February 1, 2018 Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases 187
preliminary instruction modeled after instruction 401.14 et seq. The court then
must frame alternative liability issues chosen from instructions 405.7, 405.8, and
405.9.
2. Actual malice, clear and convincing proof. “Actual malice” has
connotations other than its First Amendment meaning, so instruction 405.7 avoids
the term and uses the definition instead: whether defendant in making the
defamatory statement (about the public person claimant) knew his statement was
false or seriously doubted its truth. Defendant’s state of mind can be proved
circumstantially. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20
L.Ed.2d 262 (1968); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 643 (11th Cir. 1983).
Claimant’s burden is proof by “clear and convincing” evidence. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783,
(1986); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109
S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989).
3. Truth or falsity, preponderance of evidence. The First Amendment
requires plaintiff to prove falsity in instructions 405.7 and 405.8 cases. Defendant
must prove truth in instruction 405.9 cases because the common law presumes any
statement made with defaming effect was false. Jones, Varnum & Co. v.
Townsend’s Administratrix, 21 Fla. 431 (1885). Accord, Firestone v. Time, Inc.,
460 F.2d 712, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) (Bell, J. concurring); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Fraser, 209 F.2d 1, 9 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1954); Drennen v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
328 So. 2d 52, 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Brautigam, 127 So. 2d 718, 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). Moreover, Florida may have
made truth a “defense” issue constitutionally, Note 5 infra. The issue is phrased as
whether the statement “was false in some significant respect,” instructions 405.7
and 405.8, or “was substantially true,” instruction 405.9, not turning on
insignificant detail, e.g., Times Publishing Co. v. Huffstetler, 409 So. 2d 112, 113
(Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Whether the First Amendment requires proof of falsity by a
simple preponderance or by clear and convincing evidence (as on the actual malice
issue), is unclear. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 491 U.S. 657, n. 2. The
committee assumes “the greater weight” suffices for proof of falsity in instructions
405.7 and 405.8, as it does for proof of truth in instruction 405.9. The clear and
convincing standard, instruction 405.4, is as defined in Slomowitz v. Walker, 429
So. 2d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
4. Nodar’s dictum: How does the First Amendment fault standard apply
in 405.9? In Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984), the Florida Supreme
Court held that if the First Amendment requires proof of negligence against the