How Technology Changed the NBA
In 2014, Steve Kerr took over as the head coach for the Golden State Warriors (“Steve
Kerr”). Prior to his coaching career, Kerr was known for being a deadly three-point shooter and
famously knocking down the game-winning jump shot in the 1997 NBA Finals to clinch the fifth
championship for teammate Michael Jordan (“Steve Kerr”). Kerr holds the record for best career
three-point percentage in NBA history (“Basketball Statistics”). So, what happened when the
most potent three-point shooter in league history took over as a head coach? His Golden State
Warriors won more games in a three-year span (2014-2016) than any other team in NBA history,
while claiming two championships along the way (Young). Led by Kerr’s philosophy, they
attempted more three-point shots during those three years than any other team in league history
(“Basketball Statistics”). The Warriors’ success has caused many teams to mimic their strategy,
putting up record numbers of three-point shots. During the 2016-2017 season, NBA teams shot
twenty seven three-pointers per game--a number that has increased by almost ten shots in the last
five years and is the highest in league history (“Basketball Statistics”). However, as Toronto
Raptors’ head coach Dwane Casey notes, teams can shoot as many 3s as you’d like, but if you
don’t make them, that philosophy goes out the window” (“Lights, Cameras, Revolution”). What
if I told you that it is improved technology in basketball that has resulted in players shooting
more three-pointers than ever before? But, this technology has done more than just increase the
number of three-point attempts. The advancement of technology in basketball has resulted in a
massive influx of three-point shots, having a cascading effect on other aspects of the NBA,
changing how the game is played and coached.
The Technology
How is it that technology is able to affect such a simple game? Video technology and
player-location tracking data allows shooting technique to be broken down like never before.
College and NBA programs have the technology to use video to track shooting calculations such
as the shooter’s elbow angle, the shooter’s release point and time, the velocity of the ball leaving
the hand, the rotation of the ball, the trajectory of the shot, and the height of the player’s jump
while he shoots (McCann). One specific video and tracking program is SportVU, originally
created for military missile tracking and is now available to every NBA team (Plafke). SportVU
uses cameras synched with complex algorithms to track the x, y, and z positioning data for all
eleven objects on the court-the five players on each team and the ball (McCann). With this data,
the player’s shot can be broken down piece by piece, seeing what works and what does nott. For
example, a player can look at the height of his jump on made shots verses missed shots, and
adjust his form accordingly. Chelsy Ranard notes that technology offers “a mirrored look back
that makes coaches able to show players a reference for what they need from them that has
revolutionized training” (Technology Changing Coaching”). While there is no perfect” shot
form, shooting coaches can use of all this information to determine the most effective shooting
style for each player. For example, the average NBA player releases his shot with a 45-degree
trajectory, while Stephen Curry releases his shot between 50 and 55 degrees (“Sport Science:
Stephen Curry”). Standing five inches below the league average, Curry adjusted his shot
trajectory when he entered the league in an effort to more effectively get his shot off while being
guarded by taller defenders (Sport Science: Stephen Curry”). With advanced video and tracking
technology, it is easy to notice flaws in technique and inconsistencies in form, enabling today’s
NBA player to fine-tune his jump shot more thoroughly than ever before.
While high-tech video analysis and position tracking such as SportVU is only available at
the college and professional levels, there is a free app on the App Store that allows coaches to
view and critique video sent in by their players (“Ubersense”). The app is called Hudl Technique
by Ubersense, Inc., and it is used by middle and high school coaches around the nation to assist
individual players with their form and technique (“Ubersense”). All the player has to do is record
himself shooting several jump shots and send the coach the video clip via the app. The coach is
then able to view the jump shot in slow motion, using drawing tools and audio recording to
evaluate the player’s technique. The coach can send the edited video, complete with instructive
markings and the audio recording of the coachs evaluation and pointers, back to the player.
Panopto, a video platform for universities, says that due to “recent improvements in video
technology… it (is) easier and more affordable than ever for just about any coaching staff to
show specific moments and movements where players may be able to improve(“Athletics
Departments Use Video to Help Athletes”). At every level of the game, basketball players are
benefitting from video technology to receive improved jump shot training.
Another piece of technology that is changing basketball is the automated rebounding
machine. These machines consist of a large net surrounding the basket to catch rebounds,
draining the balls into an electric passing machine that launches the ball back to the player. Not
only does this enable the player to shoot endlessly without having to chase rebounds, but the
rebounding nets force the shooter to put proper arc on the shot (“The Gun 10K”). The machine
can be set to pass the ball back to the same spot or multiple spots. The most prevalent of these
machines is The Gun by Shoot-a-way (“The Gun 10K”). The Gun boasts that a player can shoot
up to 1,800 shots in one hour
using the machine (“The
Gun 10K”). Shoot-a-way
also has an app that records
and stores data from each
shooting zone on the court.
These machines are seen in
almost every high school,
college, and NBA gym
across the United States.
When I played high school
basketball, I would come to
the gym in the morning
before school and use The Gun. I could put up hundreds of shots without the assistance of
another player or a coach. In just three months, I saw my three-point make percentage increase
by a drastic 10%. Micah Mason, from Duquesne College, grew up shooting with The Gun in his
backyard (College Basketball’s Best Shooter”). After years of shooting and thousands upon
thousands of shots, Mason proved himself the best three-point shooter in the nation from 2013-
2015 (“College Basketball’s Best Shooter”). Mason made 46.35% of his career three-point
attempts, the fourth best percentage in NCAA history (“Basketball Statistics”). Rebounding
machines assist shooters in putting up vastly more shots in a workout than previously possible.
Analytics is the systematic computational analysis of data or statistics (Beyond
‘Moneyball’”). With the increase in technology in the last ten years, analytics have found a large
role in sports (Shea). Experts Benjamin Alamar and Vijay Nehrotra define sports analytics as
the management of structured historical data, the application of predictive analytic models that
utilize that data, and the use of information systems to inform decision makers and enable them
to help their organizations in gaining a competitive advantage on the field of play(“Beyond
‘Moneyball’”). With new spatial tracking technology like SportVU, more analytical data is
available than ever before (McCann). SportVU can record data such as shooting percentages at
different areas around the three-point arc, shooting percentages off the dribble versus off the
pass, and the average distance between the shooter and the defender (McCann). Analytics rely on
efficiency to gain a competitive edge, and when it comes to scoring, that means finding the most
effective way to score as many points as possible (Shea). So, what are the most efficient shots on
the court? The mathematical answer seems easy-three points are more than two. However, it isn’t
quite that simple. The further a player is from the basket, the smaller the chance the ball has to
go in, thus making shots under the basket most successful and three-pointers least successful.
Does the extra point make up for the smaller likelihood of making a three-point shot? If a team
attempted the same number of each shot, the team can make just 33% of their three-pointers and
score the same number of points as they would if they made 50% from the two-point area (Lenz).
Since 1980, NBA players have made approximately 48% of their two-point shots, meaning that
two-pointers result in roughly 0.96 point per attempted shot (Denton). In each year since 1995,
the NBA league-wide shooting percentage from three-point range has exceeded 33%,
analytically giving three-pointers more value per attempt and thus making them the more
efficient shot (Denton). Wade McCagh argues that “it took the most advanced spatial tracking
technology we've seen in sports to reveal a simple truth: 3 points are more than 2” (“Spatial
Analytics”). Within the last ten years, the emergence of technology capable of recording
complex analytical data has resulted in teams shifting towards a more analytic-based strategy, for
both in-game and personnel decisions.
The Technology Effect
From 1950 to 1978, the three-point line did not exist in the NBA (The History of the 3-
Pointer”). The game was played under the basket, controlled by the game’s tallest players.
During the twenty-three NBA seasons in which the three-point line did not exist and an MVP
was awarded, twenty-one of the twenty-three league MVP awards were given to a player who
was at least 6’7” and played either the center or the power forward position (“Basketball
Statistics”). The game was dominated by 6'10” Bill Russell, 7'1” Wilt Chamberlain, and 7'2”
Kareem Abdul-Jabar (Disappearance Of Traditional NBA Big Man”). These players combined
to win nineteen NBA championships and fifteen MVP awards (“Basketball Statistics”). Prior to
the 1979 season, the NBA made the decision to institute the three-point arc (“The History of the
3-Pointer”). It was not welcomed warmly, with many people considering it a “gimmick” and not
real basketball (Mather). In fact, John MacLeod, head coach of the Phoenix Suns at the time,
said, “I’m not going to set up plays for guys to bomb from 23 feet. I think that’s very boring
basketball” (Gimmick to Game Changer”). In the first season of the three pointer, NBA teams
shot only 2.8 threes per game (“Basketball Statistics”). It was not until 1994, fifteen years after
the inaugural season, that the league-wide number of three-point attempts per game reached
double digits (“Basketball Statistics”). Coaches did not put a strong emphasis on three-pointers,
and players struggled to shoot the long ball successfully (Hersch, Galileo). Three-pointers were
only taken if they were wide open or in late game situations. However, the 2000s rolled around
and the three-ball, led by sharp shooters Ray Allen and Steve Nash, was gaining momentum
(Denton). But still, the majority of the league could only make around 30% of their shots from
deep, making the the shot inefficient and mostly ineffective (“Basketball Statistics”).
Basketball trainer Rich Stoner emphasizes consistency and repetition as the two most
important keys to shooting a basketball (Basketball Training”). The first rebounding machine
that could pass the ball back to the shooter was released in 1999 (“The Gun 10K”). Rebounding
machines made it possible for NBA players to get more shooting repetitions than ever before,
branding the muscle memory into their brains (“The Gun 10K”). Not only were players getting
more repetitions than ever before, but with the use of video technology, they were able to review
and analyze their shots, ensuring that their form was consistent (Ranard). The technology of the
2000s brought players the ability to train more efficiently than previously possible. Repetitions
increased, consistency grew, and subsequently, the three-pointer was shot more accurately. From
2003 to 2008, the league-wide three-point success rate increased each year, reaching a new
league record in 2008 at 36.7% (“Basketball Statistics”). All seven of the leagues highest three-
point shooting percentage seasons occurred after 2007 (“Basketball Statistics”). With the use of
technology in shot training, the NBA began shooting the three-pointer more accurately than ever
before.
In 2009, SportVU was first used in the NBA, but only by four teams (McCann). When
SportVU was put to use, it revealed that with NBA players improved shooting percentage, the
three-point shot was analytically more efficient than a two (Lowe). While some teams valued
analytics more than others, the Golden State Warriors bought in all the way, drafting three-point
shooters Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson (Wagner). By the start of the 2012 season, SportVU
was installed in all thirty NBA arenas (McCann). For the first time in NBA history, the league
reached 20.0 three-point attempts per game in the 2012 season (“Basketball Statistics”). In 2014,
the Warriors took the league by storm, embracing the analytical philosophy of coach Steve Kerr
and shooting 27.0 three-pointers per game on the way to their first NBA championship (“Steve
Kerr”). In 2016, league-wide three-point attempts per game skyrocketed to 27.0 (“Basketball
Statistics”). From 2011 to 2016, the NBA’s average number of three-point attempts per game
increased by an astonishing nine shots (“Basketball Statistics”). The league’s three-point records
have been obliterated each of the last six seasons. The NBA is changed. The big man no longer
reigns supreme; it is a shooter’s league. The best teams in the league shoot and make the most
three-pointers. Technological innovations have resulted in players shooting more accurately than
ever before, and as analytical data is revealed, coaches are instructing their players to keep
letting the long ball fly. Technology is changing more than just the number of three-pointers
attempted and made, as an increased number of threes has a cascading affect and has changed
other parts of the NBA game.
The Changes
With NBA players shooting and making three-pointers at a historic rate, advanced
analytics have determined that the mid-range jumper is the least efficient shot in the game,
causing mid-range shot attempts to plummet. With the increased threat of three-pointers,
defenses are forced to defend the perimeter tighter than ever before, allowing space for open
drives to the basket (Hersch, Galileo). The offensive player’s goal is to either shoot a three-
pointer or beat his defender to the basket. A mid-range jumper is a jump shot taken between the
paint and the three-point line, usually between 16 and 23 feet (McCagh). The league averages
roughly 38% on shots taken in the mid-range area, while connecting on 35% of shots from three
land (Death of Mid-Range). No player wants to attempt a two-point shot that has nearly the
same likelihood of scoring as a three-point shot that is just a few steps further back. Analytical
calculations have deemed the mid-range shot as the least efficient shot on the floor, while layups
and threes are the most efficient (McCagh). Since 2009, the league-wide number of mid-range
jumpers has dropped each year, while three-point attempts and makes have increased each year
(Young). Grantland shows a shot chart for Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson from the 2014-
2015 season, with larger dots showing more frequency, red dots being the most efficient, and
blue dots being the least efficient. The Splash Brothers almost completely eliminated mid-range
shots from their game on their way to an NBA title, as three-pointers and layups proved to be
more efficient. By posing a greater threat from the three-point line, offenses are able to space out
the defense, increasing the number of three-point shots and layups, while minimizing the
analytically-inefficient mid-range jumpers.
Video technology, rebounding machines, and complex analytics have driven the
traditional NBA big man into extinction. Before NBA players were able to shoot the three-
pointer with enough accuracy to make it a dangerous threat, the game was played inside-out
(“Disappearance of Traditional NBA Big Man”). This means that the team’s first priority was to
pound the ball inside to their big man. The center played with his back to the basket, and
specialized in post moves such as the drop step or jump hook (Kier). The traditional NBA center
could be described as tall, bulky, and lumbering, while grabbing rebounds and guarding the rim.
But, three-point success has changed how offenses attack. In today’s NBA, teams space the floor
as much as possible around the three-point arc, forcing big men to come out and play perimeter
defense and giving them fewer interior scoring opportunities on offense (Disappearance Of
Traditional NBA Big Man”). As a result of this changing playing style, centers are seeing a
decrease in value and playing time. In 2016, only nine centers averaged more than thirty minutes
played per game, compared to twenty-one point guards (“Basketball Statistics”). The Warriors
have won two NBA championships by spacing the floor and playing “small-ball” without a
traditional center (Big Men”). Kevin O’Connor predicts that “as more teams copy the Warriors'
style of play, we'll see more teams going small” (“Big Men”). The last center to win the MVP
award was Tim Duncan in 2003 (“Basketball Statistics”). It has been years since the NBA has
seen a dominant traditional center. Memories of big men controlling the court are just that-
memories. Spencer Kier credits diminishing dominant post play “to the clear advantages that
athleticism has over opposing post presences, as an overwhelming amount of speed and
explosiveness is beginning to trump dominance in the paint(Death of the Traditional Big
Man”). Many teams are instead valuing more athletic power forwards, such as Anthony Davis,
Giannis Antetokounmpo, and Kristaps Porzingis, who have the ability to space and the floor,
handle the ball, and shoot from three (“Disappearance Of Traditional NBA Big Man”). Three-
point shooting success has completely shifted the center position from the focal point of the
offense to an undervalued afterthought, resulting in the disappearance of the traditional NBA big
man.
The technology innovations that have resulted in a massive influx of three-pointers into
the NBA game have made it possible for players without dominating athletic ability to dictate the
game, affecting how teams make game-time and personnel decisions. The league’s best team
entering the 2017 season is the Golden State Warriors, led by Splash Brothers” Stephen Currry
and Klay Thomson (“Steve Kerr). Curry, two time MVP and one of the most prolific shooters
of all time, owns the top three spots in the record book for three pointers made in a season
(“Basketball Statistics”). However, when he was coming out of Davidson College, NBA scouts
expressed that Curry was “far below (the) NBA standard in regard to explosiveness and
athleticism” and that “due to his size and physical attributes… he's not a natural point guard that
an NBA team can rely on to run a team” (Stephen Curry-NBADraft”). Golden State, one of the
earliest proponents of analytics, chose to draft Curry for the weapon that his three-point shooting
accuracy provided (Powell). A player’s three-point shooting ability now affects all team decision
making, from drafting to signing free agents to in-game decisions (Lowe). Prior to the three-
point revolution, NBA teams traditionally attempted to win with superior athleticism and
physicality, but Hank Hersch recognizes that the ability to shoot, a trait that for a time seemed
to rank third behind quickness and power, has become a much more valued commodity”
(Galileo). While much of basketball is dictated by athleticism, if a player can consistently make
three-pointers, no matter what their physical ability may be, they can be effective. This has made
way for a new type of player: the three-point specialist. These are players who are usually only
on the court to shoot threes, while they may be a liability in other aspects of the game
(“Basketball Statistics”). Three-point specialists such as Kyle Korver, JJ Redick, and Danny
Green lack the athleticism that much of the NBA has, but have been great contributors to their
teams by way of the long ball (Basketball Statistics”). For example, Korver stands at 6’7” but
has dunked merely twenty-four times during his fifteen-year NBA career, as he spends the
majority of his time on the court prowling around the three-point arc (Martin). The increase in
the use of technology in basketball has changed how teams evaluate talent, forcing owners and
coaches to decide whether to value size, athleticism, or shooting ability more when making
personnel decisions. Modern basketball analytics are resulting in coaches valuing three-point
shooting ability now more than they did fifteen to twenty-five years ago.
The Summary
Technology has completely changed the way the NBA game is played. With video
technology and rebounding machines, players are better three-point shooters than ever before
(“Technology Impacting Future of Basketball”). As players’ shots have improved, analytical
calculations suggest taking more three-pointers (McCagh). These factors have resulted in
coaches instructing players to shoot threes at incredibly high rates. The increased volume of
three-point attempts and the players’ improved accuracy has subsequently had a cascading effect
on other phases of the game. The number of mid-range jump shots is being minimized, as players
aim to shoot the analytically more efficient shots from three or near the basket (Death of Mid-
Range). Due to the spaced floor, the traditional NBA center is no longer the centerpiece of the
game, but rather has been diminished to a shadow of the position’s former usage and value. The
three-point shot has introduced the ability of players to be pivotal to their team without
dominating athleticism, and has changed how teams and coaches assess talent. The NBA is a
very different league than it was twenty to thirty years ago, all stemming from the technological
innovations that have enabled players to shoot more accurately from three-point land than ever
before. The message to the NBA is clear: get with the three ball or get out, because the game has
changed.
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