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VIRGINIA LAWYER | AUGUST 2020 | VOL. 69 | GENERAL INTEREST FEATURES
Virginia recognizes two tort claims for civil
conspiracy — one under the common law
and the second under Virginia Code §§
18.2-499–500. This article discusses these
two causes of action which are often the
subjects of business litigation.
Background
As early as 1888, in the case of Crump v.
Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Virginia recognized the viability of a claim for
a conspiracy to injure a person in his trade or
occupation.
1
In Crump, members of a union
attempted to compel a mercantile business to
become a union oce and employ members
of the union. When the mercantile business
refused, the union members attempted to de-
stroy its business through boycotts and threat-
ening patrons. In upholding the criminal
convictions of the union members, the Court
recognized that “a conspiracy or combination
to injure a person in his trade or occupation is
indictable.”
2
In 1933, the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Werth v. Fire Companies’ Adjustment Bureau
3
acknowledged the ability for a plainti to sue
at common law for civil conspiracy in noting
that:
A conspiracy consists of an unlawful
combination of two or more persons to do
that which is contrary to law, or to do that
which is wrongful and harmful towards
another person. It may be punished crimi-
nally by indictment, or civilly by an action
on the case in the nature of conspiracy if
damage has been occasioned to the person
against whom it is directed. It may also
consist of any unlawful combination to
carry out an object not in itself unlawful
by unlawful means. e essential ele-
ments, whether of a criminal or actionable
conspiracy, are, in my opinion, the same,
though to sustain an action special damag-
es must be proved.
In 1964, the General Assembly enacted
Virginia’s business conspiracy statute. e
statute is similar to an old Wisconsin statute,
but its remedies are stricter.
4
Surprisingly, no
legislative history exists for the statute.
5
Due
to the year of its enactment and its similarity
to statutes passed in other states around the
same time, many refer to it as the “Anti-Sit-In”
Act.
6
e business conspiracy statute is found in
sections 18.2-499 and 18.2-500 of the Virginia
Code — the criminal chapter of the Virginia
Code.
7
Under section 18.2-500, “[a]ny person
who [is] injured in his reputation, trade, busi-
ness or profession by reason of a violation of
§ 18.2-499” may seek relief in a civil court. In
turn, Virginia Code § 18.499 imposes liability
on:
Any two or more persons who combine,
associate, agree, mutually undertake or
concert together for the purpose of (i)
willfully and maliciously injuring another
in his reputation, trade, business or pro-
fession by any means whatever or (ii) will-
fully and maliciously compelling another
to do or perform any act against his will,
or preventing or hindering another from
doing or performing any lawful act . . .
e statute specically allows for the re-
covery of treble damages and “the costs of
suit, including a reasonable fee to plainti’s
counsel.”
8
e statute also provides for damag-
es if a plainti proves an attempted business
conspiracy.
9
Stating a Claim for Common Law
Conspiracy Under Virginia Law
Under Virginia law, the prima facie elements
for common law conspiracy are:
1. A combination of two or more persons;
2. To accomplish, by some concerted action;
3. Some criminal or unlawful purpose or
some lawful purpose by a criminal or
unlawful means; and
4. Resultant damage caused by the defen-
dant’s acts committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
10
by David N. Anthony, Timothy J. St. George, and H. Scott Kelly
Civil Conspiracy:
An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory
Business Conspiracy Claims Under Virginia Law
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GENERAL INTEREST
As the Supreme Court of Virginia recently commented: “The
gist of the civil action of conspiracy is the damage caused
by the acts committed in pursuance of the formed conspir-
acy and not the mere combination of two or more persons
to accomplish an unlawful purpose or use an unlawful
means.”
11
A plainti cannot maintain a claim for common law
conspiracy when the unlawful act underlying the claim does
not allow for an award of damages.
12
Ordinarily, the issue of
whether a conspiracy caused the alleged damage is one for the
jury’s decision.
13
Stating a Claim for Statutory Business Conspiracy Under
Virginia Law
Under Virginia law, a plainti must prove three elements to
state a prima facie cause of action under Virginia’s business
conspiracy statute:
1. A combination of two or more persons;
2. For the purpose of willfully or maliciously inuring a plain-
ti in reputation, trade, business, or profession; and
3. Resulting in damage to the plainti.
14
To prove attempted business conspiracy, a plainti must
prove that a person attempted to procure the participation or
cooperation of another to enter into a business conspiracy
15
and resulting damage to the plainti.
16
Proof of a civil conspir-
acy must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
17
Proving Civil Conspiracy Claims
I. A Combination of Two or More Persons to Accomplish,
by Some Concerted Action — Necessary Elements for
Common Law and Statutory Business Conspiracy Claims
Both the common law and statute require a combination of
two separate actors in a concerted action.
18
“Concerted action”
reects the statutory requirement that a plainti ultimately
prove that someone “combined, associated, agreed, mutually
undertook, or concerted together” with someone else in the
conduct at issue.
19
A plainti must prove then, to be successful
in his or her claim, that the defendants “combined together to
eect a preconceived plan and unity of design and purpose.”
20
Aer all, this “common design is the essence of the conspira-
c y.”
21
A common law conspiracy claim only requires proof of a
“tacit understanding”— an express agreement is not a neces-
sary component of the claim.
22
e “two or more persons” requirement, however, is not
satised by proof that a principal conspired with one of its
agents that acted within the scope of his agency.
23
Under such
a circumstance, a conspiracy is a legal impossibility because a
principal and an agent are not separate persons for purposes
of the conspiracy statute. is rule is commonly referred to as
the “intracorporate immunity” doctrine.
24
at doctrine holds
that where the agents or employees of a corporation are acting
within the scope of their employment, “then only one entity
exists”— the corporation — and “[b]y denition, a single
entity cannot conspire with itself.”
25
To the contrary, an agent
or employee acting outside the scope of his employment or
agency can be liable for a civil conspiracy to injure a person’s
business.
26
e question of what is within the scope of employment
is not always clear, but “[b]oth the Fourth Circuit and the
state courts of Virginia take a ‘fairly broad view of the scope of
employment.’”
27
“Generally, an act is within the scope of em-
ployment if it is ‘naturally incident to [the master’s] business
. . . done while the servant was engaged upon the master’s busi-
ness, and did not arise wholly from some external, indepen-
dent, and personal motive on the part of the servant to do the
act upon his own account.’”
28
An act may be prohibited by the
employer, tortious, or even criminal to be done yet fall within
the scope of employment. e test “is not whether the tortious
act itself is a transaction within the ordinary course of busi-
ness of the [employer], or within the scope of the [employee’s]
authority, but whether the service itself, in which the tortious
act was done, was within the ordinary course of such business
or within the scope of such authority.”
29
Further, employees are not the only agents who fall
under the doctrine as both Virginia federal and state courts
have applied the intracorporate immunity doctrine to
corporate directors.
30
Federal courts do apply an exception to
this rule where an ocer or director has a stake or a purpose
“independent of his interest in the corporation’s success.”
31
For
instance, in Greenville Publishing Company v. Daily Reector,
Inc.,
32
the Fourth Circuit observed that an exception to the
intracorporate immunity doctrine “may be justied when the
ocer has an independent personal stake in achieving the cor-
poration’s illegal objective.”
33
A Virginia state court has found
that this federal personal stake exception is dierent from
the scope of employment test and explained that the personal
stake exception “applies primarily in antitrust actions, such as
where a corporate director with a personal stake in another
business conspires to use the corporation to eliminate com-
petitors for that personal business interest, thus, hijacking the
corporation for his own personal, illegal, ends.”
34
In fact, courts
have held that the exception was meant to apply only to cir-
cumstances in which the “conspirator gained a direct personal
benet from the conspiracy, a benet wholly separable from
the more general and indirect corporate benet always present
under the circumstances surrounding virtually any alleged
corporate conspiracy.”
35
e Supreme Court of Virginia has not
adopted the personal stake exception.
36
In sum, Virginia courts consistently have held that a con-
spiracy cannot form in the following situations:
• A single entity cannot conspire with itself.
37
• A corporation cannot conspire with its wholly-owned
subsidiary.
38
• Partners cannot conspire when they are acting within the
scope of their partnership.
39
• If the conspiracy involves the breach of a contract, one of
the conspirators must be a third party to that contract.
40
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VIRGINIA LAWYER | AUGUST 2020 | VOL. 69 | GENERAL INTEREST FEATURES
II. Some Criminal or Unlawful Purpose or Some Lawful
Purpose by a Criminal or Unlawful Means — A Necessary
Element for Civil Conspiracy Claims
e key and essential element for a common law conspiracy is
the criminal or unlawful nature of the underlying conduct.
41
A complaint will be decient unless sucient facts alleging
an unlawful act or unlawful purpose are present.
42
Typically,
courts do not struggle with whether a plainti has made su-
cient factual allegations of an unlawful act or unlawful purpose
as such facts either are present in the complaint or not. The
Supreme Court of Virginia has held that allegations accus-
ing employees of forming a combination to breach their
contractual, employment, duciary, and other duties to
their employer, including the supposed unlawful conversion
by them of their employer’s condential and proprietary
information, stated sufcient unlawful purposes.
43
Virginia
courts have held that the following instances are not unlawful
acts or unlawful purposes for purposes of establishing this
element:
• Truthful business competition;
44
• e enticement of a competitor’s employee to leave his
employment so long as no means are used and the em-
ployee’s employment is terminable at will;
45
and
• Mere breach of contract
46
Where the unlawful act or unlawful purpose is the commis-
sion of a tort, the Supreme Court of Virginia recently empha-
sized that a plainti must establish that the underlying tort was
committed to recover for a common law claim of civil conspir-
acy.
47
In other words, “where ‘there is no actionable claim for
the underlying alleged wrong, there can be no action for civil
conspiracy based on that wrong.’”
48
III. For the Purpose of Willfully or Maliciously Injuring a
Plainti in Reputation, Trade, Business, or Profession—
A Necessary Element for Business Conspiracy Claims
In a series of three cases involving the business conspiracy stat-
ute, the Supreme Court of Virginia has altered the malice stan-
dard applicable to business conspiracy claims from an actual
malice standard to a legal malice standard.
49
Beginning in 1986
with the case of Greenspan v. Oshero,
50
the Court adopted a
“primary overriding purpose” standard, holding that:
[W]hen the fact-nder is satised from the evidence that
the defendant’s primary and overriding purpose is to injure
his victim in reputation, trade, business or profession,
motivated by hatred, spite, or ill-will, the element of malice
required by Code § 18.2-499 is established, notwithstand-
ing any additional motives entertained by the defendant to
benet himself or persons other than the victim.
Six years later, in the case of Tazewell Oil Co. v. United Virginia
Bank,
51
the Court appeared to move away from the primary
and overriding purpose standard set forth in Oshero. In a 4-3
decision, the Court held that sucient evidence of a con-
spiracy existed because, among other things, the defendant’s
action “exhibited a willful disregard for Tazewell’s rights.”
52
Surprisingly, the majority opinion in Tazewell made no men-
tion of the “primary overriding purpose” standard set forth in
Oshero.
53
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Whiting chided the
majority for ignoring Oshero, stating that the “primary and
overriding purpose” test should have been applied to deter-
mine whether the defendants had acted with actual malice.
54
ree years later, the Court once again addressed wheth-
er the conspiracy statute required proof of actual malice in
Commercial Business Systems, Inc. v. BellSouth Services, Inc.
55
Denitively rejecting that requirement, the Court concluded
that only proof of legal malice was necessary, i.e., that de-
fendant acted intentionally, purposely, and without lawful
justication.
56
Distinguishing Oshero, the Court explained
that its statement about a conspirator’s “primary and overrid-
ing purpose” was made in the context where the conspirator
had both legitimate and illegitimate motives for his actions and
ruled that:
57
In any event, we do not think that, as a general proposition,
the conspiracy statutes require proof that a conspirator’s
primary and overriding purpose is to injury another in his
trade or business. e statutes do not so provide, and such
a requirement would place an unreasonable burden on a
plainti.
58
Courts consistently have followed the legal malice standard set
forth in Commercial Business Systems.
59
Further, in pleading a
claim for business and common law conspiracy, keep in mind
that a plainti must allege an unlawful act or unlawful pur-
pose because “there can be no conspiracy to do an act the law
allows.”
60
An additional requirement for this second element is
proving that the injury was to “reputation, trade, business, or
profession.” e Supreme Court of Virginia has held that §§
18.2-499 and 500 “apply to business and property interests, not
to personal or employment interests.”
61
Virginia federal courts
have also made this business / personal distinction.
62
IV. Resulting in Damage to the Plainti — A Necessary
Element for Common Law and Statutory Business
Conspiracy Claims
A. Actual, Treble and Punitive Damages
Plainti must prove that they sustained damages from the al-
leged interference in a conspiracy claim.
63
Business conspiracy
claims have been a favorite claim for lawyers because § 18.2-
500 allows for the recovery of treble damages. It provides that
one who is “injured in his reputation, trade, business or pro-
fession by reason of a violation of [section] 18.2-499 may sue
therefore and recover three-fold the damages by him sustained
. . . and without limiting the generality of the term, ‘damages’
shall include loss of prots.”
64
e Supreme Court of Virginia,
in Advanced Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. PRC, Inc.,
65
also permit-
ted the recovery of punitive damages and treble damages in the
same action because “awards of punitive and treble damages
GENERAL INTEREST
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GENERAL INTEREST FEATURES | VOL. 69 | AUGUST 2020 | VIRGINIA LAWYER
GENERAL INTEREST
were based on separate claims involving dierent legal duties
and injuries.”
66
Importantly, Virginia courts consistently have
held that damage to one’s personal employment interest is not
actionable under the statute.
67
B. Injunctive Relief and Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
In addition to damages, the business conspiracy statute also
allows for permanent injunctive relief and injunctive relief
during litigation to restrain one from continuing the conspira-
torial acts.
68
Further, the conspiracy statute allows for “reason-
able counsel fees to complainants’ and defendants’ counsel.”
69
One court has held that a defendant is entitled to its attorneys’
fees even when the case is dismissed pursuant to its demurrer.
70
Of course, a party seeking to recover their attorneys’ fees must
prove that the fees were reasonable and necessary.
71
Pleading Civil Conspiracy Claims
Virginia state and federal courts appear to have diering
standards for pleading common law and statutory business
conspiracy claims. e Supreme Court of Virginia had held
that “traditional notice pleading and demurrer standards apply
in reviewing conspiracy claims.”
72
To survive an attack by a dis-
positive motion, a plainti must allege the existence of the ele-
ments of the claim in more than “mere conclusory language.”
73
A plainti must allege “concerted action, legal malice, and ca-
sually related injury . . . set[ting] forth core facts to support the
claim.”
74
Moreover, for statutory business conspiracy claims, “it
is not enough for [a] plainti merely to track the language of
the conspiracy statute without alleging the fact that the alleged
co-conspirators did, in fact, agree to do something the statute
forbids.”
75
Ordinarily, a complaint should contain factual details
of the time and place and the alleged eect of the conspiracy
in order to withstand a demurrer or motion to dismiss.
76
From
the federal court’s perspective, a statutory business conspira-
cy requires a heightened pleading to prevent “every business
dispute over unfair competition [from] becoming a business
conspiracy claim.’”
77
Defenses to a Civil Conspiracy Claim
I. Statute of Limitations
One point is clear: a conspiracy cause of action accrues when
damage is rst sustained by the plainti.
78
e length of the
limitations period running from the accrual point is unclear,
however, and the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the
“applicable statute of limitations is determined by the type of
injury alleged.” If the alleged cause of action is for personal
injuries, it is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, but if
the alleged cause of action is for injury to property, it is subject
to a ve-year limitations period.
79
David Anthony, a partner atTroutmanPepper,
has a national litigation practice representing
companies in highly regulated industries, such
as consumer nancial services companies, class
actions and complex individual lawsuits. He has
signicant litigation experience defending cases
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act and numerous other
federal and state consumer protection statutes,
with particular expertise in matters that involve
companion government investigations.
Scott Kellyis an attorney atTroutmanPepper
who represents clients in federal and state
courts, at both the trial and appellate levels.
He focuses his practice in the areas of com-
plex litigation and business disputes, nancial
services litigation, and consumer litigation.
He frequently represents businesses in mort-
gage-foreclosure disputes, auto-nance
litigation, intellectual property challenges, “ban-
the-box” compliance issues, and claims implicat-
ing Metro II standards for credit reporting.
Timothy St. Georgedefends institutions
nationwide facing class actions and individual
lawsuits. A partner atTroutman Pepper, he
has particular experience litigating cases under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, and their state coun-
terparts. He focuses his practice in the areas of
complex litigation and business disputes, nan-
cial services litigation, and consumer litigation.
Civil Consipracy continued on page 48
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II. Intracorporate Immunity
Doctrine
e intracorporate immunity doctrine
states that “there must two persons to
comprise a conspiracy, and a cor-
poration, like an individual, cannot
conspire with itself.”
80
us, a plainti
alleging that a corporation conspired
with its agents acting within the scope
of their employment, fails to state a
proper claim because the alleged con-
spiracy would involve only one entity.
81
e intracorporate immunity doctrine
does not apply when the agent acts
outside the scope of his or her agency
relationship at the time of the wrong-
ful conduct.
82
Conclusion
Common law and statutory business
conspiracy claims represent an import-
ant piece of the landscape of Virginia
business litigation. Claims brought
under Virginia’s business conspiracy
statute will remain a favorite among
trial lawyers because, if successful, they
allow for the recovery of treble damag-
es and attorneys’ fees. Nonetheless, at-
torneys should not blindly allege civil
conspiracy claims, whether under the
common law or Virginia Code §§ 18.2-
499 and -500, for the mere hope of ob-
taining enhanced remedies. Instead, as
with any claim, counsel should ensure
that necessary facts exist to
allege these claims. Virginia lawyers,
however, can expect to see many
more cases brought under Virginia’s
business conspiracy statute because
of the evolution of the malice stan-
dard from actual to legal as set forth
in the Supreme Court of Virginia’s
decisions in Greenspan, Tazewell
Oil Co. and Commercial Business
Systems, Inc. e ruling that a plainti
must merely prove legal malice instead
of actual has lowered the evidentiary
burden of proving a claim under the
statute, which together with the broad-
er categories of potentially recoverable
damages, likely will generate more civil
conspiracy claims.
q
Civil Conspiracy continued from page 25
Endnotes
1 84 Va. 927, 934, 6 S.E. 620, 624 (1888)
(arming conviction for conspiracy to
boycott a business).
2 Id.
3 160 Va. 845, 854, 171 S.E. 255, 258-59,
cert. denied, 260 U.S. 659 (1933) (citations
omitted).
4 Joseph E. Ulrich & Killis T. Howard,
Injuries to Business under the Virginia
Conspiracy Statute: A Sleeping Giant, 38
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 377 (1981).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 378.
7 See generally, Sexton, J. Scott, What’s in
a Word? e Tortured Life of the Virginia
Conspiracy Statute Va. Code §§ 18.2-499
and -500, VSB Litigation News (Spring
2004) (providing an excellent discussion
of statutory business conspiracy claims in
Virginia).
8 Va. Code § 18.2-500(A); see also AV Auto.,
LLC v. Preske, No. CL 2018-7749, 2019 Va.
Cir. LEXIS 27 (Fairfax Feb. 11, 2019).
9 Va. Code § 18.2-499(B); see also Way tec
Elecs. Corp. v. Rohm & Haas Elec.
Materials, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 480, 492
(W.D. Va. 2006) (concluding that “to prove
attempted business conspiracy, a plainti
must prove that a person attempted to
procure participation or cooperation of an-
other to enter into a business conspiracy”);
see also Schur v. Sprenkle, 84 Va. Cir. 418
(Richmond Cty. 2012).
10 Commercial Bus. Sys., Inc. v. BellSouth
Servs., Inc., 249 Va. 39, 48, 453 S.E.2d 261,
267 (1995); Glass v. Glass, 228 Va. 39, 47,
321 S.E.2d 69, 74 (1984).
11 Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 81, 639 S.E.2d
182, 189 (2007); Commercial Bus. Sys., 249
Va. at 48, 453 S.E.2d at 267 (stating that
“[t]he foundation of a civil action of con-
spiracy is the damage caused by the acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy”) (citations
omitted).
12 See Efessiou v. Efessiou, 41 Va. Cir. 142,
146 (Fairfax 1996) (sustaining demurrer to
conspiracy claim for alleged combination
to aect a fraudulent conveyance); see also,
Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Wash. Settlement
Grp., LLC, 87 Va. Cir. 77 (Fairfax 2013)
(same).
13 Commercial Bus. Sys., 249 Va. at 48,
453 S.E.2d at 267 (citing Middlesboro
Coca-Cola v. Campbell, 179 Va. 693, 702,
20 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1942)); see Ameur v.
Gates, 950 F. Supp. 2d 905, 918 (E.D. Va.
2013) (questions regarding the scope of
employment certication that fall under
the Westfall Act are decided by the court
and not the jury even if relevant state law
would provide a jury trial on such issues).
14 CaterCorp., Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc.,
246 Va. 22, 28, 431 S.E.2d 277 (1993); see
also Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 Va.
441, 449, 318 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1984) (“To
recover in an action for conspiracy to
harm a business, the plainti must prove
(1) a combination of two or more persons
for the purpose of willfully and maliciously
injuring plainti in his business, and (2)
resulting damage to plainti.”); Virginia
Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-
Conn., 144 F. Supp. 2d 558, 601 (W.D. Va.
2001), a’d sub nom. Virginia Vermiculite
Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs, Inc., 307
F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (“e elements
of a statutory conspiracy claim under the
Virginia Conspiracy Act are: (1) concerted
action (2) legal malice; and (3) causal-
ly-related injury.”); accord Multi-Channel
TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality
Cable Operating Co., 108 F.3d 522, 526 (4th
Cir. 1997) (“CQC was liable for statu-
tory conspiracy if clear and convincing
evidence showed that: (1) CQC attempted
to conspire with one or more of the other
defendants to harm Adelphia; (2) CQC
acted with legal malice towards Adelphia;
and (3) the conspiratorial actions of CQC
and one or more of the other defendants
caused Adelphia to suer damages.”);
see also T.G. Slater & Son v. Donald P. &
Patricia A. Brennan LLC, 385 F.3d 836,
845 (4th Cir. 2004) (“A claim for statutory
civil conspiracy under Virginia law must
allege (1) two or more persons combined,
associated, agreed, or mutually undertook
together to (2) willfully and maliciously
injure another in his reputation, trade,
business, or profession.”); Virginia Model
Jury Instructions – Civil, No. 40-300 (2008).
15 Va. Code § 18.2-499(B).
16 Id. § 18.2-500.
17 Multi-Channel TV Cable Co., 108 F.3d at
526; Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 578,
544 S.E.2d 666, 677 (2001); see also Dunlap
v. Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC, 287 Va.
207, 216, 754 S.E.2d 313, 318 (2014).
18 Bay Tobacco, LLC v. Bell Quality Tobacco
Prods., LLC, 261 F. Supp. 2d 483, 499 (E.D.
Va. 2003) (“the plainti must rst allege
that the defendants combined together to
eect a ‘preconceived plan and unity of de-
sign and purpose, for the common design
in the essence of the conspiracy’”); Hecht
v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., No. 3:04cv00098,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25883, at *15 (W.D.
Va. Oct. 21, 2005) (concluding that “there
is no evidence that Grin suggested
ABIC withdraw from the seminar, let
alone agreed or concerted in that action.
Indeed, it is clear from the facts that any
conspiracy claim against Grin himself
would fail. Hence, there is no evidence that
a conspiracy existed, and plainti’s claim
necessarily fails on this point”).
19 Schlegel v. Bank of America, N.A., 505 F.
Supp. 2d 321, 325 (W.D. Va. 2007) (citing
Va. Code § 18.2-499); see also Bumgarner
v. Fischer, No. CL 18-4351, 2019 Va. Cir.
LEXIS 3, at *3-4 (Richmond Cty. Jan. 17,
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49
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2019)
20 Bay Tobacco, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
21 Id.
22 Tysons Toyota v. Globe Life Ins. Co., No. 93-
1359, No. 93-1443, No. 93-1444, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 36692, at *15 (4th Cir. Dec. 29,
1994).
23 Charles E. Brauer Co. v. Nationsbank, 251
Va. 28, 30, 466 S.E.2d 382, 386-87 (1996)
(nding that a bank and its agent were
considered one person); Heard Constr., Inc.
v. Waterfront Marine Constr. Co., 91 Va.
Cir. 4, 10 (Chesapeake Cty. 2015).
24 Id; see also SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp.,
387 F. Supp. 2d 593, 617 (E.D. Va. 2005)
(granting defendant’s demurrer on busi-
ness conspiracy count because “an agent
may not conspire with its principal under
the intracorporate immunity doctrine”).
25 E.g., Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 428,
362 S.E.2d 699, 708 (1987); see also
Wonderland I, LLC v. Peck, 91 Va. Cir. 83,
85 (Norfolk 2015).
26 Meeko Corp. v. Chestereld Commerce Ctr.,
14 Va. Cir. 149, 152-53 (Chestereld Cnty.
1988); see also Nathan v. Takeda Pharm.
Am., Inc., 83 Va. Cir. 216, 224 (Fairfax
2011).
27 United States v. Domestic Indus., Inc., 32 F.
Supp. 2d 855, 861 (E.D. Va. 1999) (quoting
Gutierrez de Martinez v. United States Drug
Enforcement Admin., 111 F.3d 1148, 1156
(4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 931
(1997)).
28 Domestic Indus., 32 F. Supp. 2d at 861
(quoting Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 237
(4th Cir. 1994)).
29 Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp. 48 F.3d
1343, 1351 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Commercial Business Sys. v. Bellsouth
Servs., 249 Va. 39, 45, 453 S.E.2d 261, 265
(1995)). In Bellsouth Servs., the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the evidence
presented a jury issue on whether acts were
within the scope of employment where the
“conduct was outrageous and violative of
[the] employer’s rules” and the employee’s
“motive was personal,” but the “willful and
malicious acts were committed while [the
employee] was performing his duties . .
. and in the execution of the services for
which he was employer.” 249 Va. at 46, 453
S.E.2d at 266. See also Doe v. United States,
912 F. Supp. 193, 195 (E.D. Va. 1995) (de-
nying summary judgment on the grounds
that whether sex abuse by a psychiatrist
during therapy sessions was within the
scope of his employment was a jury issue);
Tomlin v. IBM, Corp., 84 Va. Cir. 280, 285
(Fairfax 2012) (whether or not act was in
scope of employment is armed to be a
jury issue).
30 See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-70 (1984)
(holding that, under the Sherman Act,
a corporation cannot conspire with a whol-
ly-owned subsidiary or with its ocers and
directors because they are not separate ac-
tors pursuing separate economic interests);
Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 891
F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (E.D. Va. 1995) (relying
on Copperweld and Fourth Circuit cases to
hold that a conspiracy could not exist be-
tween individual directors and between the
directors and their corporation); Bowman
v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 540-
41, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985) (stating that,
with respect to a tort action for conspiracy
to induce the breach of a contract, where
the defendants were a bank and a group of
its directors, “a third party is necessary to
create an actionable conspiracy” because
“a corporation, like an individual, cannot
conspire with itself”); Sowise, Inc. v.
Goodrich, 63 Va. Cir. fwestfall576, 577-78
(Roanoke Cty. 2004) (stating the rule: “e
corporation is an articial entity that only
acts through its agents, directors and em-
ployees. If an employee acts in the scope of
her employment and, thus, acts as an agent
of the corporation, then only a single entity
exists: the corporation” and then applying
it to sustain a demurrer because there were
no allegations that the director had acted
outside the scope of her employment).
31 E.g., Williams, 891 F. Supp. at 1175; Foster
v. Wintergreen Real Estate Co., 81 Va. Cir.
353, 360 (Nelson Cnty. 2010).
32 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1974).
33 Id. at 399.
34 Sowise, Inc. v. Goodrich, 63 Va. Cir. 576,
578 (Roanoke 2004).
35 Selman v. Am. Sports Underwriters, Inc.,
697 F. Supp. 225, 239 (W.D. Va. 1988).
36 Id. at 578 & n.13; Little Professor Book Co.
v. Reston N. Point Village Ltd. P’shp., 41 Va.
Cir. 73, 79 (Fairfax Cnty. 1996); see also
Tomlin v. IBM, Corp., 84 Va. Cir. 280, 289
(Fairfax 2012).
37 Fox, 234 Va. at 428, 362 S.E.2d at 708 (“If
the defendants were acting within the
scope of their employment and, therefore,
were agents of the City, then only one en-
tity exists—the City. By denition a single
entity cannot conspire with itself.”); Perk v.
Vector Res. Group, 253 Va. 310, 485 S.E.2d
140 (1997) (ruling that demurrer properly
sustained since defendants are not separate
entities but rather agents of each other);
see also see also Wonderland I, LLC v. Peck,
91 Va. Cir. 83, 85-86 (Norfolk 2015).
38 Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford
Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 145-46 (4th Cir.
1990) (Two wholly owned subsidiaries by
the same parent corporation are legally
incapable of conspiring with one another
for purposes of antitrust law.).
39 Saliba v. Exxon Corp., 865 F. Supp. 306, 313
(W.D. Va. 1994) (holding that “where the
alleged co-conspirators are the two general
partners in a partnership, acting within the
scope of partnership aairs, only one entity
exists—the Partnership”), a’d, 52 F.3d 322
(4th Cir. 1995).
40 Stauer v. Fredericksburg Ramada, Inc., 411
F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (E.D. Va. 1976) (citing
and discussing Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va. 533,
95 S.E.2d 192 (1956)); Chaves v. Johnson,
230 Va. 112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985)
(recognizing interference with a contract
as a basis for civil liability under § 18.2-
500); Gulledge v. Dyncorp. Inc., 24 Va. Cir.
538, 540-41 (Fairfax Cnty. 1989) (noting
that “[a]lthough a party to a contract may
conspire with a third party to interfere
with its own contract, a party to a contract
acting alone cannot interfere with its own
contract”).
41 Hechler Chevrolet v. General Motors Corp.,
230 Va. 396, 402, 337 S.E.2d 744, 748
(1985); see also Kirchner v. McAninley, No.
CL-2010-5279, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27, at
*11-12 (Fairfax Mar. 14, 2011).
42 Id.
43 CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc.,
246 Va. 22, 26, 431 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1993);
accord Int’l Paper Co. v. Gilliam, 63 Va. Cir.
485, 493 (Roanoke 2003); Lance v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 99 Va. Cir. 115, 117
(Chesapeake Cty. 2018) (conversion can
serve as the underlying tort for conspiracy
in some instances).
44 Hechler Chevrolet, 230 Va. at 402, 337
S.E.2d at 748.
45 Id.
46 Station # 2, LLC v. Lynch, 280 Va. 166, 174
(2010) (mere breach of contract is not
enough to constitute an unlawful act for
the purposes of the conspiracy statute).
47 Almy, 273 Va. at 80-81, 639 S.E.2d at 188
(refusing to recognize a civil conspiracy
claim based on an agreement to intention-
ally inict emotional distress); Citizens
for Facquier County v. SPR Corp., 37 Va.
Cir. 44, 51 (Facquier Cnty. 1995) (ruling
that a violation of Va. Code § 8.01-271.1
cannot serve as the basis for a common law
conspiracy claim).
48 Firestone v. Wiley, 485 F. Supp. 2d 694,
703 (E.D. Va. 2007) (quoting Citizens for
Facquier County, 37 Va. Cir. at 50); Glass,
228 Va. at 54, 321 S.E.2d at 78 (holding
that defendant’s “actions being lawful,
whether they acted in a spirit of actual
malice, hostility, or ill will towards plainti
is of no legal consequence”).
49 Urbanski, Michael F., Expanding the Reach
of Virginia’s Business Conspiracy Act, VSB
Litigation News at ** 4-6 (Winter 1998-99)
[“Urbanski”].
50 232 Va. 388, 398-99, 351 S.E.2d 28, 35-36
(1986); see also Conway v. Peace, 28 Va.
Cir. 226, 227 (Chestereld Cnty. 1992)
(granting motion to strike due, in part, to
plainti ’s failure to establish that defen-
dant’s primary and overriding purpose was
to injure plainti); Gerald A. Schultz &
Assoc., P.C. v. LaLonde, 17 Va. Cir. 387, 389
(Richmond Cty. 1989) (applying the “pri-
mary and overriding purpose” standard).
51 243 Va. 94, 413 S.E.2d 611 (1992).
52 Oshero, 243 Va. at 109, 413 S.E.2d at 620.
53 Urbanski, at *5.
54 Oshero, 243 Va. at 116, 413 S.E.2d at 623.
55 249 Va. 39, 47, 453 S.E.2d 261, 266-67
(1995).
56 Id. at 47, 453 S.E.2d at 267.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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59 See Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 578,
544 S.E.2d 666, 677 (2001) (holding that
the statute does not require the plainti
to prove that “a conspirator’s primary and
overriding purpose is to injure anoth-
er in his trade or business”); Advanced
Marine Enters., Inc. v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va.
106, 117, 501 S.E.2d 148, 154-55 (1998)
(holding that “Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500
do not require a plainti to prove that
“a conspirator’s primary and overriding
purpose is to injure another in his trade or
business”); Galaxy Computer Servs., Inc.
v. Baker, 325 B.R. 544, 555-56 (E.D. Va.
2005) (holding that statutes merely require
proof of legal malice); Multi-Channel TV
Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable
Operating Co., 108 F.3d 522, 526-27 (4th
Cir. 1997) (holding that Adelphia cable
only need to prove that Charlottesville
Quality Cable Operating company acted
with legal malice when it interfered with
Adelphia’s distribution rights); Williams
v. Dominion Tech. Partners, 265 Va. 280,
292 (2003) (holding that employee did not
breach his duciary duty of loyalty to his
employer when he accepted employment
with a competitor; and, thus did not act
with legal malice); Xtreme 4x4 Ctr., Inc .v.
Howery, 65 Va. Cir. 469, 475 (Roanoke Cty.
2004) (holding that alleged defamatory
statements were merely matters of opinion,
therefore, legal malice standard was not
met); Feddeman & Co. v. Langan Assoc.,
260 Va. 35, 45 (2000) (where court held
that “the failure of legal justication ‘may
include a breach of [one’s] duciary duty
or assisting someone to breach their du-
ciary duty.’”); Int’l Paper Co. v. Brooks, 63
Va. Cir. 494, 496-97 (Roanoke Cty. 2003)
(holding that ‘for IPC’s business conspir-
acy claims to survive, they must provide
enough core facts to support the inference
that Brooks acted with the requisite legal
malice”); Atlas Partners II v. Brumberg,
Mackey & Wall, PLC, No. 4:05cv0001, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 983, at *25 (W.D. Va. Jan.
6, 2006) (stating “that damaging plaintis
may not have been their primary purpose
is immaterial under Virginia law.”).
60 R & D 2001, L.L.C. v. Collins, CL-2005-
7021, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 131, at *8-9
(Fairfax Cnty. 2006) (quoting Hechler
Chevrolet v. General Motors Corp., 230
Va. 396, 402, 337 S.E.2d 744 (1985));
Commercial Roong & Sheet Metal Co. v.
Gardner Eng’s, Inc., 60 Va. Cir. 384, 386
(Fairfax Cnty. 2002) (sustaining defen-
dant’s demurrer to statutory conspiracy
claim because plainti failed to allege an
unlawful act or an unlawful purpose);
Station #2, LLC v. Lynch, Case No. CL06-
6106, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 41, at *14
(Norfolk Cty. April 30, 2008) (sustaining
demurrer to § 18.2-499 count as plainti
did not make allegations suggesting that
defendant used any illegal means); Dunlap
v. Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC, 287 Va.
207, 215 (2014).
61 Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 319, 585
S.E.2d 780, 784 (2003) (a case where
a former school board member led a
civil conspiracy charge against the local
prosecutor and county building inspec-
tor aer the latter two sought criminal
charges against him). e court did so
based on the origin of those sections in the
antitrust statutes and based on principles
of statutory construction, which it applied
to construe “reputation” in light of “trade,
business or profession.” Id.
62 See Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1259
(4th Cir. 1985) (agreeing with the federal
district courts, which “have consistently
held that a right of action is ‘aorded
[under these statutes] only when malicious
conduct is directed at one’s business, not
one’s person,’ and that the statute ‘focuses
upon conduct directed at property, i.e.,
one’s business’ and applies only to ‘conspir-
acies resulting in business-related damag-
es.’”); see also Inman v. Klockner-Pentaplast
of Am., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 642, 654 (W.D.
Va. 2006) (holding, in a former employee
vs. former employer case, that “Plainti’s
professional reputation and stock own-
ership in his own company, however,
are employment interests, not business
interests. A plethora of cases reveal that
employment interests are not covered by
the Virginia civil conspiracy statutes.”);
Warner v. Buck Creek Nursery, Inc., 149 F.
Supp. 2d 246, 267 (W.D. Va. 2001) (also
a former employee vs. former employer
case, stating that “In order to state a claim
under Section 18.2-499, courts have held
that the conspiracy must be one to injure
the plainti ‘in his business.’”); Picture
Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 863-64 (E.D. Va.
1980) (stating that “[t]he purpose of this
statutory action is to provide a remedy for
wrongful conduct directed towards one’s
business, including injury to one’s property
interest.”) (emphasis added); Campbell
v. Bd. of Supvrs., 553 F. Supp. 644, 645
(E.D. Va. 1982) (limiting claims under Va.
Code § 18.2-499 to conduct which limits a
“business” and not personal employment
interests); Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp.
434, 439 (E.D. Va. 1980) (ruling that a
plainti cannot recover under a statutory
business claim for harm to his person-
al reputation and not to any business
interest), rev’d on other grounds, 657 F.2d
45 (4th Cir. 1981); Moore v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 480 F. Supp. 364, 375 (E.D. Va. 1979)
(holding that “statutory coverage [under §
18.2-499] is aorded only when malicious
conduct is directed at one’s Business, not
one’s Person”); Loria v. Regelson, 39 Va. Cir.
536, 541 (Richmond Cty. 1996) (ruling that
“[n]o conspiracy exists under § 18.2-499
of the Code when damage to professional
reputation of an individual is alleged”).
63 Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 19 S.E.2d
84 (1942); see also Saks Fih Avenue, Inc.
v. James, Ltd., 272 Va. 177, 189-90, 630
S.E.2d (2006) (concluding that the plainti
failed to carry its burden of proof that the
defendants’ wrongful conduct proximately
caused plainti’s alleged damages); see
Dunlap v. Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC,
287 Va. 207, 215 (2014).
64 Va. Code § 18.2-500(A); Lynnwood Tech
Holdings LLC v. NR INT. LLC, 2017 Va.
Cir. LEXIS 52, *169 (where the court held
that expected or projected prots are not a
reasonable basis to estimate damages).
65 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998).
66 Id. at 124, 501 S.E.2d at 159; see also
Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, 266 Va.
558, 561 (2003) (ruling that court did not
err in awarding plainti treble and punitive
damages).
67 Jordan v. Hudson, 690 F. Supp. 502, 508
(E.D. Va. 1998), a ’d, 879 F.2d 98 (4th Cir.
1998) (ruling that postmaster’s statutory
business claim should be dismissed as
a matter of law because he alleged his
co-workers conspired to injure him in his
trade and reputation, which caused him to
be demoted. e section does not apply to
employment interests); Inman v. Klockner-
Pentaplast of Am., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d
642, 654 (W.D. Va. 2006) (ruling that the
employee failed to state a claim under the
statute because his professional reputation
and stock ownership in the company, were
employment interests and not business
interests); Warner v. Buck Creek Nursery,
Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 246, 267-68 (W.D. Va.
2001) (holding that to the extent a plainti
attempts to base his claim for conspiracy
to his personal reputation or employment,
as opposed to business interests, he fails to
state a claim); Orantes v. Pollo Ranchero,
Inc., 70 Va. Cir. 277, 281 (Fairfax Cnty.
2006) (holding that statute applies only to
“conspiracies resulting in business related
damages”); Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68,
81(2007) (no cause of action for con-
spiracy to intentionally inict emotional
distress); but see Fitzgerald v. Farrell, 63 Va.
Cir. 1, 4 (Loudoun Cnty. 2003) (concluding
that police ocer’s business conspiracy
claim survives a demurrer where his claim
that two homebuyers and homeowner
conspired to have him indicted because
they were unhappy with the work he did
on their houses as a private contractor was
an injury to his reputation or profession);
Hunter v. Simpson, 93 Va. Cir. 366, 369
(Henrico Cnty. 2016)
68 Va. Code § 18.2-500(B).
69 Kent Sinclair & Leigh B. Middleditch, Jr.,
Virginia Civil Procedure, § 2.26 (4th ed.
2003).
70 Dove v. Dayton Town Council, 39 Va. Cir.
159, 169 (Rockingham Cnty. 1996).
71 Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616,
623, 499 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1998).
72 Virginia Civil Procedure § 2.26 (4th ed.
2003) (quoting Luckett v. Jennings, 246
Va. 303, 307, 435 S.E.2d 400, 402 (stating
that “the trial court is required to consider
as true all material facts that are properly
alleged, facts which are impliedly alleged,
facts which may be fairly and justly in-
ferred from the facts alleged”).
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51
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deponent’s, but the deponent will nev-
er leave your monitor if the deponent
is pinned.
e deposing attorney should
incorporate the conference technician
into the deposition plan. First, instruct
the conference technician to pull up
the exact part of the document that
you would like to discuss. e depo-
nent may look at the documents in
hard copy or a separate window, but
this method will help everyone locate
the language under scrutiny. Second,
make sure that the documents are
clearly labeled and organized so the
conference technician can nd them.
Finally, if needed, direct the confer-
ence technician to point to or high-
light specic text or sections of the
document. e conference technician
can highlight or draw boxes around
segments you would like to discuss.
Finally, make sure that the de-
ponent testies on the record about
any individuals that are in the room
with the deponent, the nature of
any documents referenced, and any
communications received during the
deposition. In an in-person deposition,
the attorneys normally have complete
control over who is in the room, what
documents are brought into the room,
and any communications the depo-
nent receives during the on-the-record
portion of the deposition. In contrast,
in a virtual deposition, another person
might be in the room but out of cam-
era view. Similarly, the deponent could
be prompted by email or text mes-
sage without the deposing attorney’s
knowledge.
is can be mitigated by requesting
the deponent to declare on the record:
who is in the room during the deposi-
tion; that the deponent did not receive
any communications during the depo-
sition; and to identify all documents
examined in response to questions.
Conclusion
Virtual depositions can be a useful tool
to keep discovery moving forward de-
spite the numerous disruptions caused
by COVID-19. Additionally, the tech-
niques developed during COVID-19
social distancing may be useful time
and cost-saving measures well aer
the pandemic subsides. Adapting this
guide to your own practice can help
mitigate diculties and maximize the
benets of virtual depositions. q
73 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330
F. Supp. 2d 700, 706 (E.D. Va. 2004); see
also Casola, Francis H., Virginia Business
Torts, Chapter 8, Conspiracy to Injure a
Business (VaCLE 2006); Bay Tobacco, LLC
v. Bell Quality Tobacco Prods., 261 F. Supp.
2d 483, 499 (E.D. Va. 2003) (noting that a
claim for conspiracy asserted in mere con-
clusory language “is based on inferences
that are not fairly or justly drawn from
the facts alleged”); Heard Constr., Inc. v.
Waterfront Marine Constr. Co., 91 Va. Cir.
4, 10 (Chesapeake Cty. 2015).
74 Kayes v. Keyser, 72 Va. Cir. 549, 552
(Charlottesville Cty. 2007) (quoting
Atlantic Futon v. Tempur-Pedic, Inc., 67 Va.
Cir. 269, 271 (Charlottesville Cty. 2005));
see also M-Cam v. D’Agostino, No. 3:05cv6,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45289, at * 7-8 (W.D.
Va. Sept. 1, 2005) (observing that a plain-
ti ’s allegation that the defendants com-
bined together to eect a “preconceived
plan and unity of design and purpose, for
the common design is the essence of the
conspiracy”).
75 Kayes, 72 Va. Cir. at 552 (quoting Johnson
v. Kaugers, 14 Va. Cir. 172, 177 (Richmond
Cty. 1988)); see also Corinthian Mort.
Corp. v. Choicepoint Precision Mkt, LLC,
No. 1:07cv832, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28129, at * 18-19 (E.D. Va. April 4, 2008)
(requiring a plainti asserting a statutory
business conspiracy claim to allege that
defendant intentionally and purposefully
injured plainti ’s business).
76 Kayes, 72 Va. Cir. at 552; Firestone v. Wiley,
485 F. Supp. 2d 694, 703 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(stating a claimant must allege “some
details of time and place and the alleged ef-
fect of the conspiracy”); Harper Hardware
Co. v. Power Fasteners, Inc., Civil Action
No. 3:05cv799, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3821,
at *15 (E.D. Va. Jan. 19, 2006) (nding a
plainti ’s conclusory allegations that did
not detail the facts relating to the “method
of the alleged conspiracy or how it was
carried out” to be insucient).
77 Schlegel, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 325-26 (quoting
Gov’t Employees. Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp.
2d at 706 (E.D. Va. 2004)); First Hand
Communications, LLC v. Schwalbach, Civil
Action No. 1:05cv1281, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87844, at *15 (E.D. Va. 2006) (an
allegation that the parties were “working
together in a scheme” is not enough to
survive a motion to dismiss); but see
Country Vintner, Inc. v. Louis Latour, Inc.,
272 Va. 402, 414-15, 634 S.E.2d 745, 752
(2006) (rejecting defendant’s argument that
plainti was merely dressing up a violation
of the Wine Franchise Act in reversing trial
court’s decision that the Act preempted
common law or statutory business conspir-
acy claims).
78 See Eshbaugh v. Amoco Oil Co., 234 Va.
74, 76-77, 360 S.E.2d 350, 351 (1987) (a
cause of action for conspiracy under Code
§ 18.2-500 accrues when one is “injured in
his . . . business.”); see also Gallop v. Sharp,
179 Va. 335, 338, 19 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1942)
(cause of action for conspiracy accrues
when the acts committed in furtherance
of the conspiracy result in damage); Lance
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 99 Va. Cir. 115,
117 (Chesapeake Cty. 2018).
79 Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, 262 Va. 473,
482, 551 S.E.2d 596, 600 (2001). Dunlap v.
Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC, 287 Va.
207, 221-222 (2014)
80 Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va.
534, 541, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985); Foster
v. Wintergreen Real Estate Co., 81 Va. Cir.
353, 360-61 (Nelson Cnty. 2010).
81 Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 578-79,
544 S.E.2d 666, 676-77 (2001); Fortress
Holdings II, LLC v. Patty, 95 Va. Cir. 402,
408-09 (Norfolk 2017).
82 Grayson Fin. Am., Inc. v. Arch Specialty Ins.
Co., No. 2:05cv461, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7302, at *9-10 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2006);
Phoenix Redevelopment Corp. v. Rodriguez,
403 F. Supp. 2d 510, 517 (E.D. Va. 2005)
(nding the intracorporate immunity
doctrine inapplicable when the defendant
was not an employee and agent at the time
of the wrongful conduct).
Virtual Depositions continued from page 21