Working Paper No. 62 - May 2011
THE
EU,
EEAS
AND
UNION
DELEGATIONS
AND
INTERNATIONAL
DIPLOMATIC
LAW
:
NEW
HORIZONS
Jan Wouters
Sanderijn Duquet
THE
EU,
EEAS
AND
UNION
DELEGATIONS
AND
INTERNATIONAL
DIPLOMATIC
LAW
:
NEW
HORIZONS
?
Prof. Dr. Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet
A
BSTRACT
The European Union has a unique ‘sui generis’ status on the international plane,
which is reflected in its capability to enter into diplomatic relations with third States
and international organizations. Over nearly six decades the EU has gradually built
its own worldwide bilateral and multilateral diplomatic network which is made subject,
through specific agreements with the host country, to the 1961 Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations. The ‘Union delegations’ are now operating as the diplomatic
missions of the EU as a whole, in contrast to the former Commission delegations.
This paper examines the relationship between the EU and international diplomatic
law: how does the EU establish and conduct diplomatic relations? What legal
instruments are being used? How do the Vienna Convention and customary
diplomatic law come into play? What is the exact legal status of EU ambassadors
and diplomatic staff? In critically analyzing these issues the specific contribution
which the EU makes to the further development of international diplomatic law is
assessed.
K
EY
W
ORDS
European Union - EU delegations - EEAS 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations - EU ambassadors EU external representation International diplomatic
law
A
UTHORS
Prof. Dr. Jan Wouters
Jean Monnet Chair ad personam EU and Global Governance
Professor of International Law and International Organizations
Director, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and Institute for International
Law, University of Leuven
Sanderijn Duquet
Junior Member, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven
A
DDRESS FOR
C
ORRESPONDENCE
Jan.W[email protected]ven.be, Sanderijn.Duquet@law.kuleuven.be
© 2011 by Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet. All rights reserved. No portion of this paper may be
reproduced without permission of the authors.
Working papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and
critical discussion. They have not necessarily undergone formal peer review.
2
C
ONTENTS
1. Introduction 3
2. The EU as a diplomatic actor ‘sui generis’ 4
A. Not a State… 4
B. … But much more than a classical international
organization
5
C. The Lisbon Treaty’s external relations machinery
6
3. The EU’s diplomatic network 7
4. Conduct of EU diplomatic relations after Lisbon 9
A. Establishment of diplomatic relations 9
B. Accreditation process and status of delegations 10
5. Challenges for international diplomatic law 11
A. The ‘diplomatic and consular functions’ of EU
delegations
11
B. Classification of EU ambassadors and ordre
protocollaire
14
C. Application of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations
15
1. Diplomatic passport 16
2. Diplomatic asylum 17
D. Is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
always the right framework?
18
6. Conclusion 19
3
1. I
NTRODUCTION
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (‘VCDR’ or ‘Vienna
Convention’)
1
and customary international diplomatic law form the legal framework
for inter-State diplomatic relations. There are 187 State parties to the VCDR
2
and its
content has to a large extent become part of customary international law itself.
3
A
crucial issue concerns the application of international diplomatic law by non-State
actors, in casu the European Union (‘EU’ or ‘Union’).
4
The EU has an active and
passive jus legationis and relies on a worldwide bilateral and multilateral diplomatic
network to conduct international relations. Although the EU is not a party to the
Vienna Convention - the wording of Art. 48 and 50 VCDR impedes this
5
- the
Convention is being applied to the widest extent possible in the EU’s bilateral
diplomatic relations via multiple agreements.
This contribution is divided in four sections. First, we address the unique sui
generis’ status of the EU at the international plane: it is quite different from a
classical nation State but does exercise important external policies and powers that
make it also unique in comparison with classical intergovernmental organizations.
Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty
6
has reinforced the EU’s external policies and
international actorness. The creation of the function of the High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘High Representative’) and of a European
diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (‘EEAS’), are of particular
significance. The extent to which the external part of the latter body, the ‘Union
delegations’, now operating as the diplomatic missions of the entire EU,
are
contributing to the European diplomatic network will be analyzed in the second
1
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961, entry into force 24
April 1964, UNTS, vol. 500, p. 95, no. 310. Two optional protocols were added to the Convention: the
Optional Protocol concerning the Acquisition of Nationality, done at Vienna on 18 April 1961, entry into
force 24 April 1964, UNTS, vol. 500, p. 223, 51 State Parties; the Optional Protocol concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, done at Vienna on 18 April 1961, entry into force, 24 April 1964,
UNTS, vol. 500, p. 223, 66 State Parties.
2
See United Nations Treaty Collection, available at treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-3&chapter=3&lang=en (consulted in April 2011).
3
See ICJ, Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran of 24 May 1980
(U.S. v. Iran), I.C.J. Rep. 1980, 3, § 62 in fine; ICJ, Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Rep. 2002, 1, § 52.
4
G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010 (4e ed.), 282 p., 112:
relations with international organizations and special missions are excluded from the scope of the
VCDR. [Hereafter Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice.]
5
According to Art. 48, the VCDR “shall be open for signature by all States Members of the United
Nations or of any of the specialized agencies or Parties to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a
Party to the Convention […]”. Art. 50 VCDR adds that the Convention remains “open for accession by
any State belonging to any of the four categories” mentioned in Art. 48.
6
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ 2007, C 306/1, 17 December 2007.
[Hereafter Lisbon Treaty].
4
section. These delegations form a network of ‘embassies’ and fulfill a similar
function: the representation of the EU with local governments.
7
Third, this
contribution aims to examine the conduct of EU diplomatic relations after the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, we will highlight a number of challenges of a
legal and practical nature to international diplomatic law resulting from EU diplomatic
relations with third countries and international organizations.
2.
T
HE EU AS A DIPLOMATIC ACTOR
SUI GENERIS
A. Not a State...
The conduct of formal diplomatic relations is regarded as both a privilege and a
monopoly of the sovereign State.
8
The EU has a unique ‘sui generis’ status in
international law. Its Member States have conferred powers to the Union, including
powers to act externally.
9
Since EU Member States themselves remain sovereign
diplomatic actors, the EU’s constraints in initiating and conducting diplomatic
relations are put to the test regularly. Moreover, since the Union is not a nation State,
certain purely State-like competences in international diplomatic law are not at its
disposal.
First, EU Member States retain the exclusive competence to recognize other
States and/or governments, which is a preliminary condition to enter into diplomatic
relations.
10
States are the only actors in international law able to recognize other
States - be it de jure or de facto.
11
This may complicate the EU’s external relations:
one could think of a situation in which the Union intends to accredit a diplomatic
representative to a third country not recognized by all 27 Member States.
Second, the EU as a diplomatic actor is hindered by its inability to reciprocate
in diplomatic relations. Art. 2 VCDR stipulates that States agree by mutual consent to
establish diplomatic relations with equals. Reciprocal privileges and immunities in
inter-State relations are underlying principles in international diplomatic relations.
Reciprocity is based on States’ desire to see the protection offered to foreign
7
Art. 221(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2010, C 83/47, 30 March 2010.
[Hereafter TFEU].
8
Alain Plantey, Principes de Diplomatie, Paris, Editions A. Pédone, 2000, 458 p., 18. [Hereafter:
Plantey, Principes de Diplomatie]. According to PLANTEY, sovereignty also is a necessary condition for
diplomacy: Id., 20. The international diplomatic regime has a strong State-oriented nature: Ben
Rosamond, ‘Conceptualizing the EU Model of Governance in World Politics’, European Foreign Affairs
Review, vol. 10, no. 4, 2005, pp. 463-476, 465.
9
The EU must respect its Member States’ essential State functions while exercising these powers, in
conformity with Art. 4(2) of the Treaty on the European Union, OJ 2010, C 83/13, 30 March 2010.
[Hereafter TEU].
10
Eileen Denza, Diplomatic Law: A Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Oxford University Press, 2008, 556 p., 31. [Hereafter Denza, Diplomatic Law]; Plantey, Principes de
Diplomatie, 204.
11
Art. 7 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 26 December, 1933, League of
Nations Treaty Series, vol. 165, pp. 20-43.
5
diplomats on their territory equally accorded to their own diplomats accredited in
another country.
12
Precisely because of this mutual dependency diplomatic privileges
and immunities are generally well-respected.
13
This raises the question how the EU,
as a non-State actor in diplomatic law, is able to require a full-fledged diplomatic
status for its diplomatic agents in third countries without being capable to grant
equivalent privileges and immunities on its territory to foreign diplomats accredited to
the Union.
14
A pragmatic solution was found for the large number of diplomatic
missions accredited to the EU and the latter’s interest in guaranteeing protection of
its staff abroad: Article 16 of Protocol No. 7 on the privileges and immunities of the
Union
15
tasks the Member State in whose territory the Union has its seat in other
words, Belgium ‘to accord the customary diplomatic immunities and privileges to
missions of third countries accredited to the Union.’ The diplomats of third countries
accredited to the EU are entitled to exercise all normal diplomatic functions.
16
B. … But much more than a classical international organization
The sui generis’ position of the EU in international law is further accentuated by its
supranational characteristics. The broad conferral of powers
17
by Member States to
the Union causes both internal and external effects. As to the first, the EU has seen
the creation of a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the
States have limited their sovereign rights”.
18
The creation of a fully-fledged Union
legal order that is ‘an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and
which their courts are bound to apply’
19
and whose ‘essential characteristics […] are
in particular its primacy over the law of the Member States and the direct effect of a
whole series of provisions’
20
, makes the EU truly unique among international
organizations. The EU legal order and a number of its key policies (e.g. a single
currency, a common commercial policy, EU citizenship) in a certain way resemble
12
Plantey, Principes de Diplomatie, 207-208.
13
Marjoleine Zieck, ‘Diplomatiek en Consulair Recht’, in Nathalie Horbach, René Lefeber, Olivier
Ribbelink (eds.), Handboek Internationaal Recht, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, 946 p., 291. [Hereafter
Zieck, ‘Diplomatiek en Consulair Recht’]
14
From the mid-1970s onwards Commission delegations gradually obtained full diplomatic privileges
and immunities from the receiving States in conformity with the Vienna Convention: Véronique Dimier &
Mike McGeever, ‘Diplomats without a Flag: The Institutionalization of the Delegations of the
Commission in African, Carribean and Pacific Countries’, Journal of Common Market Studies 2006, vol.
44, no. 3, pp. 483-505, 496. [Hereafter Dimier & McGeever, ‘Diplomats without a Flag’].
15
Protocol No. 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, OJ 2010, C 83/266, 30
March 2010. [Hereafter Protocol no. 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union].
16
Ivor Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, Oxford University Press, 2009 (6th ed.), 730 p., 408.
[Hereafter Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Practice].
17
Art 5(1) TEU spells out that “the limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of
conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality”.
18
ECJ, Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, [1963] ECR 1.
19
ECJ, Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585.
20
ECJ, Opinion 1/91, European Economic Area, [1991] I-6079.
6
the functioning of a State.
21
Institutions, at first the High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community (‘ECSC’), later on the Commission, Council, Parliament
and Court of Justice were entrusted with executive, legislative or judicial powers.
22
Supranational principles apply in many of the decision-making processes, from the
exclusive right of legislative initiative of the Commission to the system of voting by
qualified majority in the Council and the co-legislative role of the directly elected
European Parliament in the so-called ‘ordinary legislative procedure’.
23
As to the external effects, in the course of the process of European
integration and unprecedented by any other international organization, the Union
also gathered competences that enable it to act as a prominent international actor.
24
The Union may negotiate and conclude treaties with one or more third countries or
international organizations.
25
According to Mike Smith, the EU’s growing
engagement with the global order resulted in the exercise of ‘State powers’ in the
global political economy and the global security order.
26
The Lisbon Treaty also
explicitly granted legal personality to the Union (Art. 47 TEU), enhancing its capacity
to enter into relations with States and international organizations and emphasizing
the unique EU position in international law.
Third, the Union has an active and passive jus legationis and manages its own
diplomatic service. Through the years, the scope and number of diplomatic missions
has strongly expanded.
27
Legal questions on Union delegations and their status will
be tackled infra.
C. The Lisbon Treaty’s external relations machinery
The Lisbon Treaty’s aspiration to upgrade the role of the EU at the global level has
been extensively discussed by scholars and commentators.
28
The enhanced
21
Teija Tiilikainen, ‘To be or not to be?: An Analysis of the Legal and Political Elements of Statehood in
the EU’s External Identity’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 6, no. 2, 2001, pp. 223-241, 228.
22
Magdalena Ličková, ‘European Exceptionalism in International Law’, Eur. J. Int. Law, vol. 19, no. 3,
2008, pp. 463–490, 464.
23
See, respectively, Art. 17(2), 16(3) and 14(1) and (3) TEU.
24
Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, 399.
25
Art. 37 TEU and Art. 3(2), 216, and 218 TFEU. See the EU Treaties Office Database, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do (Consultation April 2011).
26
Michael Smith, ‘The European Union and International Order: European and Global Dimensions’,
European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 12, no. 4, 2007, pp. 437-456, 452.
27
Rohit Ambast & Vinay Tyagi, ‘Ambassadors of Europe: An Insight into the Evolution of the European
Union and International Diplomatic Law’, Studia Diplomatica, vol. LXI, 2008, 16, available at
http://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_VIII_1_AmbastTyagi.pdf. [Hereafter Ambast &
Tyagi, ‘Ambassadors of Europe’].
28
See amongst others: Simon Duke, ‘Providing for European-Level Diplomacy after Lisbon: The Case
of the European External Action Service’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 211-
233. [Hereafter Duke, Providing for European-Level Diplomacy after Lisbon’]; Michael Emerson et al.,
Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor, Brussels, CEPS, 2011, 144 p. [Hereafter Emerson et al.,
Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor]; Jan Wouters, Dominic Coppens & Bart De Meester, The
European Union’s External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty’, in Stefan Griller & Jaques Ziller (eds.),
7
European external relations machinery resulted in new actors speaking and acting
on behalf of the Union.
29
The European Commission continues to represent the
Union externally, with the exception of the common foreign and security policy and
other cases provided for in the Treaties (Art. 17(1) TEU). New actors - the President
of the European Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy - were called into existence. The former represents the Union on
issues of common foreign and security policy, at his level and in that capacity (Art.
15(6) TEU). The latter has the more general mission to take the lead in the Union's
common foreign and security policy and is assisted by the EEAS (Art. 18 and 27(2)
TEU). The Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the
EEAS of 26 July 2010 (‘EEAS Decision’) spells out that the EEAS shall function as
an autonomous, sui generis body, separate from the Commission and Council.
30
Whereas the EEAS can be marked a ‘Brussels-based machinery’, its external part,
the Union delegations, operate as a diplomatic service to the Union.
31
Commission
delegations functioning under the authority of the Commission were converted into
Union delegations operating under the authority of the High Representative.
32
EU
delegations coordinate EU external policies, represent the Union outside of the
common borders and perform certain supportive tasks in regard to diplomatic and
consular protection of EU citizens.
33
The head of delegation is accountable to the
High Representative for the overall management of the work of the delegation and
for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the Union.
34
3.
T
HE EU
S DIPLOMATIC NETWORK
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission
maintained a network of Commission delegations, including staff and foreign assets,
which was almost universal in scope. While the transformation of Commission
delegations into Union delegations by the Lisbon Treaty is as such not revolutionary,
The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty?, Vienna, Springer, 2008, 383
p., pp. 143-203.
29
The lack of consistency due to the multitude of actors involved in the EU’s public diplomacy has been
a general criticism for many years which is regularly ventilated as the so-called ‘need to speak with one
voice’; Steffen Bay Rasmussen, ‘The Messages and Practices of the European Union’s Public
Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 5, no. 3, 2010, pp. 263-287, 282. [Hereafter
Rasmussen, ‘The Messages and Practices of the European Union’s Public Diplomacy’].
30
Art. 1(2) Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning
of the European External Action Service, OJ 2010, L 201/30, 3 August 2010.
31
Art 1 EEAS Decision.
32
Art. 221(2) TFEU reads: “Union delegations shall be placed under the authority of the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. See Sophie Vanhoonacker &
Natasja Reslow, ‘The European External Action Service: Living Forwards by Understanding
Backwards’, European Foreign Affairs Rev., vol. 15, no. 1, 2010, pp. 1-18, 13. [Hereafter Vanhoonacker
& Reslow, ‘The European External Action Service’].
33
Art. 221 TFEU. The functions of Union delegations are discussed infra.
34
Art. 5(2) EEAS Decision.
8
it must be noted that Union delegations represent the entire Union and all of its
policies
35
instead of solely the Commission, whose key focus was trade and aid.
36
At
present, a network of 138 Union delegations is operating globally.
37
Of these, 131
bilateral delegations - including regional delegations - are accredited to almost 160
third countries. Seven delegations represent the EU at the headquarters of
international organizations (in Geneva, New York, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Strasbourg
and Addis Ababa). The function of head of delegation of a Union delegation can be
combined with the function of EU Special Representative. Currently, one double-
hatted head of delegation is operating in Afghanistan.
38
The guidelines laid down in
the 2009 Presidency Report on the establishment of the EEAS and agreed upon by
the Council foresee autonomy in terms of administrative budget and management of
staff.
39
The High Representative, respecting usual budgetary rules, must propose a
budget for the EEAS, which is to be a separate section of the EU budget.
40
Since 1
January, 2011 the EEAS has taken over full management responsibility and related
administrative, financial and contractual obligations.
41
The budgeted administrative
expenditure for the EEAS in 2011 amounts to 464,1 million, of which 279,9
million is reserved for delegations.
42
The EEAS comprises officials from relevant departments of the General
Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from
national diplomatic services of the Member States.
43
To ensure a balanced
representation between the different categories at least one third of diplomatic staff
in delegations will be national diplomats.
44
A rotation between headquarters and
35
Art. 221(1) TFEU.
36
Roberts, Satows Diplomatic Practice, 407. The Member States are represented by the Commission
in multilateral fora for the areas where the Community has competence; this role expanded extensively
within and across competence sectors: R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, Essex, Pearson Education,
2006 (3d ed.), 387 p., 85. [Hereafter Barston, Modern Diplomacy].
37
See: EU External Service Directory, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/web_en.htm
(Consulted in April 2011).
38
Ibid.
39
§ 16 Council of the European Union, Presidency Report to the European Council on the European
External Action Service, Brussels, 23 October 2009, 14930/09, available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14930.en09.pdf (Consulted in April 2011). [Hereafter
Presidency Report EEAS 2009].
40
Art. 8 and 13(5) EEAS Decision.
41
Council of the European Union, Draft amending budget No. 6 to the general budget 2010 - Statement
of revenue and expenditure by section, Brussels, 18 June 2010, 11251/10, § 2.6 available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st11/st11251.en10.pdf.
42
European Parliament, Definitive adoption of the European Union’s general budget for the financial
year 2011, OJ 2011, L 68, 15 March 2011, I/512, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=OJ:L:2011:068:0001:0550:EN:PDF (Consulted in April
2011).
43
Art. 27(3) TEU. For comments on competing or collaborating epistemic communities in EEAS, see
David Spence, ‘Taking Stock: 50 years of European Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol.
4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 235-259, 245-251; Vanhoonacker & Reslow, ‘The European External Action Service’,
6-11.
44
Art. 6(9) EEAS Decision. For special provisions applicable to EEAS staff, see Art. 1(9) Regulation
1080/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending the Staff
9
delegations is provided for, as well as a rotation between the EEAS and national
diplomatic services and between the EEAS and the Commission/Council.
45
The
proposed establishment plan of the EEAS includes a 5.778 staff, including civil
servants, contract agents, local agents, seconded national experts, and junior
experts.
46
4.
CONDUCT OF EU DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AFTER LISBON
A. Establishment of diplomatic relations
Under international law, the recognition of a State, the establishment of diplomatic
relations and the establishment of a permanent mission should be distinguished.
47
As mentioned before, the EU does not recognize third countries and/or governments;
this recognition is a preliminary condition to enter into diplomatic relations.
Furthermore, the establishment of diplomatic relations is distinct from but can
precede the establishment of a diplomatic representation, often referred to as a
diplomatic mission.
48
According to Art. 2 VCDR the establishment of diplomatic
relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by
mutual consent. The process commences via a formal request made by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the sending State to the receiving State’s authorities. The actual
decision on the opening of a diplomatic mission is taken by the head of State or
government.
49
A similar method is used by the EU when establishing diplomatic
relations.
50
The EEAS Decision stipulates that the High Representative, in
agreement with the Council and the Commission, decides to open or close a
delegation.
51
The High Representative must thereto enter into ‘the necessary
practical arrangements’ with the receiving State or the international organization
concerned.
52
It is further spelled out that, in an ‘Establishment Agreement’ or
‘Headquarters Agreement’, the High Representative must take the necessary
measures to ensure that host States grant the Union delegations, their staff and their
Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other
Servants of those Communities, OJ 2010, L 311/1, 26 November 2010.
45
§ 22 Presidency Report EEAS 2009.
46
Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor, 141.
47
Zieck, ‘Diplomatiek en Consulair Recht’, 278; Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, 71.
48
Zieck, ‘Diplomatiek en Consulair Recht’, 278.
49
Biswanath Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1988,
22. [Hereafter Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook].
50
The European Commission started negotiating ‘Establishment Agreements’ with receiving States
granting diplomatic status to its envoys at the beginning of the 1980s: Dimier & McGeever, ‘Diplomats
without a Flag’, 496.
51
Art. 5(1) EEAS Decision.
52
Art. 5(6) EEAS Decision.
10
property privileges and immunities equivalent to those referred to in the Vienna
Convention.
53
B. Accreditation process and status of delegations
International diplomatic law governs the formal accreditation process of diplomatic
agents.
54
A diplomatic representative is appointed by the head of the sending State
whereupon his name is submitted to the government of the host State.
55
The
appointment of a head of delegation is announced to the State in a ‘Letter of
Credence’ signed by the head of the sending State or government and addressed to
the head of the receiving State, in order to receive agrément.
56
The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the receiving State is notified of the details of the appointment of
members of the mission.
57
The head of a diplomatic mission is considered as having
taken up his functions in the receiving State either when he has presented his
credentials or when he has notified his arrival and a true copy of his credentials has
been presented to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State.
58
The EU
developed a practice in which it duplicates State-to-State procedures accrediting
heads of delegation. Accreditation procedures and letters have been used by the
European Commission since the 1970s.
59
The post-Lisbon practice has been one
where the ‘Letters of Credence’ are co-signed by the President of the European
Council and the President of the European Commission - not by the High
Representative.
60
The current practice is a legacy of the Commission delegations:
before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, letters of credence of heads of
Commission delegations were signed by the President of the Commission. The head
of a Union delegation is bringing together two different tasks and institutions while
supervising both EEAS staff working in political, press, information and
administrative sections and staff from Commission services, including inter alia trade,
aid and development. Moreover, the Commission may “in areas where it exercises
53
Ibid.
54
Denza, Diplomatic Law, 49.
55
Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook, 34.
56
Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook, 50; Zieck, ‘Diplomatiek en Consulair Recht’, 281. However, since the
essence of the agrément procedure is its informality, the VCDR does not prescribe a form or method to
be used: Denza, Diplomatic Law, 49. Members of a diplomatic mission other than the head of the
mission are not subject to the previous agrément of the receiving State (Art. 7 VCDR).
57
Art. 10 VCDR.
58
Art 13(1) VCDR.
59
Dimier & McGeever, ‘Diplomats without a Flag’, 496.
60
This is remarkable, bearing in mind the general mission of the High Representative stated in Art. 18
TEU and the resemblance with the function of the HR with that of a national minister of foreign affairs,
as e.g. described in Vanhoonacker & Reslow, ‘The European External Action Service’, 1-2.
11
the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties” issue instructions to delegations to be
executed under the overall responsibility of the head of delegation.
61
The EU heads of delegation are conferred the authority to perform functions
equivalent to those of national diplomats and the third country is requested in the
letter of credence to give credit to all the head of delegation may say in the name of
the Union.
62
Still, only the receiving State (and consequently not the sending State,
or in this case, the EU) has the power to confer diplomatic status on the delegation
members.
63
The EEAS Decision does not shed light on the legal status of “EU
ambassadors” in third countries. Moreover, it is disputed whether a head of a Union
delegation may actively utilize the title of ‘ambassador’. Nevertheless, there is an EU
practice of informing the receiving State of the status which it wishes to see granted
to its direct envoys. Since 1983, the Commission has been referring explicitly to a
Courtesy Title of Ambassador’ in its letters of credence.
64
Still, until now it was urged
that the active use of the term ‘ambassador’ be avoided since it reflects a courtesy
title, and not a function and it might ventilate diplomatic sensitivities present in both
Member States and third countries.
5.
CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC LAW
International diplomatic law is confronted with a number of challenges with the EU
entering the diplomatic scene, of which a selection is discussed below.
A. The ‘diplomatic and consular functions’ of EU delegations
According to Art. 3(1) VCDR, the functions of a diplomatic mission consist, inter alia,
in: (a) representing the sending State in the receiving State; (b) protecting in the
receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits
permitted by international law; (c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving
State; (d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the
receiving State, and reporting thereon to the government of the sending State; (e)
promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and
developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations. The first function of
61
Art 5(3) EEAS Decision. For further details on the relationship between the Commission, EEAS and
Union delegations, see: Bart Van Vooren, A legal-institutional perspective on the European External
Action Service’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 48, no. 2, 2011, pp. 475-202, 492-495.
62
Compare to a classic ‘Letter of Credence’ which also contains such a request: Roberts, Satow’s
Diplomatic Practice, 62.
63
Jean Salmon, Manuel de Droit Diplomatique, Brussels, Bruylant, 1994, 678 p., 141-148. [Hereafter
Salmon, Manuel de Droit Diplomatique].
64
Dimier & McGeever, ‘Diplomats without a Flag’, 496; Philippe De Schoutheete & Sami Andoura, ‘The
Legal Personality of the European Union’, Studia Diplomatica, vol. LX, no.1, 2007, 7 available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/9083/01/Legal.Personality.EU-PDS-SA.pdf.
12
representation is often overlooked or naively minimized according to Berridge.
65
In
EU diplomacy, however, it is well-established that the head of delegation performs
tasks as direct envoy representing the Union.
66
The EU grants the head of delegation
the power to conclude contracts on behalf of the Union in the country he or she is
accredited to.
67
Similarly, the delegations may, in appropriate situations, be
authorized to bring or defend legal proceedings on behalf of the Union. Next to this,
the Union and more specifically the EEAS headquarters need to be briefed on the
situation on the ground in the third country.
68
Through the years, the European delegations’ area of competence has
expanded from being strictly related to the Commission’s commercial policy to a
broad range of Union projects and programmes.
69
The predominance of trade
diplomacy is not exclusive to the EU’s diplomatic relations: it is a first order activity in
State-to-State diplomacy
70
, though it should be stressed that EU delegations do not
engage in ‘economic diplomacy’ in the strict sense of the word. Although the
functions of EU delegations increasingly resemble those of nation States, Simon
Duke rightly argues that the EU remains a rather fragmented actor whose main
claim to being a diplomatic actor remains its considerable influence in trade,
development and assistance issues.
71
On specific topics and areas, an EU delegation’s mandate will be more
restricted compared to the mandate of a diplomatic mission of an EU Member State.
Union delegations’ powers are limited to Union powers, i.e. the competences
conferred upon the EU by its Member States.
72
Still, within the limits of those powers,
especially when they are exclusive powers
73
, the function of a Union delegation is
equivalent to that of any diplomatic mission of a sovereign State. The situation is less
clear for competences shared by the Union and Member States.
74
65
Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 114.
66
See Art. 5(8) EEAS Decision.
67
Ibid.
68
Rasmussen, ‘The Messages and Practices of the European Union’s Public Diplomacy’, 274.
69
This expansion of competences started before the transformation of Commission delegations into
Union delegations: “Broadly speaking, the Commission delegations were also not just confined to
commercial negotiations but were competent in fields such as agriculture, fisheries, environment,
transport, health and safety as well”: Ambast & Tyagi, ‘Ambassadors of Europe’, 16. It has been argued
that the previous Commission delegations were styled diplomatic missions by courtesy only, because
the range of diplomatic and consular functions they were entitled to was confined to e.g. trade, aid and
development: Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, 407.
70
Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 119; Barston, Modern Diplomacy, 134-135.
71
Duke, ‘Providing for European-Level Diplomacy after Lisbon’, 212.
72
On the principle of conferral, see Art. 5(1) and (2) as well as Art. 4(1) TEU; specifically as to the
action of EU institutions, see Art. 13(2) TEU. See also supra note 17.
73
Art. 3 TFEU lists the exclusive EU competences for trade, competition and monetary policies, the
conservation of marine biological resources and, importantly, for the conclusion of certain international
agreements.
74
See the shared competences listed in Art. 4 TFEU and Protocol No. 25 on the exercise of shared
competences; Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor, 5 and 23.
13
As part of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union delegations
have taken over the coordinating role and functions previously undertaken by the
embassy of the Member State holding the rotating Presidency.
75
Still, it is clear that
there is a strong need for intense cooperation between Union delegations and the
existing diplomatic missions of EU Member States. This is reflected in Art. 35 TEU,
according to which
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the
Union Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and
their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in
ensuring that decisions defining Union positions and actions adopted
pursuant to this Chapter are complied with and implemented.
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information and carrying
out joint assessments.
They shall contribute to the implementation of the right of citizens of the
Union to protection in the territory of third countries […]
76
Union delegations are instructed to support the Member States in their diplomatic
relations and in their role of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in
third countries on a resource-neutral basis.
77
Although it is not the core task of Union
delegations to perform consular tasks, they are nevertheless granted the capacity to
act upon requests by Member States in order to protect EU citizens who cannot turn
to their national consulates.
78
The EU delegations therefore contribute to the
implementation of the right of citizens of the Union to enjoy protection in the territory
of third countries in which the Member State of which these citizens are nationals is
not represented, laid down in art. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU.
79
Certain EU Member
75
Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor, 52.
76
Art. 35 TEU. See also: art. 221(2) TFEU and the Decision of the Representatives of the Governments
of the Member States meeting within the Council of 19 December 1995 regarding protection for citizens
of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations, 95/553/EC: Assistance in the event
of death, accident or serious illness, assistance in the event of arrest or detention, aid and repatriation
for EU citizens in difficulties.
77
Art 5(10) EEAS Decision. See: Duke, ‘Providing for European-Level Diplomacy after Lisbon’, 228-
229.
78
Art. 5(8) EEAS Decision.
79
See currently still Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting
within the Council of 19 December 1995 regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by
diplomatic and consular representations, OJ 1995, L 314, 95/553/EC, 28 December 1995, which in Art.
1 and 5 stipulates the mandatory protection and assistance in the event of death, accident or serious
illness, arrest or detention, violent crime and aid and repatriation for EU citizens in difficulties, of any
Member State's diplomatic or consular representation if his own Member State has no accessible
permanent representation. See also: Commission, Green paper on diplomatic and consular protection
of Union citizens in third countries, Brussels, 28 November 2006, COM(2006)712 which states that
“Although [Union delegations] do not have consular powers, these delegations could be included in joint
efforts to pool resources”.
14
States take the view that the European diplomatic service in the future should be
accorded full consular tasks, including the issuing of short-term (Schengen) visa.
80
B. Classification of EU ambassadors and ordre protocollaire
What is the position of EU ambassadors and their staff in the corps diplomatique
81
?
Regarding the internal classification of a diplomatic mission, Article 37 VCDR
categorizes diplomatic staff other than the ambassador into members of the
administrative and technical staff of the mission, members of the service staff of the
mission, and private servants of members of the mission. Each delegation proposes
the classification of its staff on the diplomatic list which can be either accepted or
rejected by the receiving State.
82
The EEAS uses its own classification system of
diplomatic staff, reflecting internal administrative grades. These grades are
translated into equivalent diplomatic titles and reported to the receiving State.
Seconded national officials working in delegations will be able to invoke the
diplomatic status and diplomatic title which they would have been entitled to had they
been serving in their national embassy.
83
The aforementioned sui generis status of the EU as an international
diplomatic actor is reflected in specific arrangements with host countries on the
ranking of Union heads of delegation. In a local corps diplomatique’ the
ambassadors of nation States are listed firstly in the diplomatic list containing all
ambassadors present in a capital.
84
Part two of the classification contains the
representatives of international organizations.
85
There is a strong EU reluctance of
being listed in the second part of the diplomatic list. Union delegations therefore
request to be registered at the end of the list of States’ missions, referring to the sui
generis’ position of the EU, without however claiming being equal to States.
Regarding the precedence of heads of mission, Article 16 VCDR
86
stipulates that the
80
Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor, 61: A common consular service can play a
role (a) in countries where Member States are not represented and (b) in the issuing of short-term
(Schengen) visa. The Netherlands is e.g. currently researching to what extent greater involvement of
Union delegations in consular tasks can lead towards more synergy on the one hand and budgetary
cuts on the other hand: The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nota modernisering Nederlandse
diplomatie”, 8 April 2011, 10 and 18, available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/notas/2011/04/08/nota-modernisering-nederlandse-diplomatie.html.
81
The corps diplomatique comprises the heads and the diplomatic staff of all the missions accredited to
a particular receiving State. See Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, 197; Plantey, Principes de
Diplomatie, 254.
82
Art. 17 VCDR.
83
Rules and Information concerning Seconded National Experts (SNE) in the Delegations of the
European Union, 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/delita/about_us/
Rules_and_information.pdf.
84
Plantey, Principes de Diplomatie, 254.
85
Salmon, Manuel de Droit Diplomatique, 97.
86
Art. 16 VCDR refers to Art. 13 of the same Convention, which spells out that the head of a delegation
will be considered as having taken up his functions in the order of presentation of credentials or of a
true copy thereof will be determined by the date and time of the arrival of the head of the mission. Art.
15
ranking of ambassadors will be based upon the order of the date and time of taking
up their functions
87
, while the head of the Union delegation is always classified at the
end of the heads of State missions holding the rank of ambassador and before
heads of mission of lower rank. In other words, EU delegations are not meant to be
treated according to the seniority rules laid down in the Vienna Convention. This
principle of ‘freezing of seniority’ is a general exception to the, otherwise almost
complete, applicability of the VCDR in EU-third State relations.
In general, an EU head of delegation will operate in a receiving State as an
actor in the local diplomatic corps. Specific challenges can be distinguished. First,
the head of delegation bears the nationality of one of the EU Member States also
represented in the same corps by a national diplomatic mission; prudence and
courtesy in the relationship with this is therefore crucial.
88
Second, the Union
delegation needs to develop a relationship with the embassy of the EU Member
State holding the rotating Council presidency in order to coordinate EU policy.
C. Application of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
The EU’s diplomatic network is made subject, through specific agreements with the
host country, to the Vienna Convention. Most States have accepted to accord
privileges and immunities to Union delegations, their staff and their property in this
manner. However, the specific provisions and legal frameworks may differ according
to the party concerned. As indicated above, the EEAS Decision requires the High
Representative to enter into the necessary arrangements with the host country
89
,
which opens the door to some variety in the application of the VCDR. Next to this,
the most-favoured nation requirement, which is crucial in international diplomatic
law
90
, does not apply in relation to the EU. The question remains to what extent third
countries are willing to grant VCDR privileges and immunities to Union delegations.
Historically, the Commission Delegation in the United States was the first to be
granted diplomatic status and the accompanying privileges and immunities in 1971.
91
Today, all but one of EU delegations have the status of diplomatic missions and as
such enjoy full diplomatic immunities and privileges according to the Vienna
Convention. The situation in Israel is exceptional: there is one Union delegation in
16(3) VCDR states the Article is without prejudice to any practice accepted by the receiving State
regarding the precedence of the representative of the Holy See.
87
Denza, Diplomatic Law, 119; Plantey, Principes de Diplomatie, 255; Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic
Practice, 197: The most senior ambassador is the doyen of the diplomatic corps.
88
On nationality, Art. 8(1) VCDR declares that members of the diplomatic staff of the mission should in
principle be of the nationality of the sending State.
89
Art. 5(6) EEAS Decision.
90
Art. 47 VCDR reads “in the application of the provisions of the present Convention, the receiving
State shall not discriminate as between States”.
91
Ambast & Tyagi, ‘Ambassadors of Europe’, 16.
16
Tel Aviv, where the staff (32) is accorded diplomatic privileges and immunities. The
other Israel-based Union delegation in Jerusalem (69), responsible for West Bank
and Gaza Strip, is the only EU delegation in a third country whose staff is not
granted diplomatic privileges or immunities.
92
The above-mentioned method of seeking arrangements with host countries to
‘contract-in’ the Vienna Convention has great advantages in practice but has limits
as well, as will be shown below in addressing a number of practical challenges
regarding diplomatic passports and diplomatic asylum.
1. Diplomatic passport
First, the EU does not currently issue diplomatic passports, i.e. the common travel
document for diplomats. This challenges the EEAS in sending out Union delegations.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that, although the diplomatic passport
is the globally accepted instrument to guarantee the prompt crossing of borders by
diplomats, its use is not regulated by the VCDR. The EU uses a laissez-passer
document as an alternative to the diplomatic passport. Article 6 of Protocol No. 7 on
the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union forms the legal basis for this
travel document:
Laissez-passer in a form to be prescribed by a European regulation of
the Council acting by a simple majority, which shall be recognized as
valid travel documents by the authorities of the Member States, may be
issued to members and servants of the institutions of the Union by the
Presidents of these institutions. These laissez-passer shall be issued to
officials and other servants under conditions laid down in the Staff
Regulations of officials and the Conditions of employment of other
servants of the Union. The Commission may conclude agreements for
these laissez-passer to be recognized as valid travel documents within
the territory of third States.
93
It follows from this provision that the Commission not the High Representative - is
responsible for negotiating and concluding with third States agreements for the
recognition of the EU laissez-passer. Many issues do arise here. For instance, it
remains unclear whether all foreign authorities, e.g. in airports or at border-
crossings, acknowledge these laissez-passer documents
94
and what the travel
92
European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations, email, 8 November 2010.
93
Art. 6, Protocol 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union.
94
This document e.g. lacks the security features and formalities of the diplomatic passport, which might
lead to non-recognition by third State authorities.
17
documents to be used by family members of EU delegations are.
95
The legal
situation is further complicated in case an EU diplomatic agent is not traveling
directly to the country of destination, i.e. the State he or she is accredited to, but
instead passes through a third country while proceeding to take up or to return to his
or her post, or when returning to his or her own country. In this situation it is hard to
predict to what extent foreign authorities will accept the laissez-passer document as
an alternative diplomatic passport, or how they will apply inviolability and such
immunities as may be required to ensure the EU diplomat’s transit or return.
96
The
problem might be less stringent for seconded national diplomats working for the
EEAS, as they will have received diplomatic passports from their national
governments. But precisely this situation factual and legal inequalities - is likely to
give rise to tensions within Union delegations.
2. Diplomatic asylum
The Vienna Convention does not contain provisions on diplomatic asylum. Moreover,
there is no universal acceptance by the international community of this concept’s
legal content.
97
Diplomatic asylum is regarded as a humanitarian practice rather than
a legal right, which may only be granted for the purpose of saving life or preventing
injury in the face of an immediate threat to the refugee.
98
As mentioned supra, the
EU requests third countries to respect the VCDR privileges and immunities in
relation to its delegations. This consequently also contains a reciprocal EU
commitment to respect VCDR terms and conditions in the application of such
privileges and immunities. EU delegations therefore have to respect Art. 41(1) VCDR
regarding the non-interference in the internal affairs of the receiving State and the
duty to respect the latter’s laws and regulations.
To further complicate matters, customary diplomatic law and related practices,
including diplomatic asylum, do not automatically form part of the EU diplomatic legal
web. Still, Union delegations might be confronted with persons in life-threatening
situations in need of diplomatic asylum. As an organization founded on the values of
95
The legal status of members of the households joining Union delegates residing in a third country
remains problematically unclear. According to Art. 37 VCDR family members enjoy the privileges and
immunities specified in Art. 29 to 36, but Art. 5(6) of the EEAS Decision does not specifically mention
the applicability of the VCDR to their status. M. ZIECK also points out it is in first instance the sending
State who has to stipulate who forms part of the household of a diplomat (Zieck, ‘Diplomatiek en
Consulair Recht’, 282). In casu, the EU will have to decide upon a common practice regarding the
households of its diplomats originating from 27 Member States.
96
Art. 40 VCDR deals with the passage of a diplomatic agent through or stay in the territory of a third
State. It provides for diplomatic privileges and immunities in such a case, but there is no legal guarantee
that this rule will be accordingly applied to travelling EU envoys.
97
When negotiating the VCDR, governments regarded rules on diplomatic asylum as highly
controversial and sensitive: Denza, Diplomatic Law, 141; Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, 108.
98
Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, 110.
18
respect for human dignity and human rights (including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities)
99
and having committed itself in its founding treaty to uphold
and promote its values and in particular the protection of human rights in its relations
with the wider world
100
, the EU cannot do otherwise than to uphold humanitarian
rules. In that sense, Union delegations do not only have the right but arguably even a
duty to grant diplomatic protection in extraordinary situations and adhere to the
principles of humanity if confronted with a person in a situation which poses an
immediate threat to his or her life or a serious injury. If necessary they have to
translate these principles into taking action, after careful consideration and bearing in
mind Art. 41(1) VCDR. Because of the limits to the aforementioned contracting-in
strategy, though, the concrete legal basis to grant diplomatic asylum remains
unclear. However this may be, a Union delegation according some kind of (even
provisional) diplomatic asylum can rely upon Article 22(1) VCDR on the inviolability
of the premises of the mission: the agents of the receiving State may not enter them,
except with the consent of the head of the mission. The person seeking protection
could therefore, at least temporarily, have refuge in the EU delegation. Eventually, a
settlement will have to be concluded in dialogue with the receiving State.
101
D. Is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations always the right framework?
The existing international diplomatic framework and more specifically the Vienna
Convention may not always be the most suitable legal framework in the light of the
peculiarities of the EU as an international actor.
102
The rationale behind the
European strive to insert itself consistently in the diplomatic system via the use of the
Vienna Convention is to a great degree pragmatic. The EU arguably did not even
want to become a classical diplomatic actor, but in order to function effectively in
diplomacy, it had to reconcile itself to existing global structures. In general, the
Vienna Convention is considered a success story with a well-established global
99
See Art. 2 and 3 TEU.
100
Art. 3(5) TEU and, more elaborated, Art. 21 TEU.
101
ICJ, Haya de la Torre case of 13 June 1951 (Colombia v. Peru), I.C.J. Rep. 1951 p.71: The reach of
such an agreement between State parties involved was the outcome in this case on diplomatic asylum
granted to a Peruvian national by the Colombian embassy in Lima. The International Court of Justice
held that, although Colombia was under no obligation of international law to surrender refugee Victor
Raul Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities, the diplomatic asylum had to be terminated (§ 83).
102
In general, the changing nature of diplomatic actors, functions and strategies have been argued, as
well as the conclusion of a new treaty on diplomatic relations. See amongst others: A. K. HENRIKSON,
‘Diplomacy’s Possible Futures’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2006, afl. 1, 3-27; Jorge Heine, ‘On
the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy’, The Centre for International Governance Innovation
Working Paper No. 11, 2006, available at http://igcc.ucsd.edu/pdf/HeineNewDiplomacy.pdf (consultation
February 2011); Michael Koch, ‘Wozu noch Diplomaten?’, in Enrico Brandt & Christian Buch (eds.),
Auswärtiges Amt: Diplomatie als Beruf, Wiesbaden, VS Verslag Für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005 (4th
ed.), 411p., 346-360; Barston, Modern Diplomacy, 4-5.
19
practice.
103
Berridge argues that it was precisely the limited brief of the VCDR
dealing exclusively with traditional bilateral diplomacy which was one of the reasons
of its success.
104
The limits of the ‘contracting-in’ strategy and the ‘multiple
bilateralism’ have been exemplified by the variety of legal uncertainties touched upon
in this contribution. Next to this, Art. 5(6) of the EEAS Decision is silent on the
applicability of customary international law, a key source of international diplomatic
law.
6.
CONCLUSION
In nearly six decades, the EU has developed a role as a global diplomatic actor: the
number of its diplomatic missions has increased significantly and it currently has an
almost universal network. The Union applies the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations to the fullest extent possible in bilateral agreements with third
countries and other international organizations. As a result, the EU has made an
original contribution to international diplomatic law. The EU’s aspiration to act as a
diplomatic actor originates from and is justified by its sui generis character. The
Union's external role is in many respects much more advanced than that of any other
international organization. Still, it lacks the features of a sovereign State to develop a
full-grown legal framework for establishing, maintaining and terminating inter-State
relations. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty caused significant changes.
Commission delegations became Union delegations, the EEAS was set up and the
High Representative is responsible for the Union delegations, which represent the
Union as a whole. In many ways the EU as a diplomatic actor is a success story:
Union delegations obtained privileges and immunities in conformity with the VCDR in
virtually all third countries they are present. The delegations’ representational
function is well-established and EU diplomats are taking part actively in the local
corps diplomatique.
The process of building up a global EU diplomatic service, relying on the
Commission’s work in the past, but also implementing new features since the Lisbon
Treaty, is far from completed. In all of this, a delicate balance between Union
delegations and the continued diplomatic practice and delegations of EU Member
States needs to be found.
105
Challenges also arise in the determination of a proper
legal framework. The EU pragmatically opted to contract-in the 1961 Vienna
103
Denza, Diplomatic Law, 1; Holger. P. Hestermeyer, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(1961)’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 1, available at www.mpepil.com
(Consultation February 2011).
104
Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 112.
105
Cf. Declarations No. 13 and 14 concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy attached to the
Lisbon Treaty.
20
Convention through bilateral arrangements. However, it was shown that a system of
‘multiple bilateralism’ is not on an equal footing with multilateralism. This was
illustrated by the problems regarding diplomatic passports and diplomatic asylum,
the complexity inherent to the variety of legal EU arrangements as well as the
unresolved issue of the application of customary diplomatic law.
21
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