Tax Notes, Nov. 4, 1996, p. 617: Viewpoint (Copyright, 1996, Tax Analysts)
Apart from the incentives that litigants may now have to allege physical harm as a way of attempting to exclude
all or a portion of their recovery under section 104, there now may be a similar incentive for litigants to continue
allocating recoveries. This is not a taxable vs. excludable allocation, but rather a wages vs. nonwages
allocation. For example, even when there is no physical harm, it would seem that a plaintiff would be better off if
only a portion of the recovery is allocated
to wage-like elements. If one portion of the recovery, say 50
percent, could be allocated to emotional distress damages, then that portion would seem to be outside the
traditional scope of "wages."
After all, there is support for the proposition that one should analyze the reason for a payment. If the payment
does not relate to the performance of services, and is not even calculated by reference to back pay formulas,
wage rates, etc., then how can it be treated as wages? In a recent letter ruling, LTR 9635013, Doc 96-24213 (6
pages), the Service considered the tax treatment of settlement payments distributed by a collective bargaining
agent to a company's former employees. Although the facts in the ruling are somewhat complicated, it seems
significant that at least as to one element of the recovery involved, the union argued that distributions to union
members were not made because of the group's performance of services and therefore were not wages. The
union argued that the amount paid to this group of persons was the premium a settling company paid to end the
dispute with the union. According to the union, this amount should therefore not be treated as wages.
Nonetheless, the Service in LTR 9635013 concluded that a premium was inherent in settling any dispute.
According to the Service, there was no distinction between payments made to the various groups of employees
involved in the dispute. The IRS said that the amounts for all of these groups came from money the company
paid to settle claims. The lack of a specific back-pay formula or dispute relating to those particular distributees
was irrelevant to the IRS in determining wage status. Consequently, the ruling holds that as to all of the amounts
paid, the amounts are wages for FICA, FUTA, and income tax withholding purposes.
Practical Allocation Quandry
Let us suppose we are settling a typical employment discrimination or wrongful termination matter. Assume
there was no physical injury. If 50 percent of the settlement amount is treated as wages (back pay, front pay, or
whatever), and the other 50 percent is treated as a taxable emotional distress award, should the employer insist
on withholding on this second portion, too?
Unfortunately, I do not believe the answer is clear. In fact, how you view the matter may depend upon whom
you represent. Defendants that are settling claims will often want the protection of knowing that an amount has
been paid and that there can be no further employment tax liability (for failure to withhold or for FICA). If an
amount is paid in the employment context, the employer may feel reluctant to rely on a mere statement in the
settlement agreement that the recovering plaintiff will pay any and all taxes that may be occasioned by the
settlement.
Likewise, a mere indemnity obligation on the part of the recovering plaintiff to hold the defendant harmless in the
event failure to withhold or employment tax penalties are imposed on the defendant may ring hollow. In many
employment cases, one assumes that the recovering (former) employee will be long gone by the time any such
claim under an indemnity provision would be made. True, settling employers generally ask for the indemnity,
and it can be of some value. But I have rarely seen an employer treat the indemnity as having salutary effect in
the face of likely penalties.
Of course, a settling employer may be less concerned about withholding and payroll taxes if the employment
relationship has long ago ceased, as contrasted to a situation in which a termination is negotiated and the
relationship between the employee and the company is therefore more recent. Part of the issue, too, may hinge
on how strong one believes the allocation between the wage elements and the "emotional distress" elements to
be. If the allocation to emotional distress seems quite strong, then both plaintiff and defendant may feel
considerably more comfortable in treating the emotional distress payment as merely taxable income (and the
subject of a Form 1099), but not the subject of withholding or employment taxes.
For example, if an amount is awarded by a judge or jury for emotional distress, the allocation may be particularly
strong. On the other hand, the fact that an amount is indisputably for emotional distress may assist the
employer in feeling more comfortable in not withholding. However, it does not resolve the question whether the
amount in the hands of the former employee should be subject to self- employment tax.
As a preliminary matter, practitioners are already scrambling to look for authority dealing with these issues.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be very much out there of relevance. For example, Revenue Ruling 57-
55, 1957-1 C.B. 304 (amplified by Revenue Ruling 75-64, 1975-1 C.B. 16), ruled that a payment made by an
employer to an employee who was reinstated and granted back pay under an NLRB order did constitute wages.
On the other hand, that ruling concluded that if the NLRB award for an illegal discharge was imposed against a
labor organization, the payment would merely be income (but not wages) to the recipient.
This seems to draw a line between the employer/employee relationship, with characterization as wages of any
amount received in the employment context. That characterization seems quite a bit too broad, since one
certainly can receive an amount from an employer that is not wages (a slip and fall settlement, for example).