calling public attention to a rulemaking.
Others have pointed to internal organizational goals,
such as increasing membership and financial contributions and moving members up the “ladder of
engagement” towards greater involvement, as a motivation for efforts to mobilize actions like
petition-signing and sending public comments.
Scholars have identified several potential problems with mass comment campaigns. Some
have argued that they may be used to distort regulators’ perception of public opinion, and may
lead to agency cynicism about the public comment process.
Mass comment campaigns often
involve many duplicate, or near duplicate comments.
Such duplicate comments impose various
real costs on agencies, without adding new substantive content to the rulemaking record.
It is
worth noting that, the expert consensus that the public comment process is “not a vote,” appears
to conflict with “widely held views among participating individuals, advocacy groups, and
journalists that the public expression of preferences should and does carry some weight, entirely
apart from whatever substantive justification for those preferences is offered.”
Cynthia Farina
Steven J. Balla et al., Where’s the Spam? Interest Groups and Mass Comment Campaigns in Agency Rulemaking,
11 POL’Y & INTERNET 460 (2019). Balla et al. find that that campaigns organized by regulated entities are more
substantive than campaigns organized by regulatory beneficiaries. Regulatory beneficiaries sponsored 73% of mass
comment campaigns analyzed (87% of campaigns with 1000+ comments), whereas regulated entities sponsored 27%
of mass comment campaigns (13% of those over 1000 comments). Campaigns sponsored by regulatory beneficiaries
were larger, averaging 15,783 comments, whereas those by regulated entities received an average of 4,345 comments.
Regulatory beneficiaries stated in interviews that during the Obama administration mass comment campaigns were
used to help the EPA justify proposed actions, whereas during the Trump-era the campaigns were used to cause the
administration to “feel pain” in the media and public opinion. Regulated entities, on the other hand, stated in interviews
that they use mass comment campaigns to try and counterbalance the mobilization by regulatory beneficiaries.
Farina, supra note 52, at 141; David Karpf, Online Political Mobilization from the Advocacy Group’s Perspective:
Looking Beyond Clicktivism, 2 POL’Y & INTERNET 1, 35 (2010) (“[Organizations use] email to mobilize member
interest around their top campaign priority, as a first step in a ladder-of-engagement.”); Shulman, supra note 79, at
27-30.
Sara R. Jordan & K. Lee Watson, Reexamining Rulemaking in an Era of Internet-Enabled Participation, 42 PUB.
PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 836, 856 (2019) (“At the level of regulatory politics, manufactured salience is the
generation by politically or economically motivated actors of a large number of comments . . . in order to alter the
perceptions of regulators’ ascribed level of salience of a position on a rule.”); David Schlosberg et al., Deliberation in
E-Rulemaking? The Problem of Mass Participation, in ONLINE DELIBERATION: DESIGN, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE
133, 143 (Todd Davies & Seeta Peña Gangadharan eds., 2009) (“Interviews with agency rule writers show that
agencies do not value and often openly resent form letters. The EPA, in fact, simply prints and stores an inaccessible
hard copy of all but one example of each identical or similar mass email.”); Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Still
Might (But Probably Won’t) Change Everything, 1 I/S 111, 111–12 (2005) (raising concern that agency personnel
would become cynical about mass comment campaign).
Stuart Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking, 3 J. E-GOV’T
41, 58 (2006) (finding that very small percentage of mass campaign-generated comments include unique substantive
information); see also Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J.
943, 952–59 (2006) (raising concern that e-rulemaking will increase number of comments but not range of
viewpoints).
Benjamin, supra note 54, at 904–05 (discussing costs associated with duplicative comments); see also Jeffrey S.
Lubbers, A Survey of Federal Agency Rulemakers’ Attitudes About E-Rulemaking, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 451 (2010)
(describing a survey of officials involved in rulemaking that found a widespread view that e-rulemaking increased
total amount of participation but that there was rarely useful information or new arguments in the additional
comments).
Livermore, Eidelman & Grom, supra note 19, at 992.