, such as

dissolution powers and decree-making powers.

In an ethnically, religiously or linguistically divided society, however, it might

be advisable to give veto powers to those who represent particular communities,

although successful examples of this are rare. The Constitution of Cyprus, as

originally enacted, provided for a president from the Greek community and a

vice-president from the Turkish community, each of whom had a veto over

legislation in order to protect the vital interests of their respective communities.

In Kosovo, certain classes of legislation concerning the rights, identity and

interests of national minorities require approval by a double majority of the

legislature, essentially giving those minorities a veto power that they can use for

self-preservation.

28International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

8. Decision-making questions

1. What is the overall principle of the constitutional design? Is the

constitution primarily intended to harness and direct the power of

democratic leaders, or is it primarily intended to restrain democratic

leaders in order to protect minorities, individual rights or property? What

consequences does this have for: (a) the ease or difficulty of the legislative

process; and (b) the role of the president within that process?

2. Is the president supposed to be: (a) the primary policymaker who takes the

main role in initiating policy; (b) one of several competing policymakers

who share initiative with the legislature; or (c) primarily a guardian of the

constitutional order, whose leadership is exercised only sporadically, such

as at times of crisis?

3. What powers does the president need in relation to legislation in order to

fulfil those functions?

4. Presidential veto powers and presidential agenda-setting powers (e.g. the

right to propose or introduce legislation) often operate in tandem. How

are these powers balanced?

5. How do the president’s legislative veto powers relate to his or her other

powers? Is the overall package of presidential powers sufficient for the

intended purposes? Are the powers excessive?

6. What is the structure of the legislature in terms of its electoral cycle,

number of chambers, electoral system and expected partisan composition?

What influence does this have on: (i) the difficulty of passing legislation

and (ii) the difficulty of overturning vetoes?

International IDEA 29

8. Decision-making questions

7. What is the prevailing political culture? Are their ingrained habits of

presidentialism that will tend to make the president a seemingly natural

repository of power? What effect will this have on the operation of the

political system as a whole, and what accommodation should be made for

it in the design of the veto power?

30International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

9. Examples

Table 9.1. Presidential veto powers

Country Grounds on

which veto may

be exercised

Timeline and other

veto requirements

Override procedure Additional remarks

Benin

Unitary

structure,

unicameral

legislature,

presidential

executive

Any President has 15

days to promulgate a

law or veto it; may be

reduced to 5 days in

cases of urgency, as

declared by the

legislature; if

president does not

act within this time,

Constitutional Court

may promulgate the

law if it deems it

constitutional

Absolute majority of

the legislature;

president can again

refuse to promulgate

a law that has been

overridden by an

absolute majority

but in this case

Constitutional Court

must decide whether

bill is constitutional,

and, if so, it

promulgates the law

Benin has an unusual

combination of

presidential and

judicial review;

president’s veto is

easy to override, but

can be applied twice: if

applied a second time,

it is sustained only if

Constitutional Court

deems the bill in

question

unconstitutional

Colombia

Unitary

structure,

bicameral

legislature,

presidential

executive

Any, but

override rules

differ depending

on whether veto

is exercised on

policy or

constitutional

grounds;

government may

object to a bill in

whole or in part

(line-item veto)

Variable timeline

depending on

number of articles in

bill: from 6 to 20

days; if bill is not

returned to

legislature within

this time, the

president must

promulgate it

Absolute majority in

both houses of the

legislature; if bill is

opposed on

constitutional

grounds, both

houses have to send

the bill to the

Constitutional Court,

whose decision is

binding on the

president

Decision to return bills

to legislature for

reconsideration

nominally rests with

the government, not

the president,

although the structure

of the executive is such

that the president

really directs the

government

International IDEA 31

9. Examples

Country Grounds on

which veto may

be exercised

Timeline and

other veto

requirements

Override procedure Additional remarks

Kenya

Quasi-federal

(regionalist)

structure,

bicameral

legislature,

presidential

executive

Any, but must

note reservations

when returning a

bill to parliament;

in doing so, the

president may

propose

amendments

President has 14

days in which to

grant assent or

exercise a veto; if

president does

not act within

this time, bill is

deemed to have

been enacted

Ordinary majority of

legislature if bill is

amended in accordance

with president’s

recommendations; by

two-thirds majority vote

if not so amended

Asymmetric

bicameralism gives

Senate co-decision-

making powers over

matters concerning

Kenya’s regions;

when overriding the

president’s veto, bills

subject to Senate

approval need to be

repassed by both

houses (other bills

only need to be

repassed by the lower

house)

Romania

Unitary

structure,

bicameral

legislature,

semi-

presidential

executive

On constitutional

grounds by

reference to

Constitutional

Court; on any

other grounds by

returning the bill

to parliament

President has 20

days in which to

refer bill to

Constitutional

Court or to return

it to parliament

If Constitutional Court

upholds a bill's

unconstitutionality, law

may not be promulgated

unless first amended to

bring it into line with the

constitution; in the case

of other vetoes,

legislature may repass a

bill by an ordinary

majority, and president

cannot veto it a second

time

Until the adoption of

a constitutional

amendment in 2003,

Romania had an

unusual procedure

allowing a law that

had been ruled

unconstitutional by

the Constitutional

Court to be repassed

by a two-thirds

majority in

parliament

United

States

Federal

structure,

bicameral

legislature,

presidential

executive

Any grounds, but

the reasons for

exercising the

veto must be

stated in the

president’s veto

message to

Congress

President has 10

days to grant

assent or

exercise a veto; if

Congress not in

session,

president may

exercise a pocket

veto, which

cannot be

overridden by

Congress

A veto may be

overridden by a two-

thirds majority in both

houses of Congress



Zambia

Unitary state,

unicameral

legislature,

presidential

executive

Assent may be

withheld on any

grounds;

president may

give reasons but

is not

constitutionally

obliged to do so

No timeline:

president has

unlimited time to

grant assent or

return a bill (and

no obligation to

return a bill);

bills not returned

or assented to do

not become law

If bill returned to

parliament with

proposals for

amendment, parliament

may override veto by a

two-thirds majority, with

or without amendments;

if not returned, bill is, in

effect, subject to an

absolute veto

This is an unusual

example of a system

that allows the

president to exercise

an absolute veto

simply by refusing

either to grant assent

or to return the bill to

parliament for

reconsideration

32International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

References

Where to find constitutions referred to in this Primer

The constitutional texts referred to in this Primer, unless otherwise stated, are drawn from the

website of the Constitute Project,<https://www.constituteproject.org/>.

Baker, S. H., ‘Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?’, Public

Choice , 104/1/2 (July 2000), pp. 63–79

Elgie, R., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)

Cameron, C. M., ‘The Presidential Veto’, in W. Howell and G. Edwards

(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2009), <http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/

ccameron/files/the_presidential_veto_v3.pdf>, accessed 29 July 2017

Gargarella, R., Latin American Constitutionalism 1810-2010: The Engine Room of

the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)

Hamilton, A., ‘The Provision for the Support of the Executive, and the Veto

Power’, The Federalist Papers , 73 (1788), <http://www.constitution.org/fed/

federa73.htm>, accessed 4 July 2015

Koker, P., ‘Austria and Germany: The pocket-veto power of Federal Presidents’,

Presidential Power, 24 July 2014, <http://presidential-power.com/?

p=1703>, accessed 29 July 2017

International IDEA 33

References

Madison, J., ‘The Particular Structure of the New Government and the

Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts’, The Federalist Papers , 47

(1788), <http://www.constitution. org/fed/federa47.htm>, accessed 29 July

2017

Mainwaring, S., ‘Presidentialism in Latin America’, Latin American Research

Review , 25/1 (1990), pp. 157–79

McCarty, N., ‘Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing

Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?’, The Journal of Politics, 71/2

(April 2009), pp. 369–84

Negretto, G., ‘Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin

America’, Latin American Politics and Society, 48/3 (Autumn 2006), pp. 63–

Peters, G., ‘Presidential Vetoes’, J. T. Woolley and G. Peters (eds), The American

Presidency Project, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/

vetoes.php>, accessed 29 July 2017

Paine, T., ‘To the Citizens of Pennsylvania on the Proposal for Calling a

Convention’ (1805)

Slezak, N. L., The Presidential Veto: A Strategic Asset (Center for the Study of the

Presidency, 2007)

Tsebelis, G. and Alemán, E., ‘Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin

America’, World Politics , 57/3 (April 2005), pp. 396–420

34International IDEA

Presidential Veto Powers

Annex

About the author

Elliot Bulmeris a Programme Officer with International IDEA's Constitution-

Building Processes Programme. He holds a PhD from the University of Glasgow

and an MA from the University of Edinburgh. He is the editor of International

IDEA's Constitution-Building Primer series and specializes in comparative

approaches to constitutional and institutional design.

About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International

IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with a mission to support sustainable

democracy worldwide by providing comparative knowledge, assisting in

democratic reform, and influencing policies and politics.

Based in Stockholm, Sweden, it has offices in Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe,

and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent

Observer to the United Nations.

<http://www.idea.int>

International IDEA 35

Annex

About this series

An ongoing series, International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers aim to

explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

1. What is a Constitution? Principles and Concepts*

2. Bicameralism^

3. Direct Democracy*

4. Judicial Appointments*

5. Judicial Tenure, Removal, Immunity and Accountability

6. Non-Executive Presidents in Parliamentary Democracies*^

7. Constitutional Monarchs in Parliamentary Democracies^

8. Religion–State Relations^

9. Social and Economic Rights^

10. Constitutional Amendment Procedures

11. Limitation Clauses^

12. Federalism^*

13. Local Democracy^

14. Presidential Veto Powers^

15. Presidential Legislative Powers

16. Dissolution of Parliament

17. Government Formation and Removal Mechanisms

18. Emergency Powers

19. Fourth-Branch Institutions

20. Constitutional Recognition of Political Parties

^ Also available in Arabic

* Also available in Myanmar

Download the Primers from our website: <http://www.idea.int/publications>.

An updated list of Primers is available at <http://constitutionnet.org/primers>.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist

in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by

helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public ocials

and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices.

ey also provide guidance for sta of intergovernmental organizations

and other external actors working to provide well-informed, context-

relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as

a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience

with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical

choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex

constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

(International IDEA)

Strömsborg, SE-103 34 Stockholm, Sweden

Telephone: +46 8 698 37 00

Email: publicat[email protected]

Website: www.idea.int ISBN: ----