AO
106A (08/18) Application :
fa
a Warrant by Telephone
or
Other Reliable Electronic Means
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
Central District
of
Califo
rn
ia
In
the Matter
of
t
he
Search
of
)
(Briefly describe the property to
be
searched
or
identify the
person
by
name
and
address)
)
)
Case No.
)
1850 Bradcliff Way, Pahndale, Calif
orn
ia 93551
)
)
)
2:20-mj-04487-Duty
.
FIL
ED
CLERK, O.S. DISTRICT CO
CRT
September
18
, 2020
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APPLICATION
FORA
WARRANT BYIELEPHONE OROTIIER RELIABLE ELECIRONIC MEANS
I, a federal law enforcement officer or
an
attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under
penalty
of
perjwy
that I have reason to believe that
on
the following person or property (identify the person
or
describe the
property to
be
searched
and
give its location):
See Attachment A-1
located in the Central District
of
Califo
rni
a, there
is
n
ow
cone
ea
led (identify the person
or
describe the property to
be
seized):
See Attachment B
The
basis for
the
search under Fed.
R.
Crim. P.
4l(c)
is
(checkoneormore):
[81
ev
id
ence
of
a crime;
l8I
contraband, frnits
of
crime,
or
other items
ille
ga
lly possessed;
l8I
property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
a person to
be
arrested
or
a person
who
is
unlawfully restrained.
The
search
is
related to a violati
on
of
:
Code Section
21
U.S.C. §§
841(a)(l)
, 846
21
U.S.C. §§ 843(b)
The
application
is
based
on
these facts:
See attached
Affida
v
it
l8I
Continued
on
the attached sheet.
Offense Description
Possession with Intent to Distribute a Contro
ll
ed
Su
bsta
nc
e and Conspiracy
Use
of
a Communication Facili
ty
to Facilitate the
Distribution
of
a Controlled Substance
D Delayed notice
of
____
days (give e..wct ending date
if
more than 30 days:
_____
_,
is
requested
under 18 U.S.
C.
§ 3103a, the basis
of
which
is
set forth
on
the attached sheet.
/s/
Applicant's signature
Chris top her Siliciano, Special Agent
Printed
name
and
title
Attested to
by
the applica
nt
in
acco
rdance
with
the requirements
of
Fed
.
R.
Crim.
P.
4.1
b_
telephone.
Date:
September
18
,
2020
}Jlt
J
/µ_
Judge's
signature
City and state: Los Angeles, CA
Hon. Michael
R.
Wilner, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Printed
name
and
title
AUSA: Keith D. Ellison (213-894-6920) / Puneet
V.
Kakkar (213-894-5728)
ATTACHMENT A-1
PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED
The parcel located at 1850 Bradcliff Way, Palmdale,
California 93551, containing a single family, two-story
residence with light tan stucco walls with white trim. The
front door is dark in color and located underneath a small porch
facing north. The numbers “1850” are displayed the eve above
the east side of the garage doors. The roof has light red tile
shingles. The parcel is the second parcel east of 20th Street
West on Bradcliff Way.
The area to be searched includes all rooms, annexes,
attics, basements, porches, garages, carports, outside yard,
curtilage, mailboxes, trash containers, debris boxes, storage
lockers, locked containers and safes, cabinets, rooms, parked
vehicles, motorhomes, sheds, and outbuildings associated with
the premises and shall extend into desks, cabinets, safes,
briefcases, backpacks, wallets, purses, trash receptacles,
digital devices, and any other storage locations within the
premises.
1
ATTACHMENT B
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
1. The items to be seized are evidence, contraband,
fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) (Manufacturing, Distribution of, and Possession
with Intent to Distribute, a Controlled Substance), 846 (Attempt
and Conspiracy to Commit Controlled Substance Offense), and
843(b) (Unlawful Use of a Communication Facility, Including the
Mails, to Facilitate the Distribution of a Controlled Substance)
(the “Subject Offenses”):
a. Any controlled substance, controlled substance
analogue, or listed chemical;
b. Firearms, ammunition, silencers, and other
dangerous weapons;
c. Items and paraphernalia for the manufacturing,
distributing, packaging, sale, or weighing of controlled
substances, including scales and other weighing devices, plastic
baggies, food saver sealing devices, heat sealing devices,
balloons, packaging materials, containers, and money counters;
d. United States currency in excess of $2,000,
including the first $2,000 if more than $2,000 is seized,
digital currency such as Bitcoin stored on electronic wallets or
other forms of wallets or other means, cryptocurrency private
keys and recovery seed, and records relating to income derived
from the transportation, sales, and distribution of controlled
substances and expenditures of money and wealth, for example,
money orders, wire transfers, cashier’s checks and receipts,
i
passbooks, cash cards, gift cards, checkbooks, check registers,
securities, precious metals including gold, jewelry, antique or
modem automobiles, bank statements and other financial
instruments, including stocks or bonds in amounts indicative of
the proceeds of illicit narcotic trafficking;
e. Records, documents, programs, applications and
materials reflecting the identity of, contact information for,
communications with, or times, dates or locations of meetings
with co-conspirators, sources of supply of controlled
substances, or drug customers, including calendars, address
books, telephone or other contact lists, pay/owe records,
distribution or customer lists, correspondence, receipts,
records, and documents noting price, quantities, and/or times
when drugs were bought, sold, or otherwise distributed, whether
contained in hard copy correspondence, notes, emails, text
messages, photographs, videos (including items stored on digital
devices), or otherwise;
f. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) coordinates and
other information or records identifying travel routes,
destinations, origination points, and other locations;
g. Storage units and containers, such as floor
safes, wall safes, upright safes (also known as gun safes), lock
boxes, and other self-contained locked enclosures;
h. Records, documents, programs, applications and
materials indicating travel in interstate and foreign commerce,
such as travel itineraries, plane tickets, boarding passes,
ii
motel and hotel receipts, passports and visas, credit card
receipts, and telephone bills
i. Indicia of occupancy, residency, and/or ownership
of the previously described property, premises, or vehicles, and
any other property, premises, or vehicles, including utility and
telephone bills, canceled mail, deeds, leases, rental
agreements, photographs, personal telephone books, diaries,
envelopes, registration, receipts, and keys which tend to show
the identities of the occupants, residents, and/or owners; and
j. Any digital device which is itself or which
contains evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of
the Subject Offenses, and forensic copies thereof.
2. With respect to any digital device containing evidence
falling within the scope of the foregoing categories of items to
be seized:
a. evidence of who used, owned, or controlled the
device at the time the things described in this warrant were
created, edited, or deleted, such as logs, registry entries,
configuration files, saved usernames and passwords, documents,
browsing history, user profiles, e-mail, e-mail contacts, chat
and instant messaging logs, photographs, and correspondence;
b. evidence of the presence or absence of software
that would allow others to control the device, such as viruses,
Trojan horses, and other forms of malicious software, as well as
evidence of the presence or absence of security software
designed to detect malicious software;
c. evidence of the attachment of other devices;
iii
d. evidence of counter-forensic programs (and
associated data) that are designed to eliminate data from the
device;
e. evidence of the times the device was used;
f. passwords, encryption keys, biometric keys, and
other access devices that may be necessary to access the device;
g. applications, utility programs, compilers,
interpreters, or other software, as well as documentation and
manuals, that may be necessary to access the device or to
conduct a forensic examination of it;
h. records of or information about Internet Protocol
addresses used by the device;
i. records of or information about the device’s
Internet activity, including firewall logs, caches, browser
history and cookies, “bookmarked” or “favorite” web pages,
search terms that the user entered into any Internet search
engine, and records of user-typed web addresses.
3. As used herein, the terms “records,” “documents,”
“programs,” “applications,” and “materials” include records,
documents, programs, applications, and materials created,
modified, or stored in any form, including in digital form on
any digital device and any forensic copies thereof.
4. As used herein, the term “digital device” includes any
electronic system or device capable of storing or processing
data in digital form, including central processing units;
desktop, laptop, notebook, and tablet computers; personal
digital assistants; wireless communication devices, such as
iv
telephone paging devices, beepers, mobile telephones, and smart
phones; digital cameras; gaming consoles (including Sony
PlayStations and Microsoft Xboxes); peripheral input/output
devices, such as keyboards, printers, scanners, plotters,
monitors, and drives intended for removable media; related
communications devices, such as modems, routers, cables, and
connections; storage media, such as hard disk drives, floppy
disks, memory cards, optical disks, and magnetic tapes used to
store digital data (excluding analog tapes such as VHS); and
security devices.
SEARCH PROCEDURE FOR DIGITAL DEVICE(S)
5. In searching digital devices (or forensic copies
thereof), law enforcement personnel executing this search
warrant will employ the following procedure:
a. Law enforcement personnel or other individuals
assisting law enforcement personnel (the “search team”) will, in
their discretion, either search the digital device(s) on-site or
seize and transport the device(s) and/or forensic image(s)
thereof to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory or similar
facility to be searched at that location. The search team shall
complete the search as soon as is practicable but not to exceed
120 days from the date of execution of the warrant. The
government will not search the digital device(s) and/or forensic
image(s) thereof beyond this 120-day period without obtaining an
extension of time order from the Court.
v
b. The search team will conduct the search only by
using search protocols specifically chosen to identify only the
specific items to be seized under this warrant.
i. The search team may subject all of the data
contained in each digital device capable of containing any of
the items to be seized to the search protocols to determine
whether the device and any data thereon falls within the list of
items to be seized. The search team may also search for and
attempt to recover deleted, “hidden,” or encrypted data to
determine, pursuant to the search protocols, whether the data
falls within the list of items to be seized.
ii. The search team may use tools to exclude
normal operating system files and standard third-party software
that do not need to be searched.
iii. The search team may use forensic examination
and searching tools, such as “EnCase” and “FTK” (Forensic Tool
Kit), which tools may use hashing and other sophisticated
techniques.
c. If the search team, while searching a digital
device, encounters immediately apparent contraband or other
evidence of a crime outside the scope of the items to be seized,
the team shall immediately discontinue its search of that device
pending further order of the Court and shall make and retain
notes detailing how the contraband or other evidence of a crime
was encountered, including how it was immediately apparent
contraband or evidence of a crime.
vi
d. If the search determines that a digital device
does not contain any data falling within the list of items to be
seized, the government will, as soon as is practicable, return
the device and delete or destroy all forensic copies thereof.
e. If the search determines that a digital device
does contain data falling within the list of items to be seized,
the government may make and retain copies of such data, and may
access such data at any time.
f. If the search determines that a digital device is
(1) itself an item to be seized and/or (2) contains data falling
within the list of other items to be seized, the government may
retain the digital device and any forensic copies of the digital
device, but may not access data falling outside the scope of the
other items to be seized (after the time for searching the
device has expired) absent further court order.
g. The government may also retain a digital device
if the government, prior to the end of the search period,
obtains an order from the Court authorizing retention of the
device (or while an application for such an order is pending),
including in circumstances where the government has not been
able to fully search a device because the device or files
contained therein is/are encrypted.
h. After the completion of the search of the digital
devices, the government shall not access digital data falling
outside the scope of the items to be seized absent further order
of the Court.
vii
6. In order to search for data capable of being read or
interpreted by a digital device, law enforcement personnel are
authorized to seize the following items:
a. Any digital device capable of being used to
commit, further, or store evidence of the offense(s) listed
above;
b. Any equipment used to facilitate the
transmission, creation, display, encoding, or storage of digital
data;
c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage
device capable of storing digital data;
d. Any documentation, operating logs, or reference
manuals regarding the operation of the digital device or
software used in the digital device;
e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers,
interpreters, or other software used to facilitate direct or
indirect communication with the digital device;
f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles,
or similar physical items that are necessary to gain access to
the digital device or data stored on the digital device; and
g. Any passwords, password files, test keys,
encryption codes, or other information necessary to access the
digital device or data stored on the digital device.
7. The review of the electronic data obtained pursuant to
this warrant may be conducted by any government personnel
assisting in the investigation, who may include, in addition to
law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the
viii
government, attorney support staff, and technical experts.
Pursuant to this warrant, the investigating agency may deliver a
complete copy of the seized or copied electronic data to the
custody and control of attorneys for the government and their
support staff for their independent review.
8. During the execution of this search warrant, law
enforcement is permitted to: (1) depress BERMUDEZ’s thumb-
and/or fingers onto the fingerprint sensor of the device (only
when the device has such a sensor), and direct which specific
finger(s) and/or thumb(s) shall be depressed; and (2) hold the
device in front of BERMUDEZ’s face with his or her eyes open to
activate the facial-, iris-, or retina-recognition feature, in
order to gain access to the contents of any such device. In
depressing a person’s thumb or finger onto a device and in
holding a device in front of a person’s face, law enforcement
may not use excessive force, as defined in Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386 (1989); specifically, law enforcement may use no more
than objectively reasonable force in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them.
9. The special procedures relating to digital devices
found in this warrant govern only the search of digital devices
pursuant to the authority conferred by this warrant and do not
apply to any search of digital devices pursuant to any other
court order.
ix
AFFIDAVIT
I. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT..................................2
II. BACKGROUND OF AFFIANT.................................3
III. SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE.............................4
IV. BACKGROUND ON DARKNET DRUG TRAFFICKING................5
V. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE...........................7
A. Background of Investigation......................7
B. February 11, 2020, Drug Seizures.................8
C. Review of Surveillance Video of Scoville
Residence Identifies Chavez Supplying Melkom With
Drugs...........................................10
D. Search of Chavez’s Phone Reveals Identity of
BERMUDEZ Involved With Supplying Chavez With
Methamphetamine.................................11
E. Review of Cell-Site Information Reflects Chavez
and BERMUDEZ Met Before February 11, 2020 in a
Suspected Drug Transaction......................13
F. Deputies Arrest BERMUDEZ with Methamphetamine in
March 2020......................................14
G. Additional Surveillance of BERMUDEZ.............15
VI. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DRUG OFFENSES.............19
VII. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DIGITAL DEVICES...........21
VIII. CONCLUSION......................................25
I, Christopher Siliciano, being duly sworn, declare and
state as follows:
I. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT
1. This affidavit is made in support of a criminal
complaint and arrest warrant against ANDRES BERMUDEZ, also known
as “Tito” (“BERMUDEZ”), for a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii): Possession with Intent to
Distribute a Controlled Substance.
2. This affidavit is also made in support of an
application for a warrant to search the following:
a. 1850 Bradcliff Way, Palmdale, California 93551
(the “Subject Premises”), as described more fully in Attachment
A-1;
b. A Honda Civic, California license plate number
7UVU643, registered to Moises A. Castro (“Subject Vehicle 1”),
as described more fully in Attachment A-2;
c. A motorhome, California license plate number
4PTY764, registered to Kristina Baca (“Subject Vehicle 2” and,
collectively with Subject Vehicle 1, the “Subject Vehicles”), as
described more fully in Attachment A-3; and
d. The person of BERMUDEZ, as further described in
Attachment A-4.
3. The requested search warrant seeks authorization to
seize evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (Manufacturing, Distribution of, and
Possession with Intent to Distribute, a Controlled Substance),
846 (Attempt and Conspiracy to Commit Controlled Substance
2
Offense), and 843(b) (Unlawful Use of a Communication Facility,
Including the Mails, to Facilitate the Distribution of a
Controlled Substance) (the “Subject Offenses”), as described
more fully in Attachment B. Attachments A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and
B are incorporated herein by reference.
4. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon
my personal observations, my training and experience, and
information obtained from various law enforcement personnel and
witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there
is sufficient probable cause for the requested search warrant,
and does not purport to set forth all of my knowledge of or
investigation into this matter. Unless specifically indicated
otherwise, all conversations and statements described in this
affidavit are related in substance and in part only.
II. BACKGROUND OF AFFIANT
5. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) and have been so employed since October
2017. As a requirement for employment as an FBI Special Agent,
I successfully completed the New Agent Basic Field Training
Course located at the FBI Training Academy in Quantico,
Virginia. As a function of my assignment, I have received both
formal and informal training from the FBI and other institutions
regarding computer technology, financial investigations,
cryptocurrency, and drug trafficking organizations.
6. As a Special Agent with FBI, part of my duties
includes the investigation of criminal violations as proscribed
by 21 U.S.C § 841 and 21 U.S.C § 846. Moreover, as an FBI
3
Special Agent, I am a Federal Law Enforcement Officer,
authorized to investigate violations of the laws of the United
States and to execute search and seizure warrants issued under
the authority of the United States.
7. I have conducted and participated in criminal
investigations for violations of federal and state laws
including, but not limited to, narcotics trafficking, computer-
based financial crimes, money laundering, firearms, fraud, and
other organized criminal activity. I have prepared, executed,
and assisted in numerous search and arrest warrants. I have
also conducted and participated in criminal and administrative
interviews of witnesses and suspects. I am familiar with the
formal methods of illegal narcotics investigations, including,
but not limited to, electronic surveillance, visual
surveillance, general questioning of witnesses, search warrants,
confidential informants, the use of undercover agents, and
analysis of financial records. I have participated in
investigations of organizations involved in the manufacture,
distribution, and possession with intent to distribute
controlled substances, including those involving the dark web
and virtual currency.
III. SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE
8. Since February 2019, the FBI, Homeland Security
Investigations (“HSI”), and United States Postal Inspection
Service (“USPIS”) have been investigating a drug trafficking
organization (the “STEALTHGOD DTO”) selling narcotics, including
methamphetamine and 3, 4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”)
4
on darknet marketplaces suspected of operating the monikers
“Hectorsmom”, “Stealthgod”, and others. In February 2020, law
enforcement arrested five individuals in connection with this
DTO and after searching two residences used in furtherance of
the criminal scheme, seized approximately 120 pounds of
methamphetamine, 30,000 pills of suspected MDMA, and five
firearms. Based on further investigation from that search,
agents have identified BERMUDEZ as one of the sources of supply
of methamphetamine to the STEALTHGOD DTO. BERMUDEZ has resided
at the Subject Premises and has been observed driving the
Subject Vehicles. Based on the training and experience of
investigators, evidence of drug trafficking is expected to be
recovered from the Subject Premises and the Subject Vehicles.
IV. BACKGROUND ON DARKNET DRUG TRAFFICKING
9. Based on my training and experience, I am aware of the
following concepts:
a. The “dark web,” also sometimes called the “dark
net” or “deep web,” is a colloquial name for a number of
extensive, sophisticated, and widely used criminal marketplaces
operating on the Internet, which allow participants to buy and
sell illegal items, such as drugs, firearms, and other hazardous
materials with greater anonymity than is possible on the
traditional Internet (sometimes called the “clear web” or simply
“web”). These online black market websites use a variety of
technologies, including the Tor network (defined below) and
other encryption technologies, to ensure that communications and
transactions are shielded from interception and monitoring. A
5
famous dark web marketplace, Wall Street Market, operated
similar to legitimate commercial websites such as Amazon and
eBay, but offered illicit goods and services. Law enforcement
shut down Wall Street Market in 2019.
b. “Vendors” are the dark web’s sellers of goods and
services, often of an illicit nature, and they do so through the
creation and operation of “vendor accounts.”
c. The “Tor network,” or simply “Tor,” is a special
network of computers on the Internet, distributed around the
world, that is designed to conceal the true Internet Protocol
(“IP”) addresses of the computers accessing the network, and,
thereby, the locations and identities of the network’s users.
Tor likewise enables websites to operate on the network in a way
that conceals the true IP addresses of the computer servers
hosting the websites, which are referred to as “hidden services”
on the Tor network. Such “hidden services” operating on Tor
have complex web addresses, generated by a computer algorithm,
ending in “.onion” and can only be accessed through specific web
browser software, including a major dark-web browser known as
“Tor Browser,” designed to access the Tor network. One of the
logos, or “icons,” for Tor Browser is a simple image of the
Earth with purple water and bright green landmasses with bright
green concentric circles wrapping around the planet to look like
an onion.
d. Darknet marketplaces often only accept payment
through virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, and operate an
escrow whereby customers provide the digital currency to the
6
marketplace, who in turn provides it to the vendor after a
transaction is completed. Accordingly, large amounts of Bitcoin
sales or purchases by an individual can be an indicator that the
individual is involved in drug trafficking or the distribution
of other illegal items. Individuals intending to purchase
illegal items on Wall Street Market-like websites need to
purchase or barter for Bitcoins.
e. When vendors receive orders for narcotics on the
darknet, the orders can come from anywhere in the world; vendors
are known to use U.S. mail and/or commercial carriers to
distribute narcotics.
f. Vendors operate akin to traditional drug
trafficking organizations, with sources of supply (who provide
drugs to them) and couriers (who drop off mail packages to
customers).
V. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
10. Based on my review of law enforcement reports,
conversations with other law enforcement agents, and my own
knowledge of the investigation, I am aware of the following:
A. Background of Investigation
11. Since February 2019, federal law enforcement agents
have been investigating a group of darknet drug vendors believed
to be operated by the same group, including “HectorsMom” and
“Stealthgod,” which collectively made over 18,000 sales on the
darknet. These vendor monikers sold drugs on a variety of
darknet marketplaces (some of which are now defunct), such as
Wall Street Market, Empire, and Nightmare, and through encrypted
7
communications platforms such as ProtonMail. Over the course of
the investigation, these vendors sold methamphetamine for
approximately $400 per ounce. Agents believed that these
monikers were affiliated with each other based on the
advertisements and comments on darknet forums. Agents conducted
undercover purchases of drugs, including methamphetamine, from
some of these vendor monikers. These vendors sent drugs hidden
in items such as puzzle boxes and health and wellness products.
B. February 11, 2020, Drug Seizures
12. In connection with this investigation, on February 10,
2020, the Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian, United States
Magistrate Judge, authorized search warrants for two locations
in the Central District of California associated with the
STEALTHGOD DTO, specifically the residence of Rane Melkom and
Teresa McGrath (the “Scoville Residence”) and a residence
occupied by Mark Chavez, Thomas Olayvar, and Matthew Ick (“the
“Stoa Residence”). Law enforcement officers executed the
warrants on February 11, 2020.
13. During the search of the Scoville Residence, Melkom
and McGrath were present;
1
law enforcement officers found the
following in a shed adjoining the residence:
1
Melkom and McGrath have been charged in a two-count
information for possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), (b)(1)(C). McGrath has pleaded
guilty to a superseding information charging her with conspiracy
to distribute and posses with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), (b)(1)(C), conspiracy to launder
monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and
8
a. 22.183 kilograms of actual methamphetamine.
b. Approximately 6,701 grams of MDMA.
c. Two loaded Glock pistols, bearing serial numbers
NRU539 and GMZ799.
d. 60 packaged and sealed USPS priority mail
envelopes addressed to various addresses, in over 35 states
across the country, that were later discovered to contain drugs,
including a crystalline like substance that yielded a
presumptive positive for the presence of methamphetamine, orange
triangle and square shaped pills that yielded a presumptive
positive for the presence of MDMA, Orange circle shaped pills
marked “AD30” that yielded a presumptive positive for the
presence of methamphetamine, a brown tar-like substance
suspected to be hashish, and white rectangular pills suspected
to be Alprazolam.
14. In addition, in the residence portion of the Scoville
Residence, law enforcement officers seized a loaded FNH pistol,
bearing serial number GKU0127246, under the bed of Melkom and
McGrath.
15. During the search of the Stoa Residence, Chavez,
Olayvar, Ick, and others were present;
2
law enforcement officers
found the following:
possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United States v. Melkom
and McGrath, 20-CR-00136-AB.
2
Chavez has pleaded guilty to an information charging him
with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
distribute methamphetamine and MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), (b)(1)(C) and possession of
9
a. Approximately 16.62 kilograms (36.64 pounds) of
methamphetamine; and
b. Two loaded handguns.
C. Review of Surveillance Video of Scoville Residence
Identifies Chavez Supplying Melkom With Drugs
16. During the search of Melkom’s residence described
above, agents identified a surveillance camera installed over
the entry of the shed at the Scoville Residence, where the drugs
were discovered.
17. On August 5, 2020, the Honorable Pedro V. Castillo,
United States Magistrate Judge, Central District of California,
authorized a warrant for the production and search of
information -- including video recordings -- associated with the
camera held with the provider of that surveillance camera.
18. During my review of video recordings obtained pursuant
to the warrant, I observed a video from February 9, 2020,
showing Melkom and Chavez carrying black duffel bags from a car
into the portion of Melkom’s residence where the drugs were
discovered. Based on my training, experience, and investigation
in this case, I believe that Chavez delivered methamphetamine to
Melkom for further distribution via the dark web.
firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). See United States v. Chavez, 20-CR-00130-AB.
Olayvar and Ick are currently charged in an information with
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). See
United States v. Olayvar and Ick, 20-CR-00135-AB.
10
D. Search of Chavez’s Phone Reveals Identity of BERMUDEZ
Involved With Supplying Chavez With Methamphetamine
19. Agents lawfully searched Chavez’s cellular telephone
that was seized from the Stoa Residence, which was an iPhone
with phone number ending in 8606 (the “Chavez phone”). During a
search of the Chavez phone, I found messages whereby Chavez used
coded language to discuss purchasing bulk amounts of drugs from
several individuals. Relevant here, I found several messages
between the Chavez phone and a phone number ending in 8004 (the
“BERMUDEZ phone”), to include the following:
a. On January 18, 2020, the BERMUDEZ phone sent a
message to Chavez stating: “Hey mark there 50 real good right
here at my boys house this is one of my good boys his well
connect I’ve been talking him about having 50 to 100 sitting
there just for u so he has them let me know”.
i. Based on my background, training,
experience, and investigation in this case, I believe that
Chavez and the BERMUDEZ phone were discussing methamphetamine
transactions in terms of pounds of product, such that “50 to
100” means 50 to 100 pounds of methamphetamine.
b. On February 7, 2020, the BERMUDEZ phone sent a
message to Chavez stating: “Hey mark How are you Everything
good I was Calling you to let you know I could get you some
real good ones nice and chunky for a good price as many as need
30lb + for $975.”
i. Based on my training and experience, I know
drug traffickers describe quality methamphetamine using terms
11
like “chunky”. Based on my background, training, experience,
and investigation in this case, I believe that Chavez and the
BERMUDEZ phone were again discussing methamphetamine
transactions.
c. Between February 9 and 10, 2020, Chavez and the
BERMUDEZ phone exchanged the following messages:
Chavez: Hay buddy I need another 30
BERMUDEZ phone: Okay Let me see
Chavez: Can you try to get at 950 brother
BERMUDEZ phone: Yo what’s good mark , my boy just
called me he said there’s gonna be 200
of them around 4:30-5:00pm let me know
how many u want so he could put them to
side
Chavez: Yes I’ll be ready at 8
i. Based on my background, training,
experience, and investigation in this case, I believe that
Chavez and the user of the BERMUDEZ phone were negotiating the
sale of 30 pounds of methamphetamine (“another 30”) for $950 per
pound (“Can you try to get at 950 brother”).
d. During a search of the Chavez phone, I also found
messages to and from Melkom discussing the acquisition, and
delivery to Melkom’s residence, of large quantities of
methamphetamine.
3
Relevant here, on February 10, 2020, at 11:03
p.m., Chavez sent a message to Melkom stating, “Okay I got
another 40.”
3
Agents have also lawfully searched Melkom’s phone that was
seized in connection with the above-referenced search warrants
and have identified the corresponding messages in that phone.
12
i. Based on my background, training,
experience, and investigation in this case, I believe that
Chavez messaged Melkom to tell Melkom he had obtained an
additional 40 pounds of methamphetamine (“I got another 40”). I
further believe, based on the context of this message, that this
was the approximately 40 pounds that investigators seized from
the Stoa residence on February 11, 2020.
E. Review of Cell-Site Information Reflects Chavez and
BERMUDEZ Met Before February 11, 2020 in a Suspected
Drug Transaction
20. On January 30, 2020, the Honorable Alexander F.
MacKinnon, United States Magistrate Judge, authorized a
continued warrant for the disclosure of prospective cell-site
and GPS information for the Chavez phone. On March 10, 2020,
the Honorable John E. McDermott, United States Magistrate Judge,
authorized a warrant for the disclosure of historical cell-site
information and prospective cell-site and GPS information for
the BERMUDEZ phone.
21. Based on my review of the cell-site and GPS
information obtained pursuant to the warrants, I am aware that
the Chavez phone and the BERMUDEZ phone were both located in the
vicinity of east Los Angeles around the same time -- between
10:00 and 10:30 p.m. -- on the evening of February 10, 2020.
Information for the location of the Chavez phone reflects that
Chavez did not regularly spend time in that area.
22. Based on my review of messages on the Chavez phone,
the cell-site information, the surveillance video, and my
investigation in this case, I believe that on February 10, 2020,
13
the user of the BERMUDEZ phone provided Chavez with the
approximately 40 pounds of methamphetamine seized from Chavez’s
residence on February 11, 2020. I further believe that Chavez
obtained the drugs in connection with Melkom for sale on the
dark web.
F. Deputies Arrest BERMUDEZ with Methamphetamine in March
2020
23. On March 28, 2020, unrelated to the investigation
described above, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
(“LASD”) deputies conducted a traffic stop of Subject Vehicle 1
for a moving violation on Soledad Canyon Road in Canyon Country,
California. Based on my review of that report, I am aware of
the following:
a. During the stop, deputies identified the driver
as BERMUDEZ. Deputies saw drug paraphernalia in plain view and
inquired whether there was anything else illegal in the vehicle,
to which BERMUDEZ responded he had methamphetamine inside.
Deputies conducted a search of the vehicle and found suspected
methamphetamine in a Ziploc bag stuffed between the driver’s
seat and center console. Deputies also recovered a plastic
baggie containing a black, tar-like substance resembling heroin
in the center console.
b. After the deputies advised BERMUDEZ of his
Miranda rights, which he appeared to understand and agreed to
waive, BERMUDEZ stated the drugs belonged to him but denied
selling drugs.
14
c. The deputies arrested BERMUDEZ on charges of
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) for sale,
possession of heroin, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He
was booked at the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Santa Clarita Station,
and subsequently released from custody.
d. At the time of his arrest, BERMUDEZ provided
officers with his address (the Subject Premises) and phone
number (the BERMUDEZ phone).
24. Forensic chemists at the DEA Southwest Laboratory
later confirmed the suspected methamphetamine to be 58 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
25. A review of the cell-site and GPS information for the
BERMUDEZ phone at the time of the traffic stop and subsequent
arrest, places the BERMUDEZ phone in the vicinity of Soledad
Canyon Road, and, later, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department Santa Clarita Station. Based on this information, I
believe that BERMUDEZ is the user of the BERMUDEZ phone.
G. Additional Surveillance of BERMUDEZ
26. As discussed above, at the time of his arrest,
BERMUDEZ provided officers with his address (the Subject
Premises) and phone number (the BERMUDEZ phone).
27. On April 14, 2020, an LASD detective conducted
surveillance at 42524 3rd Street, East Lancaster, California,
based on location information received from the BERMUDEZ phone.
Subject Vehicle 2 was observed parked on the west shoulder of 3
rd
Street east across from 42534 3
rd
St. East.
15
28. On April 21, 2020, an LASD detective received a
location “ping” for the BERMUDEZ phone to a location near 3rd
Street East and Avenue L-4 in Lancaster, California. The LASD
Detective observed Subject Vehicle 1 and Subject Vehicle 2
parked next to each other in the location of the phone ping.
Subject Vehicle 2 had interior lights illuminating the rear
portion of the motorhome.
29. On April 28, 2020, an LASD detective reviewing cell-
site and GPS information for the BERMUDEZ phone tracked the
phone’s location to the vicinity of the Subject Premises. Later
that day, the detective conducted surveillance of the Subject
Premises and saw Subject Vehicle 1 parked in front of the
residence.
30. On April 29, 2020, at the request of the LASD
detective, an LASD deputy stopped Subject Vehicle 1 in Palmdale,
California, for a tinted windows violation. The deputy
identified BERMUDEZ as the sole occupant of the vehicle and
observed that he was exhibiting signs and symptoms of recent
drug use. After BERMUDEZ told the deputy that he had recently
used narcotics, the deputy detained BERMUDEZ in the back seat of
the patrol car pending a narcotics investigation. During the
course of the investigation, the LASD detective (who has
assisted with this investigation, as described above) arrived
and confirmed BERMUDEZ was the driver of Subject Vehicle 1. The
detective also called the BERMUDEZ phone while the detective was
at the location. The deputy saw the phone in BERMUDEZ’s
possession light up, and heard it ring, when the detective
16
called. The deputy provided BERMUDEZ with a warning and
released him.
31. The detective later reviewed cell-site and GPS
information for the BERMUDEZ phone around the time of the
traffic stop and saw that the phone appeared at the location of
the traffic stop during that time. Following the stop, cell-
site and GPS information for the BERMUDEZ phone show that
BERMUDEZ went directly to the vicinity of the Subject Premises.
32. On May 1, 2020, the detective conducted surveillance
of the Subject Premises. At 5:50 a.m., the detective saw
Subject Vehicle 1 parked in front of the residence. At 5:00
p.m., the detective saw BERMUDEZ sitting in a chair on the front
porch of the Subject Premises.
33. Based on my review of cell-site and GPS information
for the BERMUDEZ phone, I am aware that the BERMUDEZ phone --
and, thus, BERMUDEZ -- is regularly in the vicinity of the
Subject Premises. When he is not at the Subject Premises,
BERMUDEZ commonly drives to Santa Clarita, San Fernando, North
Hollywood, Van Nuys, or Sunland. Cell-site and GPS information
show that BERMUDEZ stops at various stores and gas stations
while in those areas. Based on my knowledge of this
investigation, I believe that BERMUDEZ transports controlled
substances from the Subject Premises to those areas for the
purpose of sales.
34. On September 9, 2020, the Honorable Patricia Donahue,
United States Magistrate Judge, authorized a renewed warrant for
the disclosure of historical cell-site information and
17
prospective cell-site and GPS information for the BERMUDEZ
phone. Based on a review of this historical cell-site
information, I learned the following:
a. On July 28, 2020, the BERMUDEZ phone made
multiple outgoing phone calls. The first tower to receive a
signal from the BERMUDEZ phone during these calls placed the
address of this phone call nearby 38650 5th Street West,
Palmdale, California 93551, in the general vicinity of the
Subject Premises.
b. The BERMUDEZ phone has made multiple outgoing
calls in Sherman Oaks, California, as recently as September 1,
2020.
35. On September 17, 2020, I observed the Subject Vehicles
parked together in the vicinity of 5225 Sepulveda Blvd., Sherman
Oaks, California 91411. The vehicles were attached, and
appeared to have been parked in that location consistently.
Based on the location of the vehicles, I believe that BERMUDEZ
is spending consistent time living in Subject Vehicle 2.
Photo from September 16, 2020:
18
VI. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DRUG OFFENSES
36. Based on my training and experience and familiarity
with investigations into drug trafficking conducted by other law
enforcement agents, I know the following:
a. Drug trafficking is a business that involves
numerous co-conspirators, from lower-level dealers to higher-
level suppliers, as well as associates to process, package, and
deliver the drugs and launder the drug proceeds. Drug
traffickers often travel by car, both domestically and to
foreign countries, in connection with their illegal activities
in order to meet with co-conspirators, conduct drug
transactions, and transport drugs or drug proceeds.
b. Drug traffickers often maintain books, receipts,
notes, ledgers, bank records, and other records relating to the
manufacture, transportation, ordering, sale and distribution of
illegal drugs, including for historical transactions. The
aforementioned records are often maintained where drug
traffickers have ready access to them, such as on their cell
phones and other digital devices, and in their residences and
vehicles. These records are also maintained after a sale has
occurred.
c. Communications between people buying and selling
drugs take place by telephone calls and messages, such as e-
mail, text messages, and social media messaging applications,
sent to and from cell phones and other digital devices. This
includes sending photos or videos of the drugs between the
seller and the buyer, the negotiation of price, and discussion
19
of whether or not participants will bring weapons to a deal. In
addition, it is common for people engaged in drug trafficking to
have photos and videos on their cell phones of drugs they or
others working with them possess, as they frequently send these
photos to each other and others to boast about the drugs or
facilitate drug sales.
d. Drug traffickers often keep the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of their drug trafficking associates on
their digital devices and in their residence. Drug traffickers
often keep records of meetings with associates, customers, and
suppliers on their digital devices and in their residence,
including in the form of calendar entries and location data.
e. Drug traffickers often use vehicles to transport
their narcotics and may keep stashes of narcotics in their
vehicles in the event of an unexpected opportunity to sell
narcotics arises.
f. Drug traffickers often maintain on hand large
amounts of United States currency in order to maintain and
finance their ongoing drug trafficking businesses, which operate
on a cash basis. Such currency is often stored in their
residences and vehicles.
g. Drug traffickers often keep drugs in places where
they have ready access and control, such as at their residence
or in safes. They also often keep other items related to their
drug trafficking activities at their residence, such as digital
scales, packaging materials, and proceeds of drug trafficking.
These items are often small enough to be easily hidden and thus
20
may be kept at a drug trafficker’s residence even if the drug
trafficker lives with others who may be unaware of his criminal
activity.
h. It is common for drug traffickers to own multiple
phones of varying sophistication and cost as a method to
diversify communications between various customers and
suppliers. These phones range from sophisticated smart phones
using digital communications applications such as Blackberry
Messenger, WhatsApp, and the like, to cheap, simple, and often
prepaid flip phones, known colloquially as “drop phones,” for
actual voice communications.
i. When drug traffickers deal with significant
quantities of drugs, such as methamphetamine, they may also
possess firearms for protection of those drugs. That appeared
to be the case with respect to the STEALTHGOD DTO, given that
both residences where significant quantities of methamphetamine
was found also had guns found in the proximity of the drugs.
VII. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DIGITAL DEVICES
4
37. Based on my training, experience, and information from
those involved in the forensic examination of digital devices, I
4
As used herein, the term “digital device” includes any
electronic system or device capable of storing or processing
data in digital form, including central processing units;
desktop, laptop, notebook, and tablet computers; personal
digital assistants; wireless communication devices, such as
paging devices, mobile telephones, and smart phones; digital
cameras; gaming consoles; peripheral input/output devices, such
as keyboards, printers, scanners, monitors, and drives; related
communications devices, such as modems, routers, cables, and
connections; storage media; and security devices.
21
know that the following electronic evidence, inter alia, is
often retrievable from digital devices:
a. Forensic methods may uncover electronic files or
remnants of such files months or even years after the files have
been downloaded, deleted, or viewed via the Internet. Normally,
when a person deletes a file on a computer, the data contained
in the file does not disappear; rather, the data remain on the
hard drive until overwritten by new data, which may only occur
after a long period of time. Similarly, files viewed on the
Internet are often automatically downloaded into a temporary
directory or cache that are only overwritten as they are
replaced with more recently downloaded or viewed content and may
also be recoverable months or years later.
b. Digital devices often contain electronic evidence
related to a crime, the device’s user, or the existence of
evidence in other locations, such as, how the device has been
used, what it has been used for, who has used it, and who has
been responsible for creating or maintaining records, documents,
programs, applications, and materials on the device. That
evidence is often stored in logs and other artifacts that are
not kept in places where the user stores files, and in places
where the user may be unaware of them. For example, recoverable
data can include evidence of deleted or edited files; recently
used tasks and processes; online nicknames and passwords in the
form of configuration data stored by browser, e-mail, and chat
programs; attachment of other devices; times the device was in
use; and file creation dates and sequence.
22
c. The absence of data on a digital device may be
evidence of how the device was used, what it was used for, and
who used it. For example, showing the absence of certain
software on a device may be necessary to rebut a claim that the
device was being controlled remotely by such software.
d. Digital device users can also attempt to conceal
data by using encryption, steganography, or by using misleading
filenames and extensions. Digital devices may also contain
“booby traps” that destroy or alter data if certain procedures
are not scrupulously followed. Law enforcement continuously
develops and acquires new methods of decryption, even for
devices or data that cannot currently be decrypted.
38. Based on my training, experience, and information from
those involved in the forensic examination of digital devices, I
know that it is not always possible to search devices for data
during a search of the premises for a number of reasons,
including the following:
a. Digital data are particularly vulnerable to
inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction. Thus,
often a controlled environment with specially trained personnel
may be necessary to maintain the integrity of and to conduct a
complete and accurate analysis of data on digital devices, which
may take substantial time, particularly as to the categories of
electronic evidence referenced above. Also, there are now so
many types of digital devices and programs that it is difficult
to bring to a search site all of the specialized manuals,
equipment, and personnel that may be required.
23
b. Digital devices capable of storing multiple
gigabytes are now commonplace. As an example of the amount of
data this equates to, one gigabyte can store close to 19,000
average file size (300kb) Word documents, or 614 photos with an
average size of 1.5MB.
39. The search warrant requests authorization to use the
biometric unlock features of a device, based on the following,
which I know from my training, experience, and review of
publicly available materials:
a. Users may enable a biometric unlock function on
some digital devices. To use this function, a user generally
displays a physical feature, such as a fingerprint, face, or
eye, and the device will automatically unlock if that physical
feature matches one the user has stored on the device. To
unlock a device enabled with a fingerprint unlock function, a
user places one or more of the user’s fingers on a device’s
fingerprint scanner for approximately one second. To unlock a
device enabled with a facial, retina, or iris recognition
function, the user holds the device in front of the user’s face
with the user’s eyes open for approximately one second.
b. In some circumstances, a biometric unlock
function will not unlock a device even if enabled, such as when
a device has been restarted or inactive, has not been unlocked
for a certain period of time (often 48 hours or less), or after
a certain number of unsuccessful unlock attempts. Thus, the
opportunity to use a biometric unlock function even on an
24
enabled device may exist for only a short time. I do not know
the passcodes of the devices likely to be found in the search.
c. Thus, the warrant I am applying for would permit
law enforcement personnel to, with respect to any device that
appears to have a biometric sensor and falls within the scope of
the warrant: (1) depress BERMUDEZ’s thumb- and/or fingers on the
device(s); and (2) hold the device(s) in front of BERMUDEZ’s
face with his or her eyes open to activate the facial-, iris-,
and/or retina-recognition feature.
40. Other than what has been described herein, to my
knowledge, the United States has not attempted to obtain this
data by other means.
VIII. CONCLUSION
41. For all of the reasons described above, there is
probable cause to believe that BERMUDEZ has committed a
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii): Possession
with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance. There is also
probable cause to believe that the items to be seized described
in Attachment B will be found in a search of the Subject
Premises, the Subject Vehicles, and the person of BERMUDEZ as
further described above and in the various Attachments A.
25
Attested
t o
by
the
applicant
in
accordance
with
the
requirements
of
Fed
. R.
Crim
. P . 4 . 1
by
telephone
on
this
18th
day
of
September
, 2 0 2 0
UNIT
ED
STATES MAGISTRATE
JUDGE
Hon. Michael
R.
Wilner
26