Minnesota’s Forfeiture Laws
Minnesota House Research Department Page 14
fines” when its value is disproportionate to the seriousness of criminal activity on which it is
based.
In 1993, the Court ruled that there are constitutional limits on the value of property that may
be subject to either criminal in personam or civil in rem forfeiture due to its having been used to
commit or facilitate the commission of a crime. Regardless of whether the forfeiture provision
is characterized as a criminal penalty (like the racketeering forfeiture provision) or as a civil
remedial remedy (like the general forfeiture law), its purpose in both contexts is to serve as a
penalty for criminal behavior and, as such, it is subject to the limitations imposed by the
“Excessive Fines Clause” of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court,
therefore, remanded both cases to the courts of appeal from which they came, with
instructions to determine whether the forfeitures in the two cases were unconstitutionally
excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993);
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
In the Austin and Alexander cases, the Court declined to articulate an analytical, constitutional
test for determining whether a particular fine or forfeiture is excessive, leaving that task to the
lower courts. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia indicated some sympathy for a more
relaxed “excessiveness” inquiry in civil forfeiture cases than in criminal ones; but the majority
opinion declined to endorse his analysis or otherwise influence the future decisions of the
lower courts on this matter.
In 1998, the Court ruled for the first time that the government’s forfeiture of a particular sum
of money in an in personam forfeiture proceeding did, in fact, violate the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment.
In this case, the government forfeited $357,144 from the defendant because he had unlawfully
failed to report to customs officials that he was carrying the money at the time he boarded an
international flight. The Court ruled, in a 5-4 decision, that because the defendant’s offense was
“solely a reporting offense” and involved minimal culpability or harm, the forfeiture of this
large sum of currency was unconstitutional because it was “grossly disproportional” to the
gravity of the offense. This “grossly disproportional” standard, the Court stated, is the proper
one to use in deciding excessive fine inquiries under the Eighth Amendment because it gives
adequate deference to legislative judgments concerning the appropriate level of punishment,
and it recognizes the “inherent imprecision” of any judicial determination regarding the gravity
of particular criminal offenses. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
More recently, the court concluded that the Eighth Amendment applies to state forfeiture
actions. In Timbs v. Indiana, 1395 S.Ct. 682 (2019), the defendant was convicted of selling
heroin. The police seized a vehicle worth $42,000, claiming that it had been used to transport
the heroin. It was undisputed that Timbs used money he received from an insurance policy to
purchase the vehicle. The Indiana Supreme Court had concluded that the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive fines did not apply to the state. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed that
decision, finding that the prohibition does apply to forfeiture actions taken by a state. The court
did not decide the question of whether this particular forfeiture was excessive. Instead, the
court sent the case back to Indiana state courts for further action.