COVID-19 and Business Interruption Insurance – Supervisory Framework Central Bank of Ireland Page 17
Module 3 – Supervisory Engagement and Escalation
32. Once the relevant issues have been identified, analysed and categorised as per Module 2,
the Central Bank will move to Module 3 in relation to the relevant BI insurance policies,
which will determine what supervisory engagement and/or escalation of the issues
identified and categorised in Module 2 is warranted, if at all.
33. It is not possible to categorically outline the nature and extent of the supervisory
engagement and/or how that supervisory engagement might be escalated by the Central
Bank in the abstract. Each situation is unique and must be addressed in a fair and
proportionate manner based on the specific circumstances and the outcomes sought to be
achieved by the Central Bank. The Central Bank will apply its discretion and act with
versatility in order to find the best resolution of issues for customers and no course of action
has been ruled out for consideration by the Central Bank.
34. Quite apart from the general authority exercised by the Central Bank in the course of
intensive and intrusive supervisory engagement, the Central Bank has a suite of legal
powers that are available to assist it in the carrying out of its functions. Any decision as to
the exercise of powers or legal options in the event of non-compliance by an RFSP with its
legal and/or regulatory obligations will be a circumstance specific determination depending
on the relevant issues, the aim sought to be achieved and the speed at which clarity can be
provided to policyholders via the exercise of the relevant option. The existence of court
proceedings that deal with or touch upon some or all of the issues under consideration in
respect of a particular BI insurance policy will also be a factor in this assessment.
35. In terms of Module 3, the following overall approach will be followed by the Central Bank in
relation to each of the issues, subject to the caveats outlined above:-
(i) Responsive Policies – Issues of Cover and Causation are Clear:- Where an RFSP
does not accept that cover and causation are established, the Central Bank may set
out its view and expectations that the RFSP should accept that these issues are
established in respect of the relevant policy. Where the RFSP does not conform to
the Central Bank’s expectations, the Central Bank may consider taking such further
measures as may be appropriate to the circumstances with the aim of ensuring that
RFSPs comply with their obligations to customers under these policies.
(ii) Potentially Responsive Policies - Strong or Reasonable Argument that Issues of
Cover and Causation arise under the Policy:- Where an RFSP is denying cover
and/or causation or both, the Central Bank may intervene to seek to bring clarity to
the position as quickly as possible by communicating the Central Bank's view with
the aim of bringing about a resolution of those issues. Where the RFSP does not
conform to the Central Bank’s expectations, the Central Bank may consider taking
such further measures as may be appropriate to the circumstances with the aim of